JAMAL ABU SAMAK, Petitioner-Appellant, versus WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - MEDIUM, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 13-12161
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
(September 10, 2014)
[PUBLISH] Non-Argument Calendar D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00573-JSM-PRL
Before PRYOR, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamal Samak, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of his
On appeal, Samak argues that because the version of
Whether a prisoner may bring a
Under
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by [a
§ 2255 motion], shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
When a prisoner previously has filed a
In Williams, we held that Wofford resolved Williams‘s appeal because he could not show that our caselaw foreclosed his objection to treating his two Florida burglary convictions as violent felonies under the ACCA. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1343-44. We stated that Wofford established two necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for a sentencing claim to pass muster under the savings
In responding to Williams‘s argument that Begay2 was the “circuit-law busting, retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision” required by Wofford, we clarified that the Supreme Court case must be “circuit-law busting” in that it overturned circuit precedent that specifically addressed the claim the prisoner now asserts. Id. at 1346-47. We concluded that ”Begay is not circuit law-busting in Wofford‘s sense of the term” because it “changed the analytical framework for determining whether a given state offense is a violent felony at a high level of abstraction by crafting its ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ test,” but “[i]t did
In Bryant, we held that for a petitioner to bring a
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys . . . by means of fire . . . any building . . . shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years . . . and if death results to any person . . . shall also be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment as provided in section 34 of this title.
Here, the district court properly dismissed Samak‘s
AFFIRMED.4
I concur in the decision to affirm the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus,
INTRODUCTION
For fifteen years we have erroneously interpreted the savings clause to mean that a prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, evade the bar on second or successive motions, and circumvent the one-year statute of limitations if a decision of the Supreme Court “busts” circuit precedent that previously foreclosed the prisoner‘s claim. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274; Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). But whether the law of our Circuit—or in this appeal the law of another circuit—was once adverse to a prisoner has nothing to do with whether his motion to vacate his sentence is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” A motion to vacate under section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his sentence, but a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 allows that prisoner to challenge the legality of his detention in ways that section 2255 cannot remedy. Only then is the motion to vacate “inadequate or ineffeсtive.”
Beginning with Wofford, we have fumbled the meaning of twenty simple words at the end of the following provision:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
Our precedents have failed to consider the ordinary meaning of the text of the savings clause. We have not even tried to interpret the ordinary meaning of its key terms, such as “inadequate,” “ineffective,” “test,” and “detention.” In Wofford,
Our flawed interpretation reached its pinnacle late last year when a federal prisoner named Dudley Bryant returned to our Court. Bryant had previously filed two motions to vacate his sentence and an application to file a third, but then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
To decide Bryant‘s claim, a panel of our Court distilled from our dicta in Wofford, Gilbert, and Williams the following five-step test:
Bryant must establish that (1) throughout his sentencing, direct appeal, and first
§ 2255 proceeding, our Circuit‘s binding precedent had specifically addressed Bryant‘s distinct prior state conviction that triggered§ 924(e) and had squarely foreclosed Bryant‘s§ 924(e) claim that he was erroneously sentenced above the 10-year statutory maximum penalty in§ 924(a) ; (2) subsequent to his first§ 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Begay [v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008)], аs extended by this Court to Bryant‘s distinct prior conviction, overturned our Circuit precedent that had squarely foreclosed Bryant‘s§ 924(e) claim; (3) the new ruleannounced in Begay applies retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of Begay‘s new rule being retroactive, Bryant‘s current sentence exceeds the 10-year statutory maximum authorized by Congress in § 924(a) ; and (5) the savings clause in§ 2255(e) reaches his pure§ 924(e) -Begay error claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty in§ 924(a) .
Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. And for the first time, our Court granted relief to a federal prisoner, thereby rendering this five-step, atextual, Rube Goldbergian rule the law of our Circuit.
