*1
11(A). Never-
preservation within Section
instruction Defendant-Appellee. at P.2d at 172 given. 120 N.M. 29,093. No. jury that it must (indicating the must be told in acted self- acquit if it finds defendant Supreme Court of New Mexico. conflicting instruc- defense order avoid tions). an instruction was not tendered Such Dec. 2005. addition, Majority ease. In as the notes, can one of reasons we Opinion
conclude, facts, attempted these vol- on manslaughter of-
untary is a lеsser included fact second- is the that we believe
fense was murder of the intentional kind
degree jury which the instructed. type on ¶ Maj. some- Op. 19. That fact is not
See addition, argued. Defen-
thing Defendant appeal, perhaps on argument and thus
dant’s trial, rely on the evi- seems thought gun, that he the victim had
dence provoked by victim’s also that he was Finally, Runningwater. of Jessica
treatment Majority Opinion a conclusion reaches availability of an instruction
about the
provocation required a to have seems De-
different instruction than the instruction Maj. Op. See 8. Defen-
fendant tendered. an instruction that would ask
dant tendered question persuaded I am not actually supports. He did not ten- would have asked
der instruction Majority Opinion concludes he
question the have entitled to answered. reasons, these I concur Sec- For I, 11(B), respectfully and III. I dissent
tions 11(A) 11(C). I would af-
from Sections has chal-
firm the convictions Defendant
lenged appeal and the and sen- jury’s entered on the verdict.
tence view, I
majority being of different concur
part part. and dissent MAES,
I PETRA JIMENEZ CONCUR:
Justice. *2 (1969) (as 1978, §§ to -15 28-1-1
NMSA 2004), Kirk through Ju- amended en- appeals neau from a against him. The tered the district court *3 rejected for a request court also pre- jury that Plaintiff trial. We conclude below to create sented sufficient evidence hold genuine issues of material fact. We also jury on his that Plaintiff is entitled to trial Accordingly, claim of retaliation. we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND employed Plaintiff was Intel as engineering In equipment technician. June Cannaday, a of Stephanie co-worker Plaintiff, reported superior, Judy Rus- to her sell, had that over last few months she by inappropriate been conversa- bothered tions that she had over- sexual nature Cannaday her cubicle. heard around work stopped that the convеrsations be asked complained, she be After she moved. the conversations ceased. Department Intel’s Human Resources investigation
launched a sexual harassment allegations. into Plaintiff was one Cannaday. people implicated by Plaintiff de- alleged participation nies in the conversa- tions, claims that he was included allegations Cannaday suspected because having him which extramarital affair of Earlier, Cannaday approve. had she did featuring complained about a screen saver comput- in bikinis on Plaintiffs work women er. superiors Despite requests from his investigation
during the course of the
that he
harassment,
stead-
admit to sexual
Although
fastly maintained
innocence.
during
present
some of the
alleged
question,
no one
conversations
actually
any inappropri-
that Plaintiff
made
Associates,
Best &
Hannah B.
Hannah
According to
the In-
ate remarks.
Best,
NM, Appellant.
Albuquerque,
him
investigators prejudged
guilty,
tel
P.A.,
Gilkey
Stephenson,
Duane
Gil-
&
C.
incorrectly
protestations
interpreted
NM,
key, Albuquerque,
Appellee.
being uncoopera-
of innocence as evidence of
investigation
displaying
tive
Additionally,
argues
bad attitude.
OPINION
investigators
contemplated
had
BOSSON, Chief Justice.
beginning,
means
termination from the
as a
sending
strong message
em-
In
retaliation claim under the New of
other
(NMHRA),
Rights
ployees regarding
Act
the evils of sexual harass-
Mexico Human
essence,
court,
present
Plaintiff claims
filed the
state
claim-
ment.
example
to make an
him.
ing
unlawfully
was out
Intel had
retaliated
against
having
him
filed his
During
investigation,
course
EEOC, among
other
Ulti-
reasons.
