MOUN KEODALAH and AUNG KEODALAH, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, and TRACEY SMITH and JOHN DOE SMITH, husband and wife, Defendants-Petitioners.
No. 95867-0
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
OCT 03 2019
MADSEN, J.
En Banc
FACTS
While driving his truck, Moun Keodalah and an uninsured motorcyclist collided in April 2007. After Keodalah stopped at a stop sign and began to cross the street, the motorcyclist struck Keodalah‘s truck. The collision killed the motorcyclist and injured Keodalah. Keodalah carried auto insurance with Allstate Insurance Company that included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.
The Seattle Police Department (SPD) investigated the collision and determined that the motorcyclist was traveling between 70 and 74 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone. SPD also reviewed Keodalah‘s cell phone records, which showed that Keodalah was not using his cell phone at the time of the collision.
Allstate also investigated the collision, interviewing several witnesses who said the motorcyclist was traveling faster than the speed limit, had proceeded between cars in both lanes, and had sped into the intersection. Allstate hired an accident reconstruction firm, Traffic Collision Analysis Inc. (TCA), to analyze the collision. TCA found that Keodalah stopped at the stop sign, the motorcyclist was traveling at a minimum of 60 m.p.h., and the motorcyclist‘s excessive speed caused the collision.
Keodalah asked Allstate to pay him his UIM policy limit of $25,000. Allstate refused, offering $1
Keodalah sued Allstate, asserting a UIM claim. Allstate designated claims adjuster Tracey Smith as its
both the SPD report and TCA analysis, Smith claimed that Keodalah had run the stop sign and had been on his cell phone. Smith later admitted, however, that Keodalah had not run the stop sign and had not been on his cell phone. Before trial, Allstate offered Keodalah $15,000 to settle the claim. Keodalah again requested the $25,000 policy limit, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, Allstate contended that Keodalah was 70 percent at fault. The jury determined the motorcyclist to be 100 percent at fault and awarded Keodalah $108,868.20 for his injuries, lost wages, and medical expenses. The trial court entered judgment against Allstate for $25,302.95.
Keodalah filed a second lawsuit against Allstate and included claims against Smith. These included alleged violations of the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA),
The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review of three issues: (1) whether IFCA creates a private cause of action for violation of a regulation, (2) whether an individual insurance adjuster may be liable for bad faith, and (3) whether an individual
insurance adjuster may be liable for violation of the CPA. The Court of Appeals held that this court‘s decision in Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 187 Wn.2d 669, 672, 389 P.3d 476 (2017), which held that the IFCA does not create an independent private cause of action for violation of a regulation, foreclosed Keodalah‘s IFCA claim.3
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
This court applies de novo review to questions concerning statutory interpretation and dismissal under
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015)); see also G-P Gypsum Corp. v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 169 Wn.2d 304, 310, 237 P.3d 256 (2010) (“enacted statement of legislative purpose is included in a plain reading of a statute“). As this court opined in Evergreen Freedom Foundation,
“The meaning of words in a statute is not gleaned from [the] words alone but from all the terms and provisions of the act in relation to the subject of the legislation, the nature of the act, the general object to be accomplished and consequences that would result from construing the particular statute in one way or another.”
192 Wn.2d at 790 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burns v. City of Seattle, 161 Wn.2d 129, 146, 164 P.3d 475 (2007)); see also id. (citing Dep‘t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002), for the proposition that “plain meaning” is “discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question“).
Under
The Court of Appeals’ decision turned on the statutory duty it found in
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, their providers, and their representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of insurance.
Keodalah echoes the Court of Appeals, arguing that by imposing a duty on “all persons” to act in good faith, the plain language of the statute subjects employee adjusters to bad faith and CPA claims premised on breach of the noted statutory duty.
Smith argues that not every duty imposed by a statute is an actionable tort, that
Bennett factors
The first Bennett factor (benefited class) is not met if the statute in question benefits the general public rather than an identifiable class of persons. As this court stated in Fisk v. City of Kirkland, 164 Wn.2d 891, 895, 194 P.3d 984 (2008), “Plaintiffs, basing their claims on a statute, must establish that they fall within the class of persons intended to be protected by that statute.” And “if the statute serves the general public welfare instead of an identifiable class of persons, then there is no duty to any individual unless a specific exception applies.” Id.; see also Protect the Peninsula‘s Future v. City of Port Angeles, 175 Wn. App. 201, 210, 304 P.3d 914 (2013) (because the legislature enacted the statute at issue “to protect the general public from risks posed by legend drugs,” complainant cannot qualify as a member of a “class for whose especial benefit” the legislation was enacted); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (noting that “the Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at large“).