In Bryant, we failed in our task as a Court to interpret the text of the savings clause that Congress wrote in 1948 and to make sense of that text so as not to circumvent provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act that Congress later adopted in 1996. See Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S. Ct. 417, 420 (1933) (“We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason. We take the statute as we find it.“); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 348 (2012) (“[A]lthough properly informed human minds may agree on what a text means, human hearts often disagree on what is right. That is why we vote . . . on what the law ought to be, but leave it to experts of interpretation called judges to decide what an enacted law means.“). We not only abandoned the text of the clause itself, but we also adopted a rule at war with the provisions of the statute that limit a movant‘s ability to file a second or successive motion,
The text of the savings clause creates a rule that is both easy to understand and easy to apply. When read in harmony with the other provisions of the Act, the savings clause allows a federal prisoner to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus only when he attacks the execution of his sentence or when his sentencing court no longer exists. For example, a prisoner who challenges the deprivation of good-time credits or parole determinations may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because a motion to vacate his sentence is “inadequate or ineffective” to test that aspect of his detention. See, e.g., Hajduk v. United States, 764 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1985). Or, for example, a military prisoner whose sentencing court no longer exists must have a forum for his one opportunity to challenge the legality of his sentence. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011). But only in those kinds of limited circumstances is section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
DISCUSSION
In 1948, Congress created a new mechanism for a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his sentence. Instead of filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
One year later, Congress explicitly limited the ability of a federal prisoner to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Congress instead provided that a federal prisoner must use the new mechanism provided in section 2255, that is, moving to vacate his sentence in the court that sentenced him:
An application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief . . . .
[U]nless it also appears that the remedy by motion[,
28 U.S.C. § 2255 ,] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
In Bryant, we held that a motion to vacate a sentence is “inadequate or ineffective” when our precedent is at odds with a prisoner‘s claim and the Supreme Court later corrects that precedent, but this rule fails to consider the ordinary meaning of the text of the savings clause and the text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in at least four ways. First, Congress created this alternative mechanism for a federal prisoner to challenge his ”sentence,”
In the discussion that follows, I address each of these four textual arguments, which together point to a wholly different way of thinking about the savings clause. I then explain why that interpretation is necessary to save the constitutionality of section 2255. I conclude by acknowledging that we are not the only court to have misinterpreted the clause.
A. Congress Distinguished between Challenging the Legality of a “Sentence” in a Motion to Vacate and “Test[ing] the Legality of . . . Detention” in a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
When Congress enacted section 2255, it created a mechanism for a prisoner to challenge his “sentence” in the court that sentenced him, but Congress left open the opportunity for a prisoner to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district of his confinement “to test the legality of his detention“:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collаteral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. . . .
(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
A federal prisoner who challenges his sentence may challenge only the validity of the proceedings that resulted in his sentence, but a prisoner who challenges his detention under the savings clause may challenge the execution of his sentence. Cf. Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that a
The “detention” of a prisoner encompasses much more than a criminal “sentence.” When Congress enacted section 2255, the word “detention” meant “[k]eeping in custody or confinement,” 3 Oxford English Dictionary 266 (1st ed. 1933), or “[t]he act of keeping back or withholding, either accidentally or by design, a person or thing,” Black‘s Law Dictionary 569 (3d ed. 1933). For example, a pretrial detainee could challenge his detention because he is in “custody or confinement” even though he has not been tried. Or a federal prisoner could challenge his detention by raising claims about his good-time credits or the revocation of his parole, which involve the “act of keeping back or withholding” the prisoner by the Executive branch.
This ordinary meaning of the term “detention” also comports with the separation of labor that Congress created between the court that sentenced a prisoner and the court in the district of his confinement. In 1942, the Judicial Conference of the United States tasked a committee of federal judges to study collateral attacks of sentences in federal courts, and the committee recommended that a federal prisoner challenge the validity of his sentence in the district that sentenced him instead of in the district in which he was confined. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 214–15, 72 S. Ct. at 270.
