JOHN DOE H.B., an Individual, Appellee, v. M.J., Individually and in his Capacity as a Priest at St. Matthew Parish, and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, a Kansas Not for Profit Corporation, Appellants.
No. 121,768
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
Opinion filed January 15, 2021.
- Motions for judgment on the pleadings and motions for summary judgment test the legal tenability of the parties’ claims and defenses. In the case of both motions, the moving party asserts that even if all the facts alleged or discovered were true, the movant would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The difference between these requests lies in their scope: Motions for judgment on the pleadings, like motions to dismiss, are limited to a review of the pleadings themselves. Motions for summary judgment consider all the facts disclosed during the discovery process.
- When a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings under
K.S.A. 60-212(c) , the court is called on to determine whether—assuming all the allegations in the petition are true—the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim. Motions underK.S.A. 60-212(c) allow courts to dispose of claims as a matter of law when the pleadings frame the issues such that there are no real issues to be tried. But when the pleadings disclose factual issues that must be resolved, judgment underK.S.A. 60-212(c) is improper. - Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must show that there is nothing a fact-finder could decide that would change the outcome of the case. If a party opposing a motion for summary judgment points to evidence that creates a genuine question for the fact-finder to resolve, summary judgment should be denied.
- In ruling on a summary-judgment motion, a district court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the evidentiary record. Appellate courts apply this same framework on appeal, exercising de novo review.
- There are two types of statutory timeframes that may apply in a case: statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. A statute of limitations sets a time period in which a plaintiff may file a particular claim, beginning when a claim accrues and ending after a specified length of time. A statute of repose cuts off the time a claim may be asserted under any circumstances.
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 only applies to injuries suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse that occurred within the 8 years beforeK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 became effective—that is, abuse that occurred on or after July 1, 1984.- Courts’ primary aim during statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature‘s intent in enacting the law in question. Courts do this by examining the statute‘s text, giving common words their ordinary meanings. But this analysis does not occur in isolation. Rather, courts must consider various related statutory provisions in context—in pari materia—and seek to reconcile those provisions into workable harmony.
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 applies broadly to any action for damages, so long as those damages flow from—were “suffered as a result of“—childhood sexual abuse. This includes negligence claims against an institution for injuries that result from those abusive acts.- Kansas continues to follow rules of notice pleading. Thus, a petition must be broadly construed to determine whether, when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the petition states a cognizable claim for relief.
- It is not the role of a court at summary judgment to assess witness credibility or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, when genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved, summary judgment must be denied.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; BILL KLAPPER, judge. Opinion filed January 15, 2021. Affirmed and remanded.
Chad E. Blomberg, Mara H. Cohara, and Elizabeth D. Hatting, of Lathrop GPM LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, Carrie E. Josserand, of the same firm, of Overland Park, and Ross Henry Stewart, of Stewart Law Office, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellants.
Rebecca M. Randles, of Randles Mata, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., WARNER, J., and BURGESS, S.J.
WARNER, J.: Ordinarily, a plaintiff must assert tort claims within 1 to 2 years after he or she is injured. This timeframe prevents witnesses’ memories and other evidence from going stale with the passage of time. But the Kansas Legislature has recognized that some types of claims—such as claims for injuries suffered by a minor—may warrant a longer timeline for filing suit.
This case involves a special statutory timeline for claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. Under
John Doe H.B. filed this suit in August 2017, alleging he was sexually abused by a Catholic priest more than 30 years ago. H.B.‘s petition included claims against the former priest who committed the abuse and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kansas City, Kansas, for failing to train and supervise the priest and failing to warn or protect H.B. After limited discovery, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, alleging H.B.‘s injuries occurred before July 1984 and that he filed his petition more than 3 years after he discovered them. The Archdiocese also claimed that the extended timeline in
The district court denied the defendants’ motions, finding disputed issues of fact remained regarding when the last instance of sexual abuse occurred and when H.B. reasonably discovered that his injuries resulted from that abuse. The court also interpreted
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 31, 2017, H.B. filed a petition against M.J., a former Catholic priest, individually and in his capacity as a priest for the Archdiocese in the 1980s. H.B. alleged that M.J. had engaged in a pattern of sexual abuse when M.J. was assigned to parishes in northeast Kansas. H.B.‘s petition also asserted multiple claims against the Archdiocese, alleging that the church failed to train and supervise M.J., failed to warn H.B. of M.J.‘s behavior and protect H.B., and attempted to cover up M.J.‘s misconduct.
