OPINION
In this case we attempt to clarify the sometimes confusing state of the law surrounding the finality of judgments. The specific issue is whether a judgment declaring the rights and liabilities of the parties and awarding attorney’s fees, but reserving for future determination the amount of the fees, is final, despite the parties and the court’s recognition of the necessity for future proceedings to fix the amount of the award. We hold that it is.
This case also presents issues closely related to the finality issue: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to fix the amount of fees after more than thirty days had passed following entry of the initial judgment and after the losing party had appealed. We hold that it did.
The underlying controversy was a dispute between two lessors and their lessee over the validity of the lessors’ termination of the lease because of the lessee’s failure to comply with a covenant requiring construction of a motel on the leased premises. The trial court ruled that the lessors had properly terminated the lease and entered judgment to that effect, ordering that attorney’s fees would be awarded to the lessors after the amount had been established in a subsequent hearing. The lessee thereupon appealed. The court then held a hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees and found that the amount claimed by the lessors was reasonable, but refused to enter a further judgment for that amount on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. The lessors then appealed from this order. We consolidated the two appeals and now affirm the judgment in favor of the lessors in the first appeal and reverse the order in favor of the lessee in the second appeal, remanding for further proceedings to fix the amount of attorney’s fees.
I.
On July 1, 1979, Nick Kapnison and Robert Gathings (“the lessors”) signed a lease agreement with Howard Kelly (“the lessee”) 1 covering a tract of land located near Interstate 40 west of Albuquerque, New Mexico. The lease was for a term of twenty-five years commencing April 1, 1980, 2 and granted the lessee three ten-year options to renew.
The lease agreement required the lessee to commence and complete construction of a motel on the leased premises “with due diligence,” though it did not specify a date for commencement of such construction. The agreement also authorized the lessors to reenter and repossess the premises if the lessee defaulted in performance of any condition or covenant in the lease and if such default continued for thirty days after written notice from lessors. The agreement provided that if either party was compelled to file suit to enforce the terms of the lease, the prevailing party would be entitled to recover all expenses, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the litigation.
As of September 16,1986, the lessee had not commenced construction of the promised motel. On that date the lessors sent the lessee a written notice, declaring a default due to noncompliance with the provision requiring commencement and completion of a motel with due diligence. The lessee was given thirty days to cure the default.
The lessee failed to commence construction within this thirty-day period, and on November 12, 1986, the lessors filed an affidavit of default, declaring that the lessee’s leasehold interest was terminated. The lessee thereupon sued the lessors for reinstatement of the lease and damages for breach of contract. 3 Lessors responded with a counterclaim requesting ejectment and damages.
After a bench trial, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, declaring that the lessee had not exercised due diligence and thus had breached the lease agreement by “failing to take any substantive steps to commence construction between January 1, 1983, and September 16, 1986, when interest rates were generally at the same level or lower than when the lease was originally signed[.]” The court accordingly entered a judgment on January 8, 1990, ejecting the lessee from the premises and declaring that the lessors had lawfully terminated the lease. The judgment further provided that, upon application to the court and after a hearing, the lessors would “recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against [the lessee].”
The lessee filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 1990. On March 6, the lessors filed applications for attorney’s fees and costs. 4 The court held a hearing on August 8, 1990, and entered an order on August 28, finding the requested fees and costs reasonable but denying the applications on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to grant them. The lessors then appealed, and we consolidated the appeals.
The lessee’s appeal 5 from the January 1990 judgment challenges the judgment primarily by asserting that the findings of fact on which it rests are not supported by substantial evidence. Although the lessors have not sought dismissal of this appeal in their response to the lessee’s challenge, they do raise the issue of nonfinality of the judgment in their own appeal, 6 contending that, since the judgment was not final and appealable, the trial court retained jurisdiction and its August order refusing to fix the amount of attorney’s fees for lack of jurisdiction was therefore in error. Since the lessors’ appeal thus raises an issue of our jurisdiction to consider the lessee’s appeal, 7 and since the issue of finality of the January judgment and the related issues of the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction thereafter to fix the amount of attorney’s fees are the more significant issues on this appeal, we take up first the questions raised by the lessors’ appeal.
II.
