S22A0069. JONES v. THE STATE. S22A0380. MCFARLAND v. THE STATE.
S22A0069, S22A0380
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 22, 2022
PETERSON, Justice.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
Appellants Xzavaien Jones and Terrell McFarland were tried jointly and convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Anthony Meredith.1 Both men appeal and
On the evening of March 26, 2016, Devon Wynn was at Peachtree Mall in Columbus. Wynn, who knew both Meredith and Jones, saw Meredith near the food court entrance to the mall. Meredith was talking to Jones, another man, and a woman. Wynn was walking toward the group to greet Meredith when he saw Jones shoot Meredith. A nearby witness heard a man, whom he later identified as Jones, yell “f**k n***er, f**k n***er” at Meredith, followed by multiple gunshots. The witness then heard Jones say,
Officers obtained a surveillance video recording from the mall‘s parking lot from the evening of March 26. Douglas identified Young and Jones in the surveillance video at trial. The video showed that Young drove into the parking lot, got out of her car and paced while talking on a cellphone. Shortly thereafter, Jones and another man arrived at the mall together and parked a few spots away. The group talked briefly and then approached Meredith. Jones shot Meredith multiple times. The group then ran back to their respective vehicles and drove away.
After the shooting, Young spoke to police officers. She arrived at the police station driving a car that matched the car that she was seen driving in the surveillance video of the murder. Young denied any involvement in the shooting, telling officers that, on the afternoon of March 26, she left work and drove straight to a strip mall to do some shopping. Surveillance video from the strip mall recorded after the shooting showed Young wearing the same clothes
Cellphone data introduced at trial showed that the cellphones associated with Jones, McFarland, and Young were all in the area of Peachtree Mall at the time of the shooting. Young‘s phone placed three calls right after the shooting, two to McFarland and one to Jones. Young also sent McFarland a text message (which Young subsequently deleted) asking “y‘all good?” Investigators found that Young had deleted other post-shooting texts from her phone. In one deleted text, Young admitted being at the mall, and in another, Jones sent Young the address of 6351 Birling Drive. After the shooting, McFarland‘s and Jones‘s phones traveled east and stopped in the area of 6351 Birling Drive. Meanwhile, Young‘s phone traveled approximately three miles away to a strip mall.
Meredith‘s autopsy revealed that he suffered ten gunshot
2. Jones and McFarland assert that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed the jury foreperson after deliberations had started. We agree.
(a) The record shows that the jury was sent out for deliberations at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 26, 2017. The jury voted for a foreperson (L.M.) and then requested to return in the morning to begin deliberating. The trial court agreed and dismissed
What if someone feels like they‘re guilty but not enough hardcore evidence to prosecute[?]
no gun – but gun charge
no clothing
no gunpowder
no calls before
no sufficient evidence about gang related
flimsy witness – the eyewitness seem[s] to know more about the case than [he‘s] revealing
it‘s a[]lot of loopholes.
The trial court called the jurors into the courtroom and allowed them to review the requested video evidence. They were then sent back to the jury room to deliberate, and the judge conferred with the
If you‘ll recall, yesterday I charged you with the law that applies to the case, and also supplied you with two copies of that law.3 I will instruct you to continue to deliberate. If you have questions, refer to the law that I‘ve charged you with, determine the law, apply the law to the facts and the facts to the law to reach your verdict.
The jury returned to the jury room to continue deliberations.
At 5:04 p.m., the court received Jury Question 8, which stated: “The jury cannot come to a unanimous decision at this time on any of the 13 charges listed in the indictment. What do we do next?” Then, at 5:07 p.m., the judge received Jury Question 9 that stated: “Question #7 was not from the entire jury. One person wrote it and it is the same person unwilling to deliberate on the charges.”4 The
The jury resumed deliberating at 9:00 a.m. on April 28. At 10:31 a.m., L.M. sent the judge a note that stated, “we have taken a vote, more than once . . . and we cannot reach [a] unanimous vote on any of the 13 charges.” Attached to the note was an incomplete tally of the guilty votes for the various charges for each defendant, which indicated that the jury was split on many of the charges. In response to this note, the trial court again instructed the jury to continue its deliberations. The trial court received another note at 11:20 a.m. from L.M. that was marked “Personal to Judge.” It read:
I‘m not sure if I have a different understanding of the law or what. I honestly feel that they do have some evidence but not enough for me to say guilty. I‘m not sure if I have a different concept of how things work or what[] my duty here is, I have been through the evidence[;] we have went over it. I‘m not sure what y[‘]all want from me, only thing happening now is, I‘m getting force[d] to follow what everyone else is saying. Can I be switch[ed] with an alternate so y[‘]all can get the answer you‘re looking for.
