TRACY MILLER v. RONALD KING, WAYNE GARNER, THE STATE OF GEORGIA, THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOHNNY SIKES
No. 02-13348
D. C. Docket No. 98-00109-CV-6
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
September 14, 2004
TRACY MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor, versus RONALD KING, WAYNE GARNER, THE STATE OF GEORGIA, THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JOHNNY SIKES, Defendant-Appellee, Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
(September 14, 2004)
Before CARNES, HULL and HILL, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Tracy Miller (“Miller“), a paraplegic state prisoner, appeals the grant of summary judgment on his Eighth-Amendment claims brought under
After
I. BACKGROUND
Miller is a paraplegic, wheelchair-bound inmate at Georgia State Prison (“GSP“) in Reidsville, Georgia. Miller suffers from complete paralysis in his right leg, partial paralysis in his left leg, and a neurogenic bladder condition that causes urinary incontinence. At GSP, Miller is housed in disciplinary isolation in the “K-Building,” which is designated a “high maximum” security section of the prison. As a result of more than 180 disciplinary reports, Miller has been held in isolation in the K-Building since at least 1998, and is due to remain in isolation for a total of more than eight years. Able-bodied inmates in disciplinary isolation are housed in less stringent units than the “high maximum” security K-Building. Because K-Building cells are so small and not accommodated for the wheelchair-bound, prison policy calls for beds to be removed daily so that the wheelchair-bound inmates have some minimal area within which to move around their cells.1
A. Complaint
Miller originally filed this action under
Miller subsequently amended his complaint to add as defendants the State of Georgia, the GDOC, and GSP Warden Johnny Sikes, in his official and individual capacities. Miller also added disability-discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA, retaliation claims under the
Regarding his Eighth-Amendment and ADA claims, Miller‘s Complaint essentially makes the following claims against the defendants: (1) that there is no room in his small cell for him to maneuver his wheelchair, making him immobile and restrained for extended periods of time and that this problem is exacerbated by GSP staff‘s failure to remove his bed from his cell daily, as prison policy requires for wheelchair-bound inmates; (2) that the showers and toilets in the K-Building are not wheelchair-accessible, that he has been denied the opportunity to bathe regularly and to obtain basic hygiene, and that GSP staff have not provided him necessary urine catheters or assistance in using portable toilets, resulting in Miller‘s urination and defecation on himself; and (3) that GSP officials and staff have ignored his medical complaints, failed to provide him with rudimentary medical devices required for his paraplegic condition, including leg braces, orthopedic shoes, a wheelchair-accessible van, and wheelchair repairs, and failed to provide him with required medical care,
Miller alleges that GSP officials and staff, including Warden Sikes personally, were aware of his paraplegic condition, the inhumane conditions of his confinement and his serious medical needs, and were deliberately indifferent to those conditions and needs. On these bases, Miller seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief under
B. Preliminary Injunction Hearing
Miller filed numerous motions for emergency preliminary injunctions. The magistrate judge conducted a hearing at which Miller, several inmates, and prison officials testified. We review that evidence because Miller relies on it in this appeal.
During the hearing, Clarence Downs, a GSP prisoner housed in the K-Building with Miller, testified that he had observed correctional officers using excessive force against Miller, that officers at times shut off the water to Miller‘s cell for days at a time, that Miller‘s cell was not large enough to maneuver a wheelchair, and that prison staff did not remove beds from cells during the day to make the cells wheelchair-accessible. The magistrate judge admitted into evidence a letter from J. Philip Ferraro, GDOC Assistant Director of Legal Services, a copy of which was provided to Warden Sikes, stating that “the beds for disabled prisoners in restricted quarters are removed during the day to ensure they have enough room to maneuver their wheelchairs in their cells.” During the hearing, Miller emphasized that his bed was not removed from his cell daily as required by GDOC policies.
Dr. Carolyn Mailloux, the GSP medical director, testified that Miller was able to stand on his own and maneuver for short periods of time, and that while Miller would not necessarily require a “wheelchair with legs,” it would be beneficial to him. Although Dr. Mailloux requested various medical consultations and treatments for Miller, Miller never received the prescribed consultations or treatments because each time either Miller refused or GSP Utilization Management did not approve the visits. Dr. Mailloux acknowledged that Miller had experienced some muscle atrophy. However, Dr. Mailloux testified that medical staff examined Miller shortly before or after he was placed in disciplinary isolation, that Miller‘s cell was wheelchair-accessible, that she was not aware that the prison staff had ever refused Miller medical treatment, and that Miller‘s life was not in imminent danger due to lack of medical treatment at the prison. She further testified that Miller had not received physical therapy because he refused to go to a prerequisite consultation, and that Miller could travel in a regular van without any special accommodations.