This division of labor Congress crafted when it passed section 2255 also comports with the nature of sentencing and confinement in 1948. Congress passed section 2255 in an era where the length of “detention” was governed by parole determinations and good-time credits. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
In the light of this history, it is inconceivable that the savings clause is reserved for those prisoners who want a second bite at the apple to challenge the legality of their sentences by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in the districts that confine them after they already challenged the legality of their sentences in the courts that sentenced them. What an odd result that yields in this appeal: Even after the District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed his first motion to vacate his sentence, Samak v. United States, No. CRIM A. 91-189, 2000 WL 557331, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000), and the Fifth Circuit denied him a certificate of appealability, Samak attempts to evade those denials and hopes for a different result by challenging his sentence again in our Court under our multi-prong Bryant rigmarole. Even stranger, our Court must now review the law of the Fifth Circuit to determine whether any decision of the Supreme Court has “busted” precedents of that circuit court. See Majority Op. at 7 n.3.
Prisoners not only sue in the wrong court when they attack the legality of their sentences in the district of their confinement, but they also sue the wrong
Judge Martin‘s partial dissent in Bryant highlights this problem about the proper defendant and venue. Judge Martin urged the panel to grant the writ by directing the warden to release Bryant immediately. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1293 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As she explained, releasing a successful habeas petitioner from custody is the sort of remedy a warden has historically carried out since the inception of the Writ, which roughly translates to “bring the body.” Id. at 1295–96. Of course, courts may now dispose of a habeas petition “as law and justice require,”
Collateral review for federal prisoners, in this way, is fundamentally different from petitions for writs of habeas corpus for state prisoners. A state prisoner may seek relief by filing a petition “on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
B. “To Test” Is Not Synonymous with “To Win.”
A prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if he cannot adequately or effectively test the legality of his detention, and “to test the legality of his detention” means only to have the opportunity to raise an argument about the legality of his detention. The definition of “to test” is “to try,” 11 Oxford English Dictionary 220 (1st ed. 1933), or “to ascertain the truth or the quality or fitness of a thing,” Black‘s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1720. In the light of these definitions, whether a prisoner may “test” a claim about the legality of his detention is not coterminous with whether he wins or loses that claim; whether a prisoner may “test” his claim requires us to ask only whether the prisoner has the opportunity to raise that claim for our examination. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he clause is concerned with process—ensuring the petitioner
A prisoner cannot adequately or effectively test the legality of his detention if his claim is not cognizable in a motion to vacate his sentence. If the claim is not cognizable, then a prisoner cannot “test” it and obtain a “remedy” as the clause requires. For example, a prisoner cannot “test” a claim about the revocation of his parole in a motion to vacate his sentence. That claim and other claims related to the execution of a prisoner‘s sentence do not contend that the sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” or that “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,”
In Bryant, we conflated the words “to test” with the words “to win” or “likely to win.” We decided that, if settled circuit precedent goes against a
C. The Section 2255 Remedy Is “Inadequate or Ineffective” When a Prisoner Contests Something Other Than the Legality of His Sentence, Not When Circuit Precedent Is Merely Adverse to His Claim that Challenges the Legality of His Sentence.
For the savings clause, we have surmised that two conditions must be present to render section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to test a claim. First, erroneous circuit precedent “foreclosed” a prisoner‘s argument during sentencing, direct appeal, and first collateral proceeding. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. Second, a Supreme Court decision later “busted” that circuit precedent. Id. at 1275–76. But this approach contravenes the legal meaning of “inadequate or ineffective.”
