ANDREW JONES, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants-Respondents.
No. S-1-SC-37094
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
July 14, 2020
Opinion Number: 2020-NMSC-013
Released for Publication September 8, 2020.
VIGIL, Justice.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Denise Barela-Shepherd, District Judge
Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC
Adam C. Flores
Laura Louise Schauer Ives
Joseph Patrick Kennedy
Shannon L. Kennedy
Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioner
Doughty Alcaraz, P.A.
Robert M. Doughty III
Jeffrey Merrill Mitchell
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondents
Daniel Yohalem
Katherine Elizabeth Murray
Santa Fe, NM
Leon F. Howard, III
Albuquerque, NM
Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, PA
Lauren Keefe
Albuquerque, NM
for Amici Curiae New Mexico Foundation for Open Government and American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} This case requires us to examine
{2} Plaintiff Andrew Jones (Jones) appeals the order of the district court that granted summary judgment to the Department of Public Safety (DPS), thereby dismissing Jones‘s IPRA enforcement action. Jones argues that the district court misconstrued
{3} We conclude that Jones is correct. We reverse the Court of Appeals. We reverse the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to DPS, concluding that the district court‘s interpretation of
I. BACKGROUND
{4} James Boyd was shot and killed by Albuquerque Police Department officers on March 16, 2014. On April 8, 2014, Mr. Boyd‘s brother Andrew Jones sent a written request to DPS pursuant to IPRA for various records relating to the shooting. DPS responded fourteen days later, agreeing to produce a primary incident report, the personnel records of one of the officers involved, and one subpoena. DPS denied production of all other pertinent records in its possession.
{5} DPS denied production of the requested records for two reasons. First, and primarily, DPS grounded its refusal to produce the requested records in
{6} Jones filed suit in district court pursuant to IPRA, claiming that DPS “made no attempt or effort to make non-exempt information, documents or material evidence available for Plaintiff‘s review, nor indicate how the records requested fall within the cited exemption.” Jones sought production of the requested records, attorney fees, and costs, among other relief.
{7} Jones subsequently moved for summary judgment, contending that IPRA required disclosure of the requested records under the undisputed material facts. Jones argued that neither of the reasons offered by DPS—that there was an ongoing criminal investigation and that the FBI asked DPS to withhold the records—was legally sufficient to justify its refusal to produce the requested records.
{8} First, Jones argued that, even if the district court accepted DPS‘s contention that production of the records would pose “a demonstrable and serious threat to an ongoing criminal investigation,” the IPRA exception cited by DPS—
{9} In response to Jones‘s motion, DPS offered a broad interpretation of
{10} DPS attached two documents to support its contention that it was entitled to withhold the requested records: an affidavit from the DPS cabinet secretary and a letter from the FBI. Both documents indicated that there was, indeed, an ongoing criminal investigation. DPS argued that whether there was an ongoing criminal investigation was a disputed issue of material fact. The documents also indicate that the FBI requested that DPS delay disclosure of related materials in order to maintain the integrity of the investigation, if possible under IPRA.
{11} After a hearing, the district court denied Jones‘s summary judgment motion. The district court found that whether there was an ongoing criminal investigation was both material and disputed.2 It further found that the requested records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to
{12} DPS moved for summary judgment on April 15, 2015. DPS stated that it produced the records requested by Jones on January 14, 2015, subsequent to the completion of the FBI investigation. It further stated that the district court had already ruled that the (by then produced) records had been properly withheld pursuant to
{13} The district court granted DPS‘s summary judgment motion, concluding that there were no remaining issues of material fact and DPS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It was undisputed that DPS produced the requested records in accordance with the prior ruling of the district court, so inspection of the records was no longer at issue. The district court concluded that Jones could not be entitled to an award of attorney fees because the requested records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to
{14} Jones appealed the district court‘s summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals. Over a dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed by memorandum opinion. Jones v. Albuquerque Police Dep‘t, No. A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. (May 10, 2018) (nonprecedential). The Court of Appeals declined to reach Jones‘s argument that the district court was incorrect to find that the requested records were exempt from production under
{15} Jones filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{16} Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that is disfavored in New Mexico courts. Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 8, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280 (citing Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 1977-NMSC-071, ¶ 9, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589). “Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cahn v. Berryman, 2018-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 408 P.3d 1012 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Orders granting or denying summary judgment are reviewed de novo. United Nuclear Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 285 P.3d 644. “In reviewing an order on summary judgment, we examine the whole record on review, considering the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits.” Cahn, 2018-NMSC-002, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{17} “To the extent we must construe the applicable statutes, our review is de novo.” Romero v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 2020-NMSC-001, ¶ 11, 455 P.3d 851. “We examine the plain language of the statute
B. The IPRA Framework as It Pertains to This Case
{18} As declared by our Legislature, the purpose of IPRA “is to ensure that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of public officers and employees.”