H.B.‘s petition stated that M.J. had sexually abused H.B. multiple times at the rectory at St. Matthew‘s parish in Topeka, where M.J. lived. H.B. also alleged that M.J. abused him at the Topeka YMCA and the Athletic Men‘s Club, as well as on road trips to other churches and to M.J.‘s parents’ house. H.B. asserted that “[m]ultiple priests and lay persons within the Archdiocese knew or should have known that [M.J.] was sexually abusing children, including [himself].” H.B.‘s petition alleged that this abuse occurred when he was approximately between the ages of 9 and 12 years old and between his fourth- and seventh-grade years.
In his petition, H.B. alleged that the years of abuse caused him “to develop various psychological coping mechanisms and symptoms of psychological distress, including great shame, guilt, self-blame and depression [that rendered him] unable [to] discover that he was a victim of sexual abuse.” He stated that he had “repressed all memory of the abuse until approximately late fall 2015 when news reports of sexual abuse by priests incardinated in Guam [where H.B. lives] hit the media.”
Kansas statutes require any claim for damages, including claims of childhood sexual abuse, to be brought within certain time periods. Relevant here:
K.S.A. 60-515 governs claims by people who are under a legal disability, which includes minors. This statute allows anyone who suffers an injury while he or she is under the age of 18 to bring a claim within 1 year of reaching the age of majority.K.S.A. 60-515(a) . At the same time, no claims may be brought, as a matter of law, more than 8 years after the offending act.K.S.A. 60-515(a) .- The only exception to these time limitations are for claims of childhood sexual abuse, which are governed by
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523(a) .
Unlike
The Archdiocese and M.J. moved to dismiss H.B.‘s petition based on these statutes. The defendants asserted, based on the allegations in H.B.‘s petition, that the alleged abuse must have ended in April 1984 (when H.B. turned 13) or May 1984 (at the end of his seventh-grade school year). Thus, H.B.‘s claims were long outside the 1-year statute of limitations and 8-year statute of repose in
The district court denied the motions to dismiss and ordered the parties to conduct limited discovery “to ascertain when these events could have possibly happened or the last date these events could have possible happened.” The parties thus conducted discovery to determine two factual points:
- The last date of the childhood sexual abuse alleged in the petition—to ascertain whether it occurred before or after July 1, 1984, and thus whether H.B.‘s claims were barred by
K.S.A. 60-515 ‘s 8-year statute of repose. - The date H.B. discovered (or reasonably should have discovered) that his injuries resulted from childhood sexual abuse—i.e., whether H.B.‘s August 2017 petition was filed within
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 ‘s 3-year limitation period.
According to records produced by the Archdiocese, M.J. was formally assigned as a priest at St. Matthew‘s parish from July 1981 through June 1983. He was transferred to a parish in Overland Park for the following year and to a parish in Kansas City after that. At H.B.‘s request, the Archdiocese also provided a log showing who presided over the funeral Mass of a local boy in May 1985; these records listed the then-pastor at St. Matthew‘s, and not M.J., as the celebrant.
At his deposition, H.B. described M.J.‘s pattern of sexual abuse. H.B. testified that he remembered the abuse starting around when he served as an altar boy beginning in fourth grade. H.B. indicated that M.J.‘s abusive acts continued over the course of the next few years at several locations, including St. Matthew‘s church and rectory in Topeka; at M.J.‘s parents’ house; at Savior of the World Seminary in Kansas City, Kansas; at a YMCA; and in the car while driving to Kansas City, Meriden, and Paxico, where M.J. would sometimes travel to celebrate Mass.
When asked if the sexual abuse ended after he was 12, H.B. replied “Oh, no. It still continued until I was in the eighth grade.” H.B. explained that the abuse continued throughout the time he was a server at St. Matthew‘s, a role he performed until he got caught sneaking sacramental wine in eighth grade. H.B. indicated that it was M.J. who lectured him and the other altar boys who were caught in that act. And H.B. noted that although M.J. was assigned to another parish in 1983, he continued to intermittently celebrate or assist with Mass at St. Matthew‘s and help with various matters at H.B.‘s high school.
Although H.B. admitted he had some trouble remembering specific instances of abuse, he claimed that recent counseling sessions had helped him to recall certain suppressed memories. H.B. recalled that one such instance occurred around Christmas 1984 when he was in eighth grade. Another occurred in May 1985 (at the end of his eighth-grade year), the day before a funeral of a local boy. H.B. indicated that although M.J. did not preside over the funeral Mass (as the Archdiocesan records showed), he was there to concelebrate and help distribute communion since so many people attended the funeral.