The words “inadequate” and “ineffective” have ordinary legal meanings, and wе cannot abandon the meanings of these words because we think a prisoner‘s claim ought to be cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For example, we do not call a lawyer‘s work “ineffective” because his client lost. See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, J., concerning the circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e)) (“A lawyer‘s work satisfies the ‘ineffective assistance’ doctrine if counsel presents the best available defense, even if that defense is doomed.“). Instead, counsel is “ineffective” only when “counsel‘s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012); Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406–07 (2011); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–25, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536–37 (2003). Likewise, we do not call a remedy at law “inadequate” solely because a defendant is unlikely to win an award of money damages. Cf. Black‘s Law Dictionary, supra, at 940. Instead, a remedy at law is “adequate” when a plaintiff‘s claim is cognizable in a court of law and redressable with a legal remedy, regardless of the plaintiff‘s chances of success. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2000); Weaver v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1999); United Steelworkers of Am. v. USX Corp., 966 F.2d 1394, 1404–05 (11th Cir. 1992); Hobson v. Fischbeck, 758 F.2d 579, 581 (11th Cir. 1985). Similarly, writs of mandamus are unavailable “where there is another means to obtain adequate review,” In re Bethesda Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1408 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added), but the adequacy of an appeal, in lieu of a petition for a writ of mandamus, does not depend on whether the petitioner is likely to win his appeal. Instead, we ask only whether his claim is addressable in an appeal. See, e.g., In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 1991) (ruling that mandamus was the only appropriate remedy because “[t]he trial judge has effectively frozen the litigation and thwartеd the possibility of an appealable final order“); see also Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260, 67 S. Ct. 1558, 1559 (1947) (stating that the “extraordinary remed[y]” of mandamus “should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy” (emphasis
That a prisoner‘s claim is unlikely to succeed on the merits because of the time and place a prisoner raised it does not render section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective.” In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 617–18, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1608 (1998), for example, a prisoner collaterally attacked his sentence on the ground that he was innocent of “using” a firearm after the Supreme Court defined “use” in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995). Bousley had procedurally defaulted his claim, but he argued that he could establish cause to justify his procedural default because, “before Bailey, any attempt to attack his guilty plea would have been futile.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621, 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1610, 1611 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Supreme Court rejected Bousley‘s argument and ruled that “futility cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was ‘unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time.‘” Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 n.35, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1573 n.35) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, a federal prisoner cannot argue that a motion to vacate his sentence was “inadequate or
Our understanding of the terms “inadequate or ineffective” has been doomed from the start. We adopted our understanding of “adequacy” based on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit in Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.). The Seventh Circuit did not give adequacy its plain meaning, but instead declared that adequacy “should mean” that “a prisoner [has] a reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legality of his conviction and sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). That pragmatic approach is wholly unsuited for the task before us—the interpretation of text enacted by Congress. Moreover, the rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit—that a prisoner must have a reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legality of his conviction and sentence—is not what the savings clause says. The clause asks whether the “remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
Contrary to this flawed approach inspired by the Seventh Circuit, a prisoner who files a motion undеr section 2255, has both an adequate and effective forum to litigate the legality of his conviction and sentence, but the remedy under section 2255 might not be adequate or effective to resolve some claims about his detention. When a prisoner challenges the execution of his sentence, vacating that sentence entirely is “not adapted to the end in view,” Black‘s Law Dictionary, supra, at 940, or is “[o]f such a nature as not to produce . . . the intended[] effect,” 5 Oxford English Dictionary 239 (1st ed. 1933) (defining “ineffective“). For example, if a prisoner challenges a parole determination or the deprivation of good-time credits, he challenges the actions of executive officials and not the actions of the court that sentenced him. A motion to vacate his sentence, therefore, is inadequate to address those actions by parole or prison officials. Compare Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 186, 99 S. Ct. at 2241 (rejecting section 2255 motion challenging changes to parole), with Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487, 492 n.10, 93 S. Ct. at 1835, 1838 n.10 (stating that a section 2241 petition that “alleged that the deprivation of [prisoners‘] good-conduct-time credits was causing or would cause [the prisoners] to be in illegal physical confinement” was “squarely within the traditional scope of habeas corpus“). Moreover, a motion filed in the sentencing
D. Our Interpretation of the Savings Clause Is at War with the Other Provisions of Section 2255, But an Interpretation Focused on “Test[ing] the Legality of . . . Detention” Avoids that Problem.
When we have interpreted the savings clause, we have professed to take into account the other provisions of the Act, but that was an empty promise. The effect of our interpretation has been the very opposite—we have armed prisoners with a
In Williams, we defended our interpretation of the savings clause as purportedly respecting other provisions of section 2255 while not making the savings clause meaningless:
[T]he savings clause cannot simply mean that every § 2255 motion that appears to have been incorrectly decided based on subsequent Supreme Court precedent may be revisited through a § 2241 habeas petition; if it did, then the bar on second or successive motions would effectively be written out of the statute, and the savings clause would swallow up the specific allowance for a second motion when the basis of the challenge is “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) . Yet by the same token, the circumstances delineated in § 2255(h)(1) and (2) cannot be the only instances in which the § 2255 remedy is inadequate; if that were true, then it would be the savings clause that was rendered meaningless.