{19} The Legislature has limited this general rule by providing seven specific exceptions and one “catch-all” exception to the right to inspect public records. See
law enforcement records that reveal confidential sources, methods, information or individuals accused but not charged with a crime. Law enforcement records include . . . inactive matters or closed investigations to the extent that they contain the information listed in this paragraph.
Also pertinent is
{20} The related goals of prompt and scrupulous compliance with IPRA are ingrained within the Act. See Faber, 2015-NMSC-015, ¶ 29 (considering the structure, history, and purpose of IPRA and concluding that distinct statutory provisions encourage prompt compliance and deter wrongful denials). For example, inspection of records pursuant to a written request shall be permitted “as soon as is practicable under the circumstances, but not later than fifteen days after receiving a written request.”
{21} Below, we first address the two reasons that the Court of Appeals dismissed Jones‘s appeal, concluding that the appeal was wrongly dismissed. We then proceed to address the district court‘s interpretation of
C. Jones Did Not Acquiesce to the Order Denying Jones‘s Summary Judgment Motion
{22} Jones challenges the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that he could not appeal the ruling of the district court that
{23} The order denying Jones‘s motion for summary judgment was interlocutory and nonfinal. See Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 14, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (“The general rule in New Mexico is that an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011) (stating, in the context of federal law, that “[o]rdinarily, orders denying summary judgment do not qualify as final decisions subject to appeal” and “are by their terms interlocutory” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Such an order is generally not immediately appealable. See Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 328, 992 P.2d 879 (“As a general matter, this Court‘s appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of any final judgment or decision, any interlocutory order or decision which practically disposes of the merits of the action, or any final order after entry of judgment which affects substantial rights.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing
{24} As both parties note, Jones could have applied for discretionary remedies such as interlocutory review or reconsideration in response to the district court‘s order denying summary judgment. See, e.g.,
{25} We are also unpersuaded that, by acquiescence, Jones lost his argument that the records were wrongly withheld. Jones‘s position was that DPS failed to comply with IPRA when it denied inspection of the requested records in the first place. That position was considered and rejected by the district court when it addressed Jones‘s motion for summary judgment. In our view, the fact that Jones did not specifically object to the additional records production procedure devised by the district court while it clearly rejected Jones‘s position does not indicate Jones‘s acquiescence.
