THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RALPH WILLIAMS’ NORTH WEST CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., ET AL, Appellants.
Nos. 43644, 43745
En Banc.
July 22, 1976.
Petition for rehearing denied September 16, 1976.
87 Wn.2d 298
HAMILTON, J.—Appellants are Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (North West), a Washington corporation, Ralph Williams, Inc. (RWI), a California corporation, and Ralph Williams, individually and as corporate president of North West and RWI. They appeal from an order imposing terms upon the granting of a continuance and from a judgment assessing civil penalties for unfair and deceptive practices in the operation of an automobile business. The appeals from the respective orders were consolidated and will be considered seriatim. We affirm both the order and the judgment.
In May of 1968, North West opened its automobile dealership in North Seattle. In October 1970, respondent, the State of Washington, brought an action against appellants claiming violations of the Consumer Protection Act (
Initially, the trial court concluded there was no possibility North West would conduct future business in Washington State. The court declared the entire case moot and granted appellants’ motion to dismiss. In State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 265, 268, 510 P.2d 233, 59 A.L.R.3d 1209 (1973), we reversed the trial court‘s judgment on all grounds and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.
In November 1973, the trial judge set trial for March 11, 1974. Three days before the scheduled trial date appellants’
The Court of Appeals issued an amended order allowing the withdrawal of counsel and quashed the $10,000 terms deposit and the $75,000 bond. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to allow respondent an opportunity to make an adequate showing of the actual additional costs, fees and expenses to the State of Washington necessitated by reason of the continuance and following such a hearing the Superior Court may enter an order requiring the above-named petitioners to immediately pay an amount which would compensate the
On April 12, 1974, the trial court conducted a hearing to decide the terms for a continuance. Respondent‘s attorneys and office personnel filed affidavits concerning the cost of the continuance. Appellants took the depositions of each person who filed an affidavit in support of the allowance of terms. Appellants were given access to relevant documents in respondent‘s possession. Each affiant also testified at the hearing. The affidavits, depositions, and testimony established the amount of time required to repeat the trial preparation. The court, however, rejected the hourly rates because they were not respondent‘s actual costs. Respondent based its costs on reasonable fees for similar services in the community. The court directed respondent to submit proof of the actual salaries of each person involved in the trial preparation. The court also requested respondent to offer proof of any overhead costs. Respondent submitted additional affidavits establishing the actual per-hour cost of the delay. Appellants were given an opportunity to refute the additional affidavits. The court entered an order awarding respondent $13,638.79 in terms. An appeal was taken from this judgment.
Appellants challenge the trial court‘s decision to award terms for the continuance.
(d) Trials. When a cause is set and called for trial, it shall be tried or dismissed, unless good cause is shown for a continuance. The court may in a proper case, and upon terms, reset the same.
(Italics ours.) This rule vests the trial court with the power to impose terms as the condition for granting a continuance. The amended order of the Court of Appeals also recognized this power when it remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine the actual costs of the continuance. The decision to impose terms is within the discretion of the trial court. We will overturn the court‘s decision only if there exists a manifest abuse of discretion.
Appellants contend they did not cause a conflict of interest. Appellants claim the negotiated consent decree caused the conflict. We disagree. The Court of Appeals quoted with approval the original trial court order, which ruled that appellants and their attorney should have reasonably anticipated the ethical difficulty. On remand, the trial court did not reopen this issue. The record clearly supports the conclusion that appellants were responsible for the postponement. Mr. Friedman gave a number of depositions concerning his employment with North West. A simple examination of these depositions would have uncovered the future conflict of interest. Appellants waited until 3 days before the trial date to bring this matter to the trial court‘s attention. We therefore approve of the imposition of terms as a condition for granting appellants’ motion for a continuance.
Appellants also challenge the procedure utilized by the trial court to resolve their continuance motion.
