KATHY DYER; ROBERT DYER, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Graham Dyer, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. RICHARD HOUSTON; ALAN GAFFORD; ZACHARY SCOTT; WILLIAM HEIDELBURG; PAUL POLISH; JOE BAKER, Defendants - Appellees
No. 19-10280
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
July
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC July 6, 2020
STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No panel member nor judge in regular active service having requested an en banc poll (
Plaintiffs Kathy and Robert Dyer (“the Dyers“) appeal the dismissal on qualified immunity grounds of their deliberate-indifference claims against paramedics and police officers employed by the City of Mesquite, Texas. The Dyers’ claims arise out of the death of their 18-year-old son, Graham, from self-inflicted head trauma while in police custody. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Graham died after violently bashing his head over 40 times against the interior of a patrol car while being transported to jail. The Dyers brought various claims against the paramedics who initially examined Graham, the officers who transported him, and the City of Mesquite. Relevant here are the deliberate-indifference claims against paramedics Paul Polish and Joe Baker (“Paramedics“) and police officers Alan Gafford, Zachary Scott, and William Heidelburg (“Officers“). The district court
A.
Regarding the Paramedics, we accept as true the allegations in the Dyers’ operative complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). According to the complaint, Polish and Baker arrived on the scene in the late evening hours of August 13, 2013. There they found Graham already detained by police officers for exhibiting erratic behavior. After “learning that [Graham and his friend] had consumed LSD,” one “paramedic went over to examine Graham.” He summoned the second paramedic, after which they both “further examine[d] Graham.” Graham “had sustained a visible and serious head injury.” Moreover, the Paramedics “were aware that [Graham] had ingested LSD and was incoherent and screaming,” and “were aware that he was not rational and was in a drug induced
Based on these allegations, the Dyers claim the Paramedics violated Graham‘s Fourteenth Amendment right not to have his serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). They claim Polish and Baker “made no recommendations for further treatment or medical intervention, including sedation which would have calmed Graham down and allowed him to comply with instructions.” They further claim “Polish and Baker also knew of the substantial risk of serious harm that would result from ignoring the psychosis of someone who had ingested LSD, yet they did nothing to treat Graham [or] transport him for treatment.” Finally, they claim “Graham should have been given a sedative and transported to the emergency room” because the Paramedics “were aware of facts demonstrating a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to treat Graham.”
B.
Regarding the Officers, we take the relevant facts from the summary judgment record, construed in favor of the non-movants.1 Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Responding to the late evening 911 call concerning Graham, Officer Gafford first arrived on the scene, observed Graham‘s erratic behavior, and physically restrained him. Officer Houston arrived next and handcuffed Graham. During this encounter, Graham was “rolling” and “yelling” while officers tried to calm him down. Officers Heidelburg, Scott, and Fyall next arrived. The Paramedics then arrived, examined Graham, and released him to the police. See supra I.B.
Graham was then placed in Heidelburg‘s patrol car. While officers were trying to secure Graham, he bit Fyall on the finger.
At that point, Scott stopped to help “prevent [Graham] from banging his head on the back of the car.” Gafford also pulled over, seeking to help stop Graham from doing “further harm to himself.” Gafford testified he could “actually see the car shaking from side to side” as Graham flung himself around in the back seat. When the car stopped, Graham continued
All three Officers removed Graham from the patrol car and brought him into the sally port. Graham continued kicking and screaming as jail personnel tried to secure him. Graham was moved inside the jail, placed in a restraint chair, and eventually put in a padded cell. No evidence shows Graham caused any further harm to himself once restrained. The Officers each said they had no recollection of reporting to the jail sergeant the fact that Graham had slammed his head repeatedly against the interior of the patrol car en route to jail. The investigation report states only that the jail sergeant was “[i]nformed by transport officers [Graham] had been medically cleared at the scene.”
Just over two hours later, the sergeant noticed Graham‘s breathing was labored and summoned paramedics, who arrived at 1:40 a.m. Graham was transported to a local hospital and died at 11:00 p.m. that evening. Among other injuries, the autopsy reported extensive blunt force injuries to Graham‘s head and cranial hemorrhaging. The reported cause of death was craniocerebral trauma.