While able-bodied inmates in isolation are housed elsewhere, Warden Sikes testified that Miller was housed in the K-Building because of its wheelchair accessibility to the shower and the yard. Sikes testified that Miller was moved to the K-Building from the infirmary because he proved a continual distraction to both staff and inmates in the infirmary, and that the K-Building‘s accommodations were reasonable
Reginald Ford, a correctional officer at GSP, testified that on one occasion he responded to Miller‘s complaint of a back injury, but the medical staff did not respond immediately. GSP staff physician Dr. Thomas Lowry testified that he had on one occasion attempted to treat Miller for back pain, but Miller refused. Dr. Lowry testified that Miller met the criteria for an assisted-living facility at August State Medical Prison, but that, to his knowledge, Miller had received reasonable medical care at GSP.
Next, Visol Smith, a correctional unit manager at GSP, testified that the medical staff had evaluated Miller after he complained about his back injury. According to Smith, prison staff cleaned Miller‘s cell and brought food trays to his bed, and because the staff was able to accommodate Miller‘s disability, the K-Building was appropriate housing for Miller. Smith did testify, however, that the bed was not removed from Miller‘s cell on a daily basis to allow Miller more room for his wheelchair, although there were plans to begin doing so.
Finally, defendant King, the GSP hearing officer, testified that most inmates are restored privileges and returned to the dorms when they are taken out of isolation status. Miller, on the other hand, continued to live in the K-Building upon removal from isolation status due to his poor behavior.
C. Denial of Preliminary Injunction
After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court deny Miller‘s motion for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate judge concluded that Miller arguably demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth-Amendment claims that GDOC staff “knowingly failed to remove [Miller‘s] bed from his cell each day as recommended by the Legal Division of the GDOC and failed to change his status to allow for complete general population privileges for one day following thirty days of disciplinary isolation.” The magistrate judge found, however, that Miller failed to establish irreparable harm, as required for a preliminary injunction.
With regard to Miller‘s Eighth-Amendment claims, the magistrate judge concluded, on the basis of Dr. Mailloux‘s testimony, that Miller failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Specifically, the magistrate judge‘s report stated:
Mailloux testified that Plaintiff has been provided adequate medical care and that there are no serious medical needs of Plaintiff which have not been accommodated. Additionally, Dr. Mailloux explained that Plaintiff has refused medical care on several occasions. Some of these incidents include Plaintiff refusing to go to consultative appointments at Augusta Medical State Prison because he would not be transported in a vehicle which was wheelchair accessible. Dr. Mailloux explained that Plaintiff‘s medical condition is such that he does not need to be transported in a wheelchair accessible van.3
D. Summary Judgment for Garner and Sikes
Subsequently, all defendants jointly moved for summary judgment, and submitted the affidavits of King, Sikes, and Dr. Mailloux. In his affidavit, Warden Sikes stated that he was not medically trained, that “sick call requests” were routed directly to GSP medical staff, and that he was never involved in any decision regarding Miller‘s diagnosis or care. Moreover, Warden Sikes stated that he did not discriminate against Miller due to any disability, and that Miller was moved to disciplinary housing because he “virtually destroyed his hospital cell.” In her affidavit, Dr. Mailloux stated that the medical care received by Miller was consistent with contemporary medical standards, and that Miller‘s housing assignment was not contrary to his medical condition or needs. Dr. Mailloux further stated:
While inmate Miller does have medical limitations, his condition is not such that he appears to be disabled in a major life activity. While he uses a wheelchair at times, he also has been observed standing and I have seen reports of occasions when he has caused considerable damage to his cell, all of which could not have been physically possible if he were indeed unable to ambulate as he sometimes contends.
In opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Miller submitted two briefs, his own affidavit, as well as the affidavits of inmates Dwight Benton and Tony Goodman. Miller also filed his own motion for summary judgment.
