BETHEA v. THE STATE.
A16A0377
Court of Appeals of Georgia
May 26, 2016
786 SE2d 891
Following a jury trial, Anthony Bethea was convicted of voluntary manslaughter1 and concealing the death of another.2 He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, contending that the trial court erred by excusing a juror fоr cause after deliberations began. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Construed in favor of the verdict,3 the record shows that Bethea got into a drunken altercation with his roommate, Darrell Bailey, after a night out. The altercation ended when Bethea grabbed Bailey in a choke hold that caused Bailey to die. When Bailey did not revive from the choke hold, Bethea dragged his bоdy to the woods, where it was discovered a few weeks later due to the strong odor of decomposition.
Bethea was charged with murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another. He testified at trial, making a self-defense argument. After the close of the evidence and the trial court‘s instructions, the jury retreated to the jury room to deliberate at 4:17 p.m. The jury later asked the court a question, seeking clarification as to the use of hands as deadly weapons, which the trial court answered in writing with сonsent of both counsel. By 6:15 p.m., the jury was still deliberating, so the trial court adjourned for the day and reconvened proceedings the next day at 10:00 a.m.
The next morning, the courtroom dеputy reported that when he opened the door to the jury room, a juror stated: “[S]he wants out, she can no longer be a part of this, bring an alternate in, she wants out.” With the consеnt of the parties, the court brought in the juror to inquire as to the circumstances.
The trial court first instructed the juror not to indicate her view on the verdict nor the view of any other jurors. Thе juror agreed and explained that one or two other people agreed with her, but she believed they “would be still in that room all week.” The trial court explained that they had only deliberated for two hours, and they needed to take more time to deliberate. The juror replied that she tried to complete the deliberation process, “but I just feel like I don‘t want to be a part of it.” The trial court again explained the jury‘s responsibility to examine the evidence and deliberate and asked if the juror could talk to the othеr jurors and try and reach a verdict. The juror responded, “Yes, ma‘am, I can do that. We have to have one verdict. And if they keep what they going on and on [sic], ain‘t nobody coming tоgether . . . but I‘m not going to be forced to go along with what they were saying just to put a verdict on the table. I can‘t do that.”
During the conversation, the juror appeared to be upset and crying, and the trial court attempted to calm her. As the trial
The juror returned to the jury room, and the courtroom deputy recounted that he had heard her say the prior day that she had already made her decision. After hearing from both parties, the court examined case law4 and explained that “I‘m not looking at her saying she‘s got a different opinion with somebody else. . . . My concern is the way she . . . approached [the deputy] and she was wanting to leave, wasn‘t wanting to talk to anybody, her mind was made up.” The deputy confirmed that the juror said “she was wanting to go.” Thе court also expressed a concern, based on the juror‘s demeanor and repeated interruptions, that the court did not expect the juror to engage in rational, impartial deliberation with the other jurors. Based on the court‘s inquiry and argument of counsel, the court excused the juror over Bethea‘s objection.5 As the juror was being escortеd out of the jury room, the juror stated that the other jurors were “beginning to do what they‘re supposed to be doing in there . . . now they‘re making that decision more where I was — I am.” After further deliberation, the jury, with the alternate, returned a verdict of guilty as to voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing the deаth of another. The trial court then merged the aggravated assault count
with the manslaughter count. Bethea‘s motion for new trial was denied, giving rise to this appeal.
Bethea arguеs that the trial court erred by excusing the juror and replacing her with an alternate. We find no basis for reversal.
“[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to remove a juror,”7 and such a ruling is reviewed for an abuse of the court‘s discretion.8
Here, the trial court‘s main concern was that the juror was visibly upset and had reached a fixed and definite opinion so soon after the deliberation began without fully
excusing a lone holdout after more than two days of deliberatiоn,10 there is evidence showing that, very early on, the juror had ceased deliberating with the other members of the jury and “wanted out” of the process.
The fact that the juror eventually stated that [s]he could be impartial [and deliberate] does not require the trial court to ignore the numerous times [s]he equivocated or the other [evidence] showing that [s]he expressed a fixed and definite opinion and does not make the trial court‘s credibility decision to strike [her] error.11
Further, the record is clear that, despite excusing the juror, the trial court carefully considered avoiding excusing the juror simply because she might be in the minority or a potential holdout. The trial court voiced her concern that jurors not be remоved simply because they were holdouts, saying “the [mere] fact that one juror does not agree with the other [does] not constitute cause for removal.” Instead, the court‘s basis for excusing her was the juror‘s unwillingness to meaningfully participate in deliberation based on a thorough review of the evidence.
In light of the trial court‘s inquiry on the record into the juror‘s mindsеt and demeanor, the court‘s careful consideration of the relevant concerns, and the juror‘s explicit resistance to deliberation, and the evidence suppоrting a finding that the juror held a fixed and definite opinion so early in the process, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing the juror.12 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error.
Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
DECIDED MAY 26, 2016.
Kenneth D. Kondritzer, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Cynthia Cartwright, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.