Johnson v. Tony's Town Mister Quik

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Judy JOHNSON, Pеtitioner, v. TONY‘S TOWN MISTER QUIK and the Workers’ Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 83283.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 9, 1996.

915 P.2d 355

Today is the first time a court of this state has applied to the facts of this case 51 O.S. 1991 § 155(22), the subdivision granting state immunity for any “Department of Corrections approved wоrk release program.” The Court, on its own motion, finds immunity from suit in District Court¹ in those words of that statute. Let us review the facts.

Thomas Horton was painting a cabin that day in Lake Murray State Park under a prisoner work release program. At no time prior to then had his assignments ever included firefighting, nor had he or the other inmates in the program ever received any firefighting training.

A grass fire broke out in the Park. Trained, municipal firefighters were summoned and had arrived on the scene. Horton‘s work supervisor took him and his work crеw to a site near the fire, where they were given shovels and toe sacks and told to help put it out. A flatbed truck driven by a State Tourism employee (not a firefighter) pulled up for them, and the inmates jumped on board. Neither Hоrton nor the other inmates had any protective gear for firefighting. The truck then drove into the grass fire, the driver‘s idea being to get to the other side of the flames. Horton, perhaps in a panic, perhaps in a reasoned decision not to be on the truck when the gas tank exploded, jumped off and ran.² In the process he was seriously burned. He sued the State, alleging negligence on the part of the Tourism employee. The State wins without а trial.

Are we, then, to take it from this Court that the Department of Corrections of this State approved a work release program which was to impress into firefighting duty inmates who have had no firefighting training, who have been furnished no firе-protective equipment, and who are told to get on a truck which promptly drives into the fire? I doubt we could find a DOC representative who would confess to “approval” of that sort of work release program. Thе Eighth Amendment would come to mind.³ The implications would be vast, especially in a nation widely regarded as the leader in protection of human rights.

The Plaintiff‘s brief before the Court of Appeals used the dictionary to define “method” as a systematic procedure for attaining an objective, the issue being whether this bizarre episode was the state‘s “method” of providing fire protection. He argued by way of example, that if fire broke out in the сlassroom, and the teacher, instead of shepherding the first graders to safety, instructed them to fight the fire with their coats, that probably would not have amounted to the school district‘s method of providing fire protection. His argumеnt finds support in

State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1979), and

Jackson v. Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 680 P.2d 877 (1984).

His analogy applies well to the thought that this incident was part of a Department-approved work release program. Absent express testimony that it was so approved I would neither assume nor infer Dеpartmental approval. I would consider this episode an adventuristic aberration, just as it would have been had the teacher fought the fire with her first graders. I would not find immunity for the State in either § 155(6) or (22), but would let a jury determine who should be accountable for Horton‘s burns.

Joseph F. Bufogle, Bufogle and Associates, ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‍Tulsa, for Petitioner.

Robert Highsaw, State Insurance Fund, Oklahoma City, for Respondents.

OPALA, Justice.

The single issue tendered by Tony‘s Town Mister Quik‘s [respondent or employer] quest for dismissal is whether the claimant‘s petition for review can be deemed filed when mailed and hence timely. We answer in the affirmative and deny the motion to dismiss with prejudice to renewal.

I

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Judy Johnson [claimant or Johnson] filed her Fоrm 3 for cumulative-trauma injury occasioned by on-the-job stress. The trial tribunal heard the case on February 17, 1994 and entered its order denying the claim on February 28. A copy of the tribunal‘s memorial was sent to the parties that day.

Claimant mailed her petition for review on March 21, 1994—the last day to bring her proceeding in this court.¹ Her paperwork was received by this court‘s clerk on March 22, 1994—more than twenty days after the February 28 order was sent. Employer moved for dismissal in its response to the petition for review and later pressed a formal motion.

II

THE TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT DECISIONS

The provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B)² require that a petition to review a Workers’ Compensation Court‘s decision be brought within twenty days of the day a copy of the tribunаl‘s decision was sent to the parties.

Ireton v. Saint Francis Hosp., 844 P.2d 151 (Okla. 1992)³ holds that the mailbox rule⁴ which is authorized by the provisions of 12 O.S. Supp. 1993 § 990A(B)⁵—does not govern the commencement of proceedings to review a Workers’ Compensation Court‘s decision. Today we overrule

Ireton as an incorrect exposition of our statutory law.

