Kеnneth L. MANTELL, as Administrator for the Estate of Kenneth R. Mantell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LTD., et al., Defendants, and Portage County, Ohio; Officer Kreider, Corrections Officer, Portage County Sheriff‘s Office; Dan Cardinal, Portage County Sheriff‘s Office; and John Does 1-10, Various Unknown Officers/Deputies, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-4257.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
May 12, 2015.
302
HOOD, District Judge.
Kenneth R. Mantell (“Mantell“) diеd on July 5, 2010, as a result of injuries he received when he hanged himself at the Portage County Jail. His father, as the personal representative of his son‘s estate
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Portage County and its officers, Nathan Kreider and Daniel Cardinal, on all federal and state-law claims. Plaintiff appeals the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of these defendants with respect to his claims arising under
I.
On May 20, 2010, Officer Jon Meade Hurley of the Streetsboro Police Department arrested Mantell on charges of domestic violence and child endangerment after Mantell was involved in a fight in a parking lot with his estranged girlfriend, Lindsey Hamilton. Hurley took Mantell to the Streetsboro police station for processing where Mantell told intake officers of a prior suicide attempt and a family history of suicide but denied any current intent to harm himself.
Hamilton came to the police station where she completed some paperwork and spoke with Officer Hurley in the lobby. There, Officer Hurley “went over with her the procedure, what was going on, what part she needed to take in it” as the victim of a crime. [Deposition Of Officer Jon Meade Hurley, DE 156-1 at 43, ll. 2-4; PageID#: 1376.] According to Hurley, as Hamilton exited the police station, “she [told Hurley] to keep an eye on [Mantell]. And [Hurley] asked her why, and she said that he‘s had suicidal thoughts in the past, and then she left.” [Id. at 43, ll. 8-11; PageID#: 1376.]
As Hamilton describes their conversation, “I just flat out told him, I told him, I‘m, like, He needs to be on suicide watch.” [Deposition Of Lindsey Hamilton, DE 155-1 at 57, ll. 2-3; PageID#: 1189.] She testified that, when asked by Hurley why she thought that Mantell needed to be on suicide watch, she
.... told him he‘s had prior prior happenings with it, prior discussions about it. I knew that he was suicidal. I knew hе‘s attempted it before, and just because of his state of mind he was in, he was so angry, and usually whenever he was that angry and that irate and with that much rage, like his whole thinking in his head was just that: It‘s easier if I‘m not here.
[Id. at 57, ll. 9-18; PageID#: 1189.] She clarified by stating “I just told him that I knew that he‘s attempted suicide before ...” and “I just told him that he needs to be on suicide watch and that I knew that he had prior attempts.” [Id. at 62, ll. 12-13; PageID#: 1194; DE 155-1 at 72, ll. 5-7, PageID#: 1204.]
Mantell was transferred to the Portage County jail, and Deputy Nathan Kreider collected Mantell‘s basic information, then turned Mantell over to the intake nurses for an initial health screening. After Mantell‘s initial screening and pat-down, Hur-
[Id. at 50, ll. 4, 8-15; PageID#: 1475.] While Kreider intended to tell the nurse what Hurley had said, at no time did he convey that information to the nurse because he was called аway to another task and by the time he returned the nurse had completed her assessment of Mantell.2 Kreider did not try to find the nurse at that point because the nurses had completed their assessment and Mantell had not “presented that he was in any imminent danger to hurt himself.” [Id. at 69, ll. 10-12; PageID#: 1494.]
Tamara Dalesandro and Rochelle Balk were the nurses who encountered and screened Mantell on May 20, 2010. The nurses made both an initial screening and a full assessment of Mantell. During the full assessment conducted by Dalesandro, Mantell was very calm and reported treatment for depression and an attempted suicide by overdose in 2006 but denied any then-current suicidal impulse. Dalesandro found no reаson to place him on any kind of observation or watch. In her deposition, Dalesandro states that, if she had been told that Hamilton told Hurley that “[Mantell] will hurt himself,” she would have put Mantell on behavior watch at a minimum and, possibly, suicide watch. [Deposition of Tamara L. Dalesandro, DE 158-1 at 71, ll. 2-3 and 6-7; PageID#: 1620.] Similarly Balk would have placed him on suiсide watch or, at the very least, behavior watch under those circumstances. Had Mantell been placed on suicide watch, he would have been kept in a stripped cell in the booking area within sight of officers at all times; had he been placed on behavior watch, Mantell would have been monitored at intervals оf 15 minutes or less. In either case, Mantell would have been seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours. As it was, Mantell was placed in the general population at the jail.
