Mark A. Jackson v. Conroy Rental
No. 24AP-190
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 10, 2024
[Cite as Jackson v. Rental, 2024-Ohio-4467.]
DORRIAN, J.
(C.P.C. No. 23CV-7705); (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
DECISION
Rendered on September 10, 2024
On brief: Mark A. Jackson, pro se. Argued: Mark A. Jackson.
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Mark A. Jackson appeals pro se from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion to dismiss filed by defendant-appellee Conroy Rental. Because we conclude the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Jackson filed a complaint in October 2023, asserting a claim for defamation against Conroy. The complaint stated that Conroy falsely alleged in an eviction filing that Jackson and his wife had not paid rent. Jackson attached to his complaint an eviction complaint and eviction court summons in Franklin County M.C. case No. 2023-CVG-016050. In the eviction complaint, Conroy alleged that Jackson and Carla Summers failed to pay rent under the terms of their written lease agreement. Although the docket in case No. 2023-CVG-016050 is not part of the record before us, we note that an agreed judgment entry was filed in that case on June 5, 2023.1 In the present case, Jackson attached to his complaint a signed, undated copy of an agreed judgment entry providing that he would vacate the rental premises no later than November 2, 2023, and that he waived the affirmative defense of discriminatory eviction based on failure to allow a reasonable accommodation for an emotional support animal.
{¶ 3} Conroy moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted Conroy‘s motion, concluding it could not identify any cause of action in Jackson‘s complaint for which relief could be granted.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Jackson appeals and assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in dismissing appellant‘s action. Appellant‘s action is firmly supported by law and solid overwhelming evidence.
{¶ 5} We review de novo a trial court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss under
{¶ 6} Jackson‘s complaint asserted claims for defamation and slander.2 “[D]efamation occurs when a publication contains a false statement ‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person‘s reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.‘” Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995). The elements of defamation are: (1) the defendant made a false and defamatory statement, (2) the false statement was published, (3) the plaintiff was injured, and (4) the defendant acted with the required degree of fault. Rhoads v. Olde Worthington Business Assn., 10th Dist. No. 23AP-324, 2024-Ohio-2178, ¶ 50.
{¶ 7} In his complaint, Jackson asserted that Conroy falsely claimed in the eviction complaint that he had failed to pay rent. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[a] statement made in a judicial proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a defamation action as long as the allegedly defamatory statement is reasonably related to the proceeding in which it appears.” Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 460 (1993). See Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d 229 (1986), syllabus (“As a matter of public policy, under the doctrine of absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, a claim alleging that a defamatory statement was made in a written pleading does not state a cause of action where the allegedly defamatory statement bears some reasonable relation to the judicial proceeding in which it appears.“); Savoy v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-696, 2014-Ohio-3043, ¶ 19 (“[A] statement in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged and may not form the basis for a defamation action as long as the allegedly defamatory statement is reasonably related to the proceedings.“). In a recent decision, the First District Court of Appeals concluded that allegedly defamatory statements made in a forcible entry and detainer complaint were privileged and dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim for defamation. FAP Properties XL, L.L.C. v. Griffin, 1st Dist. No. C-210646, 2022-Ohio-3410, ¶ 18-22. Similarly, in this case, any allegedly defamatory statements made in an eviction complaint would be privileged. Jackson‘s complaint does not allege any defamatory statements were made outside of the eviction proceedings; therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for defamation upon which relief can be granted.
{¶ 8} Jackson‘s complaint also referred generally to the Americans with
{¶ 9} Jackson asserted in his complaint that Conroy threatened and intimidated him and his wife in retaliation for having a medical support animal. Jackson attached to the complaint a letter from his wife‘s physician indicating that it was medically necessary for her to have her cat as an emotional support animal. Title I of the ADA would not apply because Title I prohibits discrimination in employment, not housing. Friedman v. Ebner Properties, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-179, 2023-Ohio-4398, ¶ 26. Title II of the ADA provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 11} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Jackson‘s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.