Kelli EMBRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALLAHAN EYE FOUNDATION HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 05-10905
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 23, 2005.
147 Fed. Appx. 819
Non-Argument Calendar. D.C. Docket No. 03-02608-CV-S.
Anne R. Yuengert, Ronald H. Kent, Jr., Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kelli Embry appeals through counsel the district court‘s grant of summary judgment, pursuant to
Embry, an African-American employee of Callahan, who was hired as a patient-accounting clerk in August 2000, filed a civil complaint, asserting that Callahan (1) discriminated against her because of her race by disciplining her more harshly than similarly situated Caucasian employees; (2) discriminated against her because of her race by subjecting her to other unequal treatment, including (a) not providing her with orientation when she first was hired,2 (b) forcing her to “clock in and out,” and (c) denying her privileges given to white employees; and (3) retaliated against her for engaging in the protected activity of opposing these discriminatory employment practices by disciplining her.
Callahan filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Embry‘s claims, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact existed on Embry‘s claims of disparate treatment because Embry had (1) not established an “adverse employment action,” (2) failed to establish that Callahan treated persons outside of her protected class more favorably, and (3) not produced evidence showing that Callahan‘s non-discriminatory reasons for her treatment were pretextual. Callahan argued that it was due summary judgment on Embry‘s retaliation claims because Embry could not show either that she engaged in protected activity prior to the alleged retaliatory treatment, or that the treatment was based on protected activity. Callahan further contended that, even if Embry could establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on her one-day suspension, she could not show that Callahan‘s non-retaliatory reason for suspending her was pretextual.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Callahan filed a declaration by Keren Elkins, Embry‘s supervisor at Callahan, in which Elkins attested that (1) Callahan hired Embry as a patient-account representative on September 5, 2000; (2) as one of several patient-account representatives in the business office, Embry was responsible for submitting insurance claims for payment; (3) from Embry‘s date of hire until February 28, 2001, Mark Teske was the acting supervisor over the business office; and (4) in February 2001, Elkins began her duties as the Director of Patient Accounts, with supervisory responsibility over the business office.
Elkins further attested that (5) in May 2001, Michelle Capps, another patient-account representative in Callahan‘s business office, had to leave work and go to the hospital because she had an allergic reaction to a coworker‘s perfume; (6) on August 23, 2001, to address this allergy problem, Callahan distributed a memorandum, implementing a new policy prohibiting the use of fragrances that could cause an employee to have an allergic reaction;3 (7) in
Elkins stated, as well, that, (13) when Elkins was informed that Michael Morrison, a part-time employee in the business office who was not working at Callahan in the Fall of 2001, when the policy was instituted, had been wearing cologne, Elkins investigated the complaint;5 (14) during this meeting with Morrison, (i) Elkins did not detect cologne on Morrison, and (ii) Morrison denied knowing about the fragrance policy; and (15) since April 10, 2002, Elkins had investigated all allegations relating to the fragrance policy and had not determined that any other employees had violated it. Finally, Elkins attested that, (16) because of repeated abuses of the lunch break by employees, all of the employees in the business office were required to “clock in and out” for lunch; (17) Elkins sent an e-mail to these employees to inform them of this policy change; (18) Elkins was not aware of any times that Capps violated this policy; and (19) Elkins did not know that Embry complained to Burleson about race discrimination in May 2001.
Callahan also introduced a copy of Elkins‘s deposition, which included, in addition to the above-referenced testimony, that, upon becoming supervisor of the business office, Elkins decided to enforce in the office the hospital-wide policy prohibiting employees from eating at their desks after “clocking in” at work. On January 31, 2002, Elkins saw Embry and another African-American employee, LeAndrenetta Nalls, eating at their desks after they “clocked in” at work, in violation of this policy. After sending them an e-mail reminding them of this policy, Elkins e-mailed Bailey about the violations. Bailey responded by suggesting that Elkins discipline employees for such violations, to which Elkins replied: “I agree ... boy want [sic] that be fun, I can‘t wait.”