While held at both the police station and the jail, Mantell called his family and friends repeatedly. He appeared highly agitated when a restraining order was entered during his videо arraignment at 1:00 p.m. on May 21, 2010.
After the arraignment, Mantell continued calling a friend, Jodie Davis, until Davis quit taking his calls. At the time, there were approximately 40 inmates in the day room, and Portage County Corrections Officer William Robert Tench was the only officer assigned to the pod. At 3:00 p.m., Mantell was chastised by Tench for using a towel and paper to block out light from the window and mirror lights in
Tench found Mantell in his cell, hanging from a sheet at the foot of the bunk bed. Despite resuscitation attempts, Mantell never regained consciousness and died on July 5, 2010, at the age of twеnty-six, as a result of his injuries.
Following Mantell‘s death, Plaintiff brought suit under
II.
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of summary judgment. Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir.2007)). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III.
Prison officials may be held civilly liable under
In the prisoner-suicide context, we recognize that proof of a prisoner‘s psychological needs manifesting themselves in suicidal tendencies with “a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life” are sufficiently serious for purposes of the objective component. Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th Cir.1992)); see also Perez, 466 F.3d at 424. The subjective component is satisfied with proof that a prison official drew an inference from the available facts that there was a “strong likelihood” of prisoner suicide, but then disregarded that risk by failing to take adequate precautions to mitigate the risk. Gray, 399 F.3d at 616. Thus, to be held liable, “a prison official must be cognizant of the significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own life.” Linden v. Washtenaw Cnty., 167 Fed.Appx. 410, 421 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir.2000)).
For the purposes of the objective component of our inquiry, we assume without deciding that Mantell‘s psychological needs manifested themselves in suicidal tendencies with “a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life.” See Gray, 399 F.3d at 616. However, we see no proof from which a reasonable finder of fact could determine that either Kreider or Cardinal perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to Mantell during their interactions with him and, in fact, drew that inference. Thus, Plaintiff has
The case before us is distinguishable from the facts in Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534 (8th Cir.2003), and Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.2003), which Plaintiff urges us to consider as persuasive authority. In Coleman and Cavalieri, officers were not only advised by witnesses that the inmates in question were at risk of suicide and had threatened to commit suicide at or near the time of their arrest, or to kill themselves if jailed, but there was also evidence from which a jury could conclude that officers were aware of requests for assistance or unusual or erratic—even patently suicidal—behavior by the inmates. Coleman, 349 F.3d at 539; Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 619. By contrast, Kreider and Cardinal had only a bald report of concern on the part of Mantell‘s estranged girlfriend and Mantell‘s own report, made during his medical assessmеnt, of treatment for depression and a single suicide attempt some five years in the past. There was no immediate report or sign of unusual or worrisome behavior to belie their observations of his calm demeanor during intake or his statement to the nurse that he was not, at that time, suicidal. At best, with respect to Kreider and Cardinal‘s failurе to pass along information about Hamilton‘s statement to the nursing staff, Plaintiff here has demonstrated nothing more than the officers’ “mere negligence[, which] is not enough to make out an Eighth Amendment violation.” Davis v. Fentress Cnty., 6 Fed.Appx. 243, 250 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970). On the undisputed facts available to the district court and presented on appeal, we conclude that no jury could reasonably conclude that Kreider or Cardinal drew an inference from the available facts that there was a “strong likelihood” of prisoner suicide, let alone that they disregarded that risk by failing to take adequate precautions to mitigate the risk. Gray, 399 F.3d at 616. Summary judgment was appropriate.
In the absence of any constitutional violation, the district court did not need to further сonsider Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, nor do we. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)) (holding that an official sued under
IV.
Finally, we need not and will not consider Plaintiff‘s argument that the district court erred when it held that Plaintiff‘s state-law claims for (1) willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, (2) wrongful death, and (3) survivorship failed as a matter of law. Whether the district court correctly decided the issues or not, the district court reached its decision based on Defendants’ argument that no willful, wanton, and reckless conduct claim could stand alone under Ohio law and that, to the extent that Plaintiff sought relief under Ohio‘s law of wrongful death and survivorship on the grounds that Defendants acted willfully, wantonly, and recklessly, the claims fаiled upon application of state law. Plaintiff offered no response to these arguments before the district court, and “an argument not raised before the district court is waived on appeal to this Court.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.2008).
V.
For all of the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.