DEEPAK KALPOE еt al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; PHILLIP C. McGRAW et al., Real Parties in Interest.
No. B246154
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Seven, California
Dec. 17, 2013
222 Cal. App. 4th 206
WOODS, J.
Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, Kristina M. Beck, William J. Cremer, Joshua D. Yeager, I. Brian Marquez; Girardi Keese, Thomas V. Girardi and Graham B. Lippsmith for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, William C. Haggerty, Neil S. Tardiff; Jackson Walker, Charles L. Babcock and Nancy W. Hamilton for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
WOODS, J.—Deepak Kalpoe and Satish Kalpoe (individually referred to by their first names, collectively referred to as petitioners) filed a petition for writ of mandate after the trial court granted a motion in limine brought by Phillip C. McGraw, CBS Paramount Domestic Television, and Peteski Productions, Inc. (collectively real parties in interest).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners, residents of Aruba, were questioned in connection with the 2005 disappearance of Natalee Holloway, an American teenager on a high school trip to Aruba. McGraw is the host of a television show (the Show) produced by Peteski Productions Inc. (Peteski) in association with CBS Paramount (CBS) and broadcast on a national television network.
Real parties in interest hired a private investigator, Jamie Skeeters, to travel to Aruba in the summer of 2005 to investigate Holloway‘s disappearance. Skeeters arranged to meet with Deepak by representing that he would help exonerate him. Skeeters secretly recorded and videotaped the meeting with Deepak. During the meeting, Skeeters asked Deepak if he and Satish had sex with Holloway the night she disappeared.
After the episode aired, Deepak claimed he had not consented to the videotaping and recording of the meeting, and had not known that Skeeters was recording it. He also claimed that when Skeeters asked if Holloway had sex with him and his brother, he responded “No,” shaking his head, and that the videotape played on the Show had been manipulated.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 13, 2006, petitioners filed a complaint alleging several causes of action against real рarties in interest.1 A first amended complaint was filed on February 22, 2008. It contains causes of action for defamation, defamation per se, invasion of privacy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit, negligent misrepresentation and deceit and civil conspiracy.
In October 2011, real parties in interest filed a motion in limine (Motion in Limine No. 1) seeking to bar petitioners from introducing any evidence at trial regarding general or punitive damages for defamation, defamation per se, false light, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 The motion was based on
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on December 19, 2012.
On January 31, 2013, we issued an order to show cause to the superior court directing a written return to be filed by real parties in interest and allowing petitioners to file a reply.
DISCUSSION
The statute goes on to define “special damages” as those damages suffered in respect to plaintiff‘s property, business, trade, profession or occupation including monies expended as a result of the alleged libel (
Prior to this time, common law provided that a plaintiff could recover general damages without proving actual injuriеs. (Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 30 [81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912].)
In 1949,
Petitioners contend the trial court erred in applying
1. Statutory Interpretation
We first examine the language of the statutes. Real parties in interest argue that the plain language of
In interpreting a statute, the objective is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent and thereby effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 179 P.3d 882]; Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 137 P.3d 218].) To ascertain that intent, we begin with the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857, 92 P.3d 350].) “If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196]; see Smith v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 83.)
“If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we ‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ ” (Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
We do not construe a statute in isolation, but rather construe it in context with reference to the entirе scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole scheme may be harmonized and still be effective. (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14 [177 Cal.Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352].) We presume that when enacting a statute, the Legislature was aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules. (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 118 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 326].)
Given this framework, the plain language of
We note that reviewing courts may examine the legislative history of an unambiguous statute if it supports or bolsters their interpretation of that statute. (In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, 519 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608].) In any event, we find nothing in the legislative history of
2. Case Law
Despite the lack of reference to content in the plain language of the statutes, petitioners contend the case law interpreting
In Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers (1950) 35 Cal.2d 121 [216 P.2d 825], the defendant published newspapers which repоrted that the plaintiff was a convicted felon. The plaintiff sued for libel and the defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not comply with
In Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Cal.2d 788 [228 P.2d 6], a daily newspaper published an article containing allegedly defamatory statements about a United States Embassy employee. The employee sued the authors of the article but not the newspaper publisher. (Id. at pp. 790-791.) Justice Traynor again wrote for the Supreme Court, finding that the protection of
Almost 20 years later, the Supreme Court decided Field Research Corp. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 110 [77 Cal.Rptr. 243, 453 P.2d 747]. In that case, a gubernatorial candidate made statements in press conferences or interviews about a company engaged in conducting and disseminating public opinion polls, claiming that one of the polls released was inaccurate and dishonest. (Id. at pp. 112, 113-114.) In addressing the issue of whether the candidate was the рroper party on whom to serve the retraction request, the court, again in an opinion authored by Justice Traynor, cited Werner and Pridonoff, noting, “it is only the publisher or broadcaster who has the power effectively to correct or retract. . . . Indeed many news stories and editorials disseminated by either enterprise do not reveal the identity of the author and are accepted by the public as statements of the enterprise itself. Even when the participant is identified, the weight that the public will attach to his statement may be determined largely by the reputation for truth and impartiality that the enterprise itself enjoys.” (Id. at p. 115.)
In Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 991 [193 Cal.Rptr. 206], a show business personality sued a weekly magazine, the National Enquirer, alleging that an item about her in a “gossip column” was false and libelous. The celebrity had demanded and received a retraction. A jury awarded her compensatory and punitive damages. The Enquirer appealed the amount of the judgment and contended that it was not excluded from the protection afforded by
In Condit v. National Enquirer (E.D.Cal. 2002) 248 F.Supp.2d 945, a former congressman‘s wife brought a libel action against the National Enquirer. In determining whether the Enquirer was a “newspaper,” the federal district court cited Field Research Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 110, noting that a news publication subject to
Petitioners contend that Werner and its progeny conclude the intent of the Legislаture in enacting
Werner, Pridonoff, Burnett and Condit all involve print publications, but focus on whether the publication can be considered a “newspaper” as used in the statute. No books, whether fiction or nonfiction, trade journals, magazines or advertisement flyers are considered. Even editorials in newspapers are included under the statute‘s reach. (Kapellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20; Grillo v. Smith (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 868 [193 Cal.Rptr. 414].) In Gomes v. Fried (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 924 [186 Cal.Rptr. 605], an editorial was published on the front page of a weekly newspaper with a photograph of a police officer with a caption which suggested that he was sleeping on duty. (Id. at p. 935.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the only possible defamatory portion of the article was the photograph with its caption. (Ibid.)
The cases which focus on content seek to distinguish certain publications from newspapers by defining them as magazines and not “newspapers.” Thus the judicial interpretation stays true to the statute‘s literal language by including only those written publications which can be considered “newspapers” within its scope.
The question presented here is whether, in light of these cases,
3. Television Broadcast Cases
We now examine the cases involving television broadcasts.
In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 133], a sports arena owner sued over an investigatory television show that purported to be a news report about safety in public places. A request for a retraction was made but the Court of Appeal determined that a plaintiff must be named with specificity in the retraction
In Arno v. Stewart (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 955 [54 Cal.Rptr. 392], in a television broadcast of one of a series of dance shows, the host referred to a singer as his “‘buddy from the Mafia.‘” (Id. at p. 958.) The singer demanded a retraction. After a jury trial which resulted in a defense verdict, the singer appealed. The issues raised in the appeal involved the propriety of the jury instructions and did not include anything about applicability of
In Mullins v. Brando (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 409 [91 Cal.Rptr. 796], a guest being interviewed on a television talk show made statements about the actions of a group of police officers. A demand for a retraction was made by the police officers group. The issue on appeal was whether the statements were defamatory. The case did not discuss the applicability of
In O‘Hara v. Storer Communications, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1101 [282 Cal.Rptr. 712], a news report erroneously named a private citizen as a prostitute. The citizen made what was described as a “conditiоnal request” for a retraction, and the Court of Appeal determined that the request did not qualify as a retraction under
In White v. Valenta (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 243 [44 Cal.Rptr. 241], an automobile dealer chose to advertise his business by filming live commercials at his place of business. During one commercial which was currently being aired on television, an owner of an adjacent parcel of property stepped in front of the camera and uttered angry words at the dealer who was speаking. (Id. at pp. 244-245Id. at p. 258.) Although the Court of Appeal held that the broadcast literally came within the purview of
In Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 991 [283 Cal.Rptr. 644], a series of television broadcasts allegedly implied that an antique silver dealer had engaged in fraud. The case only addressed
None of these сases holds that “visual and sound radio broadcasting” refers only to radio or television programs which disseminate breaking news. The
In Cable News Network, the plaintiff brought a defamation lawsuit based upon statements made in two shows broadcast on a cable news network and a magazine article which was “inextricably intertwined” (In re Cable News Network, supra, 106 F.Supp.2d at p. 1002) and marketed together with the shows. The district court noted, “At thе time the statute was amended to cover television broadcasts the Legislature likely had not even contemplated magazine-style broadcasts such as those at issue here.” The court held that due to the specific circumstances of this case,
Nothing in these cases limits the type of television programs to which
4. Conclusion
A close examination of the cases reveals the scope of
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. Each party is to bear its own costs.
Perluss, P. J., and Segal, J.,* concurred.
Petitioners’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 19, 2014, S216065.
*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.