In Sacramento Valley Irrigation Co. v. Lee,
It appears, therefore, that there are two distinct lines of cases upon the question of what constitutes a final decree. The United States cases ... hold that no judgment or decree will be regarded as final within the meaning of the statutes in reference to appeals unless all issues of law and fact necessary to be determined were determined and the case completely disposed of so far as the court had power to dispose of it.
This rule, however, has been qualified to the extent that the retention of the case by the court after decree for the purpose of distribution of funds, etc., even though other and incidental decrees relating to the subject matter of the original decree and involving some of the same issues may be necessary in order to finally dispose of the case, will not destroy its character as a final decree from which an appeal may be taken.
Sacramento Valley,
The rule in Forgay v. Conrad — that a judgment or decree adjudicating the basic rights and liabilities in controversy is to be given a practical, not technical, construction and treated as final even though other, more or less ministerial actions remain to be taken by the rendering court — retains considerable vitality today. See generally 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.11 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Moore’s] (commenting, however, that the rule “is not always a rule of easy application[,]” id. at 97). One of its most recent applications (although the case was not cited in the opinion) is Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
Other state courts considering this issue have ruled consistently with Budinich. Three state supreme courts — those of Connecticut, Colorado, and Kansas — have addressed the issue since Budinich was decided, and all three have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision to hold that a judgment on the merits is final even though the recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees is undetermined. Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Co.,
The general rule in New Mexico for determining the finality of a judgment is that “an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible.” B.L. Goldberg & Assocs. v. Uptown, Inc.,
Like most general statements, however, this one, perhaps because of its frequent repetition, is often pronounced as if it were an absolute, inflexible rule, like the law of gravity, instead of a general proposition admitting of various exceptions. That the rule has exceptions or qualifications, however, was explicitly recognized by this Court in its early statement in Sacramento Valley: The retention of jurisdiction for the purpose of distributing funds, etc., does not destroy the judgment’s finality for purposes of permitting an appeal to be taken. Other exceptions or qualifications have been recognized in the numerous and widely varying circumstances in which the For-gay-Conrad rule has been applied in the federal courts. See 9 Moore’s ¶ 110.11, at 91-105. And, despite the appearance of inflexibility in the foregoing statement of the general rule, our case law makes it clear that the term “finality” is to be given a practical, rather than a technical, construction. Central-Southwest Dairy Coop. v. American Bank of Commerce,
Our statutes, rules, and cases illustrate numerous situations in which an order does, as contemplated by Foster v. Addington,
Similarly, in mortgage foreclosure cases, this Court has often recognized that a decree adjudicating the mortgagor’s indebtedness is final and appealable, notwithstanding the necessity for further proceedings to enforce the judgment and supervise the sale of the mortgaged property. Speckner v. Riebold,
Our holding in Crown Life was nothing new; sixty years ago we held that a motion to enter a deficiency judgment after a judicial sale of property ordered sold by the original decree of foreclosure
was merely a step in proper subsequent proceedings to enforce the judgment already rendered. The personal indebtedness of the defendants had already been adjudged. The amount for which execution should issue was alone left to be determined, and that by mere computation. We cannot see how the motion for entry of deficiency judgment can be considered as a new judgment, or as a modification of the original “final decree,” any more than a motion to confirm the master’s report of sale should be so considered. An order of confirmation is a “final order affecting a substantial right made after the entry of a final judgment.” So, also, an order in proceedings supplementary to execution. So we must classify an order determining, after foreclosure sale, the amount of deficiency to be entered as a personal judgment.