The trial court had extensive discussions with the parties regarding how it should proceed. During those discussions, McFarland, as well as Young, moved for a mistrial. Without ruling on the motions, the trial court eventually decided to conduct an inquiry.
The trial court brought in the jury and asked L.M. for clarification on the tally. L.M. stated that “someone else took the tallies and did all that, I just signed [the note].” Still, L.M. stated that the votes for Jones were “11 to 1” on all charges; for Young, the vote was “11 to 1” on the murder and aggravated assault charges, and “8 to 4” on the gang act charge; and, for McFarland, the vote was “6 to 6” on the murder charges, “7 to 5” on the aggravated assault, and “5 to 7” on the gang act charge.5
Statement from J.S.: [L.M.] has not fairly deliberated during this trial. She has insulted others because of differing views. However, I know this is a part of the process — to discuss our different views. To expand on [the] insult, she has attacked (verbally) others on their views of the law. I do not think she was fit to be on a court case.
Statement from C.R.: Witnessed the fore[person] refer to a juror as “Dr. Phil.” The fore[person] has stated she would not want any of us to ever be on a jury deciding her fate if ever a defendant. The fore[person] has stated she has made up her mind and she feels like we are trying to “change her mind.” The fore[person] stated she has looked around the room and sees the others giving her bad looks.
Statement from L.W.: [L.M.] made a statement about how she was about to “go off” and she didn‘t want to have anyone come make arrests in here. She has also said we‘ve been giving her disgusted looks and by her language is nonchalantly insulting several others based on their own interpretation of the evidence presented to all of us. She also has stated about her time in prison and I believe she was suspected of aggravated assault according to what I have heard from her.7
Once again, the parties had a lengthy discussion regarding the trial court‘s next steps. Ultimately, the court brought the four jurors and
The testimony of the four jurors included that L.M. was defensive and combative in the jury room; had been insulting other members of the panel to the point that those persons would “refrain from being forthcoming in their opinions“; “was very obstinate,” “not involved at all,” and “wanted to call it quits” as soon as “midafternoon” on the first day of deliberations; “made up her mind” early in the deliberation process, but refused to explain her opinions or the reasoning behind them; had physically removed herself from the table and refused to participate in discussions; sat in the corner of the room and would not make eye contact with other jurors; and refused to consider or listen to the views of other jurors, deliberate with an open mind, or review all of the evidence presented at trial. Jurors testified that L.M.‘s behavior was “disruptive to moving forward in [the] deliberation process” because, although it did not prevent them from considering the evidence and the law, it forced them to “operat[e as] an eleven member jury.” L.W. clarified that
I didn‘t know that she had chosen not guilty on some of the ones that she read out today, when we were all here together? Because she keeps saying I don‘t know. I don‘t know. I don‘t know. So we couldn‘t really put it down as a not guilty or a guilty when we were taking the votes. And I‘m not even sure I saw her hand go up on either of those votes as we re-tallied them again this morning.
But another juror explained that not-guilty votes were not asked for: “[W]e never did the opposite vote, and therefore the numbers that are not on that sheet of paper we gave to you were not necessarily votes for the opposing view, they were just not stated votes at this time.”8
[B]efore we even just got into the box or whatever, it was already guilty, you know and I‘m — like I said in the note I wrote you, I said maybe I got a ‘mis-concept’ of how the law is and how things work and all that. That‘s why I asked to be switched out, because how I — in my mind, how I got it, and how I look at things as the real evidence as far as the gun and all this — maybe I watch too much TV, I don‘t know, but in my mind, this is how it‘s set up. And that‘s what I explained to the other jurors. They had all these different people here with different minds, and it‘s, like I said, maybe I got a misunderstanding on how things work or — I‘m not sure.