Based on a review of a video recording from Heidelburg‘s patrol car, the investigation report found that Graham hit his head on the metal cage, side window, and back seat of the car approximately 46 times.
II.
“We review a district court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 589 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov‘t, 806 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“The qualified immunity defense has two prongs: whether an official‘s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff; and whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Brown, 623 F.3d at 253 (citing Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009)). A court may rest its analysis on either prong. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
III.
We first address whether the district court properly granted the Paramedics’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court relied on the first prong, finding the amended complaint failed to state a plausible deliberate-indifference claim against the Paramedics. Specifically, the court found insufficient the allegations that, because the Paramedics observed Graham‘s “serious head injury” and “LSD-induced behavior,” they should have provided additional care.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right “not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials.” Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing, inter alia, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). To succeed on a deliberate-indifference claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) the official was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and (2) the official actually drew that inference. Domino v. Tex. Dep‘t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Id. at 756.
We agree with the district court that the Dyers’ complaint fails to allege facts that plausibly show the Paramedics’
Measured against these standards, we cannot say the complaint plausibly states a deliberate-indifference claim against the Paramedics. We therefore affirm the district court‘s dismissal of those claims.
IV.
We next address the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to the Officers based on qualified immunity. On prong one of the qualified immunity standard, the district court found genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Officers Heidelburg and Gafford acted with deliberate indifference to Graham‘s serious medical needs. But, as to Officer Scott, the district court found the Dyers “failed to present evidence that [he was] aware of facts indicating a risk of injury and inferred a risk of injury to Graham.” On prong two, however, the district court concluded all three Officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
A.
Turning first to the district court‘s prong one ruling, we agree that the record discloses genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Officers Heidelburg and Gafford acted with deliberate indifference. But we disagree as to Officer Scott, finding similar fact disputes as to him.
The district court correctly found a genuine dispute concerning whether Gafford and Heidelburg were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a detainee in their custody. A reasonable trier of fact could find that those Officers were aware that Graham, in the grip of a drug-induced psychosis, struck his head violently against the interior of Heidelburg‘s patrol car over 40 times en route to
A reasonable jury could find that Graham‘s injuries—from which Graham would die within roughly 24 hours—were so severe, and their cause so plainly evident to the Officers, that the Officers acted with deliberate indifference by failing to seek medical attention, by failing to inform jail personnel about Graham‘s injuries, and by informing jail personnel only that Graham had been “medically cleared” before arriving at the jail.4 A reasonable jury could find otherwise, of course, but the district court correctly concluded that the Dyers presented enough evidence that the Officers “were aware of a risk of injury to Graham that they did nothing to alleviate,” allowing the Dyers to survive summary judgment on prong one.5
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Dyers, we conclude there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Officer Scott, like Gafford and Heidelburg, acted with deliberate indifference to Graham‘s serious medical needs. The district court therefore erroneously granted Scott summary judgment on prong one.
B.
Turning to prong two of the qualified immunity standard, we ask whether there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether “the unlawfulness of the [Officers‘] conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.‘” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 388 (2019) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (cleaned up). While the Dyers need not identify a case “directly on point,” “existing precedent” must “place[ ] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Morgan, 659 F.3d at 372 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). That precedent, moreover, must “define[ ] the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity.” Id. at 371–72. In sum, “the salient question” we ask at prong two is whether the state of the law at the time of the incident “gave [the Officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [Graham] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); accord Morgan, 659 F.3d at 372 (“The sine qua non of the clearly-established inquiry is ‘fair warning.‘“) (citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
The district court‘s prong two analysis was legally erroneous. Instead of asking whether controlling authority placed the unconstitutionality of the Officers’ alleged conduct “beyond debate,” Morgan, 659 F.3d at 372, the court instead found that our deliberate-indifference case law was too muddled even to attempt the inquiry. Specifically, the district court pointed to “confusion” in our cases over whether deliberate indifference requires proof of an officer‘s “actual intent to cause harm in medical-inattention claims.” The court therefore concluded that “there is no clearly established right in the Fifth Circuit to be free from medical inattention by officers who do not actually intend to cause harm.”
