JONES v. THE STATE.
S19A1248
Supreme Court of Georgia
DECEMBER 23, 2019
307 Ga. 505
MELTON, Chief Justice.
FINAL COPY
Jаcob Daniel Jones appeals his convictions and sentences for three counts of felony sexual battery.1 On appeal, Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his criminal sentences violate the Georgia and United States Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Viewing the evidence in this light, the record shows that, at all relevant times, Jones was 18 years old, and the victim, J. S., was 15. On the morning of August 12, 2013, J. S. was at hоme with her
After some time, J. S. started to become uncomfortable with the conversation, so she wаlked to a nearby basketball goal and called out to her other friends still inside the home to come outside and join her in a game. The group, which included J. S. and Jones, proceeded to play basketball and, at some point during the game, J. S. hugged Jоnes. At this time, Jones put his hands between J. S.‘s legs, then moved them over her buttocks and breasts and said, “if I wanted to I could get you there.” J. S. testified that these touches occurred over her clothing and without her permission. J. S. backed away and continued to play basketball until Jones left.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient
2. We turn next to Jones’ claim that the statutory sentencing scheme for felony sexual battery3 is unconstitutional as applied to him. Jones argues that the felony sentencing statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia and United States Constitutions, and violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the Georgia Constitution. We address each in turn.
(a) First, Jones argues that the felony sexual battery
As we have previously explained, under the rational basis test,
the claimant must establish that he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him. Next, the claimant must establish that there is no rational basis for such different treatment. And because the legislation is presumptively valid, the claimant has the burden of proof as to both prongs.
Additionally, the General Assembly “has wide discretion in setting penalties, . . . and courts may not ‘substitute thеir judgments
(b) Jones next claims that the sentencing scheme for felony sexual battery violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Jones alleges that, because he was facing up to 15 years in confinement under
Both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
[w]here, as here, a sentence is not challenged as barbaric or otherwise categorically prohibited, a court engages in a two-step inquiry to determine whether that sentence is grossly disрroportionate. First, a court compares the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. If this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court proceeds to the next step аnd compares the defendant‘s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Conley v. Pate, 305 Ga. 333, 336 (3) (825 SE2d 135) (2019).
Importantly, when assessing the gravity of the offense as part оf the threshold comparison, courts do not look only at the statutory elements of the offense in question. Rather, they consider what actually happened — the particular circumstances of the crimes at issue — as shown by the record.
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. Likewisе, “[a]n as-applied challenge addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a
Here, Jones was charged with three counts of felоny sexual battery, and the evidence showed that he groped the breasts, buttocks, and groin of a 15-year-old girl without her consent. For this, Jones received three concurrent five-year probated sentences as a first offender. Jones comрlains that his sentence is grossly disproportionate because, had he been charged under the Romeo and Juliet provision of the child molestation statute, he would have received a misdemeanor sentence. We are not persuаded by this argument, as the Romeo and Juliet provision of the child molestation statute applies even to consensual behavior between teenagers, whereas, here, there was evidence that Jones touched the intimate parts of J. S. withоut her consent.
Jones also argues that the felony sexual battery sentencing
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
I have previously articulated my skepticism that our analytical approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Georgia Constitution is consistent with the original public mеaning of that Clause. See Conley v. Pate, 305 Ga. 333, 339 (825 SE2d 135) (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring). But because even under that approach Mr. Jones‘s claim fails, it is not necessary to reconsider that approach here. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the majority.
Felony sexual battery sentencing; constitutional question. Catoosa Superior Court. Before Judge Van Pelt.
Sean J. Lowe, David J. Dunn, Jr., for appellant.
Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, Christopher A. Arnt, Melissa A. Pittman, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.