L.M. also was questioned by the trial court about her criminal history, responding that she had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor simple battery charge and received a sentence of probation. She said that she did not recall any voir dire questions that called for a
After the jurors returned to the jury room, the State moved the trial court to remove L.M. from the jury. The defendants objected. The trial court took a recess to consider all of the arguments and testimony; during the break, L.M. sent another note to the trial court (at approximately 5:10 p.m.) that stated: “Judge, with all respect I am a residen[t] of Columbus, GA an[d] the way things just took place, I don‘t agree. I thought the jurors[‘s] info [would] be private, I did not sign[] up for this, and to get [thrown] under the bus in front [of] the whole courtroom is a slap in the face.”
After another recess, the trial court granted the State‘s motion to remove L.M. In a subsequent written order, the trial court found as follows:
[L.M.] did not threaten the other jurors nor did she unduly pressure or intimidate them into changing their opinions. However, through those same testimonies, it was discovered that the foreperson was impeding the jury‘s progress as a whole in deliberating. It was stated that as early as two hours into deliberations, L.M. announced that she had made up her mind and then removed herself from further discussions. According to fellow jurors, L.M. removed herself from the table and
positioned herself in the corner of the room away from the other jurors, and she refused to communicate her reasons for her state of mind. She further stated that she would not deliberate any longer and asked to be removed from the jury. Multiple jurors stated that in order to proceed with deliberations, they had to act as if it was an 11[-] person jury, including when it came to voting on guilt or innocence.
Before the trial court could inform the jury of its ruling, however, the court received another note from L.M., which stated: “We as the jury has [sic] come to a verdict. We are ready to deliberate.” The defendants, once again, moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The court brought the jury back into the courtroom and informed the jurors that the court would “not accept the verdict.” Thereafter, the trial court removed L.M. from the panel and replaced her with an alternate juror. McFarland and Young moved again for a mistrial; Jones moved for a mistrial as well, and the trial court denied the motions.
Deliberations with the alternate juror proceeded over the course of three weekdays, although their commencement was delayed due to tornado warnings, then the jury lost at least half a
(b) A trial court generally has broad discretion to remove a juror for cause. But this discretion is narrowed once deliberations have begun, and even more so when removing a dissenting juror from a jury that appears to be divided.
The general rule on removing jurors for cause is statutory.
If at any time, whether before or after final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies, becomes ill, upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to
perform his duty, or is discharged for other legal cause, the first alternate juror shall take the place of the first juror becoming incapacitated.
As this Court has explained:
The question of whether to remove a juror is a matter committed to the trial court‘s discretion, even after jury deliberations have begun. However, there must be some sound basis upon which the trial court exercises his discretion to remove the juror. A sound basis may be one which serves the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the integrity of the judicial process.
Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 36-37 (2) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Both the need for investigation and the possibility of harmful error are heightened when a jury has begun deliberations or when a jury is deadlocked.” Id. at 37 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). And “because removing a dissenting juror when the jury is deadlocked risks violating a defendant‘s right to a unanimous verdict, a trial judge must exercise the utmost care in determining that good cause exists before removing the juror.” Id. at 37 (2) (citing Ramos v. Louisiana, — U.S. — (140 SCt 1390, 1397, 206 LEd2d 583) (2020); and United States v. Brown, 996 F3d 1171, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc)).9
On the other hand, a number of Georgia appellate decisions have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in removing a juror during deliberations when the removal was for a reason related to a juror‘s view of the evidence, or when the trial court‘s investigation was insufficient to conclude with confidence that the reason for removal was unrelated to the juror‘s view of the evidence. In other words, a juror‘s view of the evidence is not the sort of “legally relevant purpose” our case law requires before removing that juror, even when the juror‘s view of the evidence has a negative effect on deliberations. See, e.g., Moon, 312 Ga. at 36-50 (2) (trial court abused discretion in removal of a holdout juror when all jurors made up their minds quickly and trial court‘s contemporaneous statements about the juror‘s misconduct were not supported by findings); Mills v. State, 308 Ga. 558, 559-563 (2) (842 SE2d 284) (2020) (trial court abused discretion in removal of holdout juror who said she would change her mind only if the State had a clear-
In one sense, this case could perhaps have fit in either of these two lines of cases: while the evidence the trial court developed during its investigation could have supported findings that would place this case in the line allowing removal, the findings the trial court actually made instead placed it squarely in the line prohibiting removal. There was sufficient testimony from which the trial court could have found that L.M. insulted, threatened, unduly pressured, and intimidated other members of the jury, the sort of behavior unrelated a juror‘s view of the evidence that we have held can justify removal; indeed, the State and the dissent rely in part on this point
Instead, the trial court based its removal of L.M. on four related findings: (1) she ceased deliberating after making up her mind as early as two hours into deliberations, (2) she refused to communicate her reasons for her conclusion, (3) she sought to physically distance herself from the other members of the jury, and (4) she asked to be removed from the jury. Even assuming these findings are supported by the record,13 they are insufficient to
In Jones, we concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in removing a juror who asked to be removed, “repeatedly broke down” when questioned by the court, and told the court she was unable to continue to deliberating. 307 Ga. at 465-466 (2). But there was no indication in that opinion that the reason the juror felt that she was unable to continue was that she had reached a firm conclusion at odds with her fellow jurors. Indeed, we made clear in that case that “it would be inappropriate to release the juror at issue
In Mills, we held that a trial court abused its discretion in removing a holdout juror who said that she would change her mind only if the State could present a clear-resolution video of the crime. See 308 Ga. at 559-563 (2). The trial court found that this constituted failure to follow the court‘s instruction on the burden of proof, but we disagreed, in part due to an insufficient investigation. See id. Nothing in Mills supports the State‘s argument; the trial court here made no finding about any failure by L.M. to follow instructions.
In Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. 324 (578 SE2d 438) (2003), we affirmed a trial court‘s decision to investigate and then give an Allen charge instead of remove a juror or grant a mistrial; in that case, a note from the jury accused a juror of refusing to apply the law, and then later a juror threatened violence. See id. at 326-331 (2). Nothing in Mayfield supports the State‘s argument; the trial court in Mayfield did not remove a juror, and, in any event, the trial court
Finally, the State cites Bethea, a Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the removal of a juror based in part on the trial court‘s conclusion that the juror had “reached a fixed and definite opinion” early in determinations, apparently after “fewer than two hours.” 337 Ga. App. at 219-220. But we have cited that case only once, in a “Compare” cite that characterized the juror removed therein as having “formed an unwavering opinion before fully vetting the evidence[.]” Moon, 312 Ga. at 47 (2) (b). Our uncritical citation of Bethea in that fashion did not adopt all of its reasoning. And to the extent that Bethea holds that a juror‘s refusal to deliberate further once she has made up her mind after two hours of deliberations is good cause to remove her, we decline to adopt that holding now.