We disagree with the district court‘s prong two analysis. Admittedly, the district court was correct that our deliberate-indifference cases are not a paradigm of consistency. As discussed supra, a panel of
Reviewing the record de novo, we conclude a reasonable jury could find the Officers’ conduct contravened clearly established law. In Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, our court confronted a deliberate-indifference claim after a detainee, Thompson, died in jail from a seizure brought on by delirium tremens (“DTs“). 245 F.3d at 452–54. We found genuine disputes of material fact as to the jail sergeant, Whorton, who was aware that Thompson had elevated blood-alcohol content, was “hallucinating,” and “was injuring himself in his cell.” Id. at 452, 463. In particular, Whorton knew Thompson had “beg[u]n to collide with objects in his cell, sometimes falling and striking his head against the window, floor or concrete bench.” Id. at 454. Whorton provided some care to Thompson—she placed him in a straitjacket (but not an available helmet), had extra mattresses placed in his cell, dressed his head wound, and even claimed to seek advice from a hospital, id. at 453–54, 463—but when Whorton‘s shift ended, she instructed her colleagues not to summon medical help without contacting her and only if Thompson was “dying.” Id. at 454. Seven hours later, Thompson died from a seizure brought on by DTs. Id. We found a jury question as to whether Whorton‘s behavior was objectively unreasonable, given “[c]learly established law forbids a significantly exacerbating delay or a denial of medical care to a detainee suffering from DTs.” Id. at 463. Any reasonable jailer, we explained, “would have recognized the constitutional obligation to summon medical assistance well before Thompson died,” and also would not have instructed subordinates not to get help unless Thompson “was on the verge of death.” Id. at 464.
Thompson defines clearly established law in sufficient detail to have notified the Officers that their actions were unconstitutional. See, e.g., Morgan, 659 F.3d at 372 (controlling precedent must define pertinent right “with a high degree of particularity“). Similar to the jail sergeant in Thompson, here the Officers had custody of a delusional detainee who was severely harming himself, and yet—despite being aware of the detainee‘s dire condition—they did nothing to secure medical help. Arguably, this situation presents a clearer case of deliberate indifference than Thompson. There, although providing Thompson some care, the jailer recklessly misjudged the severity of Thompson‘s condition that led to the seizure that caused his death. 245 F.3d at 453–54, 463–64. Here, the Officers actually witnessed Graham violently slamming his head against the patrol car over and over again, inflicting
Compare this case with our decision in Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2000). There, officers pepper sprayed the plaintiff, cuffed him, and placed him on his chest in the back of the patrol car. Id. at 319. Instead of taking the plaintiff to the hospital to flush out the pepper spray, the officers drove him to jail. Id. There, they discovered the plaintiff had stopped breathing and attempted CPR; the plaintiff later died at the hospital. Id. at 318–19. We concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity against a deliberate-indifference claim. Id. at 324–25. Among other reasons, we explained that the officers heard the plaintiff moaning during the trip to jail (indicating he was still breathing), and that, when the officers realized he had stopped breathing in jail, they “immediately began CPR.” Id. at 325. Further, the suggestion that the officers take the plaintiff to the hospital was “based solely on a need to decontaminate the effects of the pepper spray,” and there was no evidence “that the delay in the decontamination caused [the plaintiff] to stop breathing.” Id. Thus, we concluded there was no evidence that the officers “had knowledge that [the plaintiff] was in need of any other immediate medical attention.” Id.
By contrast, in this case a reasonable jury could find that (1) Graham violently bashed his head against the interior of Officer Heidelburg‘s patrol car over 40 times while en route to jail; (2) Officers Heidelburg, Gafford, and Scott were fully aware of Graham‘s actions and of their serious danger; (3) the Officers sought no medical attention for Graham; and (4) upon arriving at jail, the Officers failed to inform jail officials what Graham had done to himself, telling them only that Graham had been “medically cleared” at the scene. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Officers “were either aware or should have been aware, because it was so obvious, of an unjustifiably high risk to [Graham‘s] health,” did nothing to seek medical attention, and even misstated the severity of Graham‘s condition to those who could have sought
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s order dismissing the deliberate-indifference claims against the Paramedics. We REVERSE the summary judgment dismissing the deliberate-indifference claims against the Officers, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.