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Vaughn v. State
931 S.W.2d 564
Tex. Crim. App.
1996
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*1 appeals For all these reasons the court of declining suspend

did not err Rule

31(e)(3) judgment in this cause. The

court of is therefore affirmed.

WHITE, J., participating.

MALONEY, J., dissents. VAUGHN, Appellant,

Brenda Cantrell Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 234-95. Texas, Appeals

Court of Criminal

En Banc.

Sept. *2 Vaughn conviction. affirmed the

claim and (Tex.App . —Houston petition for discre In her Dist.] [1st challenges the court appellant tionary review claim, contend appeals’ disposition of this ignored Fifth Circuit case- ing the court contrary. granted review law to appeals erred the court of determine whether was not holding appellant’s ineffective.

I. guilt-innocence Appellant testified testimony Her raised of trial. of a third and defense issues of self-defense jurors to believe or party. The were entitled testimony, and it is clear that disbelieve her justi- actions were they did not find that her claimed. At the fied as she again hearing jury, appellant took before the again inno- and maintained her the stand by the State: cence when cross examined you accept “Q. Vaughn, do Miss jury’s verdict? Yes,

A. I have to. took Q. During you denied what jury found to be true. place and what the you admit to the members And do now place? jury that that took Dickson, Houston, appellant. Lewis No, I was absolute A. what told the Curry, Attorney, Alan Assistant District truth, truth, was the what what believe Houston, Paul, Atty., Aus- Matthew State’s happened was the absolute truth.” tin, for State. closing argument punishment, In his foregoing prosecutor ex- referred change: ON APPELLANT’S OPINION know, gentlemen, one ‘You ladies PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY things has to do when the first REVIEW their they to rehabilitate is to admit want PER CURIAM. they Admit the Admit what did. crime. felony of- Appellant was convicted of the they an- injustice harm caused to and the aggravated assault. V.T.CA. Penal fense of up here But we didn’t hear other. appel- § 22.02. After the found Code They not admitted today. [sic] had have indictment, guilty charged as lant admitting to They are not anything. term, year punishment at a six assessed her you guilty them of. That’s what found $5,000 probated, and a fine. step anybody has to take rehabilita- first possible it. A They haven’t done Appeals, tion. appeal On to the First Court it, they alia, for them to do appellant argued, inter reason could be that she was admit get on the stand and assis- would have to effective reasonably denied thing they us. But the you lied to punishment phase of tance of counsel at the that is the I, they admitting it and § are Art. 10 of the Texas Consti- trial under step to rehabilitation.” first tution. The court of overruled Appellant’s trial counsel did not to this dined to fault counsel for to raise a questioning argument. rejected claim less-than-well-settled point judgment affirm error. We will review, ground In her con- appeals.2 of the court of tends that counsel was ineffective because of *3 object. According appel- this failure to to II. lant, questions argument put the State’s and “Catch-22,” i.e., her in a a situation with A. equally prejudicial undesirable and alterna- determining The test for whether Specifically, appellant argues tives. that the counsel rendered ineffective assistance of State violated the Due Process Clause of the punishment phase noncap- counsel at the of Fifth Amendment to the United Con- States adopted by ital trial is that the Court Ex by forcing stitution her to choose between Duffy, (Tex.Cr.App. Parte 607 S.W.2d 507 First, two evils.1 she could choose to admit 1980). This test asks whether counsel was guilt. her Because this admission would be reasonably likely to render effective assis protestations inconsistent with her of inno- reasonably and counsel ren tance whether trial, guilt-innocence phase cence at the of i.e., dered effective whether the assistance — open up aggravated perjury her

would reasonably defendant received effective assis charges. § See V.T.C.A. Penal Code 37.03. Langley, of counsel. Ex Parte tance Such an admission would also waive a review 141, 143 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). S.W.2d There sufficiency of the of the evidence and all requirement preju no that a defendant show during error that occurred the inno- performance dice—that but for counsel’s phase. cence DeGarmo v. proceeding outcome of the would have been (Tex.Cr.App.1985); McGlothlin v. required different —as is under second short, (Tex.Cr.App.1995). 896 S.W.2d 183 prong Washington, of Strickland U.S. might prosecuted perjuring she for her- (1984). 80 L.Ed.2d might statutory right self and she forfeit her Cruz, parte (Tex.Cr.App. Ex 739 S.W.2d 53 appeal. Her other choice is one she cause, actually persist made in viz: to telling that she was innocent. Un- correctly appeals As court of scenario, der this she would face what oc- states, argue successfully order to her prosecutor curred in this invited case: object trial counsel’s failure to to the State’s punish harshly being her more for questioning and amounted to inef recalcitrant. assistance, appellant fective must show that

