Plaintiff, Thomas R. Okrie, commenced this original action to challenge the constitutionality of Public Act 164 of 2013 (PA 164).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS
In the mid-1800s, long before the creation of the Court of Claims, the Board of State Auditors, which was a specially initiated administrative board, decided claims brought against the state:
Before the Court of Claims was created, persons with claims for damages against the state initially sought relief before the Board of State Auditors. This board, originally created by 1842 PA 12, heard claims against the state until the early Twenties, at which time the State Administrative*448 Board was created to hear such claims.[3 ] 1921 PA 3, 1925 PA 374, 1927 PA 133, and 1929 PA 259. See, Cooperrider, Governmental Tort Liability, 72 Mich L Rev 187, 250-256 (1973). 1939 PA 135, the original Court of Claims Act, gave the state Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims and demands against the state or any of its departments or agencies. [Freissler v State Hwy Comm, 53 Mich App 530, 537; 220 NW2d 141 (1974).]
In 1939, the Legislature enacted the Court of Claims Act, 1939 PA 135,
In late 2013, PA 164 was introduced to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and transfer it to this Court. To the concern of many in the legal community, the bill was ushered through the Legislature with extraordinary speed and little allowance for discussion as to the wisdom of the proposed dramatic changes to the Court of Claims system.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2013, plaintiff filed a verified class action
On November 5, 2013, the Court of Claims granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiffs breach-of-contract claim. Defendants then moved for summary disposition of the remainder of plaintiffs claims. PA 164 took effect on November 12, 2013, and on the following day, Judge Michael J. Talbot, Chief Judge of the Court of Claims, issued an order temporarily staying all Court of Claims cases. On December 13, 2013, plaintiff filed the instant petition, the first such petition under MCL 600.308(4), to challenge PA 164.
This Court ordered that plaintiffs petition proceed to a full hearing.
After this Court issued the order directing a hearing on plaintiffs petition, Judge SERVITTO granted defen
II. DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL STANDARDS
In this petition, plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of PA 164. An examination of the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law. GMAC LLC v Treasury Dep’t, 286 Mich App 365, 372; 781 NW2d 310 (2009). Plaintiffs issues involve interpretation of the Michigan Constitution, a process that requires the application of three rules. The first is the rule of “common understanding,” which means that courts should give the Constitution the interpretation that the majority of the people would give it. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor, 481 Mich 56, 67; 748 NW2d 524 (2008). Consequently, when interpreting the Constitution, this Court examines what the text meant to the ratifiers, the people, when they ratified the Constitution. Mich Dep’t of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184, 191; 749 NW2d 716 (2008). The second rule provides that, to clarify the meaning of constitutional provision, courts should consider the circumstances surrounding its adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished. Kearney v Bd of State Auditors, 189 Mich 666, 673; 155 NW 510 (1915). Third, courts generally are to presume that a statute is constitutional. Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd Partnership v Naftaly, 489 Mich 83, 90; 803 NW2d 674 (2011).
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Plaintiff maintains that PA 164 unconstitutionally interferes with this Court’s jurisdiction and blurs the line dividing the powers of government. Whether the separation-of-powers doctrine has been violated is a question of law. Fieger v Cox, 274 Mich App 449, 463-464; 734 NW2d 602 (2007).
The separation-of-powers clause in the Michigan Constitution provides:
*453 The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution. [Const 1963, art 3, § 2.]
Given that the Legislature’s task is to enact laws in accordance with the authority that has been granted to it, it follows that the Legislature does not have authority to alter the jurisdiction of a court in a manner that is inconsistent with our Constitution. See Chicago & WMR Co v Nester, 63 Mich 657, 660; 30 NW 315 (1886) (stating that the Legislature may not disturb or destroy the jurisdiction of a constitutional court, i.e., one on which the state constitution confers authority). We therefore examine the creation of the Court of Claims and the mechanism by which it is empowered in order to determine whether the Legislature had the authority to enact PA 164.
The Constitution of 1835 established the Supreme Court as the lone constitutional court in Michigan, but
For example, the Constitution of 1850 provided for the creation of circuit courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace along with the Supreme Court.
The system of providing for certain constitutionally created courts, along with providing the Legislature with authority to create other courts, continues in our current Constitution. Notably, Const 1963, art 6, § 1 provides:
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme*456 court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.