Bethea states generally that “[l]egal cause for excusing a juror arises when the court determines, in its sound discretion, that the juror holds an opinion so fixed and definite that he or she cannot lay it aside and decide the case on the evidence presented and the court‘s
This Court also has held that good cause to remove a selected juror who has reached a “fixed and definite” opinion of guilt or innocence can be established after jury selection, before the start of deliberations. See Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 417-418 (5) (721 SE2d 876) (2012). Indeed, a juror or prospective juror who holds a fixed opinion about guilt or innocence before the evidence is complete and the judge has charged the jury has necessarily arrived at that opinion improperly, because that opinion is necessarily based on something other than all the evidence and the judge‘s charge. But it makes no sense to extend that same proposition to a juror who has reached a fixed opinion after listening to all of the evidence and the judge‘s charge, and engaging in deliberations. Such a juror may have done precisely what we expect jurors to do — consider the law and
Bethea can be read in two different ways. First, it can be read consistent with Georgia law as affirming the removal of a juror who refused to decide the case based on the trial evidence. See 337 Ga. App. at 219-220 (noting trial court‘s concern that juror reached a decision “without fully vetting the evidence with the other jurors,” and stating that good cause for removing exists when “juror holds an opinion so fixed and definite that he or she cannot lay it aside and decide the case on the evidence presented and the court‘s charge” (citation and punctuation omitted)). But Bethea can also be read to conclude that a juror may be removed for deliberating for what the court deems an insufficient amount of time before arriving at a conclusion. See id. (citing as reasons for removal that “she had reached an unwavering opinion fewer than two hours into the deliberation,” “very early on, the juror had ceased deliberating with the other members of the jury,” and “the juror held a fixed and definite opinion so early in the process“). We expressly disapprove
Georgia law does not require a juror who has properly reached a fixed opinion as to guilt or innocence to continue to deliberate indefinitely in order to fulfill the juror‘s duty. See Moon, 312 Ga. at 46 n.7; Delgado, 356 Ga. App. at 629-630; Semega, 302 Ga. App. at 880-883 (1). At some point a juror who has reached and communicated a firm conclusion as to guilt or innocence may stop engaging with other jurors in deliberations.16 Most people lack the fortitude to debate an issue with strangers indefinitely. That does not mean that they are “unable to perform [their] duty” within the meaning of
I‘m not sure if I have a different understanding of the law or what. I honestly feel that they do have some evidence but not enough for me to say guilty. I‘m not sure if I have a different concept of how things work or what[] my duty here is, I have been through the evidence[;] we have went over it. I‘m not sure what y[‘]all want from me, only thing happening now is, I‘m getting force[d] to follow what everyone else is saying. Can I be switch[ed] with an alternate so y[‘]all can get the answer you‘re looking for. I‘m firm!
A juror cannot be removed from a jury based on his or her request to be removed when that request is based on a “firm” conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to convict. Compare Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 827, 829 (2) (470 SE2d 674) (1996) (affirming removal when juror informed court she could not fulfill her duties as a juror because she had to undergo emergency dental surgery); Alford, 244 Ga. App. at 238 (affirming removal when juror kept repeating that he wanted to be removed and “never stated that he believed the defendants were innocent but rather described problems dealing with his fellow jurors and participating in deliberations“); and Cloud, 235 Ga. App. at 722 (1) (affirming removal when juror requested removal, cried, and said he could not judge the defendant, and the record provided “no support for [defendant‘s] contention that the juror was actually expressing his view of [defendant‘s] innocence“); with Mason, 244 Ga. App. at 247-250 (reversing removal when juror concluded defendant was not guilty, but requested to be removed because she needed to get back to her business and if she were required to continue deliberating, she “might change her vote to go along with the majority” even though “her opinion about the case would not change“).
Because the trial court abused its discretion in removing L.M.
3. Although we conclude that Jones and McFarland are entitled to new trials based on the trial court‘s handling of the juror issue, we must consider McFarland‘s argument that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his convictions, as retrial would be precluded were he correct on this point. We conclude that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient.
McFarland specifically argues that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient as to him under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), because the State failed to show that he was a party to the crimes. When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
Here, the State presented sufficient evidence that McFarland was a party to the crimes charged. The State provided evidence that McFarland belonged to a criminal street gang and that he had a motive to avenge the killing of a senior gang member. Cellphone evidence showed that McFarland was in contact with Jones and Young before and immediately after the crimes. It also placed him
in the area of Peachtree Mall at the time of the crimes, which directly contradicted McFarland‘s statement to the police wherein he denied being present at the mall at the time of the shooting. The cellphone evidence showed him moving in the same direction as Jones and ending in the vicinity of an address Jones had texted to Young after the shooting. Finally, surveillance video showed Jones, Young, and a third man meet in the mall parking lot. The video then showed the group approach Meredith together, Jones shoot Meredith, and the three flee the scene together after the shooting.When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize a rational jury to find McFarland guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged based upon his being a party to the crimes. See
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ., who concur in part and dissent in part.
Because I agree with the majority opinion‘s conclusions that the evidence was sufficient to sustain McFarland‘s convictions, I concur in Division 3. However, because the record shows that the trial court had a sound legal basis for dismissing a juror who, single-handedly, ground the deliberative process to a halt, our standard of review mandates a finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Division 2 and from the judgment reached in the majority opinion.