Appellant argues that trial counsel was would have committed error overruling objection. Vaughn, objecting for dilemma such an ineffective not Appellant cannot meet by prosecutor. The court of 888 at 74. created S.W.2d below, of, dispositive As we discuss there is found no caselaw or this burden. clearly supporting appellant’s addressing, even this claim. The court de- no caselaw improvidently Response underlying to the claim was 1. Nowhere in her "Brief in 202(k). First, Granting Discretionary Re- granted. Tex.R.App.Pro., of her Petition for Rule appellant any cite statute or Federal view” does disposition present the ineffective assis- our of provision that was violat- State constitutional that the caselaw on tance claim is to the effect alleged say that the ed error. She does predi- the substantive issue was too uncertain to Hobson’s choice she faced violated "Due Pro- Second, assistance claim. cate an ineffective I, § cess” but does not elaborate. Article 19 of appellant issue on did not raise the substantive speaks in terms of "due the Texas Constitution appeal. Finally, it is not even clear that reason, appel- we course of law.” For this take appeals reached the substantive issue so court of argu- "Due Process" to be an lant’s invocation of just pointed out the lack of much as it brought under the Fifth Amendment authority. Vaughn, 888 S.W.2d at 73- definitive United States Constitution. Thus, appellant’s assistance of ineffective only grounds claim is the two counsel granted 2. We also review on the merits granted properly that is before this Court review underlying assistance of claim the ineffective only ground review we need to claim, and is the namely questions that the State’s process decide. arguments appellant's violated due decide, however, rights. For various reasons we princi- basing ineffec and McGlothlin violates the claim. have said that an DeGarmo chal- ple equal claim on that is unset access. Nor does tive assistance caselaw holdings “would lenge the time of counsel’s actions of DeGarmo tled at themselves, and stare decisis engage hindsight exami be to kind McGlothlin those decisions compels counsel the Su us assume nation effectiveness of preme expressly Court disavowed Strick are valid. Davis, ...” Parte land Ex Similarly, it is far from certain (counsel (Tex.Cr.App.1993) ineffec perjury prosecution of a vio possibility argu prosecutor’s tive for the Constitution. A defendant’s lates ment, punishment phase capital guilt phase of trial take the stand synonymous that “deliberate” with “inten testify in not insu his own behalf does *4 clearly tional” since this Court had not inter being prosecuted perjury if him from late “deliberate”), preted citing Strickland way while on he lies some material 668, 690, Washington, 466 U.S. nothing know of in the Constitu stand. We (1984). 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d We A defen prevent prosecution. tion to such analysis engage not such an here.

will deciding stand at whether to take the dant phase simply con punishment of trial is B. consequences more fronted with momentous Having chosen at to take the stand vague perjury prosecu than the threat of a offense, guilt deny appel committing Indeed, testimony gives if a tion. defendant lant cornered into was a difficult decision punishment which with tes at is inconsistent prosecutor again once she stand took the guilt timony given at the of the same punishment. necessarily But it at does not provided he has the State with evidence appellant’s rights follow that violated. were constituting prima aggravated facie case Though punish guilt an admission of her at A. perjury against the defendant. See V.T.C to aggravated perjury, ment would amount §§ 37.03 and 37.06. Penal Code § 37.03, A Penal Code and a waiver of V.T.C McGlothlin, rights, appellate supra, and De to avoid Appellant wants to be able Garmo, supra, it is unclear that there is yet prosecution, to be such a she also wants anything putting ap unconstitutional about leniency jury by to seek from the “com able pellant a choice between these conse However, testify privilege to ing clean.” quences. Cantu in one’s own defense “cannot be construed Cf. (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (putting defendant right perjury.” Har include commit testify hard choice of whether or not does York, 222, 225, ris v. New S.Ct. U.S. process his due rights). not violate (1971). 643, 645, That she will 28 L.Ed.2d 1 if perjury charges potentially have answer initially note criminal de punishment and admits her she testifies right have no due process fendants to an clearly process not due does violate appeal. Rosales v. against This right her self-incrimination. (Tex.Cr.App.1987), citing v. Illi Griffin arguably nothing more than predicament is nois, 585, 100 351 U.S. L.Ed. 891 S.Ct. (and constitutional) logical result of (1956). only right The that the federal con choices her series of defense.3 stitution confers criminal defendants that, appeal pro context of an if a state C. by statute, appeal provide an it must vides appellate way Appellant to the in a instead to continue