III

THE PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY COMMANDED BY ART. 5, § 46, OKL. CONST., REQUIRES (A) THAT THE § 990A(B) MAILBOX RULE BE APPLIED TO THE REVIEW PROCESS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DECISIONS AND (B) THAT IRETON BE OVERRULED

Our sole concern here is whether the mailbox provisions of § 990A(B)—a general statutory rule of appellate procedure⁶—should apply to proceedings for rеview of compensation decisions. The terms of Art. 5, § 46⁷ command that general rules of appellate process be symmetrical and apply across the board.⁸ Unless contrary reasons be clearly shown, proceedings filed in this court for review of decisions made by inferior courts and tribunals comprise but one class. To single out for less favorable treatment those who seek review of workers’ compensation decisions by denying them the benefit of the mailbox rule—legislatively ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‍fashioned and judicially implemented—would create a dichotomous division in the general adjective law governing this court‘s reviewing cognizance. A disparate procedural treatment is neither explicitly nor implicitly contemplated by the statute under construction. Extending the mailbox rule to proceedings brought under § 3.6(B)⁹ would plainly satisfy the constitutional call for uniformity. More importantly, the provisiоns of § 990A(B)(1) do not prohibit the mailbox rule‘s application to proceedings for review of compensation decisions, (2) create no burden on this court‘s operation and (3) facilitate filings by persons who reside outside this court‘s immediate situs.

Ireton offends the uniformity-of-procedure strictures demanded by Art. 5, § 46.¹⁰ It is hence overruled.

IV

SUMMARY

Fundamental fairness can only be dispensed within the framework of orderly process. General rules of appellate practice must satisfy the uniformity-of-procedure mandate of § 46.

Ireton,¹¹ which created a dichotomous division in the general rule that proceedings for review are deemed filed when mailed, offends this State‘s fundamental law. The mailbox rule—now recognized as applying to appeals from district court decisions¹²—must equally govern petitions for review brought under the terms of § 3.6(B).

The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied with prejudice to renewal. This appeal shall proceed to the decisional stage.

KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur.

ALMA WILSON, C.J., concurs in result.

LAVENDER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., dissent.

KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice, concurring:

I agree that the mailbox rule, 12 O.S.Supp. 1994 § 990A(B),¹ is applicable to Workers’ Compensation appeals for the reasons expressed in part III of the majority opinion.

I am also of the opinion that these same reasons require that appeals frоm the Workers’ Compensation Court be accorded the same amount of time for an appeal to be filed. Title 85 O.S.Supp.1994 § 3.6(C), Rule 1.100(a), Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S. 1991, Ch. 15, App. 2, and Rule 1.18, Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S. 1991, Ch. 14, App. 2 should be amended to provide for uniform application of appellate procedure.²

WATT, Justice, with whom LAVENDER, J., joins, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case for two reasons. First, I see no reason to abandon the rule established in

Ireton v. St. Francis Hospital, 844 P.2d 151 (Okla.1992), that 12 O.S.Supp. 1994 § 990A.B applies only to petitions in error, and not to petitions ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‍to review orders of the Wоrkers’ Compensation Court.

Ireton was rightly decided. I believe, therefore, that the express language of the statute should be followed until and unless the Legislature chooses to broaden it. Second, § 990A.B does not apply here because Petitioner‘s certificate of mailing does not show that her petition for review was mailed “by certified mail with return receipt requested,” as expressly required by § 990A.B. [Emphasis added.]

We have apparently decided only one case interpreting § 990A.B. In

Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 879 P.2d 132, 134 (Okla.1994), we held that § 990A.B applied to appellant‘s petition in error because “the pe-

tition was mailed to us on September 2, 1993 by U.S. certified mail, return receipt requested. September 2, 1993 is therefore deemed the filing date of the petition in error [under § 990A.B].” [Emphasis added].

Marshall makes clear that an appellant has a duty to make a showing that she mailed her petition in error via “certified mail, return receipt requested” before she can claim relief under § 990A.B. Even if a petition for review of a Workers’ Compensation Court order could be held to come under § 990A.B, petitioner here made no showing that she came under its terms by having mailed her petition by certified mail, return receipt requested. Her petition for review, therefore, should have been dismissed.