In his affidavit, Benton, a disabled inmate at GSP, attested that the K-Building cells were not wheelchair-accessible. Benton averred that he is a paralyzed inmate at GSP, that he is also housed in the K-Building, that Miller has no access to occupational therapy, physical therapy, showers, or the library, and that Miller‘s cell is not accommodated and lacks “wheelchair space.” According to Benton, Miller was harassed on a daily basis and never leaves his cell. Benton never observed Miller standing without the use of his “devices.” In his affidavit, Goodman, another disabled inmate at GSP, also stated that the cell block where he and Miller are housed is not wheelchair-accessible. According to Goodman, Miller has no way to shower, and no access to recreation, physical therapy, or occupational therapy.4
In his affidavit, Miller attested that he is paralyzed completely in his right leg and partially in his left leg due to gunshot wounds. Miller filed a letter from Dr. Mailloux in which she acknowledged that Miller is a “partially paralyzed inmate.”5
The magistrate judge‘s report recommended (1) that summary judgment be granted to defendants Garner and Sikes but not the other defendants, and (2) that all of Miller‘s motions be denied. Over Miller‘s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge‘s report and granted summary judgment to Sikes and Garner, but otherwise denied summary judgment as to defendants King, the State of Georgia, and the GDOC. The parties then consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.
E. Summary Judgment on ADA Claims
Subsequently, defendants King, the State of Georgia, and the GDOC filed a supplemental motion for partial summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted. Over Miller‘s objections, the magistrate judge concluded that: (1) Miller‘s ADA claims against the State of Georgia and the GDOC were precluded by the
F. Jury Trial on Due-Process and Retaliation Claims Against King
The magistrate judge then held a jury trial on Miller‘s due-process and retaliation claims against defendant King as the GSP hearing officer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of King. The magistrate judge denied Miller‘s motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law.
G. Appeal
On appeal Miller argues that: (1) the jury‘s verdict on his due-process and retaliation claims was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the magistrate judge improperly conducted voir dire and lacked jurisdiction; (3) the magistrate judge and district court improperly denied Miller‘s motions for preliminary injunctions; and (4) the magistrate judge and district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his Eighth-Amendment claims under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court‘s rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that bound the district court.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). This Court, like the trial court, must view all evidence and all factual
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1279-80 (quoting
III. DISCUSSION
Miller challenges the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on his Eighth-Amendment and ADA claims. Specifically, Miller argues, inter alia, that: (1) genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on his Eighth-Amendment claims against Warden Sikes under
We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants except for Miller‘s: (1)
A. Eighth-Amendment Claims Under § 1983
1. Proper Defendants Under § 1983
When filing a suit under
A prisoner, however, may bring a
In addition, a prisoner may sue state officials in their individual capacities under
The more difficult question is whether Miller‘s evidence was sufficient to create factual issues regarding his alleged Eighth-Amendment violations against Warden Sikes. We discuss our Eighth-Amendment jurisprudence and then apply it to Miller‘s claims.
2. Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain
“Although the United States Constitution does not require comfortable prisons, neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison, along with the conditions under which the prisoner is confined, is governed by the
The
Under the subjective component, the prisoner must prove that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating that an individual may be held liable under the
It is also “well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under
3. Miller‘s Claims
We conclude that Miller‘s evidence creates genuine issues of material fact regarding his Eighth-Amendment claims for monetary damages against Warden Sikes in his individual capacity and for injunctive relief against Warden Sikes in his official capacity.
As a wheelchair-bound paraplegic who suffers from complete paralysis in his right leg, partial paralysis in his left leg, and a bladder condition that causes urinary incontinence, Miller unquestionably has serious medical needs. See Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990) (immobile broken foot constituted serious medical need); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989) (deteriorating leg constituted
In addition, Miller has presented affidavits stating that the K-Building in which he is housed does not contain wheelchair-accessible showers and toilets, that he is denied the opportunity to bathe, and that he is denied urine catheters and staff assistance in using toilets. While the defendants hotly dispute these assertions, Miller‘s evidence creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether he, as a paraplegic, has been afforded the basic levels of humane care and hygiene. Assuming the truth of the affidavits presented by Miller — that Miller is wheelchair-bound and virtually immobile or trapped in his small, unsanitary cell for extended periods, forced to remain in his own urine and excrement with no ability to move and no physical therapy, as his body deteriorates — Miller has satisfied the objective prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry.