access courts elected Equal protesting does not violate the Protection Clause her innocence at the ap- Appel prosecutor phase. of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The cross-examined allege argument pellant lant waiver of a and made a does how her reasonable her. sufficiency review and trial error under on the he elicited from all based answers way appellant testify. 3. There is one can avoid her co- not to nundrum, she can invoke her Fifth Amend- viz:

Appellant subject gov- prosecutor’s questions argument same rules erning punishment hearing cross-examination as other wit- did in fact violate her open impeach- process rights. ness. She was therefore due As the court of issues, noted, “[ajppellant ment on all relevant a factor which has cited no Texas author- undoubtedly ity supports made the decision to take the ... her contention that the question stand a difficult one. But we are inclined to State’s were harmful agree Vaughn, with the that “[n]o State error.” 888 S.W.2d at 74. She presented by caselaw, violation is ... a difficult controlling deci- cites Fifth Circuit but no sion for a precedent.5 defendant.” Brief for An State ineffective assistance of To alleged take the stand and maintain inno- counsel claim cannot on be based an light probability cence in evaluating that the error of counsel when the caselaw unrepentant will see her as or even defiant counsel’s actions and decisions in- voluntary was a by appellant tactical decision stance was nonexistent or not definitive.

and her counsel.4 The fallout of this choice The most that can be said about the state of seems to us no different than appellant’s underlying that attendant the caselaw as to unclear, to a defendant’s decision whether or claim if not to is that not silent result, guilt-innocence altogether. ruling take the stand at “... and be sub- As a ject array potentially appellant’s hypothetical objection there to the broad [would be] *5 impeaching say, they extremely Vaughn, sources. That is to are uncertain.” 888 S.W.2d just likely most factors which should inform a at 74.

proper, strategy. well-founded trial caselaw, Given the indefinite state of the appeals we cannot fault the court of

III. concluding appellant’s that trial counsel was But we need not reach the merits of not ineffective for prosecutor’s questions pun- substantive claim. Even if we resolved at favor, appellant

that issue in her appellant’s willingness would still ishment about to ad- Moreover, not have guilt. ques- established ineffective assistance of mit her the State’s Appellant’s arguments counsel. claim of manifestly ineffective as tions and were not so sistance of compel counsel would fail even were we appeals error as to the court of today to announce for the despite first time that the find ineffective assistance of counsel States, 941, jury system may 4. That our result in the convic- 5. v. Thomas United 368 F.2d 945 Cf. (5th States, persons Cir.1966); tion of innocent is not a factor in our Bertrand v. United 467 appellant's jury 901, (5th Cir.1972); consideration of claim. The ver- F.2d 902 United States v. system. dict is the 302, (5th Cir.1974); most accurate result under our Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 312 truth, Though we can never know the absolute Laca, 922, (5th v. United States 499 F.2d 927 accept jury we must have confidence in and Cir.1974); 214, Wright, United States v. 533 F.2d possible verdict as the best answer and as the (5th Cir.1976). 216 contemplation truth in law. must persuasive authority, Fifth Circuit caselaw is finality defer to and afford verdicts. We binding but it is not State, on this Court. Stewart v. question jury’s proce- decline to verdict if the 118, (Tex.Cr.App.1984); 686 S.W.2d 121 resulting dure in that verdict was within consti- State, (Tex.Cr.App. Flores v. 487 S.W.2d 122 tutional bounds and did not otherwise violate Thus, event, possibility convicting actually any law. distin instant case is people appellant’s quan- guishable ways innocent does not make from the cited caselaw in various dary punishment First, process. at appellant violation of due that does not discuss. 164, 174, Lynaugh, Franklin v. 487 U.S. court was the sentencer the cases on relied Cf. 2320, 2327, (1988) (no Second, S.Ct. 101 L.Ed.2d 155 appellant. clearly do those cases jurors’ to have residual indicate whether defendants took stand guilt doubts about defendant’s considered as mit- guilt phase. and claimed their innocence at the trial). igating capital factor at Finally, the defendants in the federal cases had appear no choice but to before the appellant’s argument may To the extent that be sentencing proceeding informal then used in fed based on the idea that no conviction is final until prosecutions. eral Whether these distinctions all are exhausted and that hence an question we need not now make difference is admission of should not waive of her decide; say they statutory appellate rights, dispute suffice to underscore the is With touching ap indefinite nature of the caselaw on DeGarmo and McGlothlin. See Thomas v. United States, 941, (5th Cir.1966). pellant’s 368 F.2d claim. grounds on self-incrimination was supporting appellant’s comment caselaw