Contrary to Williams, the savings clause is not an end-run around the bar on second or successive petitions or the statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Each of those limitations has a fixed set of exceptions. The savings clause is not an additional, unenumerated exception. Instead, the purpose of the savings clause both predates and postdates the bar on second or successive motions and the statute of limitations. A prisoner who properly invokes the savings clause need not worry about those bars because that
1. Evading the Bar on Second or Successive Petitions Some of the Time Is As Much an Affront to Congress As Evading It All of the Time.
We have previously attempted to limit the savings clause by ruling that it is not broad enough to catch “every § 2255 motion that appears to have been incorrectly decided based on subsequent Supreme Court precedent,” lest “the savings clause . . . swallow up the specific allowance for a second motion” for new rules of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1342–43. In Williams, for example, we limited the savings clause by explaining that Begay was not “circuit law-busting in Wofford‘s sense of the term” for Williams because we had never held that his exact prior felony,
Even if we so heroically disallow prisoners like Williams and Samak to circumvent the bar on second or successive petitions, our interpretation of the savings clause still circumvents the bar on second or successive petitions for the remaining successful prisoners like Bryant. Our interpretation is not any less bad because we ignore the clear statutory ban on second or successive motions that raise non-constitutional issues for Bryant, but heed that ban for Wofford, Gilbert, Williams, and now Samak. We must instead, at all times, adhere to the clear directive of federal law that federal prisoners may file a second or successive motion challenging the legality of their sentences based on only two changed circumstances:
- newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or - a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Our interpretation of the savings clause circumvents that directive in three ways. First, we allow a prisoner to seek relief even though he has no “newly discovered evidence” that he is innocent of his “offense.” Second, we allow a prisoner to seek relief based on a new rule interpreting a statute, not the Constitution, even if he previously filed a motion to vacate his sentence. Third, we allow prisoners to seek relief based on that new rule even if the Supreme Court did not make it retroactive.
The successful petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Bryant is paradigmatic. In 2008, the Supreme Court crafted a rule about what constitutes a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See Begay, 533 U.S. at 144–45, 128 S. Ct. at 1586. Bryant then argued that he was legally innocent of his sentence in a motion to vacate his sentence. But we denied Bryant‘s application to file this third motion because Begay was not a new rule of constitutional law. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1260. So then Bryant asked to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that raised the same argument—the new rule in Begay rendered his enhanced sentence unlawful. Id. at 1260–61. And we let him. Next, we gave him relief because we
When we grant a prisoner like Bryant relief under the savings clause for an argument that he is legally innocent of his sentence and not actually innocent of his offense, we sidestep the clear command of Congress. To file a second or successive motion based on actual innocence, the prisoner must have “newly discovered evidence” proving that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense.”
Allowing federal prisoners to attack the legality of their convictions and sentences via the savings clause evades the bar on second or successive petitions that governs both state and federal prisoners. For a striking example, we recently denied an application to file a successive habeas petition of a state prisoner sentenced to death because his claim was a “pure sentencing claim.” In re Hill, 715 F.3d at 296, 301. The prisoner argued that the state could not execute him because new evidence proved that he was mentally handicapped. Id. at 289–90. But we denied his application because any claim that he was mentally handicapped was not “newly discovered evidence of actual innocence.” Id. at 296. That prisoner could not “point[] to any newly discovered facts that establish[ed], or could even possibly establish, his innocence of the underlying offense of murder.” Id. But our Court this year refused to acknowledge that our hands are similarly tied for federal prisoners like Bryant who allege only that they are legally innocent of their sentences. Instead, our Court has rendered the savings clause a loophole for federal prisoners while state prisoners—even if sentenced to death—get no such relief.