Here, the interest addressed in
The second Bennett factor, regarding legislative intent to create a remedy, also concerns statutory interpretation. If the statute, read in the context of all the legislature has said on the subject, is plain on its face, we will give it that plain meaning. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11-12. But if after reading the statute in context, it remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. Id. at 12. Here,
As to the statutory context, we find it significant that the insurance code contains several specific enforcement mechanisms. The insurance commissioner has broad authority to make rules and conduct investigations to give effect to the insurance code.
(noting the ease with which the drafters could have expressed a private statutory cause of action, “we think that the omission implies the absence . . . of intent to create a private statutory cause of action“); see also Perez-Crisantos, 187 Wn.2d at 680 (where a statute specifically designates the things on which it operates, there is an inference that the legislature intended all omissions). Accordingly, the overall statutory context suggests that the legislature did not intend to imply a cause of action based on violations of
The historical context of this statute also bolsters this conclusion. An actionable common law duty of good faith had already been established when
The third Bennett factor concerns whether recognizing a cause of action would be consistent with the legislature‘s purpose in enacting
of action for insurance bad faith as a matter of policy. We acknowledge that in the abstract, recognition of an implied cause of action under
In sum, application of the Bennett factors does not support the imposition of an implied cause of action here. In light of
Keodalah alleged that adjuster Smith committed “per se CPA violations” by committing specific unfair claims settlement practices, as defined in the Washington Administrative Code (WAC), and by engaging in “bad-faith conduct.” Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 14. To establish a CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) an unfair
or deceptive act or practice that (2) affects trade or commerce and (3) impacts the public interest, and (4) the plaintiff sustained damage to business or property that was (5) caused by the unfair or deceptive act or practice. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 785-93, 719 P.2d 531 (1986); Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 183 Wn.2d 820, 834-35, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015). All five elements must be established for a CPA claim to be successful. Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 38, 204 P.3d 885 (2009). Certain elements of a CPA claim are deemed satisfied “per se” based on violation of another statute. The first two elements of a CPA claim are established where a statute declares that a violation is a per se unfair trade practice. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d at 786. The third element also may be established per se based on a showing that a statute has been violated that contains a specific legislative declaration of public interest impact. Id. at 791.
As for the WAC violations, Keodalah‘s complaint described alleged violations found in
Keodalah also repeats his reliance on
While
It is established that insureds may bring a private action against their insurers for breach of duty of good faith under the CPA. It is also established that breach of an insurer‘s duty of good faith constitutes a per se CPA violation. However, only an insured may bring a per se [CPA] action.
Id. at 394 (some emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Further, while this court has held that the CPA may apply although the plaintiff and defendant had no contract and were in an “adversarial relationship,” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 41-42, nevertheless, this court in Panag did not overrule Tank and its treatment of the statutory duty of good faith. Rather, it reiterated that “[o]nly an insured may bring a CPA claim for an insurer‘s breach of its statutory duty of good faith.” Id. at 43 n.6 (citing Tank). Although Keodalah, as the insured here, can sue Allstate, he cannot also sue Smith.7 Because Keodalah claims a breach of the duty of good faith by someone
outside the quasi-fiduciary relationship, his CPA claim based on
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that employee adjusters are not subject to personal liability for insurance bad faith or per se claims under the CPA. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court‘s
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pagni v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 173 Wash. 322, 349-50, 23 P.2d 6 (1933)); see also Annechino v. Worthy, 175 Wn.2d 630, 638, 290 P.3d 126 (2012) (agents are not personally liable for quasi-fiduciary duties that may arise when dealing on behalf of a disclosed principal where the agent does not independently owe a duty to the third party and does not knowingly make misrepresentations); Pain Diagnostics & Rehab. Assocs. v. Brockman, 97 Wn. App. 691, 697, 988 P.2d 972 (1999) (“In creating the insurance regulatory scheme, the Legislature and the insurance commissioner did not intend to provide protection or remedies for individual interests; they intended only to create a mechanism for regulating the insurance industry.“); Cogan v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 658, 663, 648 P.2d 875 (1982) (acknowledging the “unmitigated loyalty in the principal-agent relationship” and “an agent‘s absolute duty to his principal“); Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 72 Wn.2d 939, 956-58, 435 P.2d 936 (1967) (a principal who is under a duty to provide protection for others or their property and who confides the performance of such duty to a servant is subject to liability for harm caused to such others by the failure of the agent to perform the duty); Greene v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Wn.2d 569, 573, 320 P.2d 311 (1958) (test for determining if employee is acting in the course of his employment is whether the employee at the time was engaged in the performance of duties required of him by his contract of employment or by specific direction of his employer, or if he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer‘s interest).