Consequently, selected courts, such as municipal courts and the Court of Claims, are not constitutionally created, but instead are only constitutionally permitted, and derive all their powers from the Legislature. People ex rel Wexford Co Prosecuting Attorney v Kearney, 345 Mich 680, 687; 77 NW2d 115 (1956).
Plaintiff admits that, like the municipal courts, the Court of Claims is not a constitutional court. Our Court clearly has stated that the Court of Claims is a court of legislative creation:
The Court of Claims is a “legislative court” and not a “constitutional court” and derives its powers only from the act of the Legislature and is subject to the limitations therein imposed. Manion v State Highway Comm’r, 303 Mich 1; 5 NW2d 527 (1942), cert den 317 US 677; 63 S Ct 159; 87 L Ed 543 (1942). The Legislature created a Court of Claims as a substitute “for the ‘board of State auditors’ and the ‘State administrative board’ for the purpose of hearing and determining ‘all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto against the State’ * * Id., 20. Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 150; 103 NW2d 769 (1960). Thus, the jurisdiction granted to the Court of Claims is “narrow and limited, substituting, merely, a ‘court’ of claims for the superseded claims jurisdiction of the earlier boards”. Id. [Littsey v Bd of Governors of Wayne State Univ, 108 Mich App 406, 412; 310 NW2d 399 (1981).]
Given that the Court of Claims was created by legislation, the amendment of that legislation does not run afoul of the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine. As Littsey noted, the Court of Claims derives its powers from the Legislature, which retains its author
Plaintiff asserts, however, that PA 164 violates the fundamental jurisdictional character of this Court by transferring additional duties to this Court. In contrast to the Court of Claims, the roots of this Court are grounded in our Constitution:
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house. [Const 1963, art 6, § 1.]
The 1963 Constitution also set forth parameters for the Legislature to establish this Court’s jurisdiction: “The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law and the practice and procedure therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court.” Const 1963, art 6, § 10.
The parties agree, and we concur, that the principal function of this Court is to act as an intermediate appellate court and to hear appeals of right from circuit courts. In addition, this Court’s jurisdiction encompasses appeals by leave as well as certain original actions and any other appeal or action established by law. See Const 1963, art 9, § 32; MCL 259.110(4); 600.308(1) and (2); MCR 7.203(A) through (D); MCR 7.206(E). Notably, those jurisdictional provisions are expressed via statute, as well as court rule. While it is true that appellate jurisdiction is understood to “only lie from one court to another,” In re Mfr’s Freight Forwarding Co, 294 Mich 57, 69; 292 NW 678 (1940)
Although plaintiff argues that the Legislature interfered with the essential constitutionally created jurisdiction of this Court, plaintiff has not cited any law expressly forbidding the transfer. More significantly, plaintiffs argument fails to account for the fact that our Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law and the practice and procedure therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court.” Const 1963, art 6, § 10 (emphasis added). And plaintiff has not demonstrated how PA 164 fundamentally altered this Court’s jurisdiction.
To the extent that plaintiff argues that this Court is not equipped to be a trial court, that argument fails, as only the Court of Claims, not this Court, must function as a trial court under PA 164. Admittedly, before becoming Chief Justice, Justice YOUNG commented that this Court is “poorly suited and equipped for factual development of new claims,” see MCR 2.112, Comments of Justices to 2007 Amendment, providing some merit to plaintiffs argument that this Court ordinarily is not prepared to be a trial court. The issue here, however, is
Even if plaintiffs argument had merit, we may not consider the wisdom of statutes properly enacted by the Legislature. Taylor v Gate Pharm, 468 Mich 1, 6; 658 NW2d 127 (2003). The courts should not exchange their judgment for that of the Legislature, which has responsibility over the legislatively created Court of Claims. See generally Kyser, 486 Mich at 535 (observing that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature in matters over which the Legislature is responsible).