I respectfully dissent.

See case details

Michael C. WASHINGTON, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents/Aрpellees.

No. 85295.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 16, 1996.

Notes

1

Department of Corrections inmates are not “employees“, and thus do not have access to the Workers’ Compensation Court when they are injured on their jobs.

In re Kroth, 408 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1965);

Clinton v. Crow, 488 P.2d 1232 (Okla. 1971). Twenty days from February 28, 1994 fell on a Sunday. The petition for review was mailed the next business day—Monday, March 21. Title 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 990A(B) provides: “The filing of the petition in error may be accomplished either by delivery or by sending it by certified mail with return receipt requested to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The date of mailing, аs shown by the postmark affixed by the post office or other proof from the post office of the date of mailing, shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error. If there is no proof from the post office of the date of mailing, the date of receipt by the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error.” Section 990A was amended effective September 1, 1994. The mailbox rule was unchanged by this amendment.

2

As far as we can tell the gas tank did not explode. The pertinent terms of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B) are: “The order, decision or award of the Court shall be final and conclusive upon all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties, unless, within twenty (20) days after a copy of such order, decision or award has been sent ... to the parties affected, an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of the state, to review such оrder, decision or award.” [Emphasis added.] See, dissent by Kauger, J. in

Rockwell International v. Hampton, ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‍886 P.2d 992, 993 (Okla. 1994).

3

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.

Ireton v. Saint Francis Hosp., Okl., 844 P.2d 151 (1992).

4

The so-called mailbox rule was first articulated in

Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng.Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818), where the court held that an offer is accepted at the moment acceptance is posted ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌​‍to the offeror in a correctly addressed envelope with postage prepaid.

Id. at 251.

5

The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. Supp. 1993 § 990A(B) are: “The filing of the petition in error may be accomplished either by delivery or by certified mail with return receipt requested to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The date of filing or the date of mаiling, as shown by the post mark affixed by the post office or other proof from the post office of the date of mailing, shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error. If there is no proof from the post office of the date of mailing, the date of receipt by the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error.” [Emphasis added.] For application of the mailbox rule in Oklahoma‘s extant jurisprudence, see

Woods v. Woods, Okl., 830 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1992);

Woody v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, Okl., 833 P.2d 257, 258 (1992).

6

The mailbox rule‘s general impact is not diminished by the location given to § 990A(B) in Title 12, which is designated for Civil Procedure.

Green v. Green, Okl., 309 P.2d 276, 278 (1957).

7

The terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., state in pertinent part: “The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: * * * * * * Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of ... in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts ... or other tribunals....” [Emphasis supplied.] See

Reynolds v. Porter, Okl., 760 P.2d 816, 822 (1988);

Maule v. Independent School Dist. Nо. 9., Okl., 714 P.2d 198, 203-204 (1986).

8

Brown v. Ford, Okl., 905 P.2d 223, 228 (1995);

Simpson v. Dixon, Okl., 853 P.2d 176, 183 (1993);

Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., Okl., 833 P.2d 1218, 1229 (1992);

Reynolds, supra note 7 at 822;

Johnson v. District Court of Oklahoma County, Okl., 738 P.2d 151, 154 (1987) (Opala, J., concurring).

9

For the pertinent terms of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B), see supra note 2.

10

Our own jurisprudence, no less than the Legislature‘s enactments, must faithfully conform to the state fundamental law‘s interdiction of non-uniform laws on prohibited subjects.

Reynolds, supra note 7 at 822. Although directed to the Legislature, Art. 5, § 46, is no less binding on the courts.

Southwestern Bell v. Okl. Corp. Com‘n., Okl., 873 P.2d 1001, 1026-27 (1994) (Opala, J., dissenting.);

Haynes v. Tulsa Public Schools Transit, Okl., 879 P.2d 128, 131 (1994) (Opala, J., concurring);

Great Plains Federal S & L v. Dabney, Okl., 846 P.2d 1088, 1095-96 (1993) (Opala, J., concurring.).

11

See supra note 3.

12

See

Woods and

Woody, supra note 5.

Case Details

Case Name: Johnson v. Tony's Town Mister Quik

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Apr 9, 1996

Citation: 915 P.2d 355

Docket Number: 83283

Court Abbreviation: Okla.