{26} The three cases cited by the Court of Appeals on this point do not convince us otherwise. See Jones, No. A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. ¶ 12 (citing N.M. Selling Co. v. Crescendo Corp., 1964-NMSC-180, 74 N.M. 409, 394 P.2d 260; Quintana v. Quintana, 1941-NMSC-038, 45 N.M. 429, 115 P.2d 1011; Chase v. Contractors’ Equipment & Supply Co., Inc., 1983-NMCA-058, 100 N.M. 39, 665 P.2d 301). These cases are about failures to preserve error, generally, not acquiescence as a distinct concept. See, e.g., Chase, 1983-NMCA-058, ¶ 15 (declining to consider two issues because the issues were first raised on appeal). In fact, two of the three cases make no mention of the term “acquiescence.” See N.M. Selling Co., 1964-NMSC-180, ¶¶ 5-7; Chase, 1983-NMCA-058, ¶¶ 12-15. We conclude that Jones did not acquiesce to the order denying summary judgment; instead, we conclude that Jones invoked a ruling by the district court on whether the records were properly withheld. See Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles, 2010-NMSC-004, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 512, 226 P.3d 611 (“To preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{27} DPS offers an alternative reason that the Court of Appeals was correct not to reach Jones‘s substantive arguments. See State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d 684 (“Under the right for any reason doctrine, we may affirm the district court‘s order on grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). DPS notes that Jones‘s notice of appeal referenced the district court‘s order granting summary judgment to DPS but did not reference the earlier order denying summary judgment to Jones that directly addressed Jones‘s substantive argument. See Rule 12-202(C) NMRA (“A copy of the judgment or order appealed from, showing the date of the judgment or order, shall be attached to the notice of appeal.“). DPS seems to conclude that, as a consequence, Jones lost his opportunity to appeal the initial ruling on DPS‘s refusal to provide the requested records.
{28} We are not persuaded. The district court‘s order granting summary judgment to DPS explicitly relied on its earlier order ruling that DPS complied with IPRA and, furthermore, Jones opposed DPS‘s motion for summary judgment by renewing his earlier argument that DPS withheld the requested records in violation of IPRA. This is sufficient to infer that Jones intended to challenge the conclusions of the order denying Jones‘s motion for summary judgment and to avoid prejudice to DPS. See Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 13 (“The policies in this state, and the purpose of [Rule 12-202], are vindicated if the intent to appeal a specific judgment fairly can be inferred from the notice of appeal and if the appellee is not prejudiced by any mistake.“); Rule 12-312(C) NMRA (“An appeal filed within the time limits provided in these rules shall not be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202 which do not affect the substantive rights of the parties.“).
{29} In sum, we conclude that Jones did not acquiesce to the order denying his summary judgment motion but instead preserved his argument that DPS withheld the requested public records in violation of IPRA.
D. This Case Is Not Moot
{30} “When no actual controversy exists for which a ruling by the court will
{31} The Court of Appeals held that this case was moot, seemingly sua sponte. Jones, No. A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. ¶ 15. Although the Court of Appeals was not perfectly clear in its treatment of the mootness issue, its conclusion that the case was moot appears to rest on the following: (1) by the time of DPS‘s motion for summary judgment, Jones had received the records he requested; (2) Jones did not argue that DPS failed to comply with the records production procedure devised by the district court; and (3) its determination that Jones could no longer challenge the finding of the district court that DPS lawfully withheld the requested records. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. From this, the Court of Appeals held that the controversy over injunctive relief to obtain the records was moot because Jones accepted the requested records without objection. Id. ¶ 15. It also held that the controversy over attorney fees was moot because, even though Jones eventually acquired the withheld records, he could not succeed in his action to enforce IPRA. Id.
{32} We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no remaining controversy over inspection of the requested records. After all, Jones obtained the requested records. But mootness was not the correct lens through which to analyze Jones‘s claim for attorney fees. We explain.
{33} Unlike the requested records—which Jones received—Jones had not received the attorney fees he requested as relief under
{34} We disagree with that conclusion. We have already determined that the Court of Appeals incorrectly denied Jones the opportunity to challenge the finding of the district court that the requested records were withheld in accordance with IPRA. Thus, we do not agree that Jones could not as a matter of law succeed in his IPRA enforcement action. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that this case should be dismissed because it is moot.