Regarding the subjective inquiry, Sikes acknowledged receiving numerous verbal and written complaints from Miller and even visited his cell. Sikes noted that Miller‘s complaints have been “voiced countless times.” According to Miller‘s evidence, Sikes was aware of Miller‘s serious medical needs, the conditions of his confinement, and that GSP staff were not correcting the alleged deprivations and thus were acting unlawfully. Yet, according to Miller‘s evidence, Sikes nevertheless did not exercise his authority as Warden to provide Miller with the required medical attention and basic living conditions to which he is entitled under the Eighth Amendment.12
B. ADA Injunctive Relief
We also agree with Miller that he is entitled to sue defendant Sikes in his official capacity for injunctive relief under the ADA, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits.14
Title II of the ADA generally prohibits disability discrimination by a “public entity” in the administration of its services, programs, or activities.
This Ex parte Young exception was recognized in the ADA context in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). The Supreme Court in Garrett first concluded that States are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for suits for monetary damages under Title I of the ADA. In a footnote, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ex parte Young exception, noting that its holding about monetary damages did not preclude suits under Title I of the ADA against state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief, as follows:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). . . .
Id., n.9 (emphasis added). Although the above footnote was in the context of Title I rather than Title II of the ADA, and although the Supreme Court in Garrett emphasized it was ruling only on Title I,15 we see no reason (and the State defendants offer none) that claims under Title II should be treated differently with regard to injunctive relief.16
Therefore, we join our sister circuits in holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar ADA suits under Title II for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. McCarthy v. Hawkins, — F.3d — (2004 WL 1789945 at * 7) (5th Cir. August 11, 2004); Chaffin v. Kansas State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 866-67 (10th Cir. 2003); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 288 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This footnote, albeit dicta and although specifically addressing Title I, reflects that the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh-Amendment bar to suit is viable under the ADA.“); Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that there is “no relevant difference between
We now turn to what Miller must prove to obtain injunctive relief in his ADA claims. To prove a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from the participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such entity; (3) by reason of such disability. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing
In order to establish the first element of a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must show that he is disabled and “that he ‘meets the essential eligibility requirements’ for participating in the program, with or without reasonable accommodations.” Love, 103 F.3d at 560 (quoting
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
In the prison context, the difficult question is what constitutes a “qualified individual” under the ADA. A disabled prisoner may not be “qualified” under the ADA to participate in various services, programs, or activities because of disciplinary reasons, health reasons, or other, valid penal justifications. See Love, 103 F.3d at 561 (“Nowhere does Westville [prison] argue that some other reason motivated its actions, such as the need to confine Love for disciplinary reasons, or for fear that other inmates would be infected, or because Love was otherwise unqualified to participate.“); see also Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1296-1301. Thus, whether a particular disabled prisoner is “qualified” to participate in the service, program or activity at issue must be decided case by case based on numerous factors, including but not limited to valid penal justifications for excluding a particular individual prisoner from a service, program, or activity.
If a prisoner is both disabled and an “otherwise qualified individual,” a state prison may not deny services, programs, or activities merely because the prisoner has a disability. In Shotz, this Court noted that ADA regulations required that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity‘s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.” Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1079-80 (quoting
Nonetheless, even if an inmate is a “qualified” individual and entitled to reasonable accommodations, we must emphasize that “terms like ‘reasonable’ . . . are relative to circumstances, and the circumstances of a prison are different from those of a school, an office, or a factory . . . .” Crawford v. Indiana Dep‘t of Corrs., 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Northeastern Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000). Consequently, courts must be mindful of the necessary balance between the ADA‘s worthy goal of integration and a prison‘s unique need for security, safety, and other penological concerns. See Randolph, 170 F.3d at 859 (“The defendants presented substantial evidence that Randolph‘s request for [a signing] interpreter created safety and security issues, as well as placed a financial burden on the prison. The Department of Corrections is entitled to have its evidence considered by the fact-finder in this case.“); Love, 103 F.3d at 561 (“Security concerns, safety concerns, and administrative exigencies would all be important considerations to take into account.“); Crawford, 115 F.3d at 487 (“The security concerns that the defendant rightly emphasizes in urging us to exclude prisoners
Finally, prisoner access to programs need not be universal because “[a] public entity need not make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving compliance with this section.” Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1080 (quoting
While we conclude that Miller has a disability under the ADA, the magistrate judge did not address Miller‘s ADA claims for injunctive relief and whether Miller was a “qualified individual” under the ADA, or whether his disciplinary problems made him unqualified to participate in certain services, programs, or activities. If Miller is a qualified individual for at least some services, programs, or activities, the magistrate judge also did not address what accommodations are reasonable under the ADA in Miller‘s particular case. Thus, we remand all of Miller‘s ADA claims for injunctive relief against defendant Sikes in his official capacity for the district court to determine these issues in the first instance.
