Rockwell International v. Hampton

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ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL, Petitioner, v. Bob HAMPTON, and the Workers’ Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 83899.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 8, 1994.

884 P.2d 1188

The purpose of the homestead exemption is to protect the family from demands of creditors³¹—to prevent the family from becoming a burden on society. Parents have a legal duty to support and educate their children and to prevent them from becoming public charges.³² Here, the father has yet to fulfill his obligations to support his child. The purpose of the homestead exemption, under the facts presented, is not served.

The mother seeking to enforce the support judgments is not the kind of creditor to which the homestead exemption was meant to apply. The exemption was intended to benefit the family. Allowing a spouse to claim the exemption‘s benefit against the family to which the spouse owes alimony and child support is contrary to the underlying policy of the homestead exemption. Because—under the facts presented—the homestead exemption may not be used to defeat the collection of past-due alimony and child support, summary judgment was improper.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED.

HODGES, C.J., LAVENDER, V.C.J., and ALMA WILSON, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur.

OPALA, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.

SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., dissent.

SIMMS, Justice, dissenting:

I cannot join the majority in its declaration that alimony and child support indebtedness are public policy exceptions to the homestead exemption, as I agree with the Court of Appeals that any additional exceptions should be created by the legislature, not the courts.

As the majority recognizes, this mother‘s claims for alimony and child support could have been protected by having the trial court place a lien on father‘s homestead property to secure performance of his obligations under the divorce decree. See

Sooner Federal Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Mobley, 645 P.2d 1000 (Okla.1982);

Putz v. Putz, 572 P.2d 970 (Okla.1978);

Whitman v. Whitman, 430 P.2d 802 (Okla.1967);

Grattan v. Tillman, 323 P.2d 982 (Okla.1958);

Bussey v. Bussey, 148 Okl. 10, 296 P. 401 (1931);

Haven v. Trammell, 79 Okl. 309, 193 P. 631 (1920).

Although the mother failed to protect herself by obtaining a lien, the Court judicially amends the exceptions to the homestead exemption provided by 31 O.S.1991, § 5, and declares father‘s conveyance fraudulent as a matter of public policy. While this situation presents obvious and substantial public policy considerations, they are concerns which should be addressed and resolved by the legislative process.

The Court is understandably sympathetic to the plight of this mother and child and their frustration with father‘s conveyance of his only valuable asset. The opinion‘s potential for harm to real property law, however, may far outweigh its beneficial effects to domestic relations litigants.

I am authorized to state that Justice HARGRAVE joins with me in the view expressed herein.

ORDER

HODGES, Chief Justice.

Petitioner‘s motion to dismiss the cross-petition for review is granted and the cross-petition filed on October 10, 1994 is dismissed as untimely. All Supreme Court proceedings to review an order of the Workers’ Compensation Court must be commenced within twenty (20) days after a copy of the order has been sent to the parties. Unlike appeals from district court orders, there is no provision for additional time within which to commence a cross- or counter-proceeding to review a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court. 85 O.S.1991 § 3.6, Rule 1.100(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases,

Smith v. State Industrial Court, 408 P.2d 317 (Okl.1965).

LAVENDER, V.C.J., and SIMMS, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur.

OPALA and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.

KAUGER, Justice, with whom OPALA, Justice joins, dissenting:

The majority‘s dismissal of the cross-petition as untimely is premised upon the twenty-day time limitation imposed by 85 O.S.Supp.1993 § 3.6¹ and Rule 1.100(a), Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S. 1991, Ch. 15, App. 2.² Rule 1.18, Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 14, App. 2³ allows a party thirty days to file an appeal. The twenty-day limitation imposed by 85 O.S.1991 § 3.6 and Rule 1.100(c) is a special law prohibited by the Okla. Const, art. 5, § 46.⁴ Because the cross-petition was filed timely under Rule 1.18, I dissent.

Notes

1

Title 85 O.S. Supp.1993 § 3.6(B) provides in pertinent part:

“The order, decision or award of the Court shall be final and conclusive upon all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties, unless, within twenty (20) days after a copy of such order, decision or award has been sent by the Administrator to the parties affected, an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of the state, to review such order, decision or award. . . .”

2

Rule 1.100, Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 15, App. 2 provides in pertinent part:

“(a) Decisions Reviewable and Time for Their Commencement. A decision of the trial judge or of the Workers’ Compensation Court en banc may be brought for review to this court in compliance with 85 O.S.1981 § 3.6 and the Rules in Part III and III(b). The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition for review in this court within twenty days after a copy of the adverse decision shall have been sent to the parties affected. . . .
(c) Cross or Counter Action to Review Same Decision. A cross-action or counter-action or a separate proceeding to review the same decision shall be commenced within the same time and in like manner as the principal proceeding. . . .”

3

Rule 1.18, Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S.1991, Ch. 14, App. 2 provides in pertinent part:

“(a) Cross-Appeal or Counter-Appeal. If a petition in error has been timely filed to commence an appeal from an appealable decision, then any party aggrieved by the same decision may file its petition in error: within forty (40) days of the date the judgment was filed with the district court clerk, except when mailing is required, all as provided by Rule 1.11, if the appealable order is a judgment or final order; or within forty (40) days of the date of the order as provided by Rule 1.40 if the appealable order is an interlocutory order appealable by right. . . .”

4

The Okla. Const, art. 5, § 46 provides in pertinent part:

“The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:
. . . Regulating practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts . . .”

31

Matter of Estate of Wallace, see note 18 at 831, supra;

In re Carother‘s Estate, see note 18, 167 P.2d at 902, supra;

Hensley v. Fletcher, see note 18, 44 P.2d at 65, supra.

32

LeCrone v. LeCrone, see note 25 at 1264, supra.

Case Details

Case Name: Rockwell International v. Hampton

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Dec 8, 1994

Citation: 886 P.2d 992

Docket Number: 83899

Court Abbreviation: Okla.