Jane DOE, the Victim in the “Disney World Girl” or “Internet Girl” Child Pornography Series formerly known as Masha Allen v. Alan HESKETH; Richard Carino; George Eliot Kabacy; Matthew Alan Mancuso; Dan W. Joachim; Ranier Gerow; Douglas Michael Stum; Richard Scheiring; Charles Lindauer; Joseph Marcus; William George Gammon; Stephen Jabbour; Albert Noah Abrams; Mayer Finkelstein, Sued in Their Individual Capacities and as Representatives of a Class of Persons Similarly Situated Jane Doe, Appellant
No. 15-1381
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
July 5, 2016
828 F.3d 159
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the district court‘s decision is AFFIRMED.
Stanley W. Greenfield, Esq., [ARGUED], Greenfield & Kraut, 1040 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA, 15219, Counsel for Appellee
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe (formerly known as Masha Allen) was adopted from Russia by Defendant-Appellee Matthew Alan Mancuso when she was five years old. Over the course of the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Doe and documented the abuse in a series of photographs and videos. Mancuso copied these media and distributed them through chat rooms on the internet in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso‘s photographs and videos became popular among viewers of child pornography and he was subsequently arrested after a law enforcement investigation identified him as Doe‘s abuser. Following his arrest, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a two-count indictment against Mancuso: count one charged Mancuso with sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of
Mancuso entered into a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to count one of the indictment (sexual exploitation) and the government agreed to dismiss count two (possession of child pornography). In the plea agreement, Mancuso made several affirmations that would affect his sentence. He “acknowledge[d] his responsibility for the conduct charged in Count Two of the Indictment” and “stipulate[d] that the conduct charged in that count may be considered by ... the District Court in imposing sentence.” J.A. 216a. He also agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” to Doe “under the
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentencing court ordered Mancuso to fully fund a trust for the benefit of Doe in the amount of $200,000 “pursuant to Title 18,
B. Procedural History
Ten years after Mancuso‘s criminal conviction, on August 23, 2013, Doe filed the present civil suit under
Following the entry of default, Mancuso‘s attorney was admitted pro hac vice to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and promptly filed a motion for relief from default judgment4 and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Mancuso argued that Doe‘s civil claim against him was barred by her prior receipt of restitution in his criminal case because the sentencing judge intended to fully compensate Doe for both the convicted and dismissed charges in his indictment. The District Court agreed and, finding that Mancuso had a meritorious defense to Doe‘s suit, set aside the default entered against Mancuso and granted his motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over Doe‘s civil suit under
Doe named fourteen defendants in her complaint, including Mancuso. The District Court dismissed one defendant with prejudice pursuant to a settlement, and dismissed all the remaining defendants except Mancuso for lack of personal jurisdiction without a designation that the dismissals were with or without prejudice. In order to examine our appellate jurisdiction, we assume without deciding that the dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction were without prejudice.
Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction under
These exceptions fit well within the policies of
In this case, the District Court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction with respect to the dismissed defendants and Doe indicated in supplemental briefing her belief that the District Court‘s dismissal operates to bar her from reasserting the dismissed claims in the District Court. Accordingly, Doe has renounced any intention to amend her complaint in the District Court with respect to her allegations of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania against the dismissed defendants. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a stipulation by parties filed after a notice of appeal rendered an earlier district court order “final and appealable“). Doe also indicated at oral argument an intention to re-file against the dismissed defendants in other courts in their home states in new actions. Although Doe did not renounce any intention to re-file against the dismissed defendants, we see no meaningful distinction to be made for purposes of
Our conclusion finds support in our precedent. In Beazer East, we held that:
Where the effect of a district court decision is to accomplish all that the parties asked the court to accomplish, and where the parties agree there cannot be—and, by court order, there will not be—any further proceedings in the district court as part of the same action, the district court‘s decision must be considered final for purposes of
§ 1291 .
124 F.3d at 560. We similarly observed in GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt that “[e]ven dismissals without prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they end [][the] suit so far as the District Court was concerned....” 272 F.3d 189, 198 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2001) (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 1994)).5
Other circuits have endorsed this principle as well. See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2006)
In assessing whether we have appellate jurisdiction, we give
Thus, we conclude that the District Court‘s disposition with respect to the dismissed defendants in this action is final within the meaning of
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‘s order dismissing Doe‘s complaint for failure to state a claim. Rea v. Federated Inv‘rs, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010). In our review, we accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, Doe may be entitled to relief. Id. As a judgment setting aside an entry of default is within the District Court‘s discretion, we review that judgment for abuse of discretion. United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1984).