In my mind, the majority opinion‘s analysis contains a fundamental flaw in that it characterizes L.M. as a “holdout” juror. As the majority opinion notes, when L.M. announced the vote tally, the jury was undecided on all of the charges related to McFarland and on one of the charges against Young. In other words, the jurors were undecided on 5 of the 13 charges and they were attempting to continue deliberating, but L.M. removed herself from all discussions and became disruptive to the process, bringing deliberations to a halt. While a juror can maintain her “not guilty” stance based upon
Turning to the removal issue, a “defendant in a criminal
Our case law is clear that a trial court abuses its discretion when a juror is dismissed “without any factual support or for a legally irrelevant reason.” Mills v. State, 308 Ga. 558, 560 (2) (842 SE2d 284) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, the cases relied upon by the majority for a finding of an abuse of discretion fall into one of these two categories. See Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 45 (b) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (holding that the trial
This is not a case where the trial court removed a juror without factual support. Compare Moon, supra; Mills, supra; Semega, supra; Stokes, supra. Instead, the trial court properly followed our case law by performing a comprehensive inquiry into the allegations of misconduct - he questioned the entire jury panel and then thoroughly questioned L.M. and the jurors who had alleged the misconduct, including asking jurors to make written accounts of the
Despite this, the majority opinion narrowly reads the trial court‘s order before concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by removing L.M. from the jury. But “[o]n appeal, the question is whether evidence supports the trial court‘s determination [for removing the juror].” Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 417-418 (5) (721 SE2d 876) (2012). Indeed, the majority‘s conclusion that “[t]his case seemingly has one foot in each line of cases” regarding juror removal requires that we affirm the decision to remove because of the deference we owe to the trial court.
Giving the trial court‘s credibility determinations and factual findings the proper deference, considering the totality of the circumstances as borne out by the court‘s extensive investigation,
Still, the majority opinion seems to credit L.M.‘s statements that she was participating in deliberations and considering the evidence in order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by removing her. However, the trial court is not required to ignore the evidence from the other jurors that L.M. was not deliberating, nor does L.M.‘s testimony “make the trial court‘s [implicit] credibility decision to strike” her erroneous. Butler, 290 Ga. at 418. See Cummings, 280 Ga. at 834-835 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in replacing a juror for good cause based on the “totality of the circumstances“).22 Moreover, “we owe substantial deference to the way in which the trial court resolved disputed
Further, I disagree with the majority opinion that the trial court did not have a sound legal basis to remove L.M. Though the majority opinion categorizes the trial court‘s findings as “part and parcel to the notion that L.M. reached a firm conclusion . . . and declined to deliberate further,” Maj. Op. p. 29, the trial court‘s order broadly concluded that L.M. “was impeding the jury‘s progress as a
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have recognized that removal of a juror who was inhibiting the deliberative process is a sound legal basis for removal because it “serves the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the integrity of the judicial process.” Arnold, 280 Ga. at 489-490 (no abuse of discretion for removal of juror “who unduly disrupts and prevents the ongoing deliberative process“). See also Bethea v. State, 337 Ga. App. 217, 219-220 (786 SE2d 891) (2016) (to the extent that it holds that a trial court does not abuse its discretion for dismissing a juror who refuses to participate in deliberations);23 Thompson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 253 (5) (581 SE2d 596) (2003) (no abuse of discretion for removal of juror where the trial court‘s investigation revealed that the hold-out juror “was connected to an ongoing attempt to subvert the jury” and that “the deliberative process of the jury was under attack“); Alford v. State, 244 Ga. App. 234, 236-237 (534 SE2d 103) (2000) (no abuse
Because removal of a juror for impeding the deliberative process provides a sound legal basis for removal, and because the trial court developed sufficient facts in the record to support its reasoning for removal, I must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing L.M. from the jury. Because I would affirm the decision of the trial court, I dissent as to Division 2 and in the judgment of the Court.24
I am authorized to state that Justice McMillian and Justice LaGrua join in this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.