Next, plaintiff argues that PA 164 erodes the constitutional division of judicial power between a superior appellate court and a trial court whose orders are subject to appellate review. The effect of PA 164 is that the Court of Appeals is required to simultaneously house an appellate court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction. Courts have long been critical of “horizontal” or “lateral” appeals. See, e.g., In re Mfr’s Freight Forwarding Co, 294 Mich at 69 (“We cannot lose sight of the fact that appeals only lie from one court to another — not from an executive officer to a court. There must be a competent judicial tribunal to pass upon a case before an appeal can be taken to a higher court.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); A Miner Contracting, Inc v Toho-Tolani Co Improvement Dist, 233 Ariz 249, 254 n 7; 311 P3d 1062 (2013); Economou v Economou, 133 Vt 418, 422; 340 A2d 86 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Morrisseau v Fayette, 164 Vt
Next, plaintiff argues that PA 164 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because, he maintains,
In each county organized for judicial purposes there shall be a probate court. The legislature may create or alter probate court districts of more than one county if approved in each affected county by a majority of the electors voting on the question. The legislature may provide for the combination of the office of probate judge with any judicial office of limited jurisdiction within a county with supplemental salary as provided by law.... [Id. (emphasis added).]
Plaintiff points out that the Constitution does not include a provision for combining the office of a Court of Appeals judge with another judicial office, such as judge of the Court of Claims. Although the Constitution expressly provides for the combination of a probate judge with another judicial office, the inclusion of § 15 was an attempt to better administrate courts in the state’s small counties,
In addition, we reject plaintiffs contention that the Court of Claims is considered a “division” of the circuit court, thereby precluding the Legislature from interfer
Plaintiff adds that PA 164 interferes with the judicial independence of this Court to perform its constitutionally mandated duties as an intermediate appellate court that is separate from the trial court whose actions are being reviewed. Initially, we observe that the addition of the independent Court of Claims has not impeded this Court from operating as the intermediate appellate court. Further, the combining of courts is not unprecedented. In 1998, this Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling that the statute transferring judges from the Recorder’s Court in Detroit, a limited jurisdiction court, to the Third Circuit Court, a general jurisdiction court, did not violate constitutional provisions regarding or
PA 164 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because it governs the Court of Claims, a legislatively created court deriving its powers from the Legislature. The Court of Claims was not a division of the circuit court, but was merely a function performed by the circuit court. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes PA 164 from any valid application.
C. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES — CONST 1963, ART 6, § 8
Plaintiff argues that PA 164 results in the four Court of Claims judges holding incompatible offices. In making this argument, plaintiff cites, in cursory fashion, Const 1963, art 6, § 8, which provides:
The court of appeals shall consist initially of nine judges who shall be nominated and elected at non-partisan elec*464 tions from districts drawn on county lines and as nearly as possible of equal population, as provided by law. The supreme court may prescribe by rule that the court of appeals sit in divisions and for the terms of court and the times and places thereof. Each such division shall consist of not fewer than three judges. The number of judges comprising the court of appeals may be increased, and the districts from which they are elected may be changed by law.
Plaintiff maintains that a violation of this provision occurs when a Court of Appeals judge is assigned to fill his or her judicial office in a different manner, i.e., by assuming the duties of a Court of Claims judge. The plain language above, however, does not prohibit a judge of this Court from sitting as a judge on a lower tribunal while holding elective office.
In further support, plaintiff cites In re Districting for Court of Appeals, 372 Mich 227; 125 NW2d 719 (1964), in which our Supreme Court opined that this Court’s districts could not be split, but instead must be drawn on county lines pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 8. In re Districting is distinguishable because our Constitution expressly provides that judges shall be elected from “districts drawn on county lines.” Const 1963, art 6, § 8 does not expressly delineate the duties of a Court of Appeals judge; hence, it may be concluded that Const 1963, art 6, § 8 does not preclude this Court’s judges from acting as judges for the Court of Claims.
Consider also that our Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to assign duties to judges: “The supreme court may authorize persons who have been elected and served as judges to perform judicial duties for limited periods or specific assignments.” Const 1963, art 6, § 23. Additionally, Const 1963, art 6, § 4 bestows the power of superintending control over all courts on the Supreme Court. See also MCL 600.225(1)
Plaintiff also cites MCL 15.182, the statute providing that a public officer or employee “shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time.” We are not convinced that the statute applies to this circumstance. The Attorney General or a local prosecutor must bring an action to enforce the statute; no private cause of action exists. See MCL 15.184 (explaining that the statute governing incompatible offices “shall not create a private cause of action” and that the “attorney general or a prosecuting attorney may apply” for “injunctive or other appropriate judicial relief or remedy.”). Moreover, the four Court of Claims judges continue to perform the responsibilities that they were elected to fulfill as Court of Appeals judges. In addition, they also perform work duties related to the Court of Claims. Although the offices may be considered “incompatible” if the judges reviewed their own Court of Claims decisions, nothing in the record supports a finding that the Court of Claims judges will review their own judgments once the cases they have decided are before this Court.
