James Earl LEMONS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 06-12-00128-CR
Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.
Decided: April 4, 2013.
Submitted: March 26, 2013. Discretionary Review Refused Sept. 11, 2013.
401 S.W.3d 267
on just before the white car, traveling in the center lane, struck both of the children. The white car did not brake prior to impact and continued traveling south after impact.
The jury was entitled to take into account that Moya had, during the course of the evening (and before striking the two children) consumed approximately six beers and then drove his car. See Rubio v. State, 203 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, pet. ref‘d) (driving under influence of alcohol can be used to show conscious disregard of substantial risk).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Moya acted recklessly when, after consuming alcohol, he voluntarily created (and then chose to disregard) a substantial and unjustifiable risk in skirting around stopped traffic by passing the other vehicles in the turn lane, simultaneously driving his car faster than the prevailing traffic flow.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
G. Calvin Grogan, Steven Lilley, Asst. Dist. Attys., Greenville, for Appellee.
Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.
OPINION
Opinion by Justice MOSELEY.
Although Darryl Cox erroneously believed that he and Karen Cox had been happily married to one another for some twenty-one years, Karen had been engaged in a clandestine affair with James Earl Lemons (the appellant here), a man Darryl knew and occasionally encountered. After a jury determined that Lemons was the person who had shot Darryl with a gun, Lemons was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to seventeen years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Lemons argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to object to the introduction of extraneous offenses, “elicited extraneous offenses committed by the defendant from a witness,” and “failed to request a limiting instruction on the extraneous offenses after they were admitted as evidence before the jury.”1 We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Darryl had encountered Lemons around the Cox home on several occasions which one might characterize as suspicious circumstances.
In the first of these unusual incidents, Darryl testified that he witnessed Lemons “peeking into the—to the back end of the [Cox] house.” Darryl said that Lemons, being questioned about this behavior, offered the explanation to Darryl “that we had a nice family and [he] wanted to see what a family looked like.” Apparently, this did not provide a precisely reasonable ring to Darryl, who called the police to report the encounter.
In another incident, Darryl woke up to the sound of his dog barking “quite veraciously [sic].” Upon going to investigate the cause of the canine ruckus, Darryl discovered Lemons in a “pickup sitting in the driveway at our neighbor‘s house,” which was adjacent to the Cox home and which was then vacant. Upon being spotted by Darryl, Lemons “peeled out and went through the ditch[.]” Darryl attempted to trail him in his own truck, also calling 9-1-1 to “follow[ ] ... the chase[,]” but Lemons’ truck sped off, and he was able to escape.
Sometime after the high-speed chase, Darryl encountered Lemons as Darryl was entering and Lemons was leaving a pizza restaurant. Darryl then indicated that it was unacceptable to him to repeatedly discover Lemons peering through the windows of the Cox home, but said that he would forgive Lemons on Lemons’ promise that he would cease doing so. Lemons refused to give that assurance.
Thereafter, Darryl would see Lemons “drive by the house on a four-wheeler” on “multiple occasions.” Darryl then saw Lemons in his truck near Darryl‘s workplace and shortly thereafter received a telephone call wherein a voice which Darryl identified as being Lemons’ said, “You haven‘t won yet” and then the call was abruptly terminated.
On more than one occasion, Darryl observed Lemons following him when Darryl was going to work, and Darryl sometimes took evasive actions to shake him from following.
On the final occasion, on the morning of September 7, 2008, Darryl once again awoke to the sound of his dog‘s violent barking. He “grabbed [his] 9mm and headed out the front door.” Darryl saw “someone staring in the back window.” Carrying his gun and a flashlight outside, Darryl decided to confront the intruder by telling him to “step back away from the house.” Darryl testified that Lemons emerged from the shadows and came toward him. Although Darryl instructed Lemons to get on the ground and wait while Karen called the police, Lemons instead used his own weapon to shoot Darryl underneath his right rib cage, whereupon Lemons ran away.
Jeremy Allen Case, emergency dispatcher for the Hunt County Sheriff‘s Department, received a 9-1-1 call from Karen stating that her husband had been shot. Karen told Case that Darryl identified the shooter as Lemons. Darryl was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery. After Darryl was airlifted to Baylor Hospital, Karen and the Coxes’ son, Curtis, drove to the hospital together, but stopped by Lemons’ trailer on the way. Karen went inside the trailer as Curtis waited in the vehicle.
Darryl identified Lemons from a photographic lineup as the person who had shot him. An investigation by law enforcement
II. Standard of Review
We begin our analysis with recognition of the rule that any allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in the record. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 589 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002), aff‘d, 106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim.App.2003). The record received by this Court is silent as to trial counsel‘s reasoning (or want of reasoning) in having not objected to extraneous evidence, in having elicited such evidence, or in not requesting an instruction to disregard such evidence at the time it was heard by the jury. It is Lemons’ burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence from that record that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim.App.1984). Rarely will a reviewing court be provided the opportunity to make its determination on direct appeal with a record capable of providing an evaluation of the merits of the claim involving ineffective assistance claims. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. “In the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect” the reasoning of trial counsel. Id. at 813-14.
We apply the two-pronged Strickland test handed down by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether Lemons received ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal. Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 730 n. 14 (Tex.Crim. App.2006). Thus, we need not examine both Strickland prongs if one cannot be met. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
First, Lemons must show that counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. There is a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that the challenged action could be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689; Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Tex. Crim.App.2004); Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim.App.2000). Therefore, we will not second-guess the strategy of Lemons’ counsel at trial through hindsight. Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim.App.1979); Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref‘d).