Elkins further testified that, on February 6, 2002, after overhearing Embry and other employees in the business office talking during work hours, she informed these
Callahan also filed a copy of Embry‘s deposition, in which Embry testified that, after Callahan instituted its policy of requiring employees in the business office to “clock in and out” during their lunch breaks, Embry, along with other African-American coworkers, Nalls, King, and Sanquenetta Williams, complied with this policy, while some of her Caucasian coworkers, including Capps, did not comply with it and used more than the 30 minutes that they were permitted for lunch breaks. Embry stated that, on May 31, 2001, when she and Williams were discussing that this policy was not being equitably enforced, Capps overheard their discussion, and Embry and Capps had a heated argument, during which they had to be physically separated by King and Williams. Elkins subsequently spoke to Embry about this argument, but Elkins did not discipline either Embry or Capps.
Embry further testified that, on May 31, 2001, she met with Burleson and discussed her altercation with Capps, along with other concerns Embry had about the business office.6 On February 15, 2002, Embry filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“), alleging that she had been discriminated against because of her race. On April 16, 2002, Embry refused to sign a discipline report informing her of her one-day suspension because (1) she was wearing the same fragrance that she normally wore, and (2) Capps had not previously had a reaction to the fragrance. Embry further stated that (1) she believed the fragrance policy only involved keeping fragrances to a minimum and was put in place to avoid Capps having an allergic reaction, (2) Embry asked Capps to smell all of her lotions to ensure that they would not bother her, and (3) Embry never wore a lotion that she had not previously tested on Capps.7 Finally, Embry testified that coworkers Williams, King, Nalls, and Morrison had informed her that they had not been disciplined that day, even though they also had been wearing fragrances.
Embry also contended that the district court should not grant summary judgment on her retaliation claim based on her suspension because (1) she engaged in protected activity by (i) complaining of race discrimination to Burleson in May 2001, and (ii) filing an EEOC charge against Callahan in February 2002; (2) her April 2002, suspension was an adverse employment action; and (3) she could show a causal connection between them based on (i) their close temporal proximity, and (ii) the series of emails between Elkins and Bailey, which reflected Elkins‘s improper motive in disciplining Embry. In addition, Embry argued that she could show that Callahan‘s articulated reason for the suspension was pretextual through (1) proof that Morrison and other employees were not disciplined in a similar manner for violating the fragrance policy, and (2) the January 31, 2002, e-mail between Elkins and Bailey, which Embry contended showed that Elkins would take pleasure from disciplining her.
Furthermore, Embry responded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to her claim that she was treated differently than white employees in certain terms and conditions of employment, that is, clocking in and out for lunch and being written up for eating breakfast at her desk, because Callahan did not enforce these policies with respect to Capps, a Caucasian employee. Embry contended that she could prove that her February 2002, reprimand was in retaliation for her complaints of race discrimination to Burleson in June 2001. She also argued that she could show that any reason for this different treatment was pretextual, based on the same evidence she had offered in relation to her suspension claims.
Callahan replied that Morrison was not similarly situated to Embry for purposes of Embry‘s suspension claim because Elkins never caught Morrison wearing cologne after April 10, 2002, when Callahan decided to suspend any employee in violation of the fragrance policy. Callahan also replied that Embry had offered no evidence showing a causal connection between her protected activities and her suspension because (1) her complaint of race discrimination in May 2001 was not close in time to the suspension, and (2) the e-mail between Elkins and Bailey, although arguably unprofessional, did not reflect a discriminatory animus.8 In addition, Callahan asserted that summary judgment was warranted on Embry‘s remaining claims because Embry had failed to show that (1) the conduct constituted “adverse
The district court granted Callahan‘s motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court initially explained that it was “doubtful” that any single, or combination of, employment actions of which Embry complained constituted an adverse employment action because the conduct either was not adverse at all, or it did not materially change her employment status. The court also discussed that, even assuming that the conduct was adverse, Embry had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on her suspension or other employment practices because she had failed to identify a similarly situated employee outside of her class who was treated more favorably. The court acknowledged that Embry had identified Morrison as a comparator, but it concluded that Embry had offered no evidence showing that Elkins knew or believed that Morrison was wearing cologne on the days that he was investigated.