Likewise, plaintiffs argument that he is entitled to the exceptional remedy of quo warranto fails.
D. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS — CONST 1963, ART 6, § 13
Plaintiff also maintains that the transfer of the Court of Claims from the Ingham Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals improperly impedes the circuit court’s jurisdiction. The scope of a trial court’s powers is a question of law. Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 299, 305; 740 NW2d 706 (2007).
Generally, the jurisdiction of circuit courts, which are constitutional courts,
Const 1963, art 6, § 13, which sets forth the jurisdiction of circuit courts, provides:
The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court.
Plaintiff adds that PA 164 changed the jurisdictional makeup of the circuit court as a court of general jurisdiction in which orders are subject to appellate review in a constitutionally tiered judicial system. The circuit court’s jurisdiction derives from the general jurisdiction imparted to circuit courts by the Michigan Constitution. See Const 1963, art 6, § 13; Hillsdale Co Senior Servs, Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 46, 51; 832 NW2d 728 (2013). Michigan’s circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See MCL 600.605 (providing, in part, that “[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to
Plaintiff neglects to explain how the transfer of Court of Claims’ functions to this Court alters the general jurisdictional makeup of the circuit court. Admittedly, by granting exclusive jurisdiction over Court of Claims matters to the four Court of Claims judges in this Court, the Legislature divested the Ingham Circuit Court of the authority to adjudicate those disputes. But that divestiture is not prohibited under statute. See, e.g., MCL 600.605, regarding the circuit court’s general jurisdiction. It simply does not follow that that transfer of authority interfered with the circuit court’s general jurisdiction. The transfer of the Court of Claims therefore does not, as plaintiff contends, “diminish” the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Given that our Constitution does not otherwise expressly confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts over cases against the state, PA 164’s transfer of the Court of Claims to this Court does not deprive the Ingham Circuit Court of constitutionally based jurisdiction.
E. DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL DECISION-MAKER
Plaintiff contends that his right to an objective, deliberative, and reasoned adjudication before a neutral decision-maker has been thwarted. Whether a party has been afforded due process of law is a question of law. Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013). In plaintiffs view, the fact that PA 164 authorizes our Supreme Court to choose the four judges to serve on the Court of Claims, see MCL 600.6404(1), in contrast to the random draw plaintiff received at the Ingham Circuit Court, calls into question whether he will receive a neutral decision-maker.
“Due process in civil cases generally requires notice of the nature of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner, and an impartial decisionmaker.” Hinky Dinky Supermarket, Inc v Dep’t of Community Health, 261 Mich App 604, 606; 683 NW2d 759 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Due process, a flexible concept, essentially requires fundamental fairness. AFP Specialties, Inc v Vereyken, 303 Mich App 497, 514; 844 NW2d 470 (2014). “It is axiomatic that [a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co, Inc, 556 US 868, 876; 129 S Ct 2252; 173 L Ed 2d 1208 (2009) (citation and quotation marks
Although plaintiff argues that PA 164 violates his right to a neutral decision-maker, plaintiff makes no specific suggestion that the four Court of Claims judges are biased, nor does he contend that the particular judge who has been assigned to this case is not a neutral judge. That the Michigan Supreme Court chooses the four judges to serve on the Court of Claims does not amount to a showing of bias. Thus, we find no due process violation based on bias that would amount to a successful facial challenge of PA 164.