Harris,
supervisor
a Human
Lin
Resources
mately,
summary judgment
Intel moved for
church,
knew Plaintiff from
initiated a
who
on Plaintiffs retaliation claim which
dis-
meeting
Plaintiff outside of work. Har-
Earlier,
granted.
trict court
the district
superior
employees
ris
who
were
rejected
request
court had
for a
investigating
against
the claim
Plaintiff.
being untimely.
ap-
trial as
meeting,
During
allegedly
Harris
threat-
peals
rulings directly
pur-
both
to this Court
repercussions
ened Plaintiff with
if he contin-
*4
28-l-13(C) (1987) (amended
suant to Sectiоn
allegations against
contest the
him
ued to
2005) (prior
appeals
directly
to 2005
made
pursued litigation.
Harris denied these
Court).
Supreme
meeting
and claims
statements
the
was to
personal relationship.
the two men’s
discuss
DISCUSSION
Harris,
day
meeting
On the
after the
Summary Judgment
14, 2001,
August
perma-
a
received
“Summary judgment
appro
{8}
warning regarding
nent written
sexual
priate
genuine
there are no
of
where
issues
problems.
harassment and attendance
In-
material
and the movant
fact
is entitled
accepting
warning,
stead of
the
Plaintiff fol-
a
judgment
matter of law.”
as
v. United
Self
open
procedure
requested
lowed
an
door
¶
Serv., Inc.,
6,
Plaintiff was threatened with retalia- Summary Against Judg- allegations tion if Case he continued to contest the against ment him and filed a clаim. summary judgment, On Plain- After Plaintiff did file with the EEOC,
tiff pleadings present- alleged did not rest on retaliation became ed against Intel’s more ensuing motion. Plaintiff intense and continued over the *6 produced showing, argu- evidence months. supervisor at least When Plaintiffs found ably, claim, people contemplated ready that some at Intel out about the EEOC she was to terminating Plaintiff even the issue him warning before sexual another written was but investigation point. harassment told to off completed. Although was On hold at that August 8, Peg Feibig, Plaintiff who was investi- had received critical work evalua- gating charge, prior the sexual supervisor’s discovery harassment wrote tions claim, timing, her notes: can the frequency, “How we make the EEOC S[tephanie Cannady— degree safe for significantly environment] criticism increased af- accuser]? Terminate ter filed K[irk Plaintiff with the EEOC. Plaintiff Juneau]? co-worker, showing deposition ownership/accountability.” He is no testified on that Mike Aloi, Plaintiff offers this statement told him that Plain- as evidence Russell instructed Graff, Department supervisor, that Human tiffs Resources was immediate Jim to re- contemplating assignments vise termination even before its in- task to show vestigation incomplete, thereby complete. was them as Plaintiff Plaintiff further set trial, position up alleged bolstered that the harass- termination. If admissible at ment these clear excuse for his termination statements would be evidеnce of when he submitted to district court Can- retaliation. naday’s testimony all that she wanted was for may In addition what Russell have stop the conversations to or to be moved and third-parties, told also Plaintiff testified that any that Plaintiff never made sexual state- directly him, complained showing Russell directly. Despite benign ments Intel’s more hostility her toward Plaintiff and his EEOC notations, explanation Feibig we con- claim. deposition, In his Plaintiff testified at clude that trial a fact-finder could reason- that Russell stated the EEOC claim was ably infer this evidence that Intel’s “nonsense,” headache,” and it “such a Plaintiff, investigators may prejudged have and she wished she did not have to deal with concluding that he had to show “аccountabili- hostility by telling it. showed Russell her
ty” committing. for acts he denied Plaintiff “created extra workload her,” Plaintiff “babysit” also demonstrated that Har- Plain- she had ris, supervisor tiff spend the Human Resources enormous amounts of time by grounds Ellis v. Univ. Kan. as to the rest of on other opposed (10th Ctr., 1186, 1194 Cir. pro- Med. supervision. her group under 1998). hostility of Russell’s evidence
vided direct
5, 2001,
when
towards him. On December
response,
argues that
In
attorney was read
from Plaintiffs
letter
temporal proximity of each of
adverse
Intel’s
Russell,
her
word
notes the
she wrote
actions,
ultimate termi-
opposed
Ar-
response
to its contents.
“disgusting”
nation,
prox-
temporal
sufficient
establishes
remarks could
guably, all of Russell’s
Inc.,
Mkts.,
imity.