The court similarly determined that summary judgment was warranted as to Embry‘s retaliation claims because, as discussed above, Embry had failed to identify any “adverse employment actions.” Moreover, although both Embry‘s May 2001 complaint to Burleson, and her filing a charge with the EEOC, qualified as protected activity, Embry had failed to show that her February 7, 2002, reprimand was causally related because Elkins denied knowing about the May 2001 complaint. The court also determined that, although Elkins knew that Embry engaged in the protected activity of filing an EEOC charge on February 15, 2002, and this activity was sufficiently close in time to establish a causal connection between this activity and Embry‘s suspension, Embry had failed to show that Callahan‘s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her suspension was pretextual.9
Issue 1: Prima facie case of disparate treatment based on race or retaliation
Embry argues that she established a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on her April 2002, suspension by (1) identifying Morrison as a proper comparator, and (2) showing that Morrison was not suspended after he violated the fragrance policy. Embry also contends that a genuine issue existed as to her prima facie case of disparate treatment based on Callahan‘s unequal enforcement of its policies involving employees eating during work and taking lunch breaks because she presented evidence showing that she, as an African-American employee, was held to a higher standard in following these policies than her Caucasian coworkers. Finally, Embry contends that she established prima facie cases of retaliation because her February 2002, reprimand and her April 2002, suspension were “adverse employment actions” that were causally connected to her May 2001, complaint of discrimination and her February 2002, EEOC charge respectively.
A court‘s order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo, “view[ing] all evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
To the extent Embry is arguing that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to her claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Where direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation is unavailable—as was the case here—a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence of discrimination sufficient to create a jury question. Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.2001) (Title VII disparate treatment); Sullivan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir.1999) (Title VII retaliation). For claims based on circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1258. If the plaintiff is successful, the defendant must “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment action].” Id. The plaintiff then may attempt to demonstrate that the proffered reason was, in fact, merely pretext for the defendant‘s acts. Id.10 “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. “If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant‘s articulated reasons is pretextual, the [defendant] is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff‘s claim.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (discussing pretext in context of discrimination involving age and disability).
a. Disparate treatment
“A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that she was a qualified member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast with similarly situated employees outside the
Although we have “not adopted a bright-line test for what kind of effect on the plaintiff‘s ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment the alleged discrimination must have for it to be actionable,” we have clarified that “not all conduct by an employer negatively affecting an employee constitutes adverse employment action.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2001). Indeed, “[a]lthough the statute does not require proof of direct economic consequences in all cases, the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff‘s employment.” Id. at 1239. Thus, “an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Moreover, the employee‘s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer‘s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances” Id.
In Davis, the plaintiff‘s claim of disparate treatment was predicated on two kinds of employer acts, that is, negative job performance memoranda placed in his file and changes in his work assignments. See id. at 1240. We determined that the memoranda, which were not “formal” reprimands, and did not result in the plaintiff suffering any tangible consequences in the form of loss of pay or benefits, were not “adverse employment actions.” See id. at 1240-41. In reaching this determination, we explained that “criticisms of an employee‘s job performance—written or oral—that do not lead to tangible job consequences will rarely form a permissible predicate for a Title VII suit.” See id. at 1241. Similarly, we concluded that the removal of the plaintiff‘s title as an officer did not constitute a demotion or a significant change in work assignments because any change in his responsibilities was not substantial. See id. at 1243-44 (noting that “Title VII is not designed to make federal courts sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity‘s business decisions” (internal quotations and marks omitted)).
Here, Embry‘s allegation that Callahan did not equitably enforce its policy requiring employees in the business office to “clock in and out” at lunch did not involve “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See id. at 1239. Indeed, the only employment act associated with this policy involved Elkins sending a general e-mail to the office reminding them of this policy. On the other hand, Embry‘s allegation that Callahan did not equitably enforce its policy requiring employees not to eat during work hours involved the fact that Elkins reprimanded her in February 2002, in part because she violated this policy. However, similar to the facts in Davis, Embry failed to cite to evidence
To the extent Embry also identified her one-day suspension as an “adverse employment action,” we recently have explained that, following the language of Title VII, “actions that affect compensation are considered adverse employment actions.” See Gillis v. Georgia Dep‘t of Corrections, 400 F.3d 883, 887-88 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that an evaluation that directly disentitled an employee to a raise of any significance was an adverse employment action under Title VII). In Gillis, however, we clarified that the case did not involve disentitlement to a de minimus raise, but, instead, revolved around an employment decision that significantly affected the plaintiff‘s compensation. See id. at 888. Assuming, as the district court did, that Embry‘s suspension began as early as 9:00 a.m., with an hourly salary of $11.83, the most compensation lost was $88.73. Thus, this suspension also did not constitute “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239.
