Wilbur JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. D.C. METRO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 16-cv-1721 (TSC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed March 9, 2017
293
As Arriva has thus shown neither a likelihood of irreparable harm nor the prospect of success on the merits, the Court ends its analysis here and does not discuss the remaining preliminary-injunction factors. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23-24, 129 S.Ct. 365; Ark. Dairy Co-op, 573 F.3d at 832.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and also deny Plaintiff‘s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
Wilbur Johnson, Wilmington, DE, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge
In a complaint filed on May 12, 2016, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, plaintiff Wilbur Johnson sued the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA“) and the “the Smithsonian Archives Museum” for negligence. He alleges that on May 10, 2013, while a passenger on a city bus, he was injured when the bus “was hit from the rear” by a “Smithsonian Archives” van. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1). He demands $325,000 in damages. (Compl. at 1).
On August 18, 2016, D.C. Superior Court dismissed the complaint against WMATA as time-barred. (See Order, ECF No. 4-2). Shortly thereafter, on August 24, 2016, the Smithsonian Institution removed the case to this court pursuant to
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (internal citations omitted). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited” because it “goes to the foundation of the court‘s power to resolve a case.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012); Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Consequently, before proceeding to the merits of a claim, a court must satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Brown v. Jewell, 134 F.Supp.3d 170, 176 (D.D.C. 2015) (courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party“) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006)).
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant offers two jurisdictional grounds for dismissal: (1) the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction (Def.‘s Mem. at 5-6) and (2) Plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA“) (Id. at 6-7). Each suffices to deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Derivative Jurisdiction
Long ago, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction.” Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). Congress has since eliminated derivative jurisdiction as a barrier to actions removed under
In a removed case such as this, a federal court‘s jurisdiction must “mirror the jurisdiction that the state court had over the action prior to removal.” Merkulov, 75 F.Supp.3d at 129 (quoting Palmer v. City Nat. Bank of West Virginia, 498 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007)). Consequently, “[i]f a State court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a suit, the Federal court likewise lacks jurisdiction over the suit upon removal, even if the Federal court would have maintained jurisdiction ‘in a
Defendant argues correctly that Plaintiff‘s negligence action against the Smithsonian “is subject to the FTCA, which grants ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ to the United States district courts over civil actions brought against the United States for monetary damages.” (Def.‘s Mem. at 6, ECF No. 4-1); see Lopez, 749 F.3d at 351 (“The United States has waived its sovereign immunity to tort liability only under the FTCA[:]“) (citing
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Even if Plaintiff had initially filed the case here, the court still would be without jurisdiction. As indicated above, the FTCA is the exclusive basis for Plaintiff‘s negligence claim against the Smithsonian. Before filing a lawsuit under the FTCA, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting the claim “first ... to the appropriate Federal agency” and obtaining a final written denial.
The Smithsonian has “no record” that Plaintiff “filed a claim for injury or damages under the FTCA[.]” (Decl. of Jessica Lauritzen, ECF No. 4-4). The attachments to the Complaint include a completed claim form containing a printed P.O. Box address for claims directed to the Smithsonian Institution. But the form is not dated and there is no indication that it was properly addressed and delivered. (See ECF No. 1-1, p. 3). Most importantly, nowhere in Plaintiff‘s opposition has he addressed, let alone refuted, Defendant‘s argument that his claim is unexhausted. Therefore, the court finds that it lacks “subject matter jurisdiction, or if not jurisdiction, the functional equivalent of it” to entertain the FTCA claim. Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 371. And “in this posture, the court could no more rule in favor of the government than against it,” id. on the non-jurisdictional ground, that the claim is barred by the FTCA‘s statute of limitations (Def.‘s Mem. at 7). See United States v. Kwai Fun
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant‘s motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
John DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 15-273 (CKK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed March 10, 2017