Lead Opinion
for the Court:
¶ 1. In this custody action between a child’s natural father and her maternal grandmother, the chancery court- found that the natural parent presumption was rebutted, and, further, that the best interests of the child were served by remaining in the physical custody of the grandmother,- while allowing the father -liberal visitation. Because the evidence-was insufficient to rebut the natural- parent presumption, -we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶ 2. Sha’Nyla Wilson (“Sha”) was born to Concetter Davis and James Wilson on April 20, 2003. Sha has a maternal hаlf-sister, Ka’Nyla (“Ka”), who is two years older than Sha.
This action began as a paternity and custody dispute between Concetter and James Wilson. James was adjudged to be Sha’s natural father. Concetter was awarded custody, and James was awarded visitation.
Concetter died in 2011. When Con-cetter’s relatives would not return Sha to James, he filed a petition for modification and sought sole legal and physical custody of Sha. The chancellor entered an order that awarded the primary physical custody of Sha to Pearlean Davis, Sha’s maternal grandmother. The chancellor also awarded James liberal visitation.
In the decision, the chancellor did not treat the issue as an initial custody dispute between a natural parent and grandparent. Instead, the chancellor considered the motion as a modification of child custody based on the prior custody determination between Concetter and James.
The judgment was appealed and assigned to [the Court of Appeals], [The Court of Appeals] reversed the judgment arid -remanded the case for the' chancellor to make a detеrmination of whether the natural-parent presumption had been rebutted. See Wilson v. Davis,111 So.3d 1280 , 1283 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2013).
Wilson v. Davis,
¶ 3. The chancellor first found that James had abandoned Sha, but the Court of Appeals reversed ■ that decision, determining that such a finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1014-15, *3. The chancellor then found James’s conduct to be so immoral as to be a detriment to Sha. The chancellor noted that James had been married three times, had a history of dating much younger women, and had a history of dating multiple women at the same time, including committing adultery. She noted that James was severity-two at -the time of the hearing. The ■ chancellor ' found that James’s current, iriuch-younger wife, Annette Wilson, had two sons who had serious anger issues, as evinced by- the fact that they were in therapy for said issues multiple times per week. The chancellor expressed concern that James had a “lack of awarеness.or lack of concerns of the potential danger” to which Sha “could be” exposed. Further, she found that Annette and Sha had rio real bond with one another, and that Annette, a homemaker, would be primarily responsible for Sha’s care.
asking this Court to remove the minor child from the home she has known for the better part of life and from her 10 year old sibling, Ka, who she resides with. Sha will also be taken away from her cousins and a very close college age aunt if Mr. Wilson obtains physical custody. In light of the emotional stress she has experienced resulting from the untimely death of her mother and considering all factors outlined above, this Court finds that this environment would be clearly detrimental to the minor child and shows an otherwise unfitness by Mr. Wilson to believe this is a gоod environment for his daughter.
The chancellor then found that the natural parent presumption had been rebutted because the court was “clearly convinced that Mr. Wilson has shown himself to be otherwise unfit.” The chancellor then placed Davis, the grandmother, on equal footing with James and applied an Albright
¶ 4. James appealed and Davis failed to file an appellate brief. The Court of Appeals declined to find that Davis’s failure to file a brief was tantamount to a confession of error. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s determination that James’s conduct was so immoral that he was unfit to have custody, and that the natural parent presumption was thus rebutted. It also found no error in the chancellor’s Albright analysis. Judge Roberts dissented in an opinion joined by Judge Irving. Judge Roberts argued that he could not “find that the chancery court’s reliance on this evidence [of James’s dating and mаrital relationships] is clear and convincing evidence of immorality and unfitness such that the natural-parent presumption should be overcome.” He further argued that the other facts of immorality and unfitness found by the chancellor, such as the anger issues of James’s stepsons, were more suited for an Albright analysis, and had little bearing on James’s morality or fitness as a parent. Judge Roberts last concluded that he could not “reconcile the chancery court’s finding that James was so immoral and unfit to parent Sha that the natural-parent presumption was overсome, while at the same time awarding him joint legal custody and liberal visitation.” Judge Roberts believed the case should be reversed and judgment rendered granting James custody, while remanding the matter to consider grandparent visitation.
¶ 5. James filed a motion for rehearing, which the Court of Appeals denied. He then petitioned this court for certiorari review, which we granted. In his petition, he argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding Davis’s failure to file a brief being tantamount to a confession of error conflicted with prior precedent, and that thе Court of Appeals’ decision that the evidence of unfitness and immorality against him established by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent presumption had been rebutted was error. We limit our review to the issue of wheth
ANALYSIS
¶ 6. This Court reviews the chancellor’s findings for manifest error. Westbrook v. Oglesbee,
¶7. “The best interest of the child is paramount in any child-custody case.” Smith v. Smith,
¶ 8. Requiring clear and convincing evidence to rebut the natural parent presumption in one of the four manners listed is important to “honor[] and protect[] the fundamental right of natural parents to rear their children.” Id. However, this Court takes the opportunity to note that the rigid adherence to proving one of the four precise factors to rebut the natural parent presumption may, in very limited and exceptional circumstаnces, place a child in a circumstance that is clearly not in his or her best interests. And, as is clearly established, the best interests of the child is the lodestar in custody cases. This Court has recognized this principle in the past, stating that “[i]n order to overcome this presumption, there must be a clear showing that the parent is unfit by reason of immoral conduct, abandonment, or other circumstances which clearly indicate that the best interest of the child mil be served in the custody of another.” Moody,
¶ 9. If the court finds that- custody should be granted to the. third party under this standard, it is required to make -very specific findings of fact on the record. We again emphasize that this is a high threshold. However, we believe this standard will allow chancery courts to reconcile the fundamental rights of natural parents to raise their own children with the primary concern in a custody case, the best interests of the child.