the absence of necessarily implausible strategy. See judgment Accordingly, we affirm the claim. (Tex.Crim.App.1992), appeals. court of Hathorn t. denied U.S. cer 744; L.Ed.2d MALONEY, J., concurs. Johnson

MEYERS, Judge, concurring. opinion). (Tex.Crim.App.1981)(panel To this agree least, I reason extent, afforded agree at with the Court’s ably in this assistance counsel effective disposition. according applicable standard. case me, however, is disturbs the Court’s What (Tex.Crim. parte Duffy, 607

Ex S.W.2d 607 apparently general application holding of App.1980). agree But I do not assistance of counsel “[a]n ineffective attorney interpose failure a defense alleged on error of claim cannot based objections or at trial can novel debatable evaluating when case law coun- counsel fall of reason never below threshold level in that instance sel’s actions and decisions every representation to which able Op. definitive.” nonexistent or not liberty Ac trial for his life is entitled. opinion of the Court’s 568. Read context join cordingly, opinion of the I cannot whole, evidently proposition is as a Court. challenge any successful meant to foreclose Appellant faced a difficult choice at upon to the trial effectiveness of penalty of her trial this case. Hav- act the law basis of his omission to whenever which, true, if ing earlier testified facts supporting action “unclear” arguably such her, acquitted knowing that would have Op. or “less-than-well-settled.” testimony, she did not believe her options have regarded *6 must all her available position, support the In of this extreme hand, equally On as unattractive. the one Davis, only parte Court cites Ex story repeat gave during she the the same (Tex.Crim.App.1993), in we which adjudication undoubtedly phase of trial would attorney that a was not ineffec held defense unrepentant jury. have made seem her object merely he chose not to tive because denying toYet confess her after earlier pun prosecutor argued during the when the surely opened it under oath would have phase capital murder trial that of a ishment course, perjury prosecution. to a she Of terms “intentional” “deliberate” the testify altogether. could have declined argument, thing. That al mean the same But, by testimony offering personal no at all objec by this Court to though later held be mitigation punishment, might in of her she tionable, interpretation plausible lenity from well have lost her best chance at Indeed, made. the law at the time it was jury. the urged attorney in that ease himself defense objection the accept, from the without choices, it is that Given these little wonder different, equally plausible, others, prosecutor, but par- she now there had wishes been “deliberate,” word interpretation the ticularly at the that she could have testified by this subsequently also held being subjected to which was punishment phase without objectionable. that We observed culpability to be any inquiry regarding her Court further end, “certainly the arguments this were within charged for the crime. To achieve both objective and that prospec- realm of reasonableness” might it is conceivable that she have merely against on the basis subse tively privilege to hold otherwise claimed a self-incrimi- developments in the case law taking quent the But such would nation before stand. best, hindsight, a ex by method have been at

maneuver would awkward disapproved by any the United States probably counterproductive pressly event. case, Washington, Supreme there- Court Strickland Given circumstances this 2065-2066, fore, say to main- I cannot decision 466 U.S. Davis, (1984). at 80 L.Ed.2d

tain her innocence even than further phase of trial rather to refuse view, my

In Davis object does not stand for onstrate his failure could not general proposition concerning plausible of law of a product have been the trial on, duty attorney representing strategy. go of an I criminal would not as the Court does, objec- adopt defendant to or unnecessary make novel debatable dubious proposition lawyers tions of his client. I trial competent defense As under- nev- case, stand our obligation rationale in it was not er have a make attorney objections, pursue because a or rights, strategies defense need never antici- assert pate change progress or contend for or which are less than well-settled. decisional law that we considered counsel’s reasons, For concur in judg- these I