Mаrx v. Schnuck
See
by the
as evidence
interpreted
(10th
fact-finder
Cir.1996)
(noting that
F.3d
environment,
retaliatory
animated
Rus-
temporal proximity”
“close
standard should
get
Plaintiff for
desire to
even with
sell’s
narrowly
interpreted too
where retal-
not be
including
her
filing the EEOC claim
iatory
quickly
began
actions
after the em-
claim).
it.
ployee filed his Fair Labor Standards
From the time Plaintiff filed his claim with
Temporal
Response: A
Standard
Intel’s
terminated,
until the time he was
the EEOC
argues
no more than six weeks
denying
addition to
causal
In
type
employ-
passed without some
of adverse
protected activity and
between
connection
(finding
ment action. See id.
causal
termination,
argues
based
original
up
writе
oc-
connection when
precedent
time
federal
between
claim,
shortly
filing the
curred
after
termi
Plaintiffs EEOC
and his
later).
termination occurred much
Given
months,
nation, nearly
precludes
five
a find
employer hostility that con-
overall context of
argues that the
ing of causation.
Intel also
during
tinued
five-month
unabated
entire
period
seven-week
between
temporal
period,
argues
Plaintiff also
warning is in
Plaintiffs second written
there is
standard is not relevant because
sufficient
itself to establish causation.
other evidence of causation.
Appeals
The United States Court
if the
Circuit has held that
adverse
Tenth
not been asked in this case
We have
employment actiоn has occurred within
adopt
the Tenth Circuit’s
where
standards
protected activity, causa
short time after the
temporal proximity is the
evidence of
this
case,
tion
be inferred from
presented
causation.
*7
Co.,
Brewing
causation,
See
v. Coors
alone.
Anderson
other direct evidence of
did
Cir.1999)
(10th
(discuss
Thus,
rely
proximity
181 F.3d
1179
temporal
not
alone.
establishing
one
one
ing
temporal proximity
case law
that
to apply
we decline
activity
protected
analysis
adopt
specific
the
in this
or
a
time
half months between
case
may, by
employment
inferring
facts
to causa-
period
and the adverse
related
causation,
itself,
three months
tion.
In this case and unlike certain
the
establish
us,
Thus,
temporal proximity
to
is
other
cases cited
long).
is too
when no
available,
evidentiary
piece of
formulation of-
plaintiff
is
a
in the
one
the
of causation
Meiners,
by
fered
Plaintiff. See
359 F.3d at
may rely on an
Tenth Circuit
inference
1231; Richmond,
at
120 F.3d
209.
fact-
arising
period
from a short time
causation
timing
to
finder
free
consider
should be
protected activity and the ad
between the
See,
proximity, along with all the other facts and
e.g.,
action.
Meiners
verse
circumstances,
(10th
deciding the
Kansas,
ultimate issue
1222, 1231
v.
359 F.3d
Univ. of
day
leave for another
Cir.2004)
of causation. We
(holding
one
that three months and
question of
the time between the em-
when
long
establish causatiоn
week was too
to
activity and
ployee engaging
protected
alone);
v.
temporal proximity
Richmond
employer taking
might
adverse action
be suf-
(10th
ONEOK, Inc.,
120 F.3d
209
Cir.
allow
of a causal con-
ficient to
an inference
1997) (a
period
three-month
without addition
nection between the two.
to
al facts would
be sufficient
establish
causation);
Dep’t
Ramirez v. Okla.
Mental
Pretext
Justification
Cir.1994)
(10th
Health,
584, 596
a
(finding
period
pri
month
Plaintiff has made
that one and
Since
one-half
causation),
ma
case for retaliation under
enough to
overruled
facie
show
formulation,
just
warning
burden
was valid or
retalia-
Douglas
McDonnell
written
shifts,
regard
to
to come forward
tion
then
Intel
for Plaintiff’s actions.
tо the
justification
valid
the adverse treatment.
warnings,
other two
the record reflects that
Douglas,
802-03,
See McDonnell
411 U.S. at
disagree
his
coworkers would
the as-
justifi-
1817.
provides
S.Ct.
Once Intel
supervisors
sessments made
because
cation, the
to
burden shifts back
Plaintiff to
they found Plaintiff to be a hard worker.
justification merely pretext
show the
is
for a
argues
disagreement
this
shows
804-05,
retaliatory motive.
See id.