Our interpretation has also gutted the second exception for second or successive motions—new rules of constitutional law. Surely, if Congress intended prisoners to file multiple motions about new rules of statutory law, then it would
Moreover, Congress did not include the requirement that a new rule be made retroactive by the Supreme Court willy nilly. For the identically worded bar on second or successive petitions for state prisoners,
Instead of our flawed interpretation of the savings clause—which allows some prisoners to avoid these congressionally erected barriers—imagine an interpretation of the savings clause that avoids circumventing the bar on second or successive motions altogether. The plain meaning of the savings clause reaches different claims than Bryant ever conceived. This understanding does not require us to weave through the bar on second or successive motions and its exceptions; it leaves those claims challenging the legality of a prisoner‘s sentence to the sentencing court and reserves the claims challenging the legality of the prisoner‘s continued confinement for the court in the district of confinement. Generally, no prisoner is entitled to multiple rounds of collateral review for the purpose of attacking his sentence. Congress carved out only two narrow circumstances in which a prisoner may try again, and we must adhere to those narrow exceptions, not widen them.
2. Our Interpretation Circumvents the Statute of Limitations and Undercuts the “Central Concern” of Finality in the Act.
When Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, it imposed a one-year statute of limitations for federal prisoners to attack the validity of their sentences. The statute of limitations may toll until a “right asserted [by the prisoner] was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”
When we allow a prisoner to challenge his sentence years after the statute of limitations expired, we frustrate the “central concern” of the Act: finality. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1502 (1998). At some point, collateral attacks must cease and a conviction must be final. That finality “is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074 (1989). And “[a] procedural system which permits an endlеss repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of underlying substantive commands.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).
But if we instead interpret the text of the savings clause according to its plain meaning—that it reaches challenges about a prisoner‘s detention that arise well after the prisoner was sentenced—then we do not undermine the time limits that Congress imposed for challenges about the legality of his sentence. The
E. The Savings Clause Is Constitutionally Necessary so that Claims about the Execution of a Sentence Do Not Go Unheard.
Some courts have stated that the savings clause is necessary to avoid “a thorny constitutional issue” about the suspension of habeas corpus, see, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997), and I agree, but for a wholly different reason. A prisoner who challenges the execution of his sentence must have a forum where he may bring that challenge, even though it arises long after a court sentenced him. The only constitutional problem inherent in the savings clause is when a prisoner seeks to challenge the execution of his sentence, and no court will hear his challenge.
Challenges about good-time credits or parole revocation or other prison disciplinary proceedings affecting a prisoner‘s confinement are challenges about executive detention. These challenges mirror challenges brought by pretrial detainees, who are the quintessential habeas petitioners because they have been detained by the Executive before courts have determined their guilt. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“To bereave a man of life or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or
Prisoners like Samak do not face that same constitutional pitfall. He could file a petition for an Original Writ from the Supreme Court to attack the legality of his sentence. The Supreme Court, not our Court, is his court of last resort. See, e.g., Chavez v. Sec‘y, Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., No. 14-10486, slip op. at 19 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2014) (Martin, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Mr. Chavez, like all capital
Regardless of the limits that the Act places on the power of our Court, the Act does not strangle the power of the Supreme Court to grant an Original Writ. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996). The Act cannot transgress the constitutional rights of prisoners who allege that they have been erroneously sentenced or unfairly tried when the Supreme Court retains its power to grant an Original Writ. The Supreme Court affirmed this proposition as early as 1868 when it decided Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1868), and as recently as 1996 when it decided Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
Travel back to 1868 when Congress stripped the Supreme Court of all of its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of circuit courts denying habeas petitions, Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44, and the Supreme Court rejected the argument that this Act unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 105. Before 1868, the Supreme Court had the power to grant an Original Writ, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82, and appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from inferior courts that had decided petitions for habeas corpus, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. But then Congress took away the latter. Aсt of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. The Supreme
More than 100 years later, Congress again limited the ability of prisoners to attack their sentences collaterally, and the Supreme Court again rejected an argument that Congress violated the Suspension Clause. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S. Ct. at 2340. Ellis Felker, a state prisoner, challenged the bar on second or successive petitions as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 658, 116 S. Ct. at 2337. Shortly before his execution, Felker attempted to file a second habeas petition on the ground that he was innocent of the offense because postconviction experts had established that his victim died when Felker was under police surveillance. Id. at 657–58, 116 S. Ct. at 2337. Our Court rejected his application to file a second petition, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act precluded Felker from seeking Suрreme Court review of our denial.