(1) Generally. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
Respondent‘s counsel and office personnel submitted affidavits of the actual cost of the delay. The cost included overhead, mailing charges, transportation costs, and lodging for witnesses. The affidavits also established the actual costs for attorneys, investigators, and an accountant. The affiants were the individuals who actually prepared the case for trial. Appellants took the depositions of these affiants and also examined the relevant documents. Further, the trial court conducted two hearings on the matter. Appellants examined each of the respondent‘s affiants at one of these hearings. Appellants were given every opportunity to refute the affidavits, depositions, and testimony. The procedure is consistent with the guidelines of
The trial on the merits finally began on September 10, 1974. The trial court found numerous violations of
Appellants claimed they sold cars at prices lower than other area car dealers. Appellants also featured automobiles as specific illustrations of their low prices. Appellants’ prices were, to the contrary, substantially higher than competitors’ prices. In fact, the advertised illustrations were not even representative of their own prices. Appellants stated they could sell automobiles for lower prices, because they received volume discounts. An automobile industry witness testified each dealer pays the same invoice price for a car, and no dealer receives volume discounts.
Appellants represented in their advertisements that each purchaser received warranties on certain cars purchased from them. Many of appellants’ automobiles came with a “12 by 12” warranty. This warranty provided a “12-month warranty at 10% over cost on all parts and labor or 12,000 miles, whichever occurs first.” Appellants advertised they would perform any warranty repairs in their “huge factory-type reconditioning plant.” The evidence revealed 12-by-12 warranty repairs were rarely available and when the warranty applied, the cost of the warranty repairs equaled or exceeded the repair costs at other reliable dealerships without any warranty whatsoever. Appellants did not possess a large reconditioning plant. Appellants’ maintenance department was inadequate to service even a portion of the cars sold at North West. Appellants’ sales personnel also made warranty statements concerning the condition of the
Appellants’ advertisements featured used car sales with easier credit terms than other dealerships. The advertisements misled consumers. The credit terms were substantially higher than advertised and more expensive than the terms offered by other dealers. The advertisements offered cars for sale for a minimal down payment and a single monthly payment—“$79 down, $79 per month.” Contrary to the advertisements, North West demanded a substantial cash down payment. If the customer could not afford the down payment, North West required the person to finance it with a small loan institution.
Newspaper and television advertisements offered quality used cars for sale. Many of the cars possessed mechanical defects, body damage, and unusually high mileage. The advertisements concealed these defects. Also, the advertisements were not bona fide offers to sell the cars. They were designed to lure consumers into North West. After a customer arrived, sales personnel disparaged the advertised cars or told customers the cars had been sold.3 Appellants then utilized a comprehensive sales system designed to confuse and deceive the customer. A North West salesperson switched the customer‘s attention to other cars at prices and terms more favorable to appellants. The staff member refused to give the prices of other cars or quoted prices lower than the actual sales prices. The salesperson also misrepresented the value that would be given on any trade-in models. If the customer expressed a desire to purchase the car, another North West staff member negotiated the contract. This person informed the customer of the increased price and monthly payments. The customer was
As part of the normal sales procedure, appellants’ sales personnel would obtain a customer‘s car for trade-in evaluation purposes. When a customer later objected to the increased price or merely declined to buy a car, the employee told the customer he could not return his automobile. This procedure was designed to exert pressure upon consumers to buy an automobile.
Appellants also informed customers that banks and other financial institutions required credit life and disability insurance. These institutions did not require such insurance. The sale of this insurance directly benefited appellants. RWI owned Banner Life Insurance Company, the agency which sold the insurance, and Williams owned the underwriter company.
Appellants also charged consumers $200 to $500 for dealer preparation on all of its cars. Appellants did not disclose this cost until after the consumer agreed to buy the car. Appellants performed minimal dealer preparation or did not prepare the cars at all.4
The trial court ruled appellants flagrantly and intentionally engaged in the above deceptive acts and practices.6 Substantial evidence supports these violations. The trial court assessed civil penalties against each appellant. The court found Williams liable for $279,000, RWI liable for $289,250, and North West liable for $289,250. The court also ordered each appellant to pay costs and attorney fees in the amount of $389,258.20. The court enjoined appellants from engaging in any of the above deceptive practices. Finally, the court entered a restitution order which required appellants to place $142,000 in a trust account for the purpose of restoring consumers’ property in appellants’ possession.