93 warnings
merely pretext. Again,
were
outset,
S.Ct. 1817. At the
we note that
jury must determine
Plaintiff and
whether
proffered justification
legiti-
whether
is
supervisors
coworkers
Intel and its
are
mate,
merely
up
or is
an excuse to cover
Finally,
points
to be believed.
to
conduct,
illegal
credibility
largely
is
issue
regarding
Russell’s notes
the letter
requires
and often
of circumstantial-
use
attorney concerning
potential
It
keeps
evidence.
is rare a defendant
docu-
referring
lawsuit
“disgusting.”
to it as
directly
ments or makes
in-
statements
argues,
merely reacting
Russell was
retaliatory
terminating
dicate a
motive for
hyperbole
province
in the letter.
It is the
employee.
Issues such as this
nor-
should
jury,
judge,
interpret
not the
Russell’s
mally
exclusively
province
be left
retaliatory
reaction as
of a
indicative
motive
jury. Judges
credibility
should not make
or not. Plaintiff has
satisfied
burden
weigh
determinations or
circumstantial evi-
show
disputed
there are
factual
re-
issues
summary judgment stage.
dence at the
garding
justification.
Intel’s
Intеl claims Plaintiff
termi
pursuant
guidelines
its
provide
nated
Plaintiff Raises
Issues of Materi-
Genuine
of an employee upon
-termination
al Fact
receipt
warnings
of three
rolling
written
in a
stated,
argues
period.
twelve-month
It
For
reasons
we conclude
Plaintiff re
warnings
put
ceived three written
within
forward
sufficient evidence
period,
warnings
solely
genuine
and two of the
were
below to create
issues of material
performance,
thereby
related
his work
respect
fact with
to his retaliation claim
justifying
goes
Bartlett,
Plaintiffs termination.
'Intel
against
fact-finder sight rendering jury superfluous. Upon of a demand must not lose just opposite. We the court, argues to state proclaims innocence remand its the fact that Intel within a jury request filed reasonable when faced he just forcefully as Plaintiff did time, no that Intel suffered period of charges sexual harassment. initially with of six-week prejudice the short way surprise or to test these sure Trial is delay. the fact- conflicting allegations, at which time judge the weigh the evidence and finder can 1-039(A) Rule NMRA Under It is principal witnesses. credibility 2005, ten- jury a is after the if demand made Mexico
well-settled in New has discretion day period, the district court appropriate vehicle is not grant it. We review whether to to determine Bartlett, do 2000-NMCA- courts to either. on ruling a court the matter district ¶ 38, 830, 036, 1062. 999 P.2d Drum, of discretion. abuse Alford (1961). 298, 303-04, N.M. Jury Trial Rights Act us, filed his Human the case before district 28, February court complaint jury state because refused Plaintiffs demand court 1, 2002, May it on Intel request and was served “ample opportunity” Plaintiff had in state filing an answer 2002. Without do Considered jury a and did not so. earlier court, abstract, the case to federal court Intel removed court’s consideration in the Plaintiffs com- its answer. and then filed jury matter not seem unreasonable. does jury, a request nor did file plaint face, did not a delay nearly nine months On its separate request in court. requesting federal filing between excessive, miti- jury and without other Rights Act com- the Human While certainly justify gating would circumstances court, pending in federal plaint was scrutiny, rejection it. On closer judge’s under Title separate federal action filed a however, analysis incom- seems the court’s Act, Rights 42 U.S.C. the 1964 Civil VII of unique plete light of the rather circum- (2000), § Plaintiff did re- which 2000e-2 case. stances magistrate quest jury. The consoli- federal complaints placed them dated the two reviewing a court’s de- When district jury trials. both on federal docket for jury, deny a for a belated demand cision Thereafter, Rights Act the Human jurisdictions have cases other several trial, jury until Novem- pending remained if variety determine at a of factors to looked court dismissed ber when federal in- was an of discretion. For there abuse the Human case remanded EEOC Belk, stance, in Pinemont Bank v. Rights Ap- Act back to state court. claim (5th Cir.1984), found it was court remand, after proximately six weeks deny jury trial an abuse of discretion court filed his demand in state had in fact parties all court when The district court on December 2002. jury, case would be tried assumed the stating, had am- request “Plaintiff denied prejudice no would result. Other courts by jury, request a trial ple opportunity length delay to the look *9 do failed so.” [to] jury for the requesting a but also the reasons a for delay, whether issues are suitable Mexico Rules of Civil Pro- New {30} 1-038(A) re- 2005, granting the motion would cedure, requires jury, whether Rule NMRA oppos- disruption for the court or jury a trial made within sult a be demand opposing party responsive ing party, and whether days the last ten after service of Wilson, 707 prejudiced. v. jury be Parrott pleading. Plaintiff failed to file re- would (11th Cir.1983); 1262, also 1267 see court within F.2d quest in state or federal either Moore, Corp. & Notwithstanding v. Fischbach rule. that Daniel Int’l day the ten (5th Cir.1990) (uti- 1061, Inc., omission, points an- 1064 out that Intel’s factors). court, that, lizing samе was never filed in state swer
21
view,
just
it is
In our
not
stances. See Hernandez v. Power Constr.
