STEVEN JANAKIEVSKI v. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ROCHESTER PSYCHIATRIC CENTER
Docket No. 18-3235
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2019 (Submitted: January 27, 2020 Decided: April 10, 2020)
LEVAL, CABRANES, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.
JONATHAN I. EDELSTEIN, Edelstein & Grossman, New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellant.
LISA ELLEN FLEISCHMANN (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrew W. Amend, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General for Criminal Matters, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Respondent-Appellee.
Petitioner Steven Janakievski appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Michael A. Telesca, J.), dismissing as moot his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In 2009, Janakievski was involuntarily committed to a New York State psychiatric institution after being charged with first-degree assault and pleading “not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.”
In 2018, several years subsequent to Janakievski‘s filing of the federal habeas petition, the state court found his mental condition sufficiently improved and ordered him conditionally released from inpatient custody, subject, as required by state law, to an order of conditions of at least three years duration. State law mandates that during that order‘s duration, he remain subject to the possibility of recommitment on the state‘s showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a dangerous mental disorder. See
The district court dismissed Janakievski‘s habeas petition on the ground that it was moot. The court reasoned that the limited-duration orders of confinement that the petition challenged had all expired and that Janakievski had been released from inpatient custody, with the consequence that he no longer suffered “an actual injury which is likely to be redressed by
We conclude that Janakievski‘s release from inpatient custody did not moot his habeas petition because the orders attacked in the petition continue to impose restrictions on his liberty. The 2018 order of conditions to which Janakievski remains subject — but which Janakievski did not directly challenge in his habeas petition — was, under state law, a mandated consequence of the confinement orders he challenges, and constitutes an ongoing injury that can be redressed by a favorable decision. We accordingly VACATE the district court‘s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
In December 2007, Janakievski attacked a co-worker with a knife, causing life-threatening stab wounds to the victim‘s head and neck. At the time, Janakievski had been using controlled substances daily and experienced psychotic delusions, including a belief that the stabbing victim was a Russian spy. He was charged with first-degree assault and tried in the County Court
In April 2009, having undergone the required examination, Janakievski was found by the state court to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder (i.e., to be in “track one“) and was committed to the Rochester Psychiatric Center (“RPC“). The state court issued subsequent retention orders continuing his involuntary commitment in October 2009, October 2010, December 2010, and
In April 2014, Janakievski, proceeding pro se, filed the instant habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. The petition asserted a range of statutory and constitutional violations with respect to the original April 2009 commitment order, the October and December 2010 retention orders, and the August 2012 retention order. The petition challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the original finding that he was dangerous and mentally ill, asserting that at the time of his commitment to the RPC “the hospital records show that he was in full remission,” and that he “should have been released.” Supp. App‘x at 42. He also alleged that the initial commitment order violated his right to due process and the Eighth Amendment. With respect to the subsequent retention orders, Janakievski asserted that they, too, were not supported by sufficient
In June 2018, while this petition to the federal court was pending, the state court released Janakievski from the RPC subject to an “order of conditions.” Supp. App‘x at 245-52; see
In addition to these particular conditions — all of which were found by the state court in June 2018 to be “reasonably necessary or appropriate” for Janakievski‘s treatment,
In dismissing Janakievski‘s petition in September 2018, the district court reasoned that the petition became moot when Janakievski was conditionally released from inpatient custody, as he was “no longer subject to any of the orders” that he challenged in his petition and thus no longer had any redressable injuries. 2018 WL 4681596, at *3. The district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability, id., but a motions panel of our court
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, including whether the petition is moot. Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2016). Although Janakievski is now represented by counsel, we construe his pro se “submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
I. Law Governing the Mootness of a Habeas Petition
To satisfy the Constitution‘s case-or-controversy requirement, a party must, at each stage of the litigation, have an actual injury which is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Mercurris, 192 F.3d at 293. If, as a result of changed circumstances, a case that presented an actual redressable injury at the time it was filed ceases to involve such an injury, it ceases to fall within a federal court‘s Article III subject matter jurisdiction and must be dismissed for mootness.
II. Janakievski Continues to Suffer a Redressable Injury Resulting From the Confinement Orders Challenged by the Petition
Notwithstanding that the 2009-2012 orders challenged in his habeas petition are no longer in effect, Janakievski contends that he faces continuing consequences from them such that a favorable decision vacating them would provide him meaningful relief. One such continuing consequence, he asserts, is the “order of conditions” to which he remains subject, which requires him
Respondent argues that the petition is moot because it attacks confinement orders that have expired and that do not themselves continue to impose a burden. Respondent concedes that the 2018 order of conditions constitutes an injury for Janakievski. But Respondent notes that the habeas petition does not challenge the 2018 order itself and argues that the restrictions imposed by the 2018 order were not “lingering effect[s]” of the expired 2009-2012 confinement orders challenged in the habeas petition, but rather were conditions “implemented to further his mental fitness as assessed in 2018.” Resp. Br. at 33. Accordingly, Respondent argues, even if Janakievski were to prevail on the merits of his petition and the district court were to nullify the challenged orders, he “would not be entitled to unconditional discharge” from his 2018 order of conditions. Id. at 24.