E. DPS Did Not Demonstrate That It Withheld the Requested Records in Accordance with IPRA; as a Result, Summary Judgment Should Have Been Granted to Jones, Not DPS
{35} In response to DPS‘s summary judgment motion, Jones did not dispute that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Instead, he renewed his argument that, as a matter of law, the records were improperly withheld in the first place. In Jones‘s view, this precluded summary judgment because he would be entitled to attorney fees and costs for his IPRA enforcement action. The district court disagreed that the records had been improperly withheld. For that finding, the district court relied explicitly on its earlier order that the requested records “were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 14-
{36} Thus, both summary judgment motions turn on the same legal issue: whether the district court correctly construed
1. The district court misconstrued Section 14-2-1(A)(4)
{37} Nowhere does the plain language of
{38} Instead of focusing on whether there was an ongoing investigation, our Legislature was concerned with the specific content of the records. Only “law enforcement records that reveal confidential sources, methods, information or individuals accused but not charged with a crime” are exempt from the general IPRA inspection requirement under
{39} Examining
{40} In sum, we conclude that the interpretation of the district court was overbroad and incongruent with the plain language of
2. Summary judgment was improperly granted to DPS and improperly denied to Jones
{41} The district court granted summary judgment to DPS because, inter alia, it determined that the records in this case were properly withheld pursuant to
{42} In response to Jones‘s summary judgment motion, DPS produced evidence directed only at its broad interpretation of
Nor did DPS present any evidence that it reviewed the requested records to separate the exempt from nonexempt information, or that it provided any nonexempt information existing within records containing exempt information, as required pursuant to
{43} DPS offers three additional arguments that it acted in accordance with the law when it denied inspection of the records requested by Jones, each of which is unpersuasive. See Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8 (explaining the right for any reason doctrine). First, DPS contends that it had a statutory duty pursuant to
{44} Second, DPS seems to contend that the records were properly withheld pursuant to the “catch-all” exception from inspection,
{45} Third, DPS argues that Estate of Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMSC-028, 139 N.M. 671, 137 P.3d 611, supports the district court‘s broad interpretation of
{46} For the reasons above, we hold that summary judgment was improperly granted to DPS. And, for the reasons below, we hold that summary judgment was improperly denied to Jones.
{47} Our appellate courts generally will not reopen denials of summary judgment after a final judgment on the merits. Beaudry v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2018-NMSC-012, ¶ 9, 412 P.3d 1100. However, where “a motion for summary judgment is based solely on a purely legal issue which cannot be submitted to the trier of fact, . . . the resolution of which is not dependent on evidence submitted to the trier of fact, the issue should be reviewable on appeal from the judgment.” Id. (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such is the situation here. Following the denial of Jones‘s summary judgment motion, there was no trial that further developed the facts and resulted in a judgment. Instead, DPS filed a summary judgment motion that turned on the same legal issue as the order denying summary judgment to Jones, and in fact relied upon that order. Thus, the summary judgment motions in this case are akin to counter-motions for summary judgment that turn on the same legal issue. Accordingly, we will review the order denying summary judgment to Jones. See Int‘l Ass‘n of Firefighters v. City of Carlsbad, 2009-NMCA-097, ¶ 22, 147 N.M. 6, 216 P.3d 256 (“When the district court acts on counter-motions for summary judgment based on a common legal issue, [our appellate courts] may reverse both the grant of one motion and the denial of the other and award judgment on the previously denied motion.“).
{48} Jones established a prima facie case for summary judgment. As a matter of law, public records are generally subject to inspection within fifteen days after written
{49} Thus, the burden fell on DPS to demonstrate that one of the IPRA exceptions from inspection covered the withheld records. See Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 264 (“If the moving party establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Our earlier analysis demonstrates that DPS did not present any competent evidence that established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DPS lawfully denied inspection of the requested records. Rather, the only evidence presented by DPS was directed at an overbroad standard for
CONCLUSION
{50} For the reasons stated, we reverse the Court of Appeals, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to DPS, and the decision of the district court denying summary judgment to Jones. We remand for further proceedings.
{51} IT IS SO ORDERED.
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
DONNA J. MOWRER, Judge
Sitting by designation
Notes
It shall be the duty of the New Mexico state police and it is hereby granted the power to cooperate with agencies of other states and of the United States having similar powers to develop and carry on a complete interstate, national and international system of criminal identification and investigation, and also to furnish upon request any information in their possession concerning any person charged with crime to any court, district attorney or police officer or any peace officer of this state, or of any other state or the United States.