Jackson v. SandersJackson v. Sanders
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hunstein
We granted certiorari in this child support modification action to consider the construсtion of a particular provision of our child support statute,
In November 2001, Appеllant Doug Jackson (“Father“) and Appellee Lisa Sanders (“Mother“) divorced in Florida. The final judgment and decree of divorce required Father to pay Mother $1,005 per month for the support of their infant son, based on Father‘s then-current annual salary of $250,000. Subsequently, both parties relocated to the Atlanta area, and a decree was entered in Cobb Superior Court in 2007, incorporating the same child support requirement.
Subsequently, Father moved for modification of custody and child support, and Mother counterclaimed, seeking аn upward modification of child support. The trial court held a bench trial in March 2014, and thereafter entered a final order granting Mother‘s motion for directed verdict on the custody modification and granting Mother‘s request for an upward modification of child support. Regаrding child support, the trial court found that Father “was not forthcoming with proof of his gross income and did not provide sufficient information to determine his gross income.” Specifically, the trial court found that the evidence Father presented was by turns incomplete, inconsistеnt, inaccurate, and not credible. Accordingly, the court determined that it was proper to apply
When cases with established orders are reviewed for modification and a parent fails to produce reliable evidence of income, such as tax returns for prior years, check stubs, or other information for determining current ability to pay child support or ability to pay child support in prior years,
and the court or jury has no other reliable evidence of such parent‘s income or income potential, the court or jury may increase the child support of the parent failing or refusing to produce evidence of income by an increment of at least 10 percent per year of such parent‘s gross income for each year since the final child support order was entered or last modified and shall calculate the basic child support obligation using the increased amount as such parent‘s gross income.
Having found that Father had failed to produce reliable evidence of his income, the court looked to the undisрuted evidence that Father‘s annual income at the time of the original 2001 child support order was $250,000 and imputed an increase of four percent per year for each of the 13 years since then, to arrive at a current imputed annual income of $380,000. Using this number, togеther with the undisputed evidence of Mother‘s annual income and certain other undisputed amounts from the child support worksheet, the trial court calculated Father‘s child support obligation at $3,994 per month.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a divided whole сourt opinion, vacated and remanded on this issue.1 The Court of Appeals’ three-judge plurality — joined by one additional judge, who concurred in judgment only — concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father had failed to produce reliable evidencе of his gross income and in thus resorting to
[T]he trial court erred by only applying a four рercent incremental increase to calculate [Father‘s] child-support obligation. Suffice it to say, the application of
OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) undoubtedly results in an extremely harsh penalty for parents who fail to produce reliable evidence of their incomes. But when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.” AndOCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B) plainly provides that when a parent failsto produce reliable evidence of his or her gross income, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether such a Draconian penalty is warranted.
Id. at 553-554. The appellate court therefore vacated the child support award and remanded for the trial court “to consider whether the application of
We granted certiorari to address the proper construction and application of
Under our well-established rules of statutory construction, we
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it mеant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). In our interpretation of statutes, we thus look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. See id.;
The first clause of
We first address the question of whether application of the prescribed increment — “at least 10 percent per year of such parent‘s gross income” — is required or merely authorized once the conditions precedent have been met. In isolation, the provision itself is less than clear on this point, because it first states that the trier of fact “may” utilize the prescribed increment but goes on to provide that the trier “shall” calculate the modified child support obligation using this amount. Notable in this regard is the phrasing of the subsection immediately preceding
This contrast indicates that
Appellant‘s suggestion that documentation of some indeterminate portion of a parent‘s total income suffices to insulate the parent from the reach of subsection (f) (4) (B) is untenable. The clear intent of the subsection is to provide for a proxy — which is alsо in the nature of a penalty — for situations in which the parent‘s failure to cooperate impedes the court‘s ability to determine how appropriately to modify child support. Subsection (f) (4) (B) thus serves not only a functional purpose — in establishing a formula for fixing the parent‘s gross income — but also a potentially disciplinary purpose — in mandating the use of a significant increment, potentially resulting in a substantial increase in the parent‘s obligation. Its utility as a tool for trial courts and as a deterrent to non-cooperation by рarents would be severely undercut if it were possible to avoid its application by producing documentation establishing only a fraction of the parent‘s total income.
Accordingly, we hold that the trier of fact may utilize
Having thus construed
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.