Armijo v. Pettit,
Yet another example, closely analogous to the present case, of a judgment that is treated as final even though further proceedings are necessary to implement it is a case in which costs remain to be assessed in favor of the prevailing party. The pendency of proceedings to fix the amount of costs does not render the judgment nonfinal. Schleft v. Board of Educ.,
To distill from all of this a general principle that will provide an easy answer to the question of when a judgment is final and when it is not is probably a hopeless undertaking. We agree with the United States Supreme Court that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within the twilight zone of finality. One formula, not yet mentioned in this opinion, has been phrased by our court of appeals as follows: “The test of whether a judgment is final so as to permit the taking of an immediate appeal, lies in the effect the judgment has upon the rights of some or all of the parties.” Bralley,
We probably can do little better than to propose the following guidelines, which may answer some but undoubtedly will not answer all of the difficult questions falling into the twilight zone: Where a judgment declares the rights and liabilities of the parties to the underlying controversy, a question remaining to be decided thereafter will not prevent the judgment from being final if resolution of that question will not alter the judgment or moot or revise decisions embodied therein. See Budinich,
What we have said is to some extent inconsistent with certain, for the most part alternative, holdings in two court of appeals cases. In Johnson v. C & H Construction Co.,
It is apparent that in both Johnson and Watson there were alternative bases for the holding that the judgment appealed from was not final. Nevertheless, in Watson the court said specifically: “[Wfjhere an award of attorney’s fees is authorized by statute or rule, and a request is made for such award, a judgment which does not dispose of the issue of attorney’s fees is not a final order.”
The lessors in the present case make a similar argument, founded on the provisions in the lease agreement entitling the prevailing party in litigation over the lease to recover that party’s attorney’s fees and costs in such litigation. They argue: “By virtue of the lease agreement, attorneys’ fees and costs ... are an additional element of damages to which [the lessors] are entitled.” Regardless of whether this is a correct characterization of the attorney’s fee provision in the lease, we think that the question of finality of a judgment adjudicating the rights and liabilities of the parties to a lease, or any other contract, should not turn on whether attorney’s fees and costs are characterized as an additional element of damages, rather than as supplementary relief awarded to the prevailing party. Likewise, the finality of a judgment should not turn on whether the governing statute or court rule authorizes attorney’s fees as part of the relief to be afforded to a successful plaintiff, rather than, for example, as an amount to be taxed as “costs” in favor of the prevailing party. 10 In this respect we agree with the Supreme Court in Budinich that the
effect of an unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the litigation at hand should not turn upon the characterization of those fees by the statute or decisional law [or, we would add, the contract] that authorizes them.
We have said elsewhere that “[t]he considerations that determine finality are not abstractions but have reference to very real interests — not merely those of the immediate parties, but, more particularly, those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial system.” ... This practical approach to the matter suggests that what is of importance here is not preservation of conceptual consistency in the status of a particular fee authorization as “merits” or “nonmerits,” but rather preservation of operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291. This requires, we think, a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the litigation in question does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final.
Accordingly, to the extent that Johnson and Watson are inconsistent with the views we have expressed above, we find it necessary to overrule those cases, insofar as they hold that an authorization for attorney’s fees, whether or not it is conceptualized as part of the relief afforded by the statute or other governing rule or contract, and whether or not it is requested in the plaintiff’s complaint or the defendant’s answer, if not granted and fixed in the judgment renders the judgment nonfinal and unappealable.
In reaching our decision on the finality of the January 1990 judgment in this case, we have not overlooked the strong policy in New Mexico disfavoring piecemeal appeals. That policy has been endorsed in numerous opinions of this Court and of the court of appeals. See, e.g., Banquest/First Nat’l Bank v. LMT, Inc.,
We are aware that the rule we have adopted may lead to an occasional “piecemeal” appeal of a judgment on the merits and an award of attorneys fees. The problem of the “piecemeal” appeal may be avoided if trial judges delay entering judgment on the merits until the fee question is resolved and dispose of both the merits and the attorney fees in a single judgment. The better practice will be to resolve all fee questions in a timely fashion. This will allow an appeal to proceed more expeditiously.
If for some reason the question of attorney’s fees must be decided after the entry of judgment on the merits, we suggest that the trial court insist upon the prompt filing and disposition of fee requests so that any pending appeal on the merits of the action may be amended to include any prospective appeal from a supplemental postjudgment award of attorney’s fees.