III. ANALYSIS
We first examine the text of
A. Section 2255 and Congress‘s Remedial Scheme
In construing a statute, we are guided by the principle that “every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.” Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001). When the statutory language is unambiguous, our inquiry is complete and we ordinarily do not consider statutory purpose or legislative history. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013). In such a case, only in the “rare circumstances” where a “literal application of the statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters ... or where the result would be so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it” is further inquiry warranted. In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The operative provision of
Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 1589, 1590, 1591, 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney‘s fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.
We faced a similar question of statutory interpretation in United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994). In that case, the federal government had entered into a consent decree with a group of defendants involving the cleanup of a parcel of land containing hazardous materials. Id. at 1178. The government later entered into another consent decree with a second group of defendants involving the cleanup of that same site. Id. at 1179. The trustees of the parcel of land, on behalf of the first group of defendants, moved to intervene under CERCLA in the government‘s second suit. Id. The relevant provision of CERCLA provided:
In any action commenced under this chapter or under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a matter of right when such person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person‘s ability to protect that interest....
Id. at 1180 n. 6 (quoting
The government, citing legislative history, contended that intervention was limited to persons who sought to raise health or environmental concerns. Id. at 1180-81. In rejecting that limited construction of the statute, we observed that the plain language of the intervention provision did not so limit or qualify the right to intervene. Id. at 1180. We expressed doubt that “Congress would have used the phrase ‘any person may intervene’ or ‘any action under this chapter’ if it had intended to restrict intervention to only those persons raising a particular, but unidentified, claim.” Id.
Similarly here, the text of
Looking beyond the text of the statute here to limit the statute‘s application is not appropriate where allowing a civil action under
With these provisions, Congress not only contemplated that a victim who had received restitution could file a subsequent civil action, but also provided procedures for that very situation. These provisions ensure that a victim will not have to re-litigate the conduct forming the basis of a criminal conviction in a subsequent civil action and a defendant will not be required to pay double damages for the same loss if a subsequent civil action is successful. We can conceive of several reasons for Congress‘s determination that a victim who has already received restitution should be permitted a subsequent civil suit.
Congress may have wanted to give victims a chance to prove a higher level of damages than that which a sentencing court found during a limited factfinding proceeding as part of sentencing.11 A victim‘s participation in a sentencing court‘s determination of restitution is limited to conferring with the government,
The opportunity for a victim to fully litigate the question of her damages in a civil action is even more important for those victims who choose not to participate in a sentencing court‘s determination of restitution. See
Civil actions, such as that provided in
Certainly Congress could not have intended in providing a remedy the opposite situation where
Nor is our construction of the statute “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” In re Segal, 57 F.3d at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1991)). At oral argument, counsel for Mancuso suggested that Congress intended
An examination of the legislative history of
Statements by legislators at the time of recent amendments to
We therefore hold that
B. Collateral Estoppel15
Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a factual or legal issue that was litigated in an earlier proceeding. When examining the preclusive effect of a prior federal court determination, we apply federal law principles of collateral estoppel. See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 1999). Collateral estoppel is appropriate where: “(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.” Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 1992)). As Doe was neither a party to Mancuso‘s prior criminal proceeding nor in privity with a party, and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question of
Since Doe was not a party to Mancuso‘s criminal sentencing proceeding, collateral estoppel will only be appropriate if she was in privity with the government. We assess privity under the rubric laid out by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008). See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 310-12 (3d Cir. 2009). A nonparty will be found to be in privity with a party to a proceeding where:
- the nonparty agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others;
- a substantive legal relationship—i.e., traditional privity—exists that binds the nonparty;
- the nonparty was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party“;
- the nonparty assumes control over the litigation in which the judgment is rendered;
- the nonparty attempts to bring suit as the designated representative of someone who was a party in the prior litigation; [or],
- the nonparty falls under a special statutory scheme that “expressly foreclos[es] successive litigation by nonlitigants.”
Id. at 894-95. Doe is not in privity with the government under the two categories of privity applicable to this case—category three and category six.
The interests of a victim and the government in a restitution determination are not sufficiently similar for a finding of privity. A victim‘s interest in the context of restitution is undoubtedly to achieve the maximum amount of compensation for herself permissible under the law. A victim such as Doe may be willing to assume the time and cost to litigate the full extent of her damages in a trial as Doe has chosen to do in her civil suit. By contrast, the interests of the government in the restitution context are necessarily affected by its responsibility to “represent the interest of society as a whole.” Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979); see, e.g., Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 186 n. 3 (noting an “obvious conflict” between the position of two victims and the government in briefing before the court with respect to whether the mandatory restitution provision in
Accordingly, the government has an interest in securing a plea agreement that is palatable to the defendant in order to avoid a lengthy and costly criminal trial in which it may not prevail and an interest in
These varied interests are balanced by the government as it decides whether to accept a plea agreement with a given amount of restitution and render the government necessarily less interested in litigating extensively to have Mancuso pay the maximum amount of restitution permissible under the law.17 The effect of these varied interests are particularly acute in the present situation as the child victim in this case had a limited ability to advocate on her behalf and instead relied on a restitution amount that was derived from a plea agreement negotiated between Mancuso and the government.