performance adequate, but to be rather be- only. ment of the Court attorney’s performance cause a defense by judged contemporary must be condi- BAIRD, Judge, dissenting. tions, including contempo- condition of Believing trial counsel was ineffective in rary-jurisprudence, by subsequent devel- manifestly to the State’s opments in the law. case improper closing argument punish- By reckoning, the instant cause comes respectfully dissent. significantly posture to us in a different than Davis. did this ease there have been no I. important developments affecting in the law A. novel or likelihood that a controversial objection one such as the thinks Appellant guilt/innocence testified at her counsel made at should have trial would phase assaulting complain- and admitted Accordingly, be sustained. she is not con- ant, justified using but contended she tending performance that his should be protect against force to or herself another

judged hindsight with improved of law- complainant’s attempted use use of yers Rather, from the future. she claims See, unlawful force. Tex. Penal Code Ann. that, only objection had he she made now §§ jury rejected appel- 9.31 and 9.33. The made, thinks he should have he would have lant’s of third de- self-defense/defense requested been entitled to relief under guilty. fense and returned a verdict existing law. punishment phase, appellant again At the Court, I am Unlike the inclined to think testified and on cross-examination *7 that there are instances in which com- some exchange following State the occurred: attorneys petent defense do not meet their you Q: accept jury’s Vaughn, Ms. do the constitutionally obligation to render effective verdict? they objec- assistance of counsel unless raise Yes, A: I have to. pursue strategies concerning tions or other Q: trial, you During denied what took the entirely which the law is not well-settled. jury place found to be and what elaborating length, Without this view at you true. now admit to And do likely obligation seems to me that such an members of the that that took objec- exists where under circumstances place? widely tion or is strategy other discussed and A: I No. What told the was the attempted throughout legal often commu- truth, I absolute what believe was the nity attorney practices, in which the is clear- truth, happened was the what absolute ly advantageous defendant or to the is the truth. available, promising strategy most defensive During jury argument punishment its significant disadvantages and has few or no argued: phase of the State agree for the I with defendant. While know, gentlemen, not decide You ladies and one of Court that we need whether the objection has attorney things her trial the first to do when thinks they to should in this of want to rehabilitate is admit their have made case was such a kind, they did. Admit only I to decide it crime. Admit what would decline be- injustice they to an- persuasively cause not and the harm caused the record does dem- Though of up an admission other. But we hear that here ... didn’t punishment aggravated to would amount today. They any- have to not admitted appellate perjury, and a waiver of her thing. They admitting you what are not anything is there rights, it unclear that is step guilty found That’s the first them of. putting appellant about unconstitutional anybody has take rehabilitation. consequences. these choice between possible A They done it. reason haven’t reasons, it, following at 567. For Ante they could be them to do would have disagree. get you the stand and admit to they they thing lied to us. But the are II. admitting it step and that is the first determining The standard for ineffective rehabilitation.1 of counsel at assistance non-capital of a trial was established in B. (Tex.Cr.App. Duffy, Ex parte S.W.2d appeal, appellant contended the On direct 1980). for ef Under this standard test questioning argument objec- above were is, first, coun of counsel whether fectiveness attorney’s tionable and that her trial failure reasonably likely sel effective was render object of rose to level ineffective assis- second, and, rea assistance whether counsel Appeals af- tance counsel. The Court of sonably Craig rendered effective assistance. State,

