Joseph Lyle Fredrick v. The State of WyomingJoseph Lyle Fredrick v. The State of Wyoming
The Honorable Suzannah G. Robinson, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Brandon Booth, State Public Defender*; Kirk Allan Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; H. Michael Bennett, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen Reeves Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before FOX, C.J., and BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, FENN, and JAROSH, JJ.
*An Order Substituting Brandon Booth for Ryan Roden was entered on October 10, 2024.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify thе Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.
[¶1] Joseph Lyle Fredrick appeals the district court‘s order revoking his probation and reinstating his underlying sentence. Mr. Fredrick contends the court violated his due process rights by failing to timely hold a final adjudication hearing, permitting a probation officer to testify by video, and allowing the revocation matter to proсeed without discovery of certain probation records. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Mr. Fredrick raises one issue on appeal, which we rephrase as three:
- Did the district court abuse its discretion when it extended Mr. Fredrick‘s
probation revocation hearing beyond the 15-day limit specified in W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(4)(B)(i) ? - Did the district court violate Mr. Fredrick‘s due process rights by permitting the probation officer to testify by video during the probation revocation hearing?
- Did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded certain probation records Mr. Fredrick demanded were privileged under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-409 (2023) and the discovery dispute did not warrant dismissal?
FACTS
[¶3] In June 2021, the State charged Mr. Fredrick with multiple counts of possession of a controlled substance (testosterone, marijuana, and heroin) and misdemeanor theft. Mr. Fredrick pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of heroin in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. The district court sentenced him to 117 days imprisonment for the misdemeanor charge with credit for 117 days served. On the felony charge, the court sentenced Mr. Fredrick to three to five years of incаrceration, suspended for three years of supervised probation. At the time of his sentencing, Mr. Fredrick resided in Oregon. His probation was transferred there through the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision.
[¶4] In September 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke Mr. Fredrick‘s probation claiming he absconded and had no contact with his Oregon probation officer after July 2023. Mr. Fredrick was arrested in Oregon on November 28, 2023, transported to Wyoming December 14, and remained in custody until the petition was decided. The district cоurt held Mr. Fredrick‘s initial appearance on December 19 and set his adjudication hearing for December 27. Prior to the hearing, the State moved to allow Mr. Fredrick‘s Oregon probation officer to appear remotely by video. The court granted the motion.
[¶5] On December 26, the State amended its petition, adding an allegation that Mr. Fredrick used fentanyl in violation of his probation conditions. During the adjudication hearing the next day, the district court provided initial appearance advisements based on the amended petition, and Mr. Fredrick denied the allegations against him. Mr. Fredrick‘s counsel asserted he did not receive the motion to allow the probation officer to appear by video and he had not received any discovery from the State. The district court continued the hearing to January 5, 2024, due to the lack of discovery and the probation officer‘s failure to appear at the hearing.
[¶6] At the January 5 hearing, the probation officer appeared by video. During cross-examination, Mr. Fredrick learned the probation officer had additional documents that she had not provided to either party prior to the hearing. Mr. Fredrick moved to dismiss the revocation petition for “failure of the State to provide discovery.” The district court denied the motion but offered another continuance to allow resolution of the alleged discovery violation. Mr. Fredrick objected to the proposed continuance because, if he remained in custody, it would violate the 15-day limit specified in
[¶7] Mr. Fredrick renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of the State‘s evidence because various probation reports and other documents were not produced in response to his discovery request. The State responded, claiming the probation records were privileged under
[¶8] At the January 19 hearing, the court denied Mr. Fredrick‘s motion to dismiss and found certain documents he sought from the probation officer were privileged under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] We review probation rеvocation decisions for an abuse of discretion. Farthing v. State, 2021 WY 114, ¶ 10, 496 P.3d 783, 786 (Wyo. 2021) (citation omitted). A district court does not abuse its discretion if it could reasonably conclude as it did. Benedict v. State, 2024 WY 55, ¶ 20, 548 P.3d 989, 995 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). Probation revocation proceedings are subject to constitutional due process. We review constitutional claims de novo. Counts v. State, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 11, 197 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to continue the hearing past the 15-day time limit specified in W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(4)(B)(i) .
[¶10] Mr. Fredrick argues the district court violated his right to due process by continuing his revocation hеaring past the 15-day limit specified in
[¶11]
If the probationer is in custody because of the probation revocation proceedings, a hearing upon a petition for revocation of probation shall be held within 15 days after thе probationer‘s first appearance before the court following the filing of the petition. If the probationer is not in custody because of the probation revocation proceedings, a hearing upon the petition shall be held within 30 days after the probationer‘s first appearance following the filing of the petition. For good cause the time limits may be extended by the court.