{34}
Co.,
“oppor
90,
503,
of whether Plaintiff had an
question
73 Ill.2d
22 Ill.Dec.
382 N.E.2d
trial;
tunity”
request
jury
(1978)
it
undisput
to
is
(stating
1204
the court abused
factors, including
did.
demand,
Other
ed
its
denying
jury
discretion
late
delay
prejudice
whether
when,
for the
reason
special
under the
of the
circumstances
result, must be considered in order to
case,
will
it
“give proper recognition
failed to
to
proper
exercise
constitute
protect
the need to
‘jealously guarded
discretion.
”
Co.,
484, 486,
v.
Carlile Cont'l Oil
81 N.M.
right
by jury’
(quoted authority
of trial
Cf.
(district
(Ct.App.1970)
P.2d
omitted)).
circumstances,
Under these
failing
abuse its discretion in
'to
court
court abused
rectify
its discretion. To
jury
party
triаl
grant
opposing
where
is not
overarching
abuse and in the
interest of fair
delayed,
prejudiced,
the court
is not
sides,
ness to both
we reverse this
decision
inconvenienced).
business
court is not
the district court
jury
and remand for a
trial.
factors,
Looking to these other
it is evident CONCLUSION
granted
district court
have
should
summary judgment.
We reverse the
{38}
motion.
deny
We
ruling
reverse the district court’s
to
during
In reality,
much of the
{35}
by jury,
Plaintiffs demand for a trial
and we
case,
procedural history of this
Plaintiff had
remand
proceedings.
for further
opportunity
to file but no real need.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
initially
the case
When
was filed
in state
court, Intel removed the case
filing
before
its
SERNA,
WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M.
answer,
triggered
and therefore never
CHÁVEZ,
and EDWARD L.
Justices.
ten-day
period
limitation
in state court.
During
pendency
court,
its
in federal
PAMELA B. MINZNER and PETRA
already
jury
jury
matter was
set
trial. A
MAES,
(specially
JIMENEZ
Justices
perfunctory
demand would have been
concurring).
unnecessary.
only upon
It was
remand to
MINZNER,
(specially
Justice
concurring).
court,
state
that Plaintiff had both
oppor
tunity and the need.
Although I
concur
the result the
reaches,
Majority Opinion
I believe the facts
delay
just
A
under six weeks does
merit a
unreasonable,
analysis.
somewhat different
I
especially
seem
do
not
consider
agree that
there is sufficient evidence of
ing
discovery
just unfolding
and no
protected
causal connection between the
ac-
date
trial
had been set.
Intel sufferеd no
tivity
complaint
filing
adverse
prejudice
appears
have
been aware all
preclude summary
along
jury
that a
anticipat
trial
not
judgment.
I
agree
also
that the trial court
scheduled,
but in fact
ed
at least while the
denying
request
erred in
jury
for a
case remained
federal court.
Bates
Cf.
(D.N.M.
persuaded
trial.
I am
that Plaintiff is
Regents,
Bd.