C. ADA Monetary Damages Claims
On appeal, Miller also argues that the magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on Miller‘s ADA claims for monetary damages. As explained above, the ADA applies to state prisons, and Miller is entitled to prove his ADA claims for injunctive relief against defendant Warden Sikes in his official capacity. Regarding Miller‘s ADA claims for monetary damages, however, this case presents the formidable legal question of whether Congress constitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in Title II of the ADA — a question that has attracted significant and well-founded debate in the courts. To aid our analysis, we describe the interplay between the ADA and the Eleventh Amendment, and the evolving jurisprudence in this area, culminating in the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
1. ADA Overview
The purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
Specifically, Title II of the ADA — the title at issue here — prescribes that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
2. Eleventh-Amendment Analysis
As a general rule, the Eleventh Amendment grants States immunity to suits brought by private citizens in federal court.22 The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can abrogate that sovereign immunity where (1) Congress “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate” the States’ sovereign immunity in the statute at issue, and (2) “Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). The ADA plainly states that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State Court . . . for a violation of” the ADA.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79. The paramount question, then, is whether Congress‘s intended abrogation of the States’ Eleventh-Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA was a valid exercise of its remedial powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has decided that the remedial and preventive measures “may not work a ‘substantive change in the governing law.‘” Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519). Regarding Congress‘s § 5 authority, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies,” but has stressed that “the distinction exists and must be observed.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
In determining whether Congress has acted within the scope of its § 5 power to abrogate States’ sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court applies the three-part “congruence and proportionality” test first established in Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. In applying the Boerne test, a court must: (1) identify “with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue,” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; (2) determine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States, and (3) if so, analyze whether the statute is an appropriate, congruent and proportional response to that history and pattern of unconstitutional treatment.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
In Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, the Supreme Court applied the Boerne test to Title I of the ADA and held that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh-Amendment immunity to suits for monetary damages under Title I, which relates to employment discrimination. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Garrett was driven by its conclusion that Congress‘s exercise of prophylactic powers under § 5 was unsupported by a relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations. 531 U.S. at 368, 374. In so holding, the majority opinion in Garrett stated that the “overwhelming majority” of the evidence before Congress relating to disability discrimination related to “the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III,” rather than Title I. Id. at 371, n.7. Thus, in Garrett, the Supreme Court left unanswered the question raised here of whether Congress validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in Title II of the ADA.24
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court revisited the question of whether Congress validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in the ADA, this time
examining Title II in the context of access of disabled persons to the courts.
Although the plaintiffs in Lane were not prisoners, Lane explains the analysis required to determine whether Title II of the ADA properly
3. Tennessee v. Lane
In Lane, the plaintiffs asserted ADA claims relating to the access of disabled persons to courts. After summarily acknowledging that Congress clearly intended to abrogate Eleventh-Amendment immunity in Title II, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the application of the Boerne “congruence and proportionality” test. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986. Applying the first step of the Boerne analysis, the Supreme Court noted that Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment‘s “prohibition on irrational disability discrimination.” Id. at 1988. But, the Supreme Court concluded, “it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review,” including rights relating to access to courts protected by the Due-Process Clause of the
In Lane, the Supreme Court then proceeded to the second step, in which it addressed the history and pattern of violations of these constitutional rights by States against the disabled. After noting that the “appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of the harm it seeks to prevent,” the Supreme Court stated: “It is not difficult to perceive the harm that Title II is designed to address. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.” Id. at 1988-89. The Supreme Court catalogued many such deprivations in the areas of voting, marrying, serving as jurors, unjustified commitment, abuse and neglect in mental health hospitals, and zoning decisions, and then explained that the decisions of other courts “document a pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting.” Id. at 1989 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In Lane, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]his pattern of disability discrimination persisted despite several federal and state legislative efforts to address it,” and that in the deliberations preceding the ADA‘s enactment, “Congress identified important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them ‘inadequate to address thepervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing.‘” Id. at 1990 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 18).