In addition, we find no direct bias in the appellate review procedure established by PA 164. The statute essentially requires Court of Appeals judges to review the work of their colleagues; significantly, however, we find unfounded any concerns that the statute would require or permit Court of Claims judges to sit in review of their own decisions on appeal of those decisions. The Legislature could have alleviated concerns that this Court would review itself by including in PA 164 a specific prohibition whereby Court of Claims judges could not conduct appellate review of cases originating from the Court of Claims; however, although past practice may have allowed a judge to review his or her own decisions, that practice has not been accepted for more than a century. See, e.g.,
Although plaintiff is unable to show actual bias, that does not end our inquiry under the due process clause. Plaintiff need not show actual bias “[i]f the situation is one in which ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of a decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ” Hughes v Almena Twp, 284 Mich App 50, 70; 771 NW2d 453 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). For example, that risk may be present when the decision-maker:
(1) has a pecuniary interest in the outcome; (2) has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him; (3) is enmeshed in [other] matters involving the petitioner.. . ; or (4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decisionmaker. [Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351; 235 NW2d 352 (1975) (citations and quotation marks omitted; formatting altered).]
In evaluating this issue, we consider “whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’ ” Caperton, 556 US at 883-884, quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975).
Although plaintiff fairly contends that the nature of appellate review set forth in PA 164 lends itself to criticism,
F. IMMEDIATE EFFECT — CONST 1963, ART 4, § 27
Plaintiff finally argues that the immediate effect given to PA 164 violates Const 1963, art 4, § 27 because the bill did not obtain two-thirds of the votes of the members of the House of Representatives. We disagree.
A statute becomes operational on its effective date. In re Request for Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71,479 Mich at 12. Generally, the effective date of a statute is 90 days after the end of the session at
No act shall take effect until the expiration of 90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed, but the legislature may give immediate effect to acts by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.
Unless two-thirds of the members of each house vote for immediate effect, that act will not become effective until 90 days after the end of the pertinent session. Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 47 Mich App 401, 405; 209 NW2d 605 (1973).
Plaintiff states that the roll call vote in the House of Representatives (57 in favor, 52 opposed) demonstrates that the two-thirds necessary for immediate effect was not reached. Plaintiff, however, has cited only the record roll call vote of the yeas and nays on the bill itself. The “record roll call vote” required to pass an act, cited by plaintiff, is separate from the “rising or voice vote” taken regarding whether to give an act immediate effect. Const 1963, art 4, § 27 does not require the taking of a record roll call vote on the issue of immediate effectiveness. Hammel v Speaker of House of Representatives, 297 Mich App 641, 649; 825 NW2d 616 (2012). The journal entry is dispositive
Plaintiff has failed to cite House Journal 96 of the session on November 6, 2013, which reflects that the requisite two-thirds of the representatives voted for immediate effect:
Rep. Stamas moved that the bill be given immediate effect.
The motion prevailed, ⅔ of the members serving voting therefor. [2013 House Journal 1758.]
The House Journal reflects that the two-thirds total was reached.
Plaintiff thereafter relies on City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n v Schimmel, 726 F3d 767 (CA 6, 2013), in which a panel of the Sixth Circuit addressed the immediate effect of a bill regarding emergency managers and remanded to the district court for it to examine whether, contrary to the holding in Hammel, our Constitution restricts the Legislature’s ability to give bills immediate effect absent a “real” two-thirds vote from the elected members. However, upon rehearing en banc, that opinion in City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n v Schimmel was vacated, 751 F3d 427 (CA 6, 2014).
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional infirmity in PA 164. The transfer of the Court of Claims to this Court does not conflict with the separation-of-powers doctrine because the Court of Claims is a legislatively created court. The Court of Claims judges on this Court are not holding incompatible offices. PA 164 does not violate the Michigan Constitution by reassigning to this Court the functions of the Court of Claims. Plaintiff has not shown that his due-process right to an impartial decision-maker was violated when the underlying case was moved from the circuit court to this Court. And the immediate effect given to PA 164 did not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 27 because the House Journal reflects that the motion obtained the requisite votes. In sum, plaintiff has not met his heavy burden to show that PA 164 is unconstitutional, and we must deny the relief sought in his petition.
This Court is authorized to hear certain original actions. Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich 559, 566; 640 NW2d 567 (2002). Jurisdiction for this particular action is provided for in PA 164 itself: “The court of appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over any action challenging the validity of [MCL 600.6404, 600.6410, 600.6413, or 600.6419].” MCL 600.308(4).
