Jane Doe v. Alan Hesketh
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12368
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Jane Doe (formerly Masha Allen) was sexually abused by her adoptive father, Matthew Mancuso, who produced and distributed child pornography depicting her; Mancuso pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation (18 U.S.C. § 2251) and a possession count was dismissed under a plea agreement.
- As part of the plea/sentencing, Mancuso agreed to and was ordered to pay $200,000 in mandatory restitution to Doe under the federal restitution statutes (including 18 U.S.C. § 2259 and the MVRA).
- Ten years after the criminal case, Doe sued Mancuso under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Masha’s Law") seeking civil damages for the predicate offenses that occurred while she was a minor.
- Mancuso defaulted; Doe obtained an entry of default, then Mancuso moved to vacate the default and to dismiss, arguing Doe’s § 2255 claim was barred by the prior restitution award (and related sentencing determinations).
- The District Court set aside the default and dismissed Doe’s complaint; Doe appealed. The Third Circuit reviews dismissal de novo and vacatur-of-default for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2255 is available to a victim who already received criminal restitution for the same underlying offense | § 2255 permits civil suits regardless of prior restitution; Congress didn’t limit the statute and restitution statutes themselves anticipate subsequent civil suits | Prior restitution and the sentencing court’s determination preclude later § 2255 recovery (avoid double recovery) | § 2255 allows a civil claim even after criminal restitution; restitution statutes provide set-off, not an absolute bar |
| Whether collateral estoppel bars Doe from litigating damages after the sentencing restitution order | Doe was not a party to the criminal proceeding and lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate damages, so estoppel should not apply | The restitution order was a final adjudication of losses and should preclude re-litigation | Collateral estoppel does not apply: Doe was not in privity with the government, interests diverged, and she lacked opportunity to fully litigate or appeal the restitution order |
| Whether the District Court properly vacated the entry of default against Mancuso | Vacating default was improper because Doe had a default judgment and dismissal should stand | Vacatur was proper because Mancuso had a meritorious defense (restitution bar) | The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s vacatur judgment and remanded: because the meritorious-defense basis failed (restitution not a bar), the District Court must re-evaluate all Rule 55(c) factors (prejudice, meritorious defense, culpability) |
| Appellate jurisdiction over this multi-defendant dismissal where some defendants were dismissed without prejudice | The appeals court may treat the District Court’s dismissals as final because Doe indicated she would not re-file in that district and proceedings are over as to that court | (Implicit) Rule 54(b) absent; interlocutory concerns | The Third Circuit exercised § 1291 jurisdiction, treating the district-court dismissals as final for appeal because they ended proceedings in that court and plaintiff renounced re-filing there |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994) (plain-text statutory interpretation can defeat narrow readings based on legislative history)
- Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997) (when district court has accomplished all requested relief, dismissals without prejudice may be final for appeal)
- Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2001) (start statutory interpretation with the statute's plain language)
- Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (Seventh Amendment jury-trial right applies to enforcement of statutory rights in actions for damages)
- Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (limits on nonparty preclusion and privity analysis)
- Stoerr v. United States, 695 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (victim’s limited procedural rights in restitution proceedings and limited appealability)
- United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing when statutory remedies would be rendered meaningless if read too narrowly)