The Supreme Court completed its step-two analysis with the conclusion that Title II was enacted in response to a history and pattern of disability discrimination in the “provision of public services and access to public facilities,” as follows:
The conclusion that Congress drew from this body of evidence is set forth in the text of the ADA itself: “Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.”
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (emphasis added). This finding, together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.
Id. at 1992 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Lane concluded that Title II of the ADA was enacted in response to a history and pattern of constitutional violations
The third and final query in the Eleventh-Amendment analysis is whether the legislation at issue is a congruent, proportional response to that history. In Lane, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether Title II as a whole satisfies Boerne‘s step-three congruence-and-proportionality requirement. Instead, the Supreme Court adopted an “as-applied” test, stating that “nothing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole. . . . Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we need go no further.” Id. at 1992-93 (emphasis added).26
Noting the long history and intractability of the States’ disability discrimination in the area of access to courts, and more generally the unequal treatment in the administration of public services, and the “considerable evidence of the shortcomings of previous legislative responses,” the Supreme Court concluded that Congress was justified in enacting prophylactic measures in Title IIfor access to judicial services. Id. at 1993. The Supreme Court characterized Title II‘s remedy in the area of access to courts as “limited” in that it does not require “States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs.” Id. Rather, Title II requires only “reasonable modifications.” Id.
Moreover, in Lane the Supreme Court emphasized the traditional breadth of the States’ due-process responsibility to afford individuals access to courts. In light of the limited nature of the ADA‘s remedy and the States’ expansive due-process responsibilities, the Court concluded: ”This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within the limits of practicability, a State must afford all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.” Id. at 1994 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786-87 (1971)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court thus concluded that Title II‘s obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the administration of justice “cannot be said to be ‘so out of proportion to a supposed
We now apply the Boerne/Lane test to Miller‘s ADA claims in the prison setting.27
4. Application of Boerne/Lane to this case
In the first step of the Boerne/Lane analysis, we identify the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Both Miller and the defendants agree that the only right at issue in this particular case is Miller‘s Eighth-Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.28
The second step requires us to determine whether Title II was enacted in response to a history and pattern of constitutional violations by the States. Although the defendants argue there is insufficient evidence of disabilitydiscrimination in prisons, we conclude that this step-two inquiry under Title II already has been decided by the Supreme Court in Lane. As previously discussed, in applying the second step of the Boerne test, the Supreme Court in Lane considered evidence of disability discrimination in the administration of public services and programs generally, rather than focusing only on discrimination in the context of access to the courts, and concluded that Title II in its entirety satisfies Boerne‘s step-two requirement that it be enacted in response to a history and pattern of States’ constitutional violations. Id. at 1992. We are bound by that conclusion as to step two.
We now proceed to the third and final step of the Boerne/Lane inquiry. This Court must decide if Title II of the ADA, as applied to claims rooted in the Eighth Amendment, is an appropriate § 5 response to the above-described history and pattern of unconstitutional treatment. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992. Given Lane, we accepted at step two that Title II was enacted in response to a history and pattern of disability discrimination in the administration of public services and programs generally. To give meaning to the Supreme Court‘s context-by-context analytical approach, however, we must consider, in step three, the history of discrimination not generally but specifically in the prison context, and the scope of the Eighth-Amendment constitutional right, and determine whether the remedyafforded by Title II is congruent and proportional to its historical backdrop and to the object of enforcing the Eighth-Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993. To meet this congruence-and-proportionality
We recognize that § 5 authorizes Congress to deter Eighth-Amendment violations by prohibiting “a somewhat broader swath of conduct” than that prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and by proscribing “facially constitutional conduct[] in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Congress‘s remedial and preventive measures, however, may not go so far as to work a substantive change in the governing Eighth-Amendment law. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986 (stating that Congress‘s remedial and preventive measures “may not work a ‘substantive change in the governing law‘” (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 117 S. Ct. at 2164)). In other words, § 5 does not place in the hands of Congress a tool to rewrite the Bill of Rights. Instead, when Congress enacts § 5 prophylactic legislation, there must be “proportionality or congruence between the meansadopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