Even if we were to conclude that Embry‘s one-day suspension involved an “adverse employment action,” summary judgment still was warranted on this claim because Embry failed to show that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected class when she was suspended for violating Callahan‘s fragrance policy. “To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must show that the ‘employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects.‘” Knight v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091 (citing Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259).11
In determining that Morrison—the only comparator identified by Embry—was not similarly situated, the district court properly considered the undisputed evidence that Embry attended a meeting on April 10, 2002, at which the staff was warned that they should not wear any scents or fragrances, and Embry‘s one-day suspension resulted from Elkins smelling a fragrance on Embry on April 16, 2002. Moreover, although Embry stated during her deposition that she believed that this fragrance policy did not prohibit the use of all fragrances, she did not contest that she was wearing a fragrance on the day in question.
On the other hand, Elkins testified that, upon investigating a complaint she received after April 10, 2002, she did not detect cologne on Morrison. Where employees have engaged in similar conduct, but the supervisor is not aware of one employee‘s conduct, this conduct may not be considered in determining whether the employees are “similarly situated.” See Knight, 330 F.3d at 1317 n. 5. Moreover, unlike Embry, Morrison, at least to Elkins,
b. Retaliation
To the extent Embry also was attempting to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, to successfully assert such a claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 740. To be considered an “adverse employment action” under Title VII‘s anti-retaliation provision, the action “must either be an ultimate employment decision or else must ‘meet some threshold level of substantiality.‘” Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616-17 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted), cert. denied, U.S., 125 S.Ct. 1850, 161 L.Ed.2d 727 (2005). “Ultimate employment decisions include decisions such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion.” Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
Assuming that Embry‘s May 2001, complaint and her February 2002, filing of an EEOC charge constituted “statutorily protected expression,” the only ultimate employment decisions Embry identified were her February 2002, reprimand and her April 2002, one-day suspension. Similar to the analysis of whether these acts were “adverse employment actions” for purposes of Embry‘s claims of disparate treatment, Embry failed to explain why these acts, which were not ultimate employment decisions, nevertheless met the “threshold level of substantiality” necessary for a retaliation claim. See id. at 618 (explaining that “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,” and that an “adverse employment action” involves conduct that “alters an employee‘s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment“).
Even if Embry‘s reprimand and suspension were “adverse employment actions,” she only needed to show that “the decision-maker[s] [were] aware of the protected conduct,” and “that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” See Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[a] plaintiff satisfies this [causation] element if [s]he provides sufficient evidence of knowledge of the protected expression and that there was a close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse action.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir.2004) (quotation and marks omitted) (reviewing grant of summary judgment in claim filed under the anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
In Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir.1999), we also concluded that the district court did not err in determining that the employee failed to establish this causation element. Id. at 1370. In Maniccia, the employee was reassigned to a different position 15 months after she filed a sexual harassment grievance against her supervisor, and her employment was terminated 21 months later. Id. at 1369-70. We determined that (1) instead of representing a pattern of retaliatory activity, these two employment actions were isolated events that had no temporal relationship to her protected activity; and (2) “[t]he more than 15-month period that elapsed between [her] grievance and the alleged adverse employment actions belie[d] her assertion that the former caused the latter.” Id. at 1370. In addition, we explained that the employee failed to show any other evidence suggesting this causation. Id.
Similar to the three-month delay in Higdon, the nine-month gap between Embry‘s protected activity in May 2001 of complaining of race discrimination to Burleson, and her February 2002 reprimand, was insufficient to establish the requisite causation in the absence of any other evidence of causation. Moreover, in the absence of “a close temporal relationship,” Embry failed to produce sufficient alternative evidence showing that her protected activity and this reprimand were “not wholly unrelated.” See Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590. Indeed, similar to the facts in Maniccia, Embry did not cite to any other discipline she received between these two events and, thus, failed to show a pattern of retaliatory acts. See Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1370.