We also must describe in detail the complex interrelationship of appellants. Williams owned all of the stock in RWI and North West. RWI and North West are part of a corporate conglomerate which Williams characterized as “the world‘s largest car dealership.” The directors and officers of RWI are also directors and officers of North
Williams managed and controlled both RWI and North West. Williams trained North West‘s general managers at one of his Southern California dealerships. The entire sales operation at the North West dealership was identical to the systems used at Williams’ California dealerships. Williams also designed and produced North West‘s newspaper and television advertisements.
Williams and RWI made all decisions which concerned North West‘s financial affairs. The officers of RWI were authorized to sign checks and draw money out of North West‘s bank accounts. North West also provided RWI with interest-free loans. RWI loaned the money acquired from North West to other Williams’ dealerships that were financially troubled. Williams opened a North West bank account in California with his name as the only signature on the account. Williams personally borrowed money from this North West California account. The money owed to North West by both Williams and RWI was repaid into this California account. The general manager of North West did not know about this California account. These repayments were not available to North West when it requested cash to pay its taxes in order to continue its operations. In fact, during the last months of 1970, North West sent its daily cash receipts to RWI. RWI supplied North West with the necessary capital to meet its daily operating expenses. All of this evidence clearly established that North West and RWI were part of a single financial entity owned, managed, and controlled by Williams.
As we have indicated, appellants appealed the trial court judgment. As a preliminary matter, we note that an appellate court possesses the inherent power to dismiss an appeal when a party disobeys certain trial court orders. See Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards Ass‘n, 42 Wn.2d 648, 257 P.2d 629 (1953), aff‘d, 348 U.S. 37, 99 L. Ed. 46, 75 S. Ct. 92 (1954); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wn.2d 735, 740-43, 167 P.2d 401, 163 A.L.R. 1314 (1946); cf. Helard v. Helard, 22 Wn.2d 950, 155 P.2d 499 (1945). In this case appellants have refused to comply with the trial court‘s restitution order and its orders concerning ancillary proceedings. Nevertheless, we decline to exercise our discretionary dismissal power because of the nature and significance of the action.
We now proceed to the merits of this appeal. In their brief, appellants advance approximately 100 assignments of error which they consolidated into 13 alphabetical sections. Respondent‘s brief followed this organizational scheme. For purposes of clarity, this court will resolve each assignment of error as it appears in appellants’ brief.
Section A.
Appellants first challenge the issuance of the injunction. Appellants need a license to conduct an automobile business within Washington State, and they maintain the Director of the State Department of Motor Vehicles may refuse to renew their license. Appellants claim this represents an adequate remedy of law. We disagree.
Appellants also claim respondent did not enter proof of any commercial activity by appellants after December 1970. Appellants contend the need for injunctive relief is moot.
Cessation of illegal conduct does not deprive a tribunal of the power to hear and determine the case; i.e., it does not render the case moot. A court may need to settle an existing controversy over the legality of the challenged practices. Also, if a court declares a case moot, a defendant may resume the prior illegal practices. Most courts refuse to grant defendants such a powerful weapon against public law enforcement. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 97 L. Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953).
Nevertheless, the issuance of an injunction may be moot if the defendant can demonstrate that “events make it absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Courts place a heavier burden on parties alleging abandonment of practices where the practices are discontinued subsequent to institution of the suit. State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 265, 272, 510 P.2d 233 (1973); see United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc‘y, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 96 L. Ed. 978, 72 S. Ct. 690 (1952). Courts must beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of reform. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc‘y, supra.
In the present case, appellants are free to continue business operations in the state of Washington. Absent an injunction, appellants may reenter the state and resume the identical deceptive practices. In light of the character of the past violations and this present ability to continue these practices, it is not absolutely clear appellants would refrain from future deceptive practices. Therefore, the trial court possessed the necessary power to hear the case and decide whether to grant injunctive relief.
This court may also review the trial court‘s decision to grant injunctive relief. The moving party, however, must demonstrate to the court the need for injunctive relief.
The record clearly establishes systematic and extensive deceptive sales practices. Appellants did not terminate these practices until after respondent filed its suit. In fact, they consistently denied the illegality of these practices and continued them for 2 months after the filing of respondent‘s suit. Appellants only ceased these practices because the Department of Revenue closed their dealership in December 1970. Appellants’ past violations, the involuntary cessation of these violations, and their continuance in disregard of the lawsuit, all point to a danger of future violations. We deem injunctive relief appropriate, and we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Appellants also maintain that the injunction constitutes an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce.