Madsen, J.
WE CONCUR:
Johnson, J.
Wiggins, J.
Owens, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Keodalah v. Allstate Ins., No. 95867-0 (Yu, J., dissenting)
No. 95867-0
YU, J. (dissenting) — I agree with the majority that
ANALYSIS
A. A claims adjuster may be liable for per se CPA violations
The majority holds that Keodalah may not assert a per se CPA claim against Smith because ”
(applying the deeds of trust act,
Unlike Keodalah‘s bad faith claim against Smith, which I address below, his CPA claim does not require us to search for legislative intent to infer a statutory cause of action, nor must we weigh the implications of recognizing an actionable common law duty. The legislature‘s intent is clear because the CPA itself explicitly creates a cause of action,
Indeed, we have explicitly rejected the argument that “the CPA applies only to disputes arising from a consumer or business transaction and that only a consumer or someone in a business relationship can bring a private cause of action under the CPA.” Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 38, 204 P.3d 885 (2009). Unlike tort claims for insurance bad faith, the CPA “is not intended to satisfy ‘reasonable expectations’ of ‘quasi-fiduciary treatment.‘” Id. at 40. Instead, the purpose of the CPA “is to complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition,” and the CPA must be “liberally construed” to promote this purpose.
The majority holds otherwise by improperly analogizing Keodalah‘s CPA claim against Smith to a CPA claim brought by a third party against an insurer. Majority at 12-14. We have previously held that third parties “lack[ ] standing to allege a per se CPA violation based upon violation of the insurance code. Only an insured may bring a CPA claim for an insurer‘s breach of its statutory duty of good faith.” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 43 n.6 (citing Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,105 Wn.2d 381, 385, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986)). However, that is irrelevant because Keodalah is the insured; he unquestionably has standing.
The majority‘s reliance on Panag and Tank thus conflates a plaintiff‘s standing to sue with a defendant‘s capacity to be sued.
B. The court should address Keodalah‘s common law claim
Turning now to Keodalah‘s insurance bad faith claims against Smith, I agree with the majority that the legislature did not intend for
(emphasis added). In addition to his statutory claim, Keodalah raises a common law bad faith claim against Smith, which the trial court dismissed and which the Court of Appeals did not reach. This court should either decide whether Keodalah‘s complaint states a viable common law claim against Smith or remand for the Court of Appeals to do so. I would decide the issue here.
Keodalah‘s complaint raises both statutory and common law claims for insurance bad faith against Smith, claiming that her “actions and omissions alleged herein are in violation of
42 sec. through 23 min., 32 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State‘s Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org. Thus, Keodalah‘s common law claim is pleaded in his complaint, is within the scope of issues on which the Court of Appeals granted review, and has been fully briefed.
The fact that Keodalah cannot raise a statutory claim against Smith does not resolve the question of whether he can raise a common law claim. Whether an implied statutory cause of action exists is a question of statutory interpretation. Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 187 Wn.2d 669, 676, 389 P.3d 476 (2017). We therefore consider factors that clarify what the legislature intended. See Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920-21. Meanwhile, our recognition of common law causes of action depends on this court‘s consideration of “logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent, as applied to the facts of the case.” Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 186 Wn.2d 58, 65, 375 P.3d 651 (2016). Where both common law and statutory claims are raised, as they are here, each should be addressed independently.
The Court of Appeals ultimately did not reach the common law claim because it reversed the trial court‘s
I would address the viability of Keodalah‘s common law claim against Smith in this court because it is a matter of first impression that has been fully briefed and can be decided as a matter of law. At a minimum, however, the court should acknowledge that Keodalah raises a common law bad faith claim against Smith and remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that claim is viable.