Like the Kansas and Connecticut courts, we acknowledge that the rule we have adopted may, at times, disserve this policy. That consequence, however, does not strike us as a sufficient reason to hold that the pendency of an attorney’s fee request destroys the finality of a judgment on the merits. For, while our decision may not always promote the policy against piecemeal appeals, which is rooted in a desire to maximize judicial economy, see Banquest,
This latter policy — promoting meaningful review — will most often be subserved, rather than subverted, by the rule we adopt today. For that matter, the policy of achieving judicial efficiency may also be promoted by enabling the parties to get on with their appeal, without wasting the time necessary to prepare for and conduct an attorney’s fee hearing before even beginning the steps necessary to perfect the appeal. Those steps — filing the notice of appeal and the docketing statement, preparing the record proper, designating and preparing the transcript of proceedings, etc. — can all be initiated and perhaps completed while the parties prepare for and the court conducts the attorney’s fee hearing. If either party is dissatisfied with the result of that hearing, that party can then appeal from the court’s decision; and, as happened in this case, the two appeals can then be consolidated. We see no loss in judicial efficiency from this procedure, and we see the potential for considerable gains in expeditiously processing the appeal on the merits, whether or not it is consolidated with another appeal from the ruling on attorney’s fees.
For all of these reasons, we hold that the January 1990 judgment in this case was final and appealable when entered, and we overrule the lessors’ contention that it was not.
III.
Before proceeding to the merits of the lessee’s appeal, we consider the lessors’ further contention that the trial court erred by refusing to fix the amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction. On this issue we sustain the lessors’ position and hold that the court retained jurisdiction to set the amount of attorney’s fees, even though more than thirty days had passed from the entry of the basic judgment and even though the lessee had in the interim appealed from that judgment.
The court’s order denying the lessors’ applications for attorney’s fees did not specify a reason for the conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction to award them, although the order noted that the lessee had filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 1990. The lessee responds to the lessors’ appeal from this order by relying both on the rule that the taking of an appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction and on the rule that a trial court retains jurisdiction over its judgment for thirty days after entry of the judgment and thereafter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
A.
The first rule has been stated many times in New Mexico, substantially as follows: “[T]he trial court loses jurisdiction of the case upon the filing of the notice of appeal, except for the purposes of perfecting such appeal, or of passing upon a motion directed to the judgment pending at the time.” Wagner Land & Inv. Co. v. Halderman,
It is clear, though, that a pending appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to take further action when the action mil not affect the judgment on appeal and when, instead, the further action enables the trial court to carry out or enforce the judgment. A prime example is Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Anaya, supra, in which this Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction, after a notice of appeal was filed, to determine the amount of costs to be awarded the prevailing party. We distinguished Baxter and White and said, relying on Samples v. Robinson,
Another example appears in Armijo v. Pettit, supra, in which we held that a motion to enter a deficiency judgment could be entertained, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal from a judgment adjudicating defendants’ indebtedness, foreclosing a lien, and directing judicial sale of the property subject to the lien. We said:
Appellant admits that, until superseded, this judgment could be enforced, even after the taking of the appeal, up to the point of entering deficiency judgment. She denies, however, that, after the appeal, and pending receipt of mandate from this court, the lower court has jurisdiction to enter a “new judgment” for the deficiency.
The original “final decree” remained in full force and effect, though appealed from, and appellant was at liberty, at her peril, to proceed to enforce it.
As we see it, appellant’s motion did not ask for a new judgment, or for any modification of the judgment appealed from. It was merely a step in proper subsequent proceedings to enforce the judgment already rendered. ... We cannot see how the motion for entry of deficiency judgment can be considered as a new judgment, or as a modification of the original “final decree,” any more than a motion to confirm the master’s report of sale should be so considered.
A third example is a trial court’s retention of jurisdiction to award supplemental relief under NMSA 1978, Section 44-6-9, to enforce a declaratory judgment. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,
A fourth example lies in the power of a district court to fix the amount of a supersedeas bond, approve an additional thirty-day extension beyond the initial sixty-day limitation within which appellant must file the bond, and rule on appellant’s motion for a stay of execution of the judgment, all under NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-22 (Repl.Pamp.1991), and SCRA 1986, 1-062 (Supp.1991). See Devlin v. New Mexico State Police Dep’t,
Federal courts have held that the pend-ency of an appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a request for attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co.,
In analyzing the result reached by the court in Wright, we note first that the general rule divesting the district court of “jurisdiction” upon the filing of a notice of appeal does not refer to the court’s jurisdiction under any statute or mandatory rule. “It is a judge-made doctrine designed to avoid the confusion and waste of time that might flow from putting the same issues before two courts at the same time. It should not be employed to defeat its purposes not [sic— or] to induce needless paper shuffling.”