We conclude that at least one of the ongoing restrictions on Janakievski‘s liberty embodied in the June 2018 order of conditions — in
As an initial matter, although it is true that Janakievski‘s habeas petition does not challenge the 2018 order of conditions itself, the district court should have, before dismissing the petition as moot, given Janakievski the opportunity to amend his habeas petition to raise such a claim. A pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend if “a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We have said that this rule applies with special force to habeas corpus petitions, since pro se habeas petitioners “ordinarily lack legal knowledge and resources.” Garcia v. Superintendent of Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 841 F.3d 581, 583 (2d Cir. 2016). Here, the district court should have
The district court also erred in concluding that Janakievski no longer suffers, as a continuing consequence of the challenged 2009 to 2012 orders, an actual injury redressable by a favorable decision. The 2018 order of conditions to which Janakievski remains subject today constitutes a “concrete and continuing injury” traceable to the challenged orders. Mercurris, 192 F.3d at 294. Although Respondent is correct that the 2018 order of conditions is a separate order from the expired commitment and retention orders challenged by Janakievski, its imposition was a direct and necessary consequence of the expired orders. The April 2009 commitment order found Janakievski to be
It is true, as Respondent asserts, that even if an order of conditions was a necessary consequence of the expired orders, specific conditions contained in Janakievski‘s 2018 order of conditions — such as mandatory outpatient treatment, drug screenings, and limits on his mobility — were not the inevitable result of Janakievski‘s earlier confinement orders. These restrictions were imposed on the basis of a new assessment of Janakievski‘s mental fitness in 2018. Resp. Br. at 33; see also
Crucially, however, as to two aspects of the order of conditions, the state court had no discretion. First, under the governing law, Janakievski could not be eligible for a discharge order terminating the order of conditions until he had spent three years as an outpatient following his conditional release from confinement. See
Because Janakievski is subject to an order of conditions, the burden on the state to cause his recommitment would be less than the burden to cause his commitment by reason of mental disease if he had previously been unconditionally discharged. “New York statutes . . . distinguish between the procedures to be followed for the involuntary civil commitment of persons suffering from mental illness and the procedures that apply to persons charged with a crime and determined, by a plea or a verdict, to be ‘not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.‘” Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Accordingly, even though other conditions imposed by the 2018 order did not flow from the earlier orders challenged in Janakievski‘s petition, but were instead newly justified at the time based on a current assessment of Janakievski‘s treatment needs, the earlier orders did have the inevitable consequence of requiring that he eventually be subject to an order of conditions, and thus of making him vulnerable for a minimum of three years to recommitment in a state psychiatric facility without the same protections that he would enjoy if he had previously been released from custody unconditionally. The district court thus erred in concluding that Janakievski‘s release from inpatient treatment meant that he was no longer suffering a continuing injury from the expired orders.
The only remaining question, then, is whether the burden imposed on Janakievski by the order of conditions might be redressed by a favorable judicial decision vacating either the 2009 commitment order or the
We reject this argument. As noted above, the state court‘s imposition of an order of conditions was a direct and mandated consequence of the prior confinement orders that Janakievski challenges in his habeas petition. A
Vacatur of the 2010 and 2012 retention orders that extended the duration of Janakievski‘s confinement could also serve to partially redress Janakievski‘s injuries. Janakievski contends that, even if he failed to show that he was entitled to an unconditional discharge in April 2009, but nonetheless showed entitlement to an earlier conditional release at the time of one of the court‘s prior retention orders — e.g., in August 2012 — “then the three-year
However, even if Janakievski would need to affirmatively demonstrate that he was fit for immediate release, the opportunity to do so would still constitute a “partial remedy” sufficient to support a finding of redressability. Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13. The chance to make that showing now
We accordingly conclude that Janakievski‘s habeas petition is not moot because the restrictions on his liberty mandated by the June 2018 order of conditions constitute a concrete and continuing injury, traceable to the 2009–2012 confinement orders he attacks, which can be redressed by a favorable decision.
Respondent asserts that, even if we reject the district court‘s mootness finding, we can nonetheless affirm on independent grounds, at least as to several of Janakievski‘s claims. Respondent argues that Janakievski‘s challenges to the 2009 and 2010 orders “are untimely and were not exhausted in state court,” and, because they “cannot be exhausted at this juncture,” are “procedurally barred from habeas review.” Resp. Br. at 24.
In habeas cases, we generally do not address a claim outside the scope of the certificate of appealability. See Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, as the certificate of appealability is limited to the question of mootness, and as the district court did not address the state‘s timeliness, exhaustion, and procedural default arguments, we decline to address those arguments and express no view as to whether they are meritorious.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court‘s judgment dismissing Janakievski‘s habeas petition as moot and REMAND for further proceedings.