JEFFREY BUTTS; KIMBERLY BUTTS; SHARRON BUTTS; SHANALE RENEE HILL; SANDRA JONES; PATRICIA COX; LANE TOWNSEND v. ROSEMARY AULTMAN, in her Official Capacity as Chairman of the State Board of Education; DOCTOR CAREY M. WRIGHT, in her Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Mississippi Department of Education; JASON DEAN, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; BUDDY BAILEY, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; KAMI BUMGARNER, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; KAREN ELAM, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; JOHNNY FRANKLIN, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; WILLIAM HAROLD JONES, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; JOHN KELLY, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education; CHARLES MCCLELLAND; WINONA MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL BOARD; FRANK MCCLELLAND, in Official Capacity as Member of the Mississippi State Board of Education
No. 19-60063
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
March 19, 2020
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.
Seven residents of Montgomery County, Mississippi (“the County“), filed this lawsuit against the County, the Winona Municipal Separate School Board, and several state officials in their official capacities. Their claims arise out of the Mississippi legislature‘s July 2016 decision to administratively consolidate two school districts and restructure the school board responsible for governing the newly-formed district. Plaintiffs allege that these actions violated their right to equal protection of the laws by depriving them of the ability to participate equally in the district‘s decision-making process.
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I.
In July 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed
From July 1, 2018 to January 1, 2019, an interim board was tasked with governing the consolidated district.
Beginning on January 1, 2019, the statute provided for the creation of a permanent school board.
In conformance with the terms of the statute, the interim board for the new district held office from July 1, 2018 to January 1, 2019. Montgomery County‘s Board of Supervisors drew two election districts in the territory outside of Winona, and, in November 2018, each district elected one school board member. The permanent board took office on January 1, 2019.
II.
We “review a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court.” Masel v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 742–43 (5th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must “accept as true any well-pleaded factual allegations,” but it is not required to accept “legal conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “When applying rational basis doctrine to a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a legislative classification must be treated as valid if a court is able to hypothesize a legitimate purpose to support the action.” Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute violates their right to equal protection by diluting or silencing the voices of Montgomery residents who live outside of Winona. Specifically, they challenge the structure of both the interim board and the permanent board. Though they “explicitly disavow[]” a race-based equal-protection claim, they argue that the statute discriminates against them on the basis of residence, denying them equal representation in matters related to the consolidated school district.
In order to state a claim for an equal protection violation, plaintiffs must show that “two or more classifications of similarly situated persons were treated differently” under the statute. Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Stefanoff v. Hays Cty., 154 F.3d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1998)). Once that threshold showing is made, the court determines the appropriate level of scrutiny with which to review the challenged statute. “Strict scrutiny is required if the legislative classification operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.” Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). If neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated, the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 417.
A.
During its six months of existence, the interim board was comprised entirely of former members of the Winona School Board, who were appointed by the Winona Board of Aldermen. Plaintiffs argue that this structure violates the Equal Protection Clause because it “exclud[es] every single person who does not live in the City of Winona from participating or having representation on the board.”
Plaintiffs’ claim against the interim board is foreclosed by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105 (1967). In that case, the Court held that “state or local officers of the nonlegislative character,” including school board members, need not be elected and may instead “be chosen by the governor, by the legislature, or by some other appointive means.” 387 U.S. at 108. The Court clarified that the strict “principle of ‘one man, one vote,‘” which was held to be constitutionally required in state elections in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), “has no relevancy” to an appointive selection scheme, Sailors, 387 U.S. at 111. Because there is no fundamental right to elect school board members, there is also no constitutional requirement for school boards to be representative of the people they serve. Id. As a result, the Court upheld the structure of Kent County‘s school board, which gave every local district a single delegate, without regard to the size or population of each district. Id. at 106–08.
The structure of the interim board is analogous to the appointive scheme that was upheld in Sailors, and it therefore withstands plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Sailors makes clear that the constitution does not require equal representation on an appointive school board. Id. at 108. The Court in Sailors also explicitly endorsed the right of states to experiment with novel approaches when establishing school boards, observing that local governments require “many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, [and] great flexibility in municipal arrangements.” See id. at 110. The constitutional legitimacy of the interim board is further supported by Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999), where the Sixth Circuit upheld a school board appointment system that left members of the district who lived outside of the city limits without any representation on the board, id. at 404–06.
Though Sailors placed limits on its holding, none of those limitations is relevant here. The Court was careful to explain that states are not permitted to manipulate the implementation of appointment structures in order to violate the constitution. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 108 (noting that states may not “manipulate [their] political subdivisions so as to defeat a federally protected right, as for example, by realigning
Thus, following Sailors, we hold that the appointive structure of the interim board implicates neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class. We agree with the district court that the interim board survives rational basis review. It was rational for the legislature to conclude that a board transition period would “best promote an efficient and smooth consolidation.” By allowing Winona board members to retain their governance roles during this interim period, the statute gave state officials additional time to prepare for the upcoming Montgomery County elections, providing a short buffer period to help promote “stable school board membership” and governance. See Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1989). Because this structure is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim against the interim board.5
B.
Plaintiffs also argue that the structure of the permanent board violates the Equal Protection clause. Under the terms of the statute, residents of Montgomery County who live outside Winona vote for two members of the five-person board. See
Unlike the interim board, the permanent board is partially elected and partially appointed. Though Sailors makes clear that there is no constitutional right to vote in school board elections, 387 U.S. at 108, the Supreme Court held in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), that strict scrutiny is required when statutes “grant[] the franchise to residents on a selective basis,” id. at 626–27 (1969) (emphasis added). When a statute restricts participation to only some eligible voters, “careful examination is necessary.” Id. at 626. “Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government.” Id. Thus, while Sailors stands for the principle that states are not obligated to provide for school board elections, Kramer clarifies that once they decide to do so, the selective extension of the right to vote is subject to “exacting judicial scrutiny,” id. at 628–29; see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, Mo. City, 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970) (affirming the importance of the one person-one vote requirement in the local election context); Avery v. Midland Cty., Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1968) (same).
Under Kramer‘s framework, courts must determine whether an election scheme unconstitutionally excludes potential voters from the pool of eligible voters. Viewing the school board structure from this perspective, plaintiffs’ claim against the permanent board must fail. Although the statute excludes Winona residents from the franchise, plaintiffs do not live in Winona, so they are not among those potentially injured by the selective voting structure. Only “voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue.” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962)) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not argue that the two election districts in Montgomery violate the requirements of one-person, one-vote; instead, they focus their argument on the relative representation afforded to Winona residents, as compared to other residents of the County.
Because this claim is not supported by the law and plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the statute‘s selective grant of the franchise, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim against the permanent board.
C.
Third, plaintiffs argue that the defendants violated their rights when they fired Montgomery County School District employees and retained employees of the former Winona Municipal Separate School District. They assert that these actions discriminated against employees based on geographic affiliation, without regard to each employee‘s experience or skills.
As plaintiffs acknowledge, school district employees are not a suspect class, and there is no fundamental right to continued state employment. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54 (holding that classifications on the basis of geography are not suspect); Arceneaux v. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he right to hold public employment is not a recognized fundamental right.“). Therefore, defendants’ decision to terminate the employees must be upheld as long as “there is any reasonably conceivable state
D.
Finally, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court‘s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.6 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must first establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2006). If the party requesting a preliminary injunction cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the injunction should be denied and there is no need for the court to address the other requirements for a preliminary injunction. Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 2003). Because plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail on the merits, they have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success. Therefore, they are not entitled to preliminary relief.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.