... It is true that in ruling on the issue of attorneys’ fees a district court must take into account both the relative merit of the plaintiff’s case and the result obtained. But this is not the sort of reconsideration of the merits which could lead to altering the substantive judgment or in any way interfere with the pending appeal. The district court merely takes the merits into account, along with many other factors, in making a discretionary decision entirely distinct from the underlying judgment. Thus the policy against two courts treating the same issue concurrently does not require withdrawing the district court’s power to decide attorneys’ fees motions while an appeal is pending.
In Garcia v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,
In collateral matters not involved in the appeal, however, the district court retains jurisdiction____ [Cjourts have found certain matters to be collateral to a final judgment. For example, even after a timely notice of appeal is filed, a district court may retain jurisdiction to determine the propriety and amount of attorney’s fees.
Id. (citations omitted).
It is possible to read one of our holdings in Baxter as inconsistent with the foregoing rationale. In that case two orders authorizing payment of attorney’s fees in a proceeding for receivership of an insurance company were held void both because they were entered after a notice of appeal had been filed and because they were entered more than thirty days after the instigators of the receivership had filed a petition for a rehearing on their request for reimbursement of expenses. It appears from the opinion that at least some of the attorney’s fees awarded by the two orders were incurred before the receivership action and thus related to the subject matter of the order under appeal. However, it is probable that at least parts of the two orders granted the instigators reimbursement of attorney’s fees incurred during, and as a result of, the receivership. Thus, Baxter can be read as saying that a trial court has no jurisdiction after entry of an underlying judgment to award attorney’s fees incurred in procuring the judgment. To the extent Baxter can be so read, we now disapprove this holding and adopt instead the statements in, inter alia, Garcia that, in collateral matters not involved in the appeal, such as determining the propriety and amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court retains jurisdiction.
B.
Similarly, we do not follow Baxter to the extent it can be read to say that the passage of thirty days from entry of the underlying judgment deprives, under NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1991), the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on requests for attorney’s fees to the party who has prevailed in the judgment. Section 39-1-1, the pertinent provisions of which are quoted in the footnote,
11
provides that the trial court retains control over a final judgment for thirty days. “[Ojnce the thirty-day period has passed, we have consistently held that the court loses jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Elwess v. Elwess,
Once again, we have a statement of a general rule that goes a bit too far: “[0]nce the thirty-day period has passed, ... the court loses jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Elwess. But it is clear from our cases that, although the court may lose jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute resolved by the underlying judgment, the passage of more than thirty days from entry of the judgment does not oust the court of jurisdiction to rule on matters “collateral to” or “separate from” the judgment. For example, in Cantrell v. Curnutt, supra, this Court held that Section 39-1-1 did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine the status of a liquor license, although considerably more than thirty days had passed since entry of the initial judgment adjudicating issues among the partners and the partnership: “We are satisfied that the court in determining that the liquor license was an asset of the partnership functioned under its retained jurisdiction for the purpose of a final accounting and dissolution of the partnership.”
And so we reach the same conclusion with respect to the trial court's loss of jurisdiction under Section 39-1-1 as we have reached concerning the same issue when a notice of appeal is filed after entry of a final judgment. The trial court retains the same jurisdiction to deal with matters collateral to or separate from the issues resolved in the judgment as it has following the filing of the notice of appeal. The necessity for further proceedings to carry the judgment into effect or otherwise to dispose of a matter that does not entail alteration or revision of decisions embodied in the judgment does not prevent finality of the judgment; and the court does not lose jurisdiction, after thirty days have passed or an appeal has been taken, to dispose of such matters. Determining the amount of an attorney’s fee award is one such matter.
IV.
We now consider the merits of the lessee’s appeal, though the issues involved in that appeal may be disposed of in fairly short order. As noted earlier, the lessee’s challenge to the January 1990 judgment is based on an attack on the trial court’s findings of fact, which in turn is based on an argument that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The lessee first asserts that there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the lessee had a reasonable time after signing the lease to commence construction and failed to exercise due diligence by not taking any substantive steps toward commencing construction between January 1, 1983, and September 16, 1986.