firmed: (Tex.Cr.App. 825 S.W.2d 1992). instant threshold case the In order for trial counsel’s failure to argument was issue is whether State’s question argu- to the State’s objectionable. argument proper If the assistance, to have been ineffective was not ineffective if appellant must he demonstrate objection inquiry lodge an and our is com objected, judge had would have plete. refusing error in to sustain his committed permissible objection. Appellant categories There are four cannot meet (1) jury argument: summation the evi questions burden. We believe (2) dence; from reasonable deductions represent proper themselves were no (3) evidence; argument answer more than the usual risk defendant as- (4) counsel; plea en opposing or for law sumes when he she takes the stand to State, Campbell v. forcement. most, testify. any error At would have and, Alejandro (Tex.Cr.App.1980); improper jury argument been (Tex.Cr.App S.W.2d State. .1973). argument The does not fit instant say cannot that the trial would permissible four into areas have committed error had he overruled an argument. Wages v. objection closing. to the State’s remarks on (Tex.App [14th Dist.] 740-741 . —Houston precedent There is no that con- definitive im Consequently, the trols; precedent *8 indeed the lack of ... was, therefore, objectionable. proper and ruling appellant’s hypothetical makes a on is in to The second issue whether objection extremely uncertain. object, reasonably rendered ef- (Tex. State, 62, Vaughn v. 74 888 S.W.2d fective assistance. The Sixth Amendment App. [1st Chief Dist.] Jus — Houston everyone many rights guarantees to valuable dissented, believing a tice Oliver-Parrott de including right to a trial to determine the punished exercising not fendant should be for guilt. rights further question of These are right to trial rather the constitutional stand in of and defined our Code enumerated Id., plead guilty. than 77. great in which sets forth Criminal Procedure Today, majority accepts a this Court in a of the manner which trial shall be detail Oliver-Parrott, premise presumed to be persons of Justice but All are Chief conducted. Proc. Ann. art. innocent. Tex. Code Grim.

nevertheless holds: emphasis supplied unless indi- cated. 1. All is otherwise

572 plea guilty 38.03. A of denial every paragraph is a of enhancement lie.” was “a The allegation indictment, material Tex. plea proper require was to to the State meet 27.17, Proc. upon Code Crim. Ann. art. and proof range its burden of to enhance the of plea, such a the State bears the burden of (Tex. punishment. Wages, In 736 S.W.2d proving guilt beyond the defendant’s a rea- 1985), App. [14th Dist.] the State — Houston 358, Winship, In sonable doubt. re 397 U.S. argued jury had been to summoned ser 1068, (1970); and, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 vice because the defendant insisted on her During art. may 38.03. a defendant right jury to a trial.2 The Court concluded complained contend that the of conduct was Id., argument improper. S.W.2d justified. § Tex. Penal Ann. 9.02. Code Con- also, Com., at 741.3 See Perdue v. justified duct that is a establishes defense to (Ky.1995) (Improper S.W.2d 163-64 prosecution. When the evidence raises closing argument to refer to the “time and defense, such a shall instruct by plea guilty trouble” occasioned not of jury that the State bears burden of trial.). resulting Similarly, the State beyond proving a reasonable doubt that the may not, argument, comment the de See, justified. defendant’s conduct was not testify. fendant’s failure To allow such a Tex. Crim. Proc. art. Code Ann. 36.14. The permit punish comment would right to contest one’s is the most valu- invoking defendant for his justice right system. able within our criminal Const, statutory right to remain silent. U.S. no summary There are determinations of Const, V; 10; and, I; § amend. Tex. art. guilt; guilty, plea even face the Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.08. still guilt. State must offer evidence Tex. case, In the instant the State asked the Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. punish persisting for in her this, necessarily Having said follows that rejected belief in her which had defense been may punished defendant not be for invok Appellant every jury. right had ing statutory rights the constitutional and raise that and to defense continue believe And, with it manifestly associated trial. regardless jury’s in it verdict. In improper argue for the State to State, (Tex.Cr. Overstreet v. 470 S.W.2d 653 punished invoking defendant should be App.1971), pun the defendant testified See, Zant, rights. those v. Cunningham ishment trial and indicated that (11th Cir.1991) (Improper F.2d agree jury’s she did with not verdict. suggest defendant not enti argued The State later the defendant rights guaranteed by tled to the Sixth could not she had be rehabilitated because

Amendment.). Several cases are illustrative guilt. not confessed her We condemned the State, point. Lopez In v. argument, noting: (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court found error reversible was committed when the A defendant a criminal ease under our prosecutor argued the had lied defendants plea laws has of not enter they pleas guilty. when entered of not See guilty probation, file a motion also, (Tex. Anderson 525 S.W.2d 20 and the fact that he has those exercised Cr.App.1975). Perkins rights against not be him. should utilized (Tex.App. S.W.2d 302-303 — Houston Id., 470 S.W.2d at 1982, pet. d), ref the Court [1st Dist.] found argued Similarly, Fifth Circuit held a de- prosecutor reversible error when the has plea may placed a situa- the defendant’s of “not true” to the fendant such *9 argued: 2. be here. has [The The State didn’t ask to defendant] brought today here and the last us all gentlemen, you’ve Ladies and what STATE: for four days. just lawyer heard from the defense amounts to Wages, at 703 S.W.2d 740-741. plea. sympathy a Don’t the defendant let in attorney put monkey this or her the case Appeals 3. error was The Court of concluded the your spend days You back. didn’t ask to four judge trial the cured when the sustained defen- at down here the courthouse this week. You objection jury to disre- get subpoena dant’s and instructed the didn't a to come down and be a gard closing argument. juror. judge didn't ask to be here. The the State’s Ibid.