M.J. indicated in response to written discovery requests that he could not recall whether he was present at the funeral Mass in May 1985 or whether he assisted with other matters at St. Matthew‘s after he was assigned to a different parish in July 1983.
Inquiries into the date when H.B. discovered (or remembered) the alleged abuse also produced divergent details. H.B. recalled that a similar scandal was reported in Guam during the summer of 2014 and that he could not go anywhere without hearing about it. In his initial petition, H.B. noted that memories of his childhood trauma came flooding back
After this limited discovery, the defendants each moved for summary judgment, again contending H.B.‘s claims were time-barred. The Archdiocese alternatively moved for judgment on the pleadings. Regardless of the procedural posture of these motions, both defendants essentially claimed that the timeframe set forth in H.B.‘s petition was a binding admission as to when the alleged conduct occurred. Thus, the defendants argued, the district court should disregard any statements made by H.B. during discovery that were inconsistent with the statements in his petition—that the abuse occurred approximately between the ages of 9 and 12 and throughout his fourth- and seventh-grade years. The defendants asserted that based on these dates, all the actions H.B. alleged occurred before July 1, 1984, and thus were barred by
In its motion, the Archdiocese further asserted that though these timelines shifted some during discovery—and particularly during H.B.‘s deposition—this shift was an effort to create a “feigned factual dispute.” Thus, the Archdiocese asserted, H.B.‘s account was not credible. Nevertheless, the Archdiocese conceded that if a jury were to believe H.B.‘s new assertions regarding the last date of abuse and the date he reasonably remembered that abuse, H.B.‘s claim would not be barred.
Alternatively, both defendants argued that H.B. had failed to bring suit within 3 years of his discovery of his injury from the childhood sexual abuse, as required by
After reading the parties’ written arguments on these points and holding two hearings, the district court denied the defendants’ motions. The court explained that a genuine factual dispute as to the last date of the alleged abuse by the priest precluded summary judgment on whether H.B.‘s claims were barred by
Rather, after the parties’ limited discovery, the court found that there were “at least three different dates of the last alleged abuse“—those included in the petition, those discussed at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and those H.B. described in his deposition.
The court noted that at the summary-judgment stage, it could not weigh this evidence to “conclusively establish the last date of the alleged abuse.” Instead, that determination was
“a question of fact which ultimately is to be decided by the fact-finder, which in this case would be the jury. This determination would be made upon or based upon all relevant information and evidence introduced at trial and probably, most importantly, would involve the credibility of the various witnesses; particularly that of the plaintiff. But that, again, would be for the fact-finder to decide.”
The court similarly found the question whether H.B. filed his petition outside the 3-year statute of limitations in
- “whether the [8]-year statute of repose in
K.S.A. 60-515(a) bars Plaintiff‘s claims against the Archdiocese and M.J.“; - “whether the special statute of limitations for ‘childhood sexual abuse’ in
K.S.A. 60-523(a) applies to Plaintiff‘s claims against the Archdiocese as an entity“; and
- “whether the [3]-year statute of limitations in
K.S.A. 60-523(a) bars Plaintiff‘s claims against the Archdiocese and M.J.”
We granted the defendants’ applications for interlocutory review.
DISCUSSION
We recognize, at the outset, that the petition in this case involves highly sensitive subject matter—raising questions of childhood sexual abuse by a former member of the clergy, suppressed memories, and details shadowed by the passing of decades. These difficult matters are understandably fraught with emotion for all parties involved. But the issues raised in the present appeal are legal in nature, calling us to consider the procedural posture of summary judgment and technical questions as to whether H.B. brought his claims within the timeframe permitted by law.