Nor can we find privity based on a conclusion that
Under the final factor of the collateral estoppel test, Doe did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question of her damages in Mancuso‘s sentencing proceeding. During sentencing, the government is the party that advocates for its desired level of restitution. See
We remain mindful of the fact that, at its core, collateral estoppel is an
Under the facts of this case, where the interests of Doe and the government were not squarely aligned, she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution in front of the sentencing court, and she had no ability to seek appellate review of that determination, we are of the firm belief that the application of collateral estoppel would simply be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.”19 Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). For these reasons, and because the collateral estoppel test and exception set forth above counsel against the application of the doctrine, we will not apply collateral estoppel to bar Doe‘s claim.
C. Relief from Entry of Default
A judgment setting aside the entry of default is within a district court‘s discre-
The District Court rested its judgment setting aside the entry of default against Mancuso solely on the finding that Mancuso had a meritorious defense—specifically, that the prior criminal restitution award barred Doe‘s present civil claim. The District Court did not address whether Doe would be prejudiced by a vacatur of default or whether the default was the result of Mancuso‘s culpable conduct. Given that we find Doe‘s claim is not barred by the prior criminal restitution award, and the District Court made no additional findings with respect to its vacatur of default for us to review, we will vacate the District Court‘s judgment and remand to the District Court for consideration anew of whether there is “good cause” for setting aside the default entered against Mancuso.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court dismissing Doe‘s complaint against Mancuso, vacate the judgment of the District Court setting aside the default entered against Mancuso, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GREENAWAY, JR.
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Notes
Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, the court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.... The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the victim‘s losses as determined by the court.... [T]he term “full amount of the victim‘s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and (F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense....
A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of ... the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.
Each of these statutory restitution schemes is governed by the procedures set forth at
We recognized an exception to this principle of finality in Morton Int‘l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 2006) for cases where district court proceedings have concluded but may be reinstated in the future such that we treat the later action as part of the prior action for purposes of determining finality. In Morton, the district court had dismissed claims against several defendants without prejudice pending the outcome of non-binding alternative dispute resolution (“ADR“) and expressly noted that the dismissed claims could be re-filed if the ADR failed. Id. at 478. In finding a lack of appellate jurisdiction, we concluded that the district court‘s disposition of the case was not final because, even though the plaintiff‘s potential re-filing against the dismissed defendants would technically occur in a separate action, any “subsequently-initiated litigation effectively will be part of the original action and controversy, albeit with a new caption and docket number.” Id. at 479.
The present case does not fall within the exception in Morton. If Doe re-files against the dismissed defendants, the new actions will be filed in other courts and so the District Court here has “accomplish[ed] all that the parties asked the court to accomplish.” Id. at 479 (alteration in original) (quoting Beazer East). Accordingly, there is no “potential for the district court to revisit the case,” id. at 480, and so any later actions filed by Doe in other courts cannot fairly be considered part of the present action. If any litigation takes place with respect to the dismissed defendants, it will occur in truly separate actions in other courts.
As Doe correctly observes,
With respect to the first factor of the collateral estoppel test (identity of issue), collateral estoppel would only be appropriate if Doe sought to litigate an issue that was previously decided by the sentencing court in Mancuso‘s criminal proceeding. As we explain supra note 8, the parties dispute whether the sentencing court‘s restitution order compensated Doe for her damages with respect to the charge against Mancuso that was dismissed. Given our conclusion that Doe is not collaterally estopped on other grounds, we do not reach this question.
As to the second factor (finality of judgment), the sentencing court‘s restitution order is sufficiently “final” to be accorded preclusive effect because it conclusively determined Mancuso‘s restitution obligation. See
We have on one occasion allowed a purported victim to directly appeal a restitution order, but without an examination of the purported victim‘s standing to appeal. See United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1996). We later disavowed our assumption of jurisdiction in that decision, noting that a “‘drive-by jurisdictional ruling[],’ in which jurisdiction ‘ha[s] been assumed by the parties, and assumed without discussion by the [c]ourt,’ does not create binding precedent.” Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 277 n. 5 (alterations in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
The CVRA accorded crime victims the right to petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus based on a denial of the right to be reasonably heard at sentencing or a denial of the right to full restitution. See