A number of jurisdictions have created a separate court or tribunal to hear claims against the state. See, e.g., 28 USC 1491; Ohio Rev Code Ann 2743.03(3)(B); NY Court of Claims Act, §§ 8 and 9 (McKinney 1963); 705 Ill Comp Stat 505/1; W Va Code 14-2-4; Tenn Code Ann 9-8-307; 42 Pa Con Stat 761. However, we note that these jurisdictions create a court or tribunal that is separate from the court that will eventually hear an appeal as of right from the original decision. In particular, we note that in Pennsylvania, although the Commonwealth Court (which functions as an intermediate appellate court) hears actions against the state as original actions, it does not hear appeals from its own decisions; instead, those appeals are heard in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 42 Pa Con Stat 723(a); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Environmental Protection v Cromwell Twp, Huntingdon Co, 613 PA 1, 14; 32 A3d 629 (2011). We have found no other court structure in the country similar to that set forth in PA 164.
The current State Administrative Board has the discretionary authority, upon the advice of the Attorney General, to allow any claim against the state for an amount less than $1,000. MCL 600.6419(1).
The current Court of Claims Act is MCL 600.6401 et seq.
The scant testimony on PA 164 that was received by the Committee on Government Operations was largely in opposition and repeatedly expressed concerns with the speed of the enactment of the legislation, with several individuals and entities calling upon the Legislature to take time to allow more responses to the legislation. See House Committee on Government Operations, Testimony From 1/2013, available at <http://house.mi.gov/ mhipubhc/CommitteeInfo.aspx?comkey==229> (accessed July 17, 2014) [perma.cc/8239-7UD2]. One commentator remarked that the swift manner in which the legislation was passed “is an embarrassment to the democratic ideal and should not be repeated.” Hastings, Down the Rabbit Hole with the Court of Claims, 93 Mich B J 14, 16 (July 2014).
Senate Journal 89 reflects 26 yeas to 11 nays for passage (10/30/13 Journal, p 1689).
House Journal 96 reflects 57 yeas to 52 nays for passage (16/13 Journal, p 1757).
The Legislature subsequently amended the Court of Claims Act to clarify that matters in the Court of Claims may be joined for trial with
The current Court of Claims Judges are Chief Judge Michael J. Talbot and Judges Pat M. Donofrio, Amy Ronayne Krause, and Deborah A. Servitto.
The clerk of this Court also serves as the clerk of the Court of Claims. MCL 600.6410(1).
The proposed class consists of similarly situated state and public school employees whose pensions will be subject to taxation under 2011 PA 38. For ease of reference, and because the Court of Claims denied plaintiffs motion for class certification, plaintiff is referred to in the singular.
Once the temporary stay was lifted in the Court of Claims, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, adding counts for breach of an investment contract purchasing service credit and breach of the Michigan Investment Plan contract. Plaintiff moved in the Court of Claims for a stay of the underlying case in light of the instant constitutional challenge to the transfer pending in this Court, but Judge Deborah Servitto, acting as a judge on the Court of Claims, denied plaintiffs motion for stay.
See Okrie v Michigan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 17, 2014 (Docket No. 319550).
Despite that order, this challenge to the constitutionality of PA 164 is not moot. In light of the constitutional challenges raised, the grant of summary disposition is not the type of subsequent event for which this Court may not fashion a remedy. See In re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 96, 112; 667 NW2d 68 (2003).
Apparently, the Legislature’s establishment and dissolution of courts had been considered with disfavor. See Streeter v Patón, 7 Mich 341, 349 (1859) (observing that the Legislature’s “frequent changes in the judicial tribunals of the state were looked upon as an evil”).
PA 164 did alter this Court’s jurisdiction in one respect, by giving this Court exclusive original jurisdiction over any action challenging the validity of the amended statutes. MCL 600.308(4). However, this alteration was consistent with the constitutional mandate that this Court’s jurisdiction “shall be provided by law . . . .” Const 1963, art 6, § 10.
Plaintiff raises a similar argument in asserting a due process violation. We will discuss that claim later in this opinion.
“These permissive provisions are included to make possible better administration of these courts in the smaller counties of the state.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3387. See also Green v Court Administrator, 44 Mich App 259, 261; 205 NW2d 306 (1972).
Because the statute does not define the term “function,” it is proper to consult a dictionary for its common meaning. Klooster v City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 304; 795 NW2d 578 (2011).