The Archdiocese and M.J. argue that H.B.‘s claims are barred under
Our review of these questions is constrained by the procedural posture in which they were presented to the district court—as motions for summary judgment and, in the case of the Archdiocese, an alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings. These motions test the legal tenability of the parties’ claims and defenses. In the case of both motions, the moving party asserts that even if all the facts alleged or discovered were true, the movant would still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
When a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings under
Summary judgment—that is, judgment without a trial—is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
In ruling on a summary-judgment motion, a district court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the evidentiary record. 289 Kan. at 900. On appeal, we apply the same framework as the district court, exercising de novo review. Martin v. Naik, 297 Kan. 241, 246, 300 P.3d 625 (2013). When we find that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. Becker v. The Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., 308 Kan. 1307, 1311, 429 P.3d 212 (2018); Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas, 307 Kan. 616, 621, 413 P.3d 432 (2018). To the extent this analysis requires the examination, interpretation, and assimilation of Kansas statutes—here,
Our analysis of these statutes starts from the recognition that there are two types of statutory timeframes that may apply in a case: statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Doe v. Popravak, 55 Kan. App. 2d 1, 8, 421 P.3d 760 (2017). A statute of limitations sets a time period in which a plaintiff may file a particular claim, beginning when a claim accrues and ending after a specified length of time. 55 Kan. App. 2d at 8. In contrast, a statute of repose cuts off the time a claim may be asserted under any circumstances. Though the timeframe set by a statute of limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons or may not arise until some time after an injury occurs, a statute of repose sets a clock that runs from the date of the injury. See 55 Kan. App. 2d at 8. When the timeframe in a statute of repose expires, the claim is absolutely abolished as a matter of law, even if the claim has not yet accrued under the relevant statute of limitations. See Shirley v. Reif, 260 Kan. 514, Syl. ¶ 1, 920 P.2d 405 (1996).
must be brought within 1 year of reaching the age of majority (a limitations period) or no more than 8 years after the occurrence of the act giving rise to the claim (a repose). Popravak, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 11. There is no question that H.B.‘s claim was brought long after either statutory deadline passed. Thus, H.B.‘s claims against the defendants may only proceed if they are permitted by the exception in
The
- because they accrued more than 8 years before the enactment of
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 and - because they were brought more than 3 years after he discovered his injury resulted from the alleged abuse.
We conclude, for the reasons we discuss in detail below, that the district court did not err when it denied the defendants’ requests for judgment at this stage in the proceedings.
1. The Kansas Legislature did not limit K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 ‘s application to claims against individual perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse.
The Archdiocese argues that the plain language of
To determine the scope of actions the legislature intended
and seek to reconcile those provisions into workable harmony. Friends of Bethany Place, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 297 Kan. 1112, 1123, 307 P.3d 1255 (2013).
Only when a statute‘s language is ambiguous will we resort to canons of construction or legislative history in construing the legislature‘s intent. Nauheim, 309 Kan. at 150. This limited role stems from the separation of legislative and judicial power within our system of government. An appellate court “merely interprets [the statutory] language” the legislature has chosen; we are “not free to speculate and cannot read into the statute language not readily found there.” Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, Syl. ¶ 2, 160 P.3d 843 (2007).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the text of
“‘Childhood sexual abuse’ includes any act committed against the person which act occurred when the person was under the age of 18 years and which act would have been a violation of any of the following:
“(A) Indecent liberties with a child as defined in
K.S.A. 21-3503 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (a) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5506 , and amendments thereto; (B) aggravated indecent liberties with a child as defined inK.S.A. 21-3504 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (b) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5506 , and amendments thereto; (C) aggravated criminal sodomy as defined inK.S.A. 21-3506 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (b) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5504 ,and amendments thereto; (D) enticement of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3509 , prior to its repeal; (E) indecent solicitation of a child as defined inK.S.A. 21-3510 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (a) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5508 , and amendments thereto; (F) aggravated indecent solicitation of a child as defined inK.S.A. 21-3511 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (b) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-
5508 , and amendments thereto; (G) sexual exploitation of a child as defined inK.S.A. 21-3516 , prior to its repeal, orK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5510 , and amendments thereto; or (H) aggravated incest as defined inK.S.A. 21-3603 , prior to its repeal, orsubsection (b) of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5604 , and amendments thereto; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed.”K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523(b)(2) .
M.J. acknowledges that H.B.‘s claims against him fall within the scope of this statute. But the Archdiocese points to two reasons why it believes the statute is limited to claims against individual perpetrators, not institutional defendants. First, it argues the legislature‘s decision to define childhood sexual abuse by way of a list of sex crimes—crimes that are committed by individuals—shows
The Kansas Legislature has defined limitations periods in multiple ways. At times, the legislature has assigned statutory timelines to specific tort claims. See, e.g.,
statute‘s timeline applies to “action[s] for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Emphasis added.)