The second Strickland prejudice prong requires a showing that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, meaning that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim.App.2009).
At trial, Karen took the stand, admitted her extramarital affair to the jury, and told them that she knew that Lemons had shot Darryl.2 She further testified on direct examination as follows:
Q Did the defendant ever tell you or offer to harm your husband?
A Yes.
Q Okay. What did he—how did he offer to harm your husband and when?
A When he wanted me to leave my husband and I told him I couldn‘t, he had mentioned cutting the brakes on the truck that my husband drove. My response was, But you don‘t know if I‘m going to drive that or if Curtis is going to drive that, you cannot do that.
. . . .
Q What‘s the other occasion that he referred to harming your husband?
A He asked me if I could give him extra medication.
Later, the following exchange occurred:
Q Let‘s go to the morning of September—well, actually, before we get to the morning your husband was shot, what did you do that Friday?
A I accompanied [Lemons] to a hearing that he had in Rains County.
. . . .
Q Okay. And did anything happen that day in court?
A Dawn Wright dropped the stalking charges that she had against [Lemons] for the September to December of 2007 time frame of him stalking her.
Lemons argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in having failed to object to this testimony.
“Extraneous offenses are inherently prejudicial, and when counsel fails to object to numerous extraneous and prejudicial matters, counsel may be ineffective.” Haagensen v. State, 346 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.). “The accused may not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal generally.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 320 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. ref‘d)). However, “[w]hen an ineffective assistance claim alleges that counsel was deficient in failing to object to the admission of evidence, the defendant must show, as part of his claim, that the evidence was inadmissible.” Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 154.
”
Next, Karen‘s testimony also established that another woman dropped stalking charges which had been filed against Lemons. Counsel‘s reasons for failing to object to this testimony do not appear in the record. “If counsel‘s reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel‘s decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.” Haagensen, 346 S.W.3d at 766 (quoting Ortiz, 93 S.W.3d at 88-89). As we noted in Haagensen, counsel may have decided not to emphasize the evidence by raising an objection on the theory that once a bell has been rung, it cannot be unrung and that the more a jury hears of a matter, the more importance they may attach to it. He may have also decided not to object in “an effort to build rapport with the jury and prevent the jury from concluding he was attempting to hide information from them.” Id. “Because trial counsel‘s failure to object may have been based on trial strategy, we are unable to conclude counsel‘s actions fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
Lemons complains that his own trial counsel elicited extraneous-offense testimony in the following excerpts of Karen‘s cross-examination:
Q Okay. And ... you [and Lemons] had little arguments off and on?
A Yes.
Q What would you normally argue about?
A Trivial stuff, money.
Q Okay.
A And him wasting it.
Q All right. Now, he‘s never harmed you at all, has he?
A In September he had grabbed me and was very aggressive.
. . . .
Q .... Now, he grabbed your arm, is that what you said?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Now, you never filed any charges or anything?
A No.
Q Okay. But he‘s never hit you or beat you or anything like that?
A He has run me off the road several times.
Eliciting testimony about prior crimes is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (court “hesitant to ‘designate any error as per se ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law’ “). However, when “no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel‘s conduct, the counsel‘s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law.” Id. In this case (which does not contain counsel‘s reasons for having asked whether Lemons had ever harmed Karen), it is quite possible that counsel expected a negative answer to his question based on conversations with his client. Further, questions regarding the matter could have been an attempt, albeit unwise in hindsight, to lessen the effect of Karen‘s response that Lemons had grabbed her arm and acted aggressively toward her. We note that “the constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The constitutional right to counsel does not mean that Lemons’ counsel was required to be errorless. Alberts v. State, 302 S.W.3d 495, 507 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (citing Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim.App.1984)). Even if we assumed this line of questioning to be an isolated failure, it does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
With respect to Karen‘s cross-examination, Lemons cannot meet the second Strickland prong, which requires a showing that but for counsel‘s unprofessional error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Here, Darryl testified to the strange, strained, and uncomfortable encounters with Lemons which occurred prior to the shooting. Darryl specifically identified Lemons as the shooter in a photographic lineup and in court. The 9-1-1 emergency call placed by Karen also indicated that the shooter was identified by Darryl at the time of the shooting. Karen admitted to having had an affair with Lemons and to having tried to warn him to run when the investigation centered upon him. She also admitted to the jury at this trial that she knew that Lemons was the person who had shot Darryl. Lemons’ own brother testified that Lemons had asked him to lie to the police to assist in the formulation of a plausible alibi. There was ample evidence admitted at trial to support the jury‘s verdict. Given the evidence presented, Lemons cannot show that the result of the proceeding would have been different had information regarding Lemons’ aggressive behavior toward Karen not been admitted, and we cannot conclude that Lemons was deprived of a fair trial.
Finally, Lemons complains that his trial counsel was ineffective in having failed to request an extraneous-offense limiting instruction at the times during the trial that evidence of the bad acts was presented.5 However, the jury charge contained the following instruction:
Evidence may have been introduced in this case regarding the defendant having committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts. You are instructed that you can not [sic] consider any such evidence to prove the character of the defendant or that he acted in conformity therewith.
You can consider any such evidence for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. You cannot consider the testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other acts, if any were committed.
We generally presume that the jury followed the trial court‘s instructions unless there is indication to the contrary. Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim.App.2009); see Higginbotham v. State, 356 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2011, pet. ref‘d). Thus, Lemons cannot demonstrate that, but for counsel‘s failure to ask for a limiting instruction at the time extraneous-offense evidence was introduced, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
We overrule Lemons’ complaints regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.