MCL 600.308(1) details matters that are appealable as a matter of right. Section 308(2) describes matters that may be appealed by leave.
MCL 600.308(4) provides: “The court of appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over any action challenging the validity of [MCL 600.6404, 600.6410, 600.6413, or 600.6419].”
Quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy provided for by law. Sobocinski v Quinn, 330 Mich 386, 389; 47 NW2d 655 (1951).
See Const 1963, art 6, § 11. See also Const 1963, art 6, § 1 (stating that Michigan’s “one court of justice” includes “one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court”).
We would be remiss not to acknowledge the fact that PA 164’s unusual court structure is fairly subject to criticism, albeit not rising to the level of constitutional infirmity. Most notably, the statute creates a Court of Claims where one Court of Appeals judge hears cases at the trial court level, and then a panel of that judge’s colleagues on the Court of Appeals reviews the decision on direct review. Surely, we do not doubt that Court of Appeals judges can be fair when reviewing their colleagues’ rulings in Court of Claims cases. See, generally, People v Aceval, 486 Mich 887, 889 (2010) (statement of Hathaway, J.) (noting that Court of Appeals judges and Michigan Supreme Court justices routinely review the decisions of their former colleagues). As members of three-person panels, we are regularly tasked with the obligation of dissenting when we disagree with the legal reasoning or conclusions of our colleagues. However, a fair concern exists with the appearance of how this direct appellate review will function. Although legally incorrect, the statute lends itself to lay criticism that an appeal as of right for Court of Claims cases is nothing more than a horizontal or lateral appeal. A peaceful governance based on principles such as the rule of law depends on the public’s trust that the judicial system is fairly and impartially deciding cases. PA 164, with its apparently unprecedented system of housing the trial court for state claims in the only appellate court of right, could contribute to distrust in the appellate process when it concerns Court of Claims matters. See Hunt, Legal Ethics — Attorney Conflicts of Interest — The Effect of Screening Procedures and the Appearance of Impropriety Standard on the Vicarious Disqualification of a Law Firm, 70 Tenn L Rev 251, 278 (2002),
Reviewing the work of a colleague is not unheard of in the judiciary; indeed, conflict panels on this Court and en banc proceedings in the federal circuit courts require some review of a colleague’s decisions, albeit on a less frequent basis, and in a situation that is not entirely comparable to the direct review, as of right, of decisions under PA 164. In addition, circuit court judges, in years past, sat on this Court by designation, thereby requiring those judges to review the work of their colleagues. Still, the nature of reviewing the work of a colleague, even in an en banc manner, is not without its critics. See, e.g., Haire, Lindquist, and Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 Law & Society Rev 143, 151, 160-161 (2003) (explaining that studies of the federal judiciary have found that district judges who sit on appellate panels, and therefore review their colleagues’ work, are less likely to vote for reversal); Brudney and Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 Law & Society Rev 565, 575 (2001); Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum L Rev 1600, 1617-1619 (October 2000) (questioning the decisions of judges in review of their colleagues, given the inevitable connections between colleagues); Rooklidge & Weil, En Banc Review, Horror Pleni, and the Resolution of Patent Law Conflicts, 40 Santa Clara L Rev 787, 795 (2000).
For examples of acts that were not ordered to take immediate effect because the vote for immediate effect either failed or was not taken, see Lansing v State Bd of Tax Admin, 295 Mich 674, 680; 295 NW 358 (1940), and In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 682; 765 NW2d 44 (2009).
We note that although an official dissent was registered in which more than a third of House members disputed whether this vote was in fact taken, see 2013 House Journal 1766, our Supreme Court has recognized that such a dissent “is a personal privilege merely. It has no force as legislative action, and cannot be resorted to to nullify a legislative act. It has no force as a statement of fact contradicting the journal.” Auditor General v Menominee Co Bd of Supervisors, 89 Mich 552, 577; 51 NW 483 (1891).
In making this argument, plaintiff does not contend that the bill failed to garner enough votes for immediate approval from the Michigan Senate. Such a claim would be meritless, however, given that the Senate Journal reveals that at least ⅔ of the members of the Senate voted to give PA 164 immediate effect. 2013 Senate Journal 1689.