Courts across the country have interpreted similar statutory language—that accords limitations periods to actions for damages caused by sexual abuse rather than actions for the abuse itself—to apply broadly to both perpetrator- and nonperpetrator-defendants. For example, Werre v. David, 275 Mont. 376, 913 P.2d 625 (1996), involved a Montana statute of limitations that applied to “‘action[s] based on intentional conduct brought by a person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.‘” 275 Mont. at 383 (quoting
Other courts considering limitations periods for actions for damages caused by sexual misconduct, rather than for the misconduct itself, have reached like conclusions. See Stephanie M. v. Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate Diocese of Southern U.S., 362 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding Texas’ sexual-abuse limitations statute—which applies to
applies to negligence claims against a church for injuries caused by a priest‘s sexual abuse because “the negligence claims . . . stem from injuries suffered as a result of the intentional childhood sexual abuse“).
The Archdiocese seeks to differentiate our analysis of
Second, the Archdiocese argues that the “as a result of” language in the Kansas statute is more akin to language used in other states’ statutes that courts have held apply only to intentional acts by sexual perpetrators. We disagree. Most notably, many of the statutes cited by the Archdiocese have a key distinction not present in
If the Kansas Legislature wished to limit
We agree with the Archdiocese that only individuals, not institutions, can engage in the acts listed as childhood sexual abuse in
2. The district court correctly found that unresolved factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
The Archdiocese and M.J. also claim that even if
nevertheless have granted judgment in their favor. They argue that the facts pleaded in H.B.‘s petition and revealed during the parties’ limited discovery reveals that H.B.‘s claims are untimely as a matter of law in two respects:
- That the last date of the alleged sexual abuse occurred before July 1, 1984, and thus his claims were extinguished by
K.S.A. 60-515(a) ‘s statute of repose beforeK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 became effective. - That H.B. discovered or reasonably should have discovered that his injuries arose from childhood sexual abuse before August 31, 2014—and thus outside
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 ‘s 3-year limitations period.
The district court found that these arguments turned on disputed factual questions and thus judgment as a matter of law—whether summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings—was improper. We examine these issues in the order the defendants present them on appeal.
2.1. Unresolved factual disputes regarding the last date H.B. was sexually abused precluded summary judgment.
As we have previously indicated, H.B. brought his claims in August 2017—over 30 years after the sexual abuse his petition alleges occurred and well beyond
The defendants argue that the timeframe set forth in H.B.‘s petition constituted binding judicial admissions that cannot be contradicted by later discovery. They contend that even though H.B. testified during his deposition about abusive acts that occurred around Christmas 1984 and in May 1985—dates that could render his claim timely under
We do not find the defendants’ efforts to confine H.B.‘s allegations to the narrowest reading of his petition persuasive. Kansas continues to follow rules of notice pleading. Thus, a petition must be broadly construed to determine whether, when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it states a cognizable claim for relief. See Cohen v. Battaglia, 296 Kan. 542, 545-46, 293 P.3d 752 (2013); see also
It is true that in some limited instances, a party‘s admissions in his or her petition may be binding on later proceedings—particularly when “other parties to the action relied thereon and changed their position” because of them. Arrowhead Const. Co. of Dodge City, Kansas, Inc. v. Essex Corp., 233 Kan. 241, Syl. ¶ 4, 662 P.2d 1195 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Wichita Sheet Metal Supply, Inc. v. Dahlstrom and Ferrell Const. Co., Inc., 246 Kan. 557, 792 P.2d 1043 (1990). But no one has demonstrated
Our Kansas Supreme Court has explained that allegations of fact included in a party‘s pleadings do not necessarily constitute judicial admissions when “‘alternative and
hypothetical forms of statement of claims and defenses, regardless of consistency . . . lack the essential character of an admission.‘” Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783, 795-99, 830 P.2d 1197 (1992). The Lytle court observed that such allegations ““are directed primarily to giving notice and lack the essential character of an admission. To allow [such pleadings] to operate as admissions would render their use ineffective and frustrate their underlying purpose.” 250 Kan. at 798-99 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 265, 781-82).
Here, H.B.‘s references in his petition to the “approximate[]” dates of his alleged sexual abuse lack the character of a judicial admission. Rather, they place the parties on notice generally as to when this abuse occurred, allowing the parties to explore the matter during discovery. And even if H.B. were confined to the timeline in his petition, the defendants’ arguments would still fail at this stage in the proceedings. At the hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, H.B. clarified that “between fourth and seventh grade years” included the summer after seventh grade—not the end of the academic year. Accordingly, when H.B. is given the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the record, the last instance of abuse could have occurred as late as August 1984—within the statute of repose at the time of the enactment of
The defendants also argue that the court should have granted summary judgment because the Archdiocese‘s records produced during discovery conclusively demonstrate that M.J. was transferred from St. Matthew‘s parish in Topeka in June 1983. But the fact that M.J. was assigned to a different parish in 1983 does not foreclose the possibility that he sexually abused H.B. after that date. In fact, H.B. testified that M.J. periodically served as a visiting priest at St. Matthew‘s and at H.B.‘s high school, even though he was assigned to a different parish. H.B. testified about one such instance in May 1985, when
M.J. assisted with the funeral Mass for a brother of one of H.B.‘s friends, alleging M.J. again abused H.B. the day before that funeral.
