*1 committed before its effec- some offenses GOODSPEED, Appellant, Melvin date,
tive it is not irrational or absurd to may suppose Legislature have earlier codifications of wanted exclude In from the newer scheme.
the offense of Texas. STATE allegations we regard to enhancement No. PD-1882-03. said, just recently nothing have “There is statutory interpretation absurd about Appeals of Texas. Court Criminal prior in certain convictions which results April and oth- being available enhancement it being ers not available.”3 And so precursor
with offenses. we did construe an Griffith encompass certain
enhancement statute
statutory precursor offenses that were not But that statute did
listed the text.4 broadly provision
contain a “catch-all” prior “similar” offenses committed
covered states, necessarily encompassing
in other prior versions of
both the current and Con
offenses committed other states.5 interpret the enhance
sequently, encompass Texas statu provision
ment produced the
tory precursors would have statutory pre including result of
absurd own every state but our
cursors mandatory supervision statute at issue
6The case, however, catch-all
in this includes no regarding out-of-state offenses.7
provision into the statute unwilling
I am read
something plainly not there. dissent.
respectfully
(Tex.Crim.
5. Id.
3. Getts v. App.2005). 6. Id. (Tex. 4. Griffith (the "argument Crim.App.2003) defendant's 508.149(a). §7. weight it not for” have more were would statute). language in the other
I. BACKGROUND
dire,
voir
conducted its
After the State
but
the venire
counsel addressed
defense
In his com-
any questions.
not ask
did
ments,
he had
counsel stated that
approximate-
for
prosecutor
listened to the
covered
and that she had
ly two hours
of
including the defense side
everything,
Although defense counsel exer-
the case.
challenges,
peremptory
all ten of his
cised
used on
challenges
those
were
two of
jurors
previously
who had
been
spective
court.
excused
the trial
aggravated
-virasconvicted of
Appellant
age
a child under
four-
sexual assault of
years in
ninety-nine
teen and sentenced
a
for new
prison. Although motion
filed,
an ineffective assistance
was
and
motion,
in the
no
counsel claim
raised
was
Davis, Texarkana,
appel-
James E.
for
to the
regard
made with
complaint was
lant.
conduct,
hearing
and no
above-discussed
DA,
Habersang,
Texar-
Nicole
Assist.
the motion.
held on
was
kana,
Paul,
Attorney,
Matthew
State’s
made
complaint
a
appeal
But on
Austin, for state.
appeals
court of
the conduct. The
about
deficient
held that this conduct constituted
OPINION
possi-
no
because there was
performance,
KELLER, P.J.,
opinion
delivered the
it
have been based on
bility that
could
PRICE, WOMACK,
the Court which
strategy.1 The court ex-
legitimate trial
KEASLER, HERVEY and COCHRAN
and
of voir dire
plained
importance
joined.
questions
to ask
the failure
held
to no assistance to the defen-
amounted
must
whether the failure
We
determine
no conceivable trial
dant and that
any questions during voir dire and
voir dire.2
permit counsel to waive
would
peremptory challenges
the exercise of two
failure to
appeals found the
The court of
jurors
already
had
been excused
who
light
ask
to be deficient
obviously
that is so
constitute
impartial
need for fair
for
inquiry
deficient that
into the reasons
answers
tendency
questioning
to elicit
unnecessary.
conduct becomes
counsel’s
challenge
basis for a
that form the
reasons
inquiry
hold that an
into the
We
gender
or race-neutral
provide
cause or
for counsel’s conduct is still needed. Con-
chal-
exercising
judgment of the
reason
sequently, we reverse the
lenge.3
appeals.
court of
(Tex.
Goodspeed.