Miller and the United States, as intervenor, argue that a history and pattern of disability discrimination in prisons existed and also formed part of the historical backdrop against which Congress enacted Title II of the ADA.29 While the defendants contend that the evidence of a history and pattern of unequal treatment in prisons is scant, Miller argues that the evidence as to prisons is not substantially less meaningful than the evidence upon which the Supreme Court relied in Lane in the context of access to courts.30 Even if a documented history of disabilitydiscrimination specifically in the prison context justifies application of some congressional prophylactic legislation to state prisons, what makes this case radically different from Lane is the limited nature of the constitutional right at issue and how Title II, as applied to prisons, would substantively and materially rewrite the Eighth Amendment. In this case, we focus on the limited nature of
This robust, positive due-process obligation of the States to provide meaningful and expansive court access is in stark contrast with the States’ Eighth-Amendment, negative obligation to abstain from “cruel and unusual punishment,“a markedly narrow restriction on prison administrative conduct. In the prison context, the States historically have wielded far-reaching discretion in their treatment of inmates, confined only by the limited Eighth-Amendment requirement that such treatment not be “cruel and unusual punishment.”31 The Eighth Amendment has no effect on most prison services, programs, and activities, such as educational, recreational, and job-training programs. Rather, the Eighth Amendment is limited to punishment, and “cruel and unusual” punishment at that. In other words, the Eighth Amendment imposes a narrow restriction – “cruel and unusual” – on only a limited sphere of prison administrative conduct – “punishment.” As explained above, even as to that punishment sphere, negligence or gross negligence does not satisfy the Eighth-Amendment standard. Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490. Instead, a prisoner alleging an Eighth-Amendment violation confronts an exacting burden of showing that the prison official wantonly and willfully inflicted pain on the inmate. Chandler, Slip Op. at 3368-69. The Eighth Amendment regulates only a small slice of prison administrative conduct.
Title II of the ADA, on the other hand, purports to proscribe the exclusion of a “qualified,” disabled prisoner from participation in any “services, programs, or activities” of a public entity. Title II is not tailored to provide prophylactic protection of the Eighth-Amendment right; instead, it applies to any service, program, or activity provided by the prison, whether educational, recreational, job-training, work in prison industries, drug and alcohol counseling, or a myriad of other prison services, programs, and activities not affected by the Eighth Amendment. Although we recognize Congress‘s power to proscribe facially constitutional conduct, Title II does not merely proscribe a “somewhat broader swath of conduct” than the Eighth Amendment, but prohibits a different swath of conduct that is far broader and even totally unrelated to the Eighth Amendment in many instances. In short, Title II prohibits far more state conduct and in many more areas of prison administration than conceivably necessary to enforce the Eighth Amendment‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, Title II addresses all prison services, programs, and activities – and goes well beyond the basic, humane necessities guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment – to disabled prisoners.
Miller stresses that Title II is limited in that it does not require state prisons to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for their services, programs, and activities, and that it does not require States to fundamentally alter the nature of those services, programs, or activities.33 What Miller ignores, however, is that theEighth Amendment has no effect on most prison services, programs, and activities. Further, while Miller‘s eligibility and the extent of the state prison‘s ADA obligations under Title II may be much more limited due to his disciplinary status in isolation in a maximum-security building, the § 5 issue must be examined in the state-prison context as a whole and the States’ ADA obligations under Title II to disabled prisoners generally, most of whom are not in disciplinary isolation in a maximum-security building. As noted earlier, ADA regulations require that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity‘s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.” Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1079-80 (quoting
D. ADA Claims Against Individuals
Finally, Miller argues that the magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment to defendant King on Miller‘s ADA claims against King in his individual capacity. We disagree because the magistrate judge properly concluded that individuals are not subject to personal liability under § 12132 for violations of Title II of the ADA.
As stated above,
Miller, on the other hand, argues that the phrase “by any such entity” modifies only the final clause of the sentence: “be
Miller‘s argument fails for two reasons. First, under Miller‘s interpretation, Congress specified the parties that could be liable for discrimination, yet inexplicably failed to specify who could be liable for denial of benefits of services, programs, or activities, implicitly allowing a broader range of defendants to be liable for those violations. In the absence of any reason for such a distinction, Miller‘s interpretation is nonsensical.
Second, had Congress intended to create liability for individuals under Title II of the ADA, it easily could have provided for such liability. In fact, Congress did provide for such liability for retaliation claims. Specifically,
We thus conclude that
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to defendant Sikes (1) individually on Miller‘s Eighth-Amendment claims for monetary damages under
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.