M.J. and the Archdiocese attempt to cast H.B.‘s recollection of these later episodes of abuse during discovery as self-serving testimony provided merely to evade the statutory timeline. But the defendants’ questions regarding the credibility of H.B.‘s testimony does not change the fact that the date of the last alleged abuse remained disputed. It is not the role of a court during summary judgment to assess witness credibility or weigh conflicting evidence. Giving H.B. the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the record, there remains a factual dispute about the date of the last abuse, and the district court correctly found that summary judgment was improper.
Because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to when the last act of alleged sexual abuse occurred, the district court did not err when it denied the defendants’ request for summary judgment based on
2.2. Unresolved factual disputes regarding the date H.B. reasonably discovered that his injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse precluded summary judgment.
Finally, the defendants contend that the district court should have granted their motions for summary judgment because “the uncontroverted material facts establish[]” that H.B. did not bring his claim within 3 years of reasonably discovering his injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse. But again, the question as to when H.B. reasonably discovered his injuries were the result of childhood sexual abuse remains unresolved at this point in the proceedings.
that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse,” whichever is later. The contours of this discovery rule are further explained in
“Discovery that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse shall not be deemed to have occurred solely by virtue of the person‘s awareness, knowledge or memory of the acts of abuse. The person need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse incidents caused the injury or illness complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which is a part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse.”
In Shirley, 260 Kan. at 526, our Kansas Supreme Court noted that ”
H.B. filed his suit on August 31, 2017. Accordingly, for his suit to have been timely brought, H.B. must have reasonably discovered that his injuries were the result of childhood sexual abuse later than August 31, 2014.
In his petition, H.B. stated that he was “unable [to] discover that he was a victim of sexual abuse” and had “repressed all memory of the abuse until approximately late fall 2015 when news reports of sexual abuse by priests incardinated in Guam hit the media.” But during H.B.‘s deposition, he provided an earlier timeline for his discovery that his injuries arose from childhood abuse. The Archdiocese and M.J. point out that H.B. remembered calling the Archdiocese in September 2014 (though the Archdiocese produced a record showing that H.B. had actually called in late March 2015). And H.B. recalled first hearing about the sexual abuse cases in Guam in the summer of 2014, with the coverage of these cases eventually leading to his awareness of his own injuries.
According to the defendants, this timeline demonstrates that H.B. necessarily knew or reasonably should have known about the nature and cause of his injuries before the end of August 2014. We disagree. H.B. did not provide a date in which the Guam stories were reported or when he became aware of his own injuries. Rather, he explained in his deposition that this was a realization that occurred over time:
“I couldn‘t go anywhere without hearing about it on the news, hearing about it on the radio, reading about it [in] the newspaper, hearing people talk about it at restaurants about the cases that were going on there. And as we were talking, I‘m just being bombarded with what had happened to me when I was a child.”
And then at some later point, whether it was September 2014 or March 2015, H.B. called the Archdiocese because he “wanted to let them know that, Hey, they did something to me and I‘m a victim and something had to be done about it.”
The defendants apparently doubt the credibility of H.B.‘s explanation. But again, summary judgment is not the time to resolve credibility questions. Instead, the district court was required to resolve all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to H.B. And our analysis is similarly limited on appeal. See Patterson, 307 Kan. at 621.
The fact-finder in this case might eventually agree with the defendants’ arguments regarding H.B.‘s testimony. Or some other evidence might arise during discovery that would conclusively pinpoint when the abuse took place. But it is not the role of a court at summary judgment—nor our role on appeal—to make credibility assessments or weigh conflicting evidence. And here, there remains a factual dispute about when H.B. did in fact discover that his injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse. When reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. Becker, 308 Kan. at 1311.
If the
Because of the conflicting evidence in the record, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that H.B.‘s suit is untimely. We therefore affirm the district court‘s denial of the defendants’ dispositive motions and remand the case for further proceedings.
Affirmed and remanded.