3.
that the failure to examine the the meritorious nature of the claim.10 Di- pre- appeal usually inadequate vehicle ascertaining vented the defense from rect raising such a claim because the record whether some members of the venire generally undeveloped.11 This is true punishment.4 full consider the *3 regard question with to the of deficient appellant The court observed that was eli- performance which counsel’s conduct gible community supervision, and while —in deference, great reviewed with without explain range punish- the did State the distorting hindsight12— the effects of ninety-nine ment as being “probation up to where counsel’s reasons for to do years prospective or life” and asked the do in jurors something appear the record.13 they if could consider the full We have said that “trial counsel should punishment, appeals the court of felt ordinarily be afforded an clearly inquire that the State did not into explain being his actions before denounced prospective whether could consider opportu- as ineffective.”14 Absent such an probation sentencing option.5 as a nity, appellate court should not find The court of also appeals found its performance deficient unless the chal- performance holding deficient was re- lenged outrageous conduct was “so that no by quired peremp- defense counsel’s use of attorney in competent engaged would have tory previously pro- strikes on two excused it.”15 jurors.6 spective characterized those strikes as “wasted” Despite appeals’s the court of char they and found that cast “extreme doubt acterization of counsel’s conduct as “no Goodspeed’s whether counsel was ac- assistance,” we cannot conclude that the tively in adversarial participating the any questions failure to ask in voir dire just cess to ensure a and fair trial.”7 outrageous that no constitutes conduct in attorney engaged
competent would have II. ANALYSIS it. Defense counsel’s articulated reason Ineffective of counsel to ask the declining questions —that cov two-part prosecution’s questioning adequately claims are evaluated under the by Supreme test formulated concerns—could be a Court ered defense’s Washington,8 requiring legitimate appro Strickland v. a under the showing priate circumstances. The Court of both deficient Montana, example, declined to prejudice.9 A Strickland claim must be has “firmly asking in the find counsel ineffective for founded record” and “the 4. at 11. Id. at Id. 411-412.
5. Id. 412. at 12. Id. at 813.
6. Id. 13. Id. at 814. 7. Id. Rylander 14. 101 S.W.3d
8. 466 U.S.
80 L.Ed.2d
(1984).
(Tex.
Thompson
9 S.W.3d
(Tex.
15. Garcia v.
Crim.App.1999).
cert, denied,
Crim.App.2001),
537 U.S.
(2003).
as there was credible evidence the appellant’s resolve ineffective assis- guilt; may any or he have had combina- separately tance of counsel claims. I write tion of these might reasons. Counsel also explain the difference between this case have that aggra- believed the facts of this Andrews State.1 vated assault of a child case were severe Andrews, defense counsel failed that there was possibility little or no correct a misstatement of the that law appellant receiving probation upon convic- harmful possi- to his client.2 There was no tion. proposed These specula- reasons are strategy ble reasonable trial that would tive, above, but as discussed is the lead defense counsel choose to remain problem trying with to evaluate an ineffec- Thus, reasons, any, silent. if counsel’s tive claim in which defense unnecessary to were resolve the ineffective given counsel has not been an opportunity assistance of claim.3 counsel why to respond, and such claims are usual- I have doubts about whether defense ly rejected. . ' pursuing this case was a reason- Finally, the court contends able trial when he failed ask counsel’s deficient is re- panel. of the venire Nonethe- vealed his use of two chal- less, it possible there was some lenges already who had been *5 legitimate reason for choice that counsel’s Again, excused. has not been af- apparent is not in the record before us. respond.24 forded the to But case, In this inadequate the record is for even if per- the strikes constitute deficient us to determine whether counsel was inef- formance, appellant they must show that proceedings fective. Habeas are a more harmed him. This he has done. in appropriate avenue this case. judgment The of court the of is comments, join majori- With these I the reversed, and the is case remanded for ty opinion. further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HOLCOMB, J., in dissenting which JOHNSON, J., MEYERS, J., dissented. joined.
PRICE, J.,
respectfully
I
I
concurring opinion
filed a
in
dissent. would hold that
COCHRAN, J., joined.
which
appel
trial counsel’s errors were such that
lant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
HOLCOMB, J.,
dissenting
filed a
properly
counsel is
reviewable
direct
MEYERS, J.,
opinion in
joined.
which
State,
appeal.
Thompson v.
