Robert Friedman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ebner Properties et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 23AP-179
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
December 5, 2023
[Cite as Friedman v. Ebner Properties, 2023-Ohio-4398.]
(C.P.C. No. 21CV-6720) (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on December 5, 2023
On brief:. Robert Friedman, pro se.
On brief: Strip, Hoppers, Leithart, McGrath & Terlecky Co., L.P.A., Paul W. Leithart, II, and Loni R. Sammons, for appellees. Argued: Paul W. Leithart, II.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
JAMISON, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Robert Friedman, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees, Ebner Properties and Mark Ebner. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} On October 22, 2021, Friedman filed a complaint against Ebner Properties and Ebner. In the complaint, Friedman alleged that he walked into Ebner Properties’ main office on October 1, 2021 and told a woman sitting at a desk that he had Tourette Syndrome. The woman informed him that Ebner Properties would not rent an apartment to him due to his disability. Friedman claimed that a friend named “Jenniffer” overheard this conversation through Friedman‘s phone. (Compl. at 1.)
{4} On September 30, 2022, defendants moved for summary judgment. Interpreting Friedman‘s complaint broadly, defendants acknowledged that Friedman had asserted claims under the Fair Housing Act and
{5} Defendants attached to their motion the affidavits of two Ebner Properties’ employees, Kelley McConnell and Ebner. Both McConnell and Ebner stated that Ebner Properties does not deny rental applications because of an applicant‘s physical or mental disability. Furthermore, Ebner testified he “would never personally tell an applicant or other individual that they would not be approved to rent from Ebner Properties because of their physical or mental disability.” (Ebner Aff. at ¶ 26.)
{6} Friedman opposed defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, in doing so, he neither submitted nor referred to any
{7} On March 1, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{8} Friedman now appeals the March 1, 2023 judgment and assigns the following error:
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in dissming my case against ebner properties because they said that grantd summary judgment to the defendant saying that no genuine issue of material fact exists that it clearly was housing discrimination in violation of title 8 of the fair housing act, and the OHIO revised code section 4112.02 and Title I of the ADA because there is direct evidence of housing discrimination
which leads to intentional infliction of emotional distress because I have Jennifer Carrington as a witness that heard them say they refused to rent me based on my disability (touret syndrome) and previously Rabbi Weingarten spoke to Mark Ebner on the phone after they already showed me my apartment where I would be living, and once Ebner found out that I had touret syndrome he said I do not want to rent to anyone with touret syndrome because we do not want to deal with having anyone with the mental anguish just in case we have to evict a person with touret syndrome, and also the trial court.
(Sic Passim.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{9} A trial court must grant summary judgment under
{10} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party does not discharge this initial burden under
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{11} Congress amended the Fair Housing Act in 1988 to prohibit housing discrimination against people with disabilities. See
{12} Here, although Friedman contended in his complaint that defendants violated the Fair Housing Act, he did not specify which specific sections defendants violated. The factual allegations in Friedman‘s complaint conceivably set forth violations of: (1)
{13} Pursuant to
{14} To establish a discriminatory statement claim under
{15} Here, Friedman alleged in his complaint two statements that appear to fit the criteria of
{16} Based on the evidence defendants presented, we conclude defendants met their burden on summary judgment to demonstrate the absence of a material issue of genuine fact on plaintiff‘s discriminatory statement claim. Consequently, the burden shifted to Friedman to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Dresher at 293. When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest on mere allegations in the complaint but must respond with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact.
{17} Although Friedman filed a memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, he neither attached nor pointed to any
{18} The Fair Housing Act also makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the * * * rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any * * * renter because of a handicap of * * * that * * * renter.”
{19} A plaintiff can establish a claim of intentional discrimination under
{20} Friedman contends the two statements alleged in his complaint are direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Friedman, however, did not prove these statements using
{21} Our analysis is not over. As we stated above, absent direct evidence, Friedman can prove intentional discrimination through circumstantial evidence. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
{22} In this case, assuming Friedman established a prima facie case, defendants proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for rejecting Friedman as a tenant. Both McConnell and Ebner stated in their affidavits that “[b]ased on [Friedman‘s] history of causing property damage to units, failing to complete the full term of multiple leases, being asked to leave properties, and being the subject of eviction proceedings, [Friedman] would not have been qualified to lease an apartment from Ebner Properties.” (McConnell Aff. at ¶ 25; Ebner Aff. at ¶ 25.) The burden then shifted to Friedman to produce evidence that this reason for rejecting him as a tenant was a pretext for discrimination. Yet, Friedman neither offered nor directed the trial court to any
{23} In sum, Friedman‘s failure to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion with
{24} Next, we address Friedman‘s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress arises when a person‘s “extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes serious emotional distress to another.” Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (1983), syllabus. Friedman contended that defendants’ violation of federal and state law prohibiting housing discrimination constituted the extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to demonstrate a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, as Friedman‘s claims for
{25} As a final matter, we must address Friedman‘s contention on appeal that defendants violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
{26} Furthermore, even on its merits, Friedman‘s belated attempt to add a new claim is unsuccessful. Title I of the ADA is inapplicable to this case because Title I prohibits discrimination in employment, not housing. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir.2003) (“Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability.“); Bowers v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 346 F.3d 402, 429 (3d Cir.2003) (“Title I of the ADA * * * prohibit[s] discrimination in employment.“).
{27} In conclusion, we determine the trial court did not err in granting defendants summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Friedman‘s assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{28} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Friedman‘s sole assignment of error, and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.