¶ 10. Turning to this case, we find that the chancellor erred for several reasons. The original hearing, conducted in the vein of a modification of custody, was held in January 2012. In April 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed the chancеry court, finding that it had applied the incorrect standard and had not determined whether the natural parent presumption was rebutted. In July 2013, after a year and a half had passed with a great potential for changed circumstances, and without holding a hearing in which both parties were on notice of the issue of rebutting the natural parent presumption, the chancery court simply amended its original order. The chancery court should have held a hearing and received and considered evidence regarding whether the natural parent presumptiоn was rebutted.
¶ 11. Furthermore, the evidence found by the chancellor was clearly insufficient to rebut the natural parent presumption. First, the court relied on evidence that James dates and marries women much younger than himself, and that these relationships overlap and include adultery. This Court has noted that marital fault, including adultery, may not be used as a sanction in custody awards. Brekeen v. Brekeen,
¶ 12. The chancellor also cited animosity between Concetter and Annette and James, including physical altercations, as reason to deny James custody. While certainly noteworthy, as it appears in the best interests of Sha to have her mother’s memory and her grief for her mother honored, Concetter has passed away, and there is thus no present danger of such animosity or confrontations. These facts are not sufficient to rebut the natural parent presumption, as they do not bear on James’s fitness or detrimental immorality, but they may be a consideration in a best interests analysis.
¶ 13. The chancellor also cited the anger issues of Annette’s two sons as a reason to rebut the natural parent presumption. Again, such issues are certainly of concern. Yet, the evidence indicated that neither Sha
¶ 14. Because none of the facts found by the chancery court are sufficiеnt to rebut the natural parent presumption, we must reverse the chancery court on this issue.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15. While the chancery court examined certain facts regarding James’s poten
¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.
Notes
. Albright v. Albright,
. Examples of courts finding that exceptional circumstances exist often involve children with special medical аnd/or developmental needs. For example, in In re Marriage of Alien, the child, who was deaf, lived with his mother; then, after his father obtained custody, the father left the child with his maternal grandmother. In re Marriage of Allen,
Another example involved a child with cystic fibrosis and cerebral palsy. In re Guardianship of D.R.G.,
. Many other states also have standards that allow for slightly more flexibility in determining whether a child should be placed with a third party instead of a natural parent. See, e.g., Watkins v. Nelson,
. The record does raise some areas of concern with James’s potential custody of Sha, yet these issues do not appear to have been examined with any thoroughness. For example, the record indicates that Sha has asthma and that peоple may smoke at her father's home. The record further indicates that she has become physically ill from the smoke. The record is also clear that Concetter, Sha’s mother, had severe asthma which led to hospital and ICU stays and, eventually, her untimely death. Certainly, a failure to cease smoking around Sha, if such is actually oc- ■ curring, could be of grave concern. The record also indicates that Sha may have certain unusual allergies or sensitivities which may not be properly addressed at her father’s home. However, on both of these issuеs, no medical evidence was introduced, no substantial testimony was adduced, and the issues were generally not examined with any specificity. Such issues could be properly addressed at a hearing in which further evidence is received and considered.
. Sha had regular, overnight visitation in the home with the two boys present, and no harm, or threat thereof, appears to have befallen her.
. The boys do not appear to have harmed their younger sister, Sha’s stepsister, who lives in the home with them.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in Part:
¶ 17. The majority’s decision to remand this case for a hearing is appropriate. But the only reason that, pending the outcome of that hearing, the child, Sha’Nyla Wilson, remains with her grandmother is that— with no legal right to do so — she' refused to turn the child over to her natural father. The natural-parent presumption has not been overcome, and this Court should not aid a third party who, with no legal right to do so, holds a child away from her natural parent. While the particular facts of this case may lead some to the personal view that Sha’Nyla would be “better off” with her grandmother and half-sibling while this case drags on, the precedent set todаy is remarkable and unsettling.
¶18. The law presumes that it is in Sha’Nyla’s best interest to be in the custody of her father.
¶ 19. We, too, should respect and follow the law. But as of today, even though this Court has determined that the natural-parent presumption has not been overcome, the majority aids the grandmother in continuing to hold the child away from her natural father, who has been deprived of having his ehild for four years while this matter has crept through — and will continue 'to creep through — the courts. This ad hoc approach to' deciding eases based on personal .views of the facts rather than an impartial application of the law, is wrong.
. See Bullard V. Welch,