9
See
S.W.3d
PRICE, J.,
in
concurring which
808,
(Tex.Crim.App.1999).
814 n. 6
I
COCHRAN, J., joined.
would further hold that trial
per
counsel’s
I agree
majority
with the
the
formance was deficient and tantamount to
rec-
ord in this
at all.
inadequate
case is
for us to
no counsel
See Strickland v. Wash
Lewis,
262, 290,
People
24. See
50 Cal.3d
834,
892,
Cal.Rptr.
266
P.2d
786
909
(1990)(defense
automatically
State,
counsel not
inef-
Id. at 102. See Matthews v.
350 S.C.
failing
272, 276,
766,
(2002) (con-
fective for
to exercise all of his allotted
565 S.E.2d
768
peremptory challenges).
cluding that
cannot assert
"[C]ounsel
object
as
failure
State,
(Tex.Crim.
1.Andrews v.
S.W.3d 98
comments which constitute an error of
159
law
2005).
App.
inherently prejudicial”).
and are
advantages.
tactical
2052,
several
employ
80 to
104 S.Ct.
ington, 466 U.S.
of
(1984);
by the court
v. Wain
noted
Gideon
to those
L.Ed.2d
addition
attorneys
might, 872 U.S.
common
it is
appeals,1
State,
Hernandez
396
See, e.g., Gray
v.
appointed
adequately
and the assistance
counsel. 9 er be
shown.
J.,
(Meyers,
648,
2045,
at
4
dissenting).
S.W.3d
817 n.
Mississippi 481
107 S.Ct.
U.S.
(1987) (requiring
95
622
automatic
L.Ed.2d
not
though
Even
the record does
defini-
juror
single
reversal even where a
tively reflect
act-
the reasons
counsel
unconstitutionally
excluded
and there was
did,
ed as he
I do not believe there is
suggestion
part
no
of bias on the
anything
say
he
under
circum-
these
seated);
jurors actually
Batson v. Ken-
stances to show
his actions were the
106,
1712,
79,
tucky, 476
106 S.Ct.
90
product
strategy.2
of a sound trial
There-
U.S.
fore,
State,
this
one of
classic
believe
L.Ed.2d 69
994
Gonzales
instances which ineffective assistance of
170,
(Tex.Crim.App.1999)
172
S.W.2d
may
adequately argued
be
State,
(Price, J.,
dissenting); Sloan
809
appeal, despite
reviewed on direct
the lack
(Tex.App.-Tyler
pet.
S.W.2d
238
developed
of a
at a
record
motion
new
improvidently granted).
dism’d
gives
opportu-
trial which
trial counsel an
State,
947
264
Cain v.
S.W.2d
nity
explain
his actions. See Mitchell v.
that, ex-
(Tex.Crim.App.1997), we stated
State,
(Tex.Crim.App.
68 S.W.3d
constitutional er-
cept
certain federal
2002) (generally,
ap-
the record on direct
rors deemed structural
the United
peal
sufficiently developed
will not be
Court,
categor-
no error is
States
representation
show that counsel’s
was de-
ically
error anal-
immune from a harmless
Strickland);
ficient
prong
under first
ysis. The situation here is different and is
Thompson v.
F.3d at 345. subjecting
analysis because the error mean- prejudice would render
Strickland by the
ingless protections afforded Ohio, v.
right e.g., to counsel.3 See Penson 75,109 346,102
488 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1988) Chapman (reasoning applying BRYANT, Randolph Clarence defen- to an Anders violation would leave Appellant, very that An- protection dant without the sought provide)4; ders McKaskle 177 n.
Wiggins, 465 U.S.
of Texas.
STATE
(1984) (error
deny-
resentation. their effort type
show that this of malfeasance is
wrong Apparently and harmful. we have relegated highly
now this to the
problematic and uncertain world of habeas
corpus. Unfortunately, negates this
scholarly ap- from the court opinion
peals. 18, 23-24,
3.However,
California,
applying
Chapman
386 U.S.
even when
the standard
analysis,
harm
here
be
error
could not
Anders
87 S.Ct.
