John Doe v. M.J., 482 P.3d 596

Plaintiff John Doe H.B. (filed Aug. 31, 2017) alleges childhood sexual abuse by former priest M.J. and sued M.J. and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese for negligent hiring/supervision, failure to warn/protect, and cover-up.
Petition alleged abuse beginning in fourth grade and continuing through seventh grade (ages ~9–12), but H.B.’s deposition and therapy revealed recalled incidents possibly into 8th grade (Christmas 1984, May 1985).
Governing statutes: K.S.A. 60-515(a) (minor’s claims: 1 year after majority; 8‑year repose from offending act) and K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 (special rule for childhood sexual abuse: 3 years from age 18 or discovery; applies only to abuse occurring on or after July 1, 1984).
Defendants moved for dismissal/summary judgment arguing (1) the abuse ended before July 1, 1984 so claims were extinguished by the 8‑year repose, (2) H.B. discovered his injury earlier than the 3‑year window, and (3) 60-523’s extended period applies only to perpetrators, not institutional defendants.
District court denied the motions after limited discovery, finding genuine factual disputes about the last date of abuse and the date of discovery and holding 60-523 applies to claims against institutions; the defendants obtained interlocutory appeal of three certified issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-523 — does it apply to institutional/non‑perpetrator defendants?	60-523 applies to any action for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, including suits against institutions.	60-523 applies only to claims against the individual perpetrators of the listed sex crimes, not to institutions.	Statute applies broadly to any action for damages that result from childhood sexual abuse, including negligence claims against institutions.
Does K.S.A. 60-515(a)’s 8‑year statute of repose bar H.B.’s claims (i.e., did last act occur before July 1, 1984)?	Pleading and discovery evidence can support last abusive act occurring after July 1, 1984 (so 60-523 could save the claim).	Petition dates constitute binding admissions showing abuse ended by spring 1984, so claims were extinguished before 60-523 took effect.	Factual disputes remain about the last date of abuse (petition vs deposition); summary judgment/judgment on pleadings inappropriate.
Did H.B. reasonably discover the abuse earlier than Aug. 31, 2014 (so 3‑year window expired)?	H.B.’s testimony shows discovery was a process and could have occurred after Aug. 31, 2014; records are ambiguous.	News coverage and H.B.’s calls to the Archdiocese show he knew or reasonably should have known before Aug. 31, 2014.	Credibility and timing are disputed; there is a genuine issue of material fact so summary judgment is improper.

Shirley v. Reif, 260 Kan. 514 (1996) (discusses interplay of childhood‑abuse statute and statute of repose; interprets discovery broadly)
Doe v. Popravak, 55 Kan. App. 2d 1 (2017) (distinguishes statutes of limitations from statutes of repose; explains 60-515/60-523 interaction)
Werre v. David, 275 Mont. 376 (1996) (statute applying limitations to damages "as a result of" childhood sexual abuse can reach claims against nonperpetrators)
C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699 (1999) (Washington court held statute covering damages "as a result of" intentional childhood sexual abuse reached negligence claims against a church)
Stephanie M. v. Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate Diocese of Southern U.S., 362 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. App. 2011) (Texas appellate decision holding abuse‑damage statute applies to nonperpetrator defendants)
Lytle v. Stearns, 250 Kan. 783 (1992) (pleading allegations ordinarily give notice and do not become binding judicial admissions)