Section B.
Appellants contend the trial court granted costs to respondent in violation of
Appellants claim their due process rights were violated because the trial judge awarded costs and attorney fees on the basis of respondent‘s 3-page affidavit. Appellants received a copy of the affidavit concerning costs and attorney fees almost 2 weeks before the hearing on the matter. Appellants made no request to examine any person or any document which concerned respondent‘s costs. Appellants clearly were given an opportunity to inquire into the specific details of the affidavit. Appellants chose not to raise any objections. We find no violation of the due process clause.
Appellants also maintain the award was excessive and punitive. The amount of allowable attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court. We will overturn the court‘s award only if there exists a manifest abuse of discretion. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 46 Wn.2d 840, 286 P.2d 107 (1955); see
Section C.
Appellants claim the imposition of civil penalties exceeded the relief sought in respondent‘s complaint. Pleadings are primarily intended to give notice to the court and adversary party of the general nature of the asserted claim. Lightner v. Balow, 59 Wn.2d 856, 858, 370 P.2d 982 (1962). The complaint contained the following paragraph in its prayer for relief:
F. That the court assess a civil penalty against each defendant of $2,000 for each and every violation of RCW 19.86.020 occurring after May 14, 1970, and before the date of final determination of this action, pursuant to RCW 19.86.130.
The reference in paragraph F to
The Attorney General‘s suit seeks to enjoin alleged “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and to secure a judgment for penalties as provided in the Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86), . . .
(Italics ours.) Accord, State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 265, 268, 510 P.2d 233 (1973). Thus, appellants knew of the claim for civil penalties and opposed any imposition of penalties from the out-
Section D.
Appellants challenge the award of civil penalties. Specifically, appellants assert that civil penalties should be assessed on the basis of one penalty per consumer and not on the basis of one penalty per violation. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973), a California Supreme Court decision, supports appellants’ position. The court there interpreted similar statutory language and determined the number of violations by the number of aggrieved consumers. We decline to follow the one-violation-per-consumer rule.11
Appellants attack the imposition of civil penalties, because the trial court did not find that the consumers relied on appellants’ wrongful conduct. A claimant need not prove consumer reliance to establish an unfair or deceptive practice. A claimant must prove that the conduct has the capacity or tendency to deceive. Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm‘n, 157 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806, 91 L. Ed. 1827, 67 S. Ct. 1188 (1947); see Comment, Toward Effective Consumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to Deceive Test Applied to Private Actions, 10 Gonzaga L. Rev. 457 (1975). Respondent clearly met this proof requirement.
Appellants also maintain the penalty assessment is inconsistent with the trial court‘s findings of fact. We disagree. The court imposed penalties against each appellant on the basis of the specific findings of fact concerning liability. Substantial evidence supports these findings, and we find no error in the assessment of penalties.
Appellants contend their liability for penalties should be joint and not individual. This argument ignores
Section E.
The trial court based a number of penalty assessments on audio portions of certain television commercials. Appellants claim exhibits 4.1 through 4.10 were inadmissible because respondent did not present any witness who observed the taping of the commercials. Federal law requires a television station to keep these audio tapes in the regular course of business. The custodian of the records identified the tapes. He also described the mode of preparation. These tapes were properly authenticated and admissible under
Appellants also assign error to the trial court‘s decision to admit the audio portions of the commercials without the video portions of the tapes.15 The trial court repeatedly asked appellants to explain the prejudicial effect of the failure to admit the video portions of the tapes. Appellants failed to establish any prejudice. The video portions of the tapes would not alter appellants’ audio misrepresentations. The audio misrepresentations were independent of the video portions of the tapes. We find no error in the failure to produce the video portions of the tapes.
Appellants’ final argument with regard to the audio tapes is without merit. Appellants contend the admission into evidence of these tapes renders the Consumer Protection Act unconstitutionally vague as it is applied. In
[T]he phrases “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” have a sufficiently well established meaning in common law and federal trade law to meet any constitutional challenge of vagueness.
Section F.
Appellants assert that the order of restitution violates
Suits for injunctive relief and restitution enforce the laws of the particular jurisdiction in the public interest by restoring the status quo. Restitution orders are appropriate and necessary as a part of equitable relief. . . . The recovery of that which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the necessity for the injunctive relief not only restores the property to the party but insures future compliance where it is assured a wrongdoer is compelled to restore illegal gains.