Any argument that a prisoner like Bryant was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to attack his sentence fails just as Yerger‘s and Felker‘s arguments failed. Bryant had many opportunities to test the legality of his sentences. He knowingly pleaded guilty to his offense; he appealed his sentence to our Court; he collaterally attacked his sentence, but failed to comply with the statute of limitations; we reviewed Bryant‘s application for a certification of appealability, but denied it; he collaterally attacked his sentence again in the district court, but failed to comply with the bar on second or successive motions; we rejectеd his application to file a
At some point, collateral review must end. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970) (“The proverbial man from Mars would surely think we must consider our system of criminal justice terribly bad if we are willing to tolerate such efforts at undoing judgments of conviction.“). The law will forever be in a state of flux, and Congress, in a state of legislation. A federal prisoner‘s sentence cannot always be vulnerable to collateral attack, lest the finality of convictions ceases to exist. As the Supreme Court plainly explained in Sunal v. Large, “It is not uncommon after a trial is ended and the time for appeal has passed to discover that a shift in the law or the impact of a new decision has given increased relevance to a point made at the trial but not pursued on appeal.” 332 U.S. 174, 182, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1592 (1947). But “[i]f in such circumstances, habeas corpus could be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial.” Id. at 182, 67 S. Ct. at 1593. As the Supreme Court prudently concluded, “Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court.” Id.
Once a prisoner has used his one motion to challenge the legality of his sentence, Congress has given him only limited options to continue to challenge that sentence: He can рresent new evidence proving his innocence,
F. The Interpretation of the Savings Clause Varies Among the Circuit Courts, But Only the Ordinary Meaning of the Text of the Clause Matters.
Our sister circuits have adopted varying interpretations of the savings clause, but few have considered the ordinary meaning of the text of the clause. A textual analysis would clean up this mess.
The majority of our sister circuits have adopted variations of the Seventh Circuit rule from In re Davenport. Most of those courts allow prisoners relief under the savings clause only if they can prove that they are actually innocent of their conviction, not their sentence. See, e.g., Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2012) (“One way to establish factual innocence is to show an intervening change in the law that establishes the petitioner‘s actual innocence. This may be achieved by demonstrating (1) the existence of a new interpretation of statutory law, (2) which was issued after the petitioner had a meaningful time to incorporate the new interpretation into his direct appeals or subsequent motions, (3) is retroactive, and (4) applies to the merits of the petition to make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)); In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Smith is actually innocent, having been convicted on the basis of an incorrect understanding of
The Second and Third Circuits have adopted an approach similar to those circuit courts, but they have stated explicitly that their approach is necessary to avoid a question about the constitutionality of
Instead, as I explained above, the savings clause is constitutionally necessary to reach claims about a prisoner‘s detention that are not cognizable in
Only the Tenth Circuit has considered the ordinary meaning of the savings clause. In Prost v. Anderson, the Tenth Circuit evaluated the words “inadequate or ineffective” and “test.” 636 F.3d at 584–85. After evaluating these terms, the court concluded that “it is evident that a prisoner generally is entitled to only one adequate and effective opportunity to test the legality of his detention, in his initial
CONCLUSION
Contrary to what many circuit courts following blindly in the wake of the Seventh Circuit in Davenport have concluded, the savings clause does not require a federal court to ask whether a claim about the legality of a conviction or sentence was foreclosed by circuit precedent when a prisoner filed his first motion to vacate
Our decision in Bryant is wrong, and we should do away with this “circuit-busting precedent” sham. Bryant does not even attempt to offеr a plausible interpretation of the text of the savings clause. Our judicial oath requires that we respect the law—that is, the text enacted by the elected representatives of the American people—and not employ a judicial contrivance to get around provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