573 Thomas, States, (quoting, United F.2d at 945 F.2d 368 v. United 368 tion. In Thomas Toteo, (5th Cir.1966), F.Supp. 214 567 judge the asked States v. 941 trial, defendant, Thus, guilty (S.D.N.Y.1963)). Circuit pled not at the Fifth who plea guilt his before a judge may his and admit not induce defen recant a trial held you “If sentencing. judge dant, guilty following The trial stated: a been found who has of clean will clean and make a breast guilt prior come by his or her jury, to confess trial all, the will thing also, for once and for Court this sentence. See imposition of length of sen- that into account take 216 Wright, 533 F.2d v. United States Thomas, F.2d at imposed.” tence to be (5th Cir.1976); Rogers, 504 v. United States profess his continued 944. The defendant (5th Cir.1974); v. States United F.2d 1079 judge imposed trial innocence and the (5th Cir.1974); Laca, United F.2d re- sentence.4 The Fifth Circuit maximum (5th Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302 Cir. v. States versed: States, 1974); v. F.2d Bertrand United part of federal Cir.1972). also, Our in the administration (5th v. States See United theory requires reject justice (7th Cir.1960). we Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 may in punished a because authority light from decisional when good faith he himself defends Court, Appeals and the this the Court crime, though his charged a even with Circuit, argument was mani Fifth the State’s It proves is evident effort unsuccessful. Accordingly, if trial counsel festly improper. dis- punishment imposed by the that the objected, the trial would have com had part for trict court on the defendant was objection. overruling mitted error his fact had himself of that he availed Therefore, did render rea trial counsel part only to a right he sonably when failed effective assistance he was indicted. crime which Furthermore, preju object. Thomas, Wiley, 278 (quoting, 368 F.2d at 944 punish because the diced 504). Additionally, the Court stated: F.2d upper end of ment was toward the assessed No matter how heinous the offense See, range.5 Moore charged, overwhelming proof of how (Tex.Cr.App.1975). may appear, hopeless the or how judgment Accordingly, I reverse the would defense, right a defendant’s to continue Appeals and remand case of the Court may His his trial violated. with not be punishment hear- to the trial court for a new right require the Govém- so, I majority fails to do ing. Because proceed to a conclusion of the respectfully dissent. guilt by independent evi- and to establish should not be under dence exercised OVERSTREET, J., joins opinion. penalty persists if he a shadow —that of his and is found the assertion faces, he the Trial guilty, view of Court’s intention, sentence, maximum

announced pros- pleads guilty,

and if he there substantially To

pect of reduced term. upon

impose such alternative defendant law. as a matter amounts to coercion suggests the 216. If the record 4. has im- 533 F.2d at Fifth Circuit held sentence The statutory authority posed sentencing may ac- possibility did not have to he the maximum rights to cooper- for a defendant’s Fifth Amendment tually term refusal to have taken defendant’s Wright, Fifth 533 F.2d at 216. The be violated. sentencing, “then the sen- ate account in into sentencing was violated when the Amendment sentence be vacated a new tence should authority the defendant’s refusal considered imposed this refusal.” consideration of without Laca, See, e.g., guilty plea. after a not confess Rogers, 504 F.2d 1085. Thomas, 945; 927; 368 F.2d at F.2d at States, (10th 273 F.2d 469 Williams United Cir.1959). years Appellant confine- six sentenced statu- fact the maximum ”[T]he ment, $5,000.00. probated, a fine of imposed dispositive of tory is not term was not *10 Wright, a Constitutional violation. the issue" of

Case Details

Case Name: Vaughn v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Sep 11, 1996
Citation: 931 S.W.2d 564
Docket Number: 234-95
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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