(Citations omitted.) Also, in Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams’ Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Wn.2d 740, 746, 504 P.2d 1139 (1973), we described a number of practices which, if proven, warrant restitutory relief.
Among the practices of the defendants of which the Attorney General complains are these: Obtaining possession of a customer‘s automobile prior to or during negotiations and then refusing to return it if the negotiations were unsuccessful; failing to account to the original buyers for excess money received in resales of repossessed cars; and failure to refund to customers unearned insurance premiums. In proving each of these allegations, the Attorney General would be expected to show specific instances of such practices; the identity of the automobile or the amount of money unlawfully withheld would be
customarily shown as a part of that proof. No further proof would be necessary in order to justify the court in ordering restitution.
Respondent met the requisite proof requirements. The record indicates that appellants are in unlawful possession of consumer money and property. For example, appellants did not return the resale profits on repossessed cars. Many consumers paid excessive rates for credit life and disability insurance. Appellants also charged unconscionable prices for a number of their automobiles. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s decision to award restitutory relief.
Appellants claim the restitution order violates their due process rights. The order directs each appellant to take certain steps to accomplish the appropriate restoration of funds. The order also establishes an efficient procedure to allow appellants to challenge each consumer claim. Appellants may challenge each restitution award before a court-appointed master and ultimately before the trial court. Other courts have sanctioned similar restitution orders. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974). The restitution order satisfies the requirements of the due process clause.
This restitution order does not create a class action for damages and subject appellants to double liability. In Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Ralph Williams’ Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., supra at 744-46, we stated the difference between restitutory relief and damages.
It is true that a court may award damages in lieu of an injunction in a proper case, and it may award damages in addition to an injunction, in order to accord the plaintiff full relief. However, as we read the statutes which authorize the Attorney General‘s action in this case, the legislature did not contemplate that the courts should inquire into the question of damages in an injunction action by the Attorney General. If the legislature considered that the state might be damaged by the acts complained of, it determined in advance the measure of “damages” insofar as the state was concerned and provided for those damages in the civil penalty section,
RCW 19.86.140 . It also provided a remedy for private persons injured in their business or property inRCW 19.86.090 . The loss of profits occasioned by “unfair methods of competition,” assuming such a loss can be shown, is such an injury.On the other hand, in a suit such as the Attorney General‘s, proof that the defendants have acquired possession of and are holding property of a customer unlawfully can be reasonably expected as part of the proof of the allegations of unfair and deceptive acts and practices (which also incidentally might constitute “unfair methods of competition“). Where these facts are shown, the court can order restitution without the necessity of hearing additional evidence.
(Footnote omitted.)
In its order, the trial court recognized this difference between restitution and damages when it provided: “Nothing in this order shall be construed to bar any consumer from pursuing any other available remedies.” There exists no possibility of double recovery. Each aggrieved consumer may sue appellants and recover proven damages in addition to any restitutory award.16
The restitution order applies to all aggrieved consumers. It is not limited to the consumers who testified at trial. See Reed, Consumer Protection in Washington: An Overview, 10 Gonzaga L. Rev. 391, 403-04 (1975).
Section G.
The trial court refused to pierce the corporate veil and
Appellant Williams’ liability is individual, not joint or cumulative. If a corporate officer participates in the wrongful conduct, or with knowledge approves of the conduct, then the officer, as well as the corporation, is liable for the penalties. See Johnson v. Harrigan-Peach Land Dev. Co., 79 Wn.2d 745, 489 P.2d 923 (1971). Corporate officers cannot use the corporate form to shield themselves from individual liability. Johnson v. Harrigan-Peach Land Dev. Co., supra at 752.
Section H.
The trial court held RWI liable on an alter ego theory for certain practices utilized by North West.17 Appellants challenge the use of the alter ego theory as it applies to RWI. However, we need not reach this issue. The record clearly supports the finding that RWI individually participated in the deceptive acts and practices. North West conducted its operation in accordance with a management contract with RWI. Williams and RWI implemented and supervised the entire North West sales operation. Also, RWI made all decisions concerning North West‘s financial affairs. RWI is personally responsible for the activities of North West and its sales personnel.18
Section I.