(emphasis added). Rule 39‘s time limits are designed to prevent delays that contravene a defendant‘s right to a “speedy disposition of the charges against him.” Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo. 1993) (“Federal due process requires that a probationer be afforded an opportunity for a revocation hearing within a reasonable time after he is taken into custody.” (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972))).
[¶12] Because a decision to extend revocation proceedings beyond the 15-day time limit is discretionary, we review an extension for any abuse of that discretion. See Lessner v. State, 549 P.3d 763, 767 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). The probationer carries the burden of proving a delay was both unreasonable and prejudicial. Reese, 866 P.2d at 84–85 (citations omitted).
[¶13] Adherence to the fifteen-day time limit in
[¶14] We first look at the cause of the delay. Id. The State‘s initial request for a continuance from December 27 to January 5 stemmed, in рart, from the probation officer‘s failure to appear at the December 27 hearing. However, the continuance also allowed the State to perfect its
[¶15] The second continuance—from January 5 to January 19—occurred because the court wanted to further consider Mr. Fredrick‘s motion to dismiss the petition based on missing discovery. Mr. Fredrick timely filed a demand for discovery on December 22. The morning of the January 5 hearing, the action plan governing Mr. Fredricks‘s probation was exchanged in discovery, and it was admitted as a hearing exhibit. The Oregon probation officer testified abоut monthly reports and notes she kept, but had not previously disclosed. A probation officer in Wyoming testified about the initial probation agreement, interstate transfer application, and other records which were not provided in discovery. In response to Mr. Fredrick‘s motion to dismiss for lack of discovery, the State claimed all these documents were privileged from disclosure under
[¶16] If the record disclosed thаt the State made its privilege claim in a deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings and hinder Mr. Fredrick‘s defense, we would question the reason for the second continuance. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.” (citations omitted)). But that is not the case here, and Mr. Fredrick does not argue as much. Instead, he suggests that Doney v. State, 2002 WY 182, 59 P.3d 730 (Wyo. 2002) should guide us to an appropriate remedy for the
[¶17] We next consider the length of the overall delay against the prescribed timeframe. Reese, 866 P.2d at 84 (citations omitted). When the court continued the first adjudicatory hearing to January 5, just two days beyond the 15-day limit after the December 19 initial appearance, it noted it could offer an earlier hearing date but that thе earlier date would occur in the middle of defense counsel‘s upcoming jury trial and a jury trial for the court. It therefore set the hearing for the next available date of January 5. As noted above, the second continuance—from January 5 to January 19—occurred so that the court could consider Mr. Fredrick‘s motion to dismiss for not having received the probation officers’ records. Mr. Fredrick‘s January 19 hearing occurred 16 days after the prescribed 15-day limit. Mr. Fredrick again relies on Doney—a case involving a 48-day and 18-day delay before an initial appearance, not an adjudicatory hearing—to suggest his delay was unreasonably long. He also points to
[¶18] Finally, we consider whether Mr. Fredrick demonstrated the 16-day delay prejudiced him. Reese, 866 P.2d at 84–85. He provides no argument or analysis to explain how that delay substantially affected his rights beyond general references to the right to have a speedy disposition of the petition. Nor, perhaps, could he since the record reflects Mr. Fredrick received 53 days of credit for the time he spent in custody—from the date of his arrest on November 28 to the date of the January 19 hearing—waiting for his final revocation hearing. When revocation proceedings are delayed, sometimes dismissal is appropriate, but sometimes credit for time served while waiting for a final revocation hearing is the remedy. Ramsdell v. State, 2006 WY 159, ¶ 19, 149 P.3d 459, 463–64 (Wyo. 2006) (affirming that either remedy can be appropriate depending on the circumstances of a case); Doney, 2002 WY 182, ¶ 17, 59 P.3d at 737 (“Should a Rule 39(a)(2) violation require a remedy, we prefer to tailor that remedy to the circumstances of each case in light of the harm the rule was promulgated to prevent.“) The receipt of credit, even if we fоund a
[¶19] Because the causes for and length of the delays were reasonable, and because Mr. Fredrick did not establish prejudice, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it extended Mr. Fredrick‘s revocation hearing beyond the 15-day time limit in
II. The district court did not violate Mr. Fredrick‘s due process rights when it permitted the probation officer to testify by video.