More importantly, Elkins was not present when Embry raised her discrimination complaint in June 2001, and Elkins attested that she did not know that Embry complained to Burleson about race discrimination. Embry, therefore, failed to establish that Elkins “was actually aware of the protected expression at the time [she] took adverse employment action.” See Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir.2000) (reasoning that “a decision maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him“); see also Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.2002) (reasoning that “neither a court nor a jury may impute knowledge to a decision-maker who has sworn he had no actual knowledge“). Thus, the court also did not err in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed on whether Embry successfully alleged a prima facie claim of Title VII retaliation based on her February 2002, reprimand. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 740.
On the other hand, as the district court concluded, the shorter period time between Embry‘s filing her EEOC charge on February 15, 2002, and her one-day suspension on April 15, 2002, was sufficiently close to establish causation for purposes of a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation. See Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220. Moreover, Elkins did not testify that she was unaware of Embry‘s EEOC charge. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the district court correctly granted summary judg-
Issue 2: Pretext
Assuming as the court did that Embry could establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on her suspension claim, Embry argues that the court erred in concluding that she failed to show that Callahan‘s articulated reasons for its challenged conduct were pretextual. Embry specifically contends that Callahan‘s reason for her April 2002, suspension was belied by (1) testimony that other coworkers were not suspended for violating the fragrance policy, and (2) the January 31, 2002, e-mail between Elkins and Bailey that Embry interprets as showing that Elkins would take pleasure in disciplining her.
As discussed above, once a plaintiff successfully alleges a prima facie case of retaliation, and once the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action, the plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer‘s articulated reasons is pretextual. Sullivan, 170 F.3d at 1059. In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, courts examine whether “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer‘s proffered legitimate reasons for its action [exist, such] that a reasonable factfinder could find [all of the reasons] unworthy of credence.” Vessels v. Atlanta Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir.2005).
As a preliminary matter, to the extent Embry has implied that Callahan‘s argument that her suspension was based on her violation of the fragrance policy was pretextual because she was wearing a fragrance that had not previously bothered Capps, “Title VII does not take away an employer‘s right to interpret its rules as its chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules.” See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984). “[A] plaintiff employee may not establish that an employer‘s proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer‘s reason, so long as the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer.” See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and marks omitted).
To the extent Embry also has cited in support of her pretext argument to the fact that Morrison was not suspended, even though he conceded that he wore cologne after April 10, 2002, Embry has correctly asserted that a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext through comparative evidence. See Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir.1985). However, as discussed above, Morrison is not a proper comparator because Elkins did not catch him wearing cologne after April 10, 2002. Moreover, Embry failed to identify another proper comparator because, assuming as true Embry‘s testimony that other coworkers wore fragrances after April 10, 2002, Elkins never caught them wearing a fragrance and, thus, did not believe they were in violation of the policy. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 740 (explaining that the relevant issue for pretext was not whether the employee actually violated the employer‘s rule, but whether the employer “honestly believed” that the violation occurred).
To the extent Embry is relying on the contents of Elkins‘s e-mail to Bailey on February 1, 2002, as evidence of pretext, this e-mail included the following comment
Furthermore, even assuming that this comment was not sarcastic, Embry has failed to explain why this general statement about disciplining the employees in the business office, and which was sent two weeks before Embry filed her EEOC charge, showed that Elkins had an intent to retaliate against Embry for engaging in protected activity. See Earley v. Champion Intern. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that “[m]ere conclusory allegations and assertions will not suffice” to establish pretext (citation omitted)). We have explained that, although a comment unrelated to a challenged employment decision may contribute to a circumstantial case for pretext, “it will usually not be sufficient absent some additional evidence supporting a finding of pretext.” See Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th. Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Thus, assuming that Embry established a prima facie case of retaliation based on her suspension, Embry failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to pretext.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Callahan summary judgment on all of Embry‘s claims. We, therefore, affirm.
AFFIRMED.
HULL, WILSON and FAY
Circuit Judges.