122 F.R.D.
1987) (where
rely
entitled to
prior
filing
on his actions
prejudice
no
would result
Equal Employment Op-
parties
defendant and both
assumed case was
portunity
trial,
protect-
Commission
evidence of
jury
plaintiffs
grant
set
motion was
activity
employer
ed
nor that his
should
ed); Aspen
be
Landscaping,
Inc. v. Longford
having
right
viewed as
waived the
of N.M., Inc.,
initiation motion, complaint internal re- Similarly, Intel I believe With this action. investigation only filing complaint with the sexual harassment garding that conceded activity. response, protected investigators “prejudged” his alleges that the EEOC was retaliated, only not argued case, that Intel their conclusions without and reached complaint, he filed EEOC adequate because Plaintiff did not evidence. assert in involvement he denied investigators also because were biased because of reply, clearly Intel stated In its harassment. membership protected in a class. He the court was issue before simply investigation that the was un- claims a result was terminated “as whether Plaintiff ought NMHRA not be construed fair. The charge he filed with of a discrimination protect general claim. such argued that specifically EEOC.” By including general such a claim investi- open for an door request “Plaintiffs scope activity, protected we within the ‘protected not gation August 2001 was ” to me create troublesome seem if argued activity.’ Intel also that even difficulty dealing unnecessary employers refusing to terminated for had been complaints. If an sexual harassment harassment, he was involved sexual admit action, employer fails to take corrective in vio- impermissible “not retaliation this was responsible for a hos- employer be held not sub- and therefore lation of NMHRA еmployee If an sus- tile work environment. ject Court’s review.” to the pected involvement in sexual harassment persuaded that Plaintiffs I am not taken, unhappy with the corrective is complaint prior filing the actions may perceive employer to employee activity protected were under EEOC retaliating employee consid- for what the Rights Act. The Mexico Human New ought just I we not ers criticism. believe employ prohibits discrimination NMHRA protect the NMHRA to resistance construe race, including age, specific grounds ment on non-discriminatory investigation of a sex, handicap, physical or mental religion, harassment claim. sexual identity. gender orientation or sеxual 28-l-7(A) (2004). 1978, § The Act NMSA However, only pro- if Plaintiffs even against any per prohibits discrimination also activity filing complaint was tected “opposed any has unlawful discrimi son who EEOC, appears have met complaint, testi natory practice or has filed a by presenting prima facie burden some evi- any proceeding under participated fied or complaint suggesting that his EEOC dence 28-1-7(1). Thus, § Rights Act.” the Human caused Intel’s adverse action. types dis prohibits the Act certain re- Plaintiff offered evidence that he started crimination; or prohibit not all unfair it does filing after ceiving poor reviews and feedback Feli employment actions. unreasonable Cf. provided direct evi- complaint. He also Conquistador v. El Resort ciano de la Cruz supervisors aware of his that his were dence (1st Club, Country Cir. F.3d had upset that it and were been 2000) proof that (holding that termination provide plaintiff filed. A can direct evidence to state a claim “unfair” is not sufficient or can discrimination if he she demon- VII; Title courts do assess under discrimi- strate that there is a nexus between rationality employers’ non merits or even comments, natory disputed employ- discriminatory decisions); Morrow business Martinez, 382 F.3d Stover v. ment decision. Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart (10th Cir.2004). The record 1077-78 Cir.1998) (7th (“Title prohibits VII discrimi supervisor that the same commented shows actions, hasty ill- natory employment having to complaint, complained about ones.”). considered ultimate “babysit” and made the that resulted termi- decision record There no indication disciplinary action discriminatory nation. She initiated protesting that Plaintiff was shortly filed. Plain- after simply that he had He asserted treatment. conversations, the retaliato- tiff has nexus between shown inappropriate not had *11 ry process, comments and the adverse review disciplinary pro and initiated action. ceedings shortly learning after of the com plaint, support jury’s could conclusion legitimate, has offered a non the complaint was the true motivation discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termi disciplinary action. nation, See Stacks v. South showing that hаd a record of Inc., western Pages, Bell Yellow poor cooperation skills, and communication F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (8th Cir.1994). complete many and had failed to I tasks Because con assigned in a timely manner. The clude that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing support sufficient to sum showing to survive judgment, I mary judgment as a matter law because concur in majority. result reached presented Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to allow reasonable factfinder conclude that I MAES, CONCUR: PETRA JIMENEZ performance concerns about Plaintiffs were Justice. pretext for retaliation. While far from overwhelming, supporting the evidence Plain prima
tiffs facie case allow would also actually conclude that Intel did not believe performance
that Plaintiffs had deteriorated. example,
For that Plaintiffs
supervisor was complaint, aware of the con “disgusting,” changed
sidered it