C. The court should recognize an actionable common law duty of good faith owed by claims adjusters to the insured
Insurance bad faith claims “are analyzed applying the same principles as any other tort: duty, breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by any breach of duty.” Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 150 Wn.2d 478, 485, 78 P.3d 1274 (2003). At this stage of the proceedings, the parties dispute only the duty element: whether a claims adjuster employed by the insurer (Smith) owes an actionable duty of good faith to the insured (Keodalah).
“Whether an individual has a duty in the first instance is a question of law.” Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 185 Wn.2d 532, 548, 374 P.3d 121 (2016). “Duty may be predicated on violation of a statute or common law principles.” Bernethy v. Walt Failor‘s, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 929, 932, 653 P.2d 280 (1982). When considering common law duties, this court looks to “logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent, as applied to the facts of the case.” Centurion Props., 186 Wn.2d at 65.
While some precedent from other jurisdictions limits the common law duty of insurance good faith to the insurer itself, other precedent suggests that claims adjusters do owe the insured a common law duty of good faith as a matter of Washington law. Furthermore, logic, common sense, justice, and policy, as applied to the facts of this case, strongly support recognizing an actionable common law duty of good faith owed by claims adjusters to the insured. I would therefore recognize such a duty.
1. Relevant precedent is mixed
Although this court has never before considered whether a claims adjuster owes a common law duty of good faith to the insured, courts in other jurisdictions have done so. While a majority of other courts do not recognize such a duty, some of them do, and Washington precedent indicates that we should not follow the majority on this issue.
“[T]he majority of courts from other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have found that such an adjustor or investigator owes a duty only to the insurance company that hired it” and owes no common law duty to the insured. Akpan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc., 961 So. 2d 865, 873 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). These courts have generally taken the view that an insurer‘s duty of good faith is derived from its “unique relationship with the insured through the insurance contract.” Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Grp., Inc., 778 F.3d 635, 645 (7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the “duty of good faith arising under the contract does not extend to a person who is not a party to the insurance contract.” Charleston Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 355 S.C. 614, 618, 586 S.E.2d 586 (2003).
However, the majority position is not unanimous. Several states explicitly recognize some type of common law cause of action for bad faith against claims adjusters. For instance, Mississippi recognizes a common law duty for adjusters to refrain from “‘gross negligence, malice, or reckless disregard for the rights of the insured.‘” Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So. 2d 111, ¶ 25 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Bass v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Miss. 1991)). New Hampshire imposes a common law duty of good faith on insurers’ agents, and Alaska holds that insurers’
Cases applying Washington law indicate that our common law more closely aligns with these minority positions. Unlike in some other states, the common law duty of insurance good faith in Washington is not derived solely from the contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured. See Lodholtz, 778 F.3d at 645. When we first recognized the common law duty, we did not attach it to any contractual relationship, instead simply stating that “[o]f course, bad faith of appellant insurer in [investigating and settling a claim] would render the insurer liable.” Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of Newark, 10 Wn.2d 624, 631, 117 P.2d 644 (1941). We later elaborated that the duty of insurance good faith “exists not only as a result of the contract between insurer and insured, but because of the high stakes involved for both parties to an insurance contract and the elevated level of trust underlying insureds’ dependence on their insurers.” Tank, 105 Wn.2d at 385 (emphasis added). As discussed further below, high stakes and an elevated level of trust are clearly implicated by the work of a claims adjuster because the claims adjuster‘s work directly influences the decisions of the insurer. Therefore, unlike in some other states, it cannot be said that “[a]bsent an insurance contract, the policy rationales for imposing a duty on a claims adjuster cease to exist” in Washington. Lodholtz, 778 F.3d at 645.
In sum, relevant precedent is mixed. While the majority of cases applying the law of other jurisdictions limit the common law duty of insurance good faith to the insurer itself, some Washington precedent indicates that we should adopt the minority position and recognize a common law duty of insurance good faith owed by the insurer‘s claims adjusters.
2. Considerations of policy, common sense, logic, and justice support recognizing a common law duty
In addition to precedent, we must also consider policy, common sense, logic, and justice, “as applied to the facts of the case.” Centurion Props., 186 Wn.2d at 65. Legislative enactments provide a clear source of public policy that this court may consider when deciding whether to recognize a common law duty. See Bernethy, 97 Wn.2d at 932-33. The most relevant statute in this case is
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, their providers, and their representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of insurance.