[¶20] Mr. Fredrick contends the district court violated his confrontation rights under the
[¶21] Mr. Fredrick overlooks that the
[¶22] State courts likewise have held that revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions but rather “purely administrative acts” to determine whether a probationer has violated the terms and conditions of their probation. See, e.g., State v. Haagenson, 2010 MT 95, ¶ 15, 232 P.3d 367, 372 (Mont. 2010); State v. Maynard, 2010 MT 115, ¶ 28, 233 P.3d 331, 341 (Mont. 2010) (describing a probation revocation as “a supervisory act involving the enforcement of conditions imposed on a term of parole or probation” (citation omitted)); Cross v. State, 586 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (“Probation revocation proceedings are administrative in nature.” (citation omitted)); see also Troupe v. State, 903 S.E.2d 721, 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024) (“[I]t is well-settled that a probationer facing revocation is not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional due process rights which attach to an accused in a criminal prosecution.” (citation omitted)); Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (Fla. 2008) (“[A] revocation proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal prosecution for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause purposes.“).
[¶23] Our precedent recognizes that probation revocations are not criminal prosecutions subject to the “full panoply of rights available under the Sixth Amendment[.]” Robinson v. State, 2016 WY 90, ¶ 34, 378 P.3d 599, 608 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981)); Counts v. State, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Peterson v. State, 2024 WY 107, ¶ 8, —P.3d— (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). We have stated a probation revocation hearing is “simply an extension of the sentencing procedure resulting from the conviction of the basic charge” rather than a “trial on a new criminal charge.” Counts, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d at 1284 (citation omitted). In line with this reasoning and these precedents, we hold Mr. Fredrick does not have a Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness in a probation revocation proceeding.
[¶24] However, because probation revocation proceedings may result in the loss of liberty, a probationer is afforded due process under the
[¶25] During the adjudication phase,
is silent, however, concerning the use of video testimony. The rule neither requires, nor indicates a preference for, in-person testimony. Mr. Fredrick cites no caselaw, and we can find none, suggesting a witness must be confronted in person during probation revocation proceedings. To the contrary,
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded certain probation records were privileged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-409 and the discovery dispute did not otherwise warrant dismissal of the petition.
[¶27] Mr. Fredrick also appeals the district court‘s decision that the probation records his supervising probation officers relied on during their testimony were privileged. To put this argument in context, we note that Mr. Fredrick moved to dismiss the State‘s revocation petition because he had not been provided with certain discovery. The court ruled, in large part, the State had not violated its discovery obligations because certain documents Mr. Fredrick sought access to were privileged under
discovery violation); Roach v. State, 901 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted) (reviewing a decision quashing a subpoena requesting privileged records).
[¶28] Mr. Fredrick complains he was advised at his initial appearance that he had a right to discovery under
[¶29] The action plan was provided in response to Mr. Fredrick‘s discovery demand and became an exhibit at the January 5 hearing. The violation reports initiated the petition and were provided in discovery. The monthly reports were to be filled out by the probationer, and the probation agreement and interstate transfer application were signed and provided to Mr. Fredrick at the beginning of his probation. Because Mr. Fredrick either received or completed these materials himself, we address them separately below. The remaining documents were notes the Oregon probation officer kept on her computer. Neither party disputes that she prepared these notes in the course of her official duties. As such,
[¶31]
“exercised with extreme caution.” Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 12, 143 P.3d at 362. In Naple, we recognized factors courts consider when determining whether dismissal should be the remedy: (1) bad faith by the State or the reasons for the discovery delay, (2) prejudice to the defendant, and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance. Id. (citation omitted).
[¶32] The record on appeal makes clear the district court considered these factors when it offered Mr. Fredrick three continuances related to discovery. The record contains no evidence that the State acted in bad faith. To the contrary, counsel for the parties talked about discovery needs and the State acquired and provided the document defense counsel requested (the action plan). The court also noted the probation agreement and reports were documents known to Mr. Fredrick and he could have subpoenaed them prior to the hearing if he had wanted them. Finally, the court found, based on witness testimony and credibility, that the documents Mr. Fredrick demanded were more likely “inculpatory” than exculpatory, and, therefore, Mr. Fredrick suffered no prejudice. For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Fredrick‘s motion for dismissal. See Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 12, 143 P.3d at 362.
CONCLUSION
[¶33] The district court did not abuse its discretion under
Notes
All information and data obtained in the discharge of official duties by probation and parole agents is privileged information and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than to the judge, the department or to others entitled to receive repоrts unless and until otherwise ordered by the judge, board or department.
(2) Failure to Comply.—If at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.