After reviewing the record, we determine that substantial evidence supported these findings. On September 16, 1986, when the lessors sent the lessee a notice of default, more than seven years had elapsed since execution of the lease. The lessee had obtained all of the preliminaries required to secure a loan commitment (zoning, appraisal, preliminary plans, survey) by the end of 1981, yet at the time it received the notice of default it still had not obtained financing. Kelly testified that he was unable to obtain financing because of high interest rates, but the lessors adduced evidence showing that after July 1982 (and except for July 1984) the prime rate was lower than at the time the lease was signed. Moreover, the lease agreement authorized Kelly to refinance any high-interest loan if rates later went down. The lease did not — as it could have — make Kelly’s obligation to construct a motel contingent upon securing financing at a given interest rate, so the court could readily have inferred that Kelly assumed the risk of obtaining a rate for construction financing that would ensure acceptable profitability from the leased premises. See Tyrpak v. Lee,
The lessee also challenges the trial court’s findings that the lessors’ notice of default was sufficient and that the lessee failed to correct the default within thirty days after receipt of the notice. Here lessee argues that, assuming it breached the lease, lessors acquiesced in the breach for perhaps as long as three years and should have given lessee notice of their intention to enforce the terms of the lease before giving notice of default.
Lessee’s argument involves the related concepts of waiver, modification, and estoppel, although it does not expressly identify these concepts in its brief. All three of these principles rely upon the same basic contention that lessors’ conduct negated the express default provision in the lease. See J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. United New Mexico Bank,
There was no waiver because there was no evidence that the lessors actually intended to waive their right to declare a default under the lease. See United New Mexico Bank,
Similarly, there was no evidence that the parties agreed to amend the lease to eliminate the requirement that the lessee would commence construction of a motel with due diligence. See id. (modification occurs when party requests and receives consideration for a waiver). There was no request for, or receipt of, consideration for a modification of the lease.
Finally, there was no estoppel, because the lessee did not show that it detrimentally relied on the lessors’ delay in enforcing the terms of the lease. See id. at 717,
Consequently, we uphold the trial court’s findings that the notice of default was sufficient and that the lessee failed to correct the default within the stipulated time period.
Lessee also contests two other findings of the trial court, but it raises no new issues and its arguments do not require additional analysis.
The judgment appealed from in Cause No. 19,021 is affirmed. The order appealed from in Cause No. 19,443 is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the setting of a reasonable attorney’s fee for the services of counsel for the lessors on this appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Through various assignments, etc., the other defendants-appellees have acquired interests in Kapnison and Gathings’s position as lessors. All of these parties are referred to herein as "the lessors.” Kelly transferred his interest in the leasehold to his corporation, Kelly Inn No. 2, Inc., which was formed after the lease was signed; the corporation and Kelly are referred to as "the lessee."
. Later amended to October 1, 1980.
. The complaint was filed on January 20, 1987. Prior to trial, the lessee abandoned the claim for reinstatement and sought only damages.
. The total of fees and costs requested by all lessors was $34,905.98. The court found this amount to be reasonable, and no issue as to reasonableness of the figure is presented on this appeal.
. Cause No. 19,021 in this Court.
. Cause No. 19,443 in this Court.
. See, e.g., In re Quintana,
. One difference between this case and Budinich is that here the January 1990 judgment expressly awarded attorney’s fees and left only their amount for future determination, whereas in Budinich neither the recoverability nor the amount was established by the initial judgment. Although, as indicated later in this opinion, we are inclined to doubt that this distinction makes any difference, we do not expressly hold that, when the judgment makes no ruling on the recoverability of attorney’s fees, it is nevertheless final.
. See, for example, Thomson v. Dean,
. See, e.g., Home Plumbing & Contracting Co. v. Pruitt,
. “Final judgments and decrees, entered by district courts in all cases tried pursuant to the provisions of this section shall remain under the control of such courts for a period of thirty days after the entry thereof, and for such further time as may be necessary to enable the court to pass upon and dispose of any motion which may have been filed within such period, directed against such judgment; provided, that if the court shall fail to rule upon such motion within thirty days after the filing thereof, such failure to rule shall be deemed a denial thereof____” NMSA 1978, § 39-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1991).