This language sets forth a strong public policy favoring good faith by all those participating in insurance matters. As such, this court has regularly looked to “the principles enunciated by the legislature in
As the majority acknowledges, majority at 9-10, these principles would be promoted through “the deterrent effect of tort law” by recognizing an actionable duty of good faith owed by claims adjusters to the
While the ultimate coverage decision is made by the insurer itself, that decision is directly informed by the work of the claims adjuster. An adjuster‘s bad faith investigation or evaluation of a claim may lead directly to an insurer‘s wrongful denial of coverage or refusal to settle a claim for what it is actually worth. Claims adjusters should thus be “fully aware that the [insured] could be harmed financially if they performed their investigation in a negligent manner and rendered a report to [the insurer] that would cause the company to refuse payment.” Morvay, 127 N.H. at 726.
Common sense and justice “support[ ] placing liability on the party best able to mitigate or control the anticipated harm.” Centurion Props., 186 Wn.2d at 83. The pivotal role of claims adjusters places them in a unique position either to prevent harm to the insured by acting in good faith or to cause harm to the insured by acting in bad faith. Indeed, the facts pleaded in the complaint suggest that Smith‘s bad faith caused Keodalah harm in this case, with Smith asserting that Keodalah was primarily at fault for the accident because he supposedly ran a stop sign and was on his cell phone, even though there was no evidence to support these allegations and Smith ultimately admitted they were not true. CP at 8.
At this early stage of the proceedings, we cannot know the full extent of Smith‘s involvement with Keodalah‘s claim, but we must take the complaint as true and “consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff‘s claim.” FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014). The allegations in Keodalah‘s complaint are entirely consistent with his claim that Smith acted in bad faith when adjusting his claim. No party or amicus contends otherwise, and potential liability on the part of her employer was clearly not sufficient to deter Smith‘s alleged bad faith conduct. Therefore, in accordance with “logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent, as applied to the facts of the case,” Centurion Props., 186 Wn.2d at 65, I would recognize a common law duty of good faith to the insured by the insurer‘s claims adjuster and hold that Keodalah states a viable claim for common law insurance bad faith against Smith.
In recognizing this common law duty, I would also recognize its limitations. Most importantly, adjusters are liable only for knowing bad faith conduct that is within their control. See Annechino v. Worthy, 175 Wn.2d 630, 638, 290 P.3d 126 (2012) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.01-.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) and citing Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wn.2d 380, 400, 241 P.3d 1256 (2010)). Thus, where claims adjusters perform their own duties in good faith, they cannot be liable for an insurer‘s ultimate decision to act in bad faith. Likewise, where the insurer‘s policies or practices make it impossible for claims adjusters to act in good faith while also fulfilling their employment responsibilities, it is the insurer who is liable. Adjusters are not liable for the insurer‘s policies, nor are they required to “place the insured‘s interests above [their] own.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 118 Wn.2d 383, 389, 823 P.2d 499 (1992).
In this case, taking the facts alleged in Keodalah‘s complaint as true and assuming hypothetical facts showing that Smith knowingly acted in bad faith when adjusting his claim, I would hold that Keodalah does state a viable claim for common law insurance bad faith against Smith. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds and remand Keodalah‘s common law claim to the trial court for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
I would hold that Keodalah‘s complaint does state viable causes of action against Smith for per se CPA violations and
Notes
Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wn.2d 381, 385, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986); see also Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 784, 793 n.2, 16 P.3d 574 (2001) (same); Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wn.2d 909, 912, 355 P.2d 985 (1960) (the duty of the insurance company to use good faith in the handling of a claim against the insured springs from a fiduciary relationship that is entirely lacking between the person injured and the insurance company); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 122, 130 n.3, 196 P.3d 664 (2008) (clarifying that the insurer has a quasi-fiduciary relationship with the insured).The duty to act in good faith or liability for acting in bad faith generally refers to the same obligation. . . . [The] source [of that duty] is the fiduciary relationship existing between the insurer and insured. Such a relationship exists not only as a result of the contract between insurer and insured, but because of the high stakes involved for both parties to an insurance contract and the elevated level of trust underlying insureds’ dependence on their insurers.