Appellants contend their newspaper advertisements did not violate
Section J.
Appellants maintain the trial court improperly admitted exhibit 278 into evidence. Appellants apparently argue that exhibit 278 represents incompetent evidence of the profits made on the sales of repossessed automobiles. In Keen v. O‘Rourke, 48 Wn.2d 1, 5, 290 P.2d 976 (1955), we held:
Where a fact or facts can be ascertained only by the inspection of numerous books and records, which are themselves proper evidence, and the jury cannot satisfactorily nor conveniently examine the same in court, a qualified person, who has perused the entire mass, may state the result of his examination and use a summary of it to illustrate his conclusion.
(Citation omitted.)
Mr. David Hill, respondent‘s investigator, testified he made a simple but exhaustive study of appellants’ consumer records or “deal files” with regard to credit sales in which there was a repossession and subsequent sale. This
Section K.
Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously assessed penalties for violations of
Section L.
The final assignments of error concern respondent‘s cross-appeal. Respondent claims appellants deceived consumers when they did not advise them of the availability of joint credit life policies. The trial court did not recognize liability in this regard.
Joint credit life policies are available in this state and are sold to two individuals who are obligated on the same contract. Appellants sold two separate insurance policies to the primary debtor and the cosigner at a cost of 1 1/2 times that of the joint policy.
not specifically prohibit the sale of individual policies to two obligors on the same contract. However, the mere fact that appellants did not advise consumers of the availability of the joint policy constitutes a deceptive practice under
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, and their representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of insurance.
We, therefore, affirm the trial court judgment regarding appellants’ appeal and reverse and remand the trial court‘s judgment regarding respondent‘s cross-appeal.
ROSELLINI, HUNTER, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, and HOROWITZ, JJ., concur.
STAFFORD, C.J. (concurring)—I agree with the majority opinion reached on the merits. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the expenditure of appellate resources was an unnecessary waste of judicial time. The consolidated appeal should have been dismissed pursuant to
An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal when a party disobeys the orders of a trial court. Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards Ass‘n, 42 Wn.2d 648, 257 P.2d 629 (1953), aff‘d, 348 U.S. 37, 99 L. Ed. 46, 75 S. Ct. 92 (1954); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wn.2d 735, 740-43, 167 P.2d 401, 163 A.L.R. 1314 (1946). Whether considered singularly or collectively, this consolidated appeal and the contempt action filed in today‘s accompanying opinion, State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 327, 553 P.2d 442 (1976), represent the most flagrant disregard and contemptuous disobedience of a trial court‘s orders that I have witnessed. The actions which caused us to dismiss the appeal in Arnold are pale by comparison.
Appellants have paid no part of the civil penalties or attorneys’ fees assessed against them by the trial court. They have willfully refused to comply with orders pertaining to ancillary proceedings, restitution, and the establishment of a trust account to protect citizens of this state who were victims of appellants’ unfair and deceptive acts and practices.
Appellants have made no attempt to explain their failure to comply with the court‘s orders. They have secreted and manipulated assets to keep them out of the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Further, they have flaunted the directions of the trial court by refusing to participate in ordered discovery proceedings and to produce documents needed to discover assets. In contrast, the trial court has given appellants additional time to comply with its orders and to purge themselves of contempt. Appellants’ response to these periods of grace has been only contemptuous refusal to comply.
At no time have the appellants attempted to supersede the trial court‘s orders, as authorized by court rule. As a result, they are obliged to comply. Ryan v. Plath, 18 Wn.2d 839, 855, 140 P.2d 968 (1943); Sewell v. Sewell, 28 Wn.2d 394, 396-97, 184 P.2d 76 (1947). Because appellants have willfully delayed and refused to comply with the prior orders of the trial court, it is now time for us to punish them for their constant and flagrant disobedience by dismissing their appeal without considering the merits, as we did in Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards Ass‘n, supra.
Dismissal is a strong sanction, but appellants’ willful and continuously contemptuous actions call for strong measures. I would have dismissed the matter without further waste of judicial time and effort.
WRIGHT, J., concurs with STAFFORD, C.J.
Petition for rehearing denied September 16, 1976.