J.W. v. N.W.J.W. v. N.W.
DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, N.W., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch, granting the petition for a domestic violence civil protection order (“DVCPO“) filed by Q.W., on behalf of her minor son, petitioner-appellee, J.W. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On May 27, 2025, Q.W., on behalf of her minor son, J.W., who turned five years old in January 2025, filed a petition for a DVCPO against appellant, her husband and the father of J.W. In addition to J.W., the petition identified Q.W. and their other minor
{¶ 3} Appellant testified that he was charged with committing domestic violence against J.W., and that the criminal court issued an order requiring him to stay away from that child. He pleaded not guilty to that offense. As of the date of the hearing, appellant had filed for divorce against Q.W.
{¶ 4} Faith Gallagher, a teacher at the preschool attended by J.W. and A.W., testified that, on May 22, 2025, appellant dropped J.W. off at her classroom. Once appellant left, J.W. was “very” upset and “came running to [Gallagher] crying.” (June 23, 2025 Tr. Vol. I at 21.) When Gallagher asked what was wrong, “he said that his dad hit him in the head that morning.” Id. Consistent with this statement, Gallagher could see a mark on the right side of J.W.‘s head. Gallagher then contacted the preschool‘s director, Sara Miller, regarding the situation.
{¶ 5} Miller testified that Gallagher told her that J.W. said that his dad had hit him. Miller took J.W. aside and asked about his morning, and J.W. said that “[d]ad was mad and he hit me. He hit me hard.” Id. at 25. She asked J.W. whether appellant previously hit him, and the child responded that “[y]eah, my dad hits me a lot. He‘s the mean guy. He‘s a mean guy in the house.” Id. at 27. J.W. then “shut down” and did not want to discuss the issue further. Id. Miller contacted appellant, Q.W., and Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS“). She took a picture of J.W.‘s forehead, which showed some swelling and a “cut-looking thing in it.” Id. at 28. At J.W.‘s request, Miller provided him with an ice pack for the injury. Miller also interviewed A.W. about what happened before the children arrived at the preschool. Over the objection of appellant‘s counsel, the trial court allowed Miller to testify that “[A.W.] said that [J.W.] went like this to him, which is just, like, a little X with his fingers, and it made dad mad so dad hit [J.W.] in the head.” Id. at 35. He added that “dad gets really mean, gets really mad.” Id. at 36.
{¶ 6} K.F., a neighbor of appellant and Q.W., testified that she had concerns about them because she repeatedly heard appellant screaming at the house, and because Q.W. had called and sent text messages, and at times fled to K.F.‘s house, reflecting Q.W.‘s
{¶ 7} Another neighbor of appellant and Q.W., P.N., testified that she had received telephone calls at 2:00 a.m. from a scared Q.W. In at least one of those calls, P.N. could hear appellant “beating on the door,” and Q.W. wanted P.N. to stay on the line with her. (Tr. Vol. II at 61.) After FCCS was contacted, P.N. was scared of what appellant might do, and she helped Q.W. develop an emergency plan and provided her with safe house information. When asked why she was scared for Q.W.‘s safety, P.N. answered by stating that on the telephone she could hear appellant “yelling and it sounded very scary . . . I heard her shaking through the phone. She came to my house with a go bag and her body was shaking all over when we hugged, like, shaking.” Id. at 66.
{¶ 8} Q.W. testified that she requested a DVCPO because she wanted to protect herself and her two children from appellant. She fears for the safety of herself and her children. There were times when she locked herself in their bedroom because she did not feel safe around appellant. Q.W. described their relationship as being fine if she remained obedient, but if she expressed her opinion, “he had a hard time accepting it.” (Tr. Vol. II at 100.) She had noticed that appellant‘s drinking had increased in the prior 6 to 12 months, making his behavior worse. Q.W. and appellant had 3 children together, but one tragically died from choking on food at a meal. Appellant viciously and wrongfully blamed Q.W. for the death of that child, calling her a “murderer” multiple times, and he said “he should spit on [her] f‘ing face.” Id. at 74, 118.
{¶ 9} On May 22, 2025, Q.W. was contacted by the preschool and informed that J.W. had arrived there with a cut and bruise on his forehead. After Q.W. picked up J.W. from preschool, J.W. told her that appellant had hit him. That evening, Q.W. watched a
{¶ 10} After the hearing concluded on June 24, 2025, the trial court issued a DVCPO against appellant for the protection of Q.W. and their two minor children, effective until December 31, 2026.
{¶ 11} Appellant timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 12} Appellant assigns the following three assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in the admission of hearsay evidence.
[II.] The trial court grant of this CPO is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[III.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in the scope and terms of the civil protection order.
III. Discussion
{¶ 13} Appellant‘s first assignment of error contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. In particular, appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting the preschool director Miller‘s testimony regarding the statements A.W. made to her about appellant hitting J.W. This assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 14} The decision to admit or exclude relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willis v. Road King Trucking, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-5921, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.); State v. Angus, 2006-Ohio-4455, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent a clear showing that the court abused its discretion in a manner that materially prejudices a party, a reviewing court will not disturb a ruling on the admission of evidence. State v. Phelps, 2015-Ohio-539, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.); State v. Issa, 2001-Ohio-1290 (2001). An abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 15} Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”
{¶ 16} Q.W. argues that the challenged statements were admissible under
{¶ 17} It is unnecessary, however, to determine the admissibility of the challenged testimony, because even if the statements were inadmissible, there was no prejudice because this evidence was cumulative to other evidence. ” ‘The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the erroneous admission of inadmissible hearsay that is cumulative to properly admitted testimony constitutes harmless error.’ ” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-3994, ¶ 60 (10th Dist.), quoting Peffer v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2011-Ohio-450, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346 (1988). See Havanec v. Havanec, 2008-Ohio-6966, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (“any error in admitting the hearsay [statements] was harmless because this evidence was already admitted through other witnesses“). Miller‘s testimony that A.W. told her that appellant had hit J.W. earlier in the day was cumulative to other
{¶ 18} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 19} In appellant‘s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial court‘s issuance of the DVCPO was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶ 20} Under
{¶ 21} An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s grant of a DVCPO to ” ‘determine whether sufficient, credible evidence supports a finding that the respondent had engaged in acts or threats of domestic violence.’ ” (Further quotation marks deleted and citation omitted.) Fleckner v. Fleckner, 2008-Ohio-4000, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting Kabeer v. Purakaloth, 2006-Ohio-3584, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Thus, we will not reverse the trial court‘s grant of the DVCPO as being against the manifest weight of the evidence so long as some competent, credible evidence goes to the essential elements of the case. Id. Moreover, if the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the appellate court must construe the evidence consistently with the trial court‘s judgment. Id.
{¶ 22} Here, competent, credible evidence supported the trial court‘s issuance of the DVCPO. Evidence reasonably demonstrated that appellant had engaged in acts or threats
{¶ 23} Because the issuance of the DVCPO was supported by competent, credible evidence, we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶ 24} Appellant‘s third assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in defining the scope and terms of the DVCPO. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him any meaningful communication with his two children until December 31, 2026, a year and a half after issuance of the DVCPO. We are unpersuaded, and this assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 25} ”
{¶ 26} Appellant argues that the scope and terms of the DVCPO preclude him “from any meaningful relationship with the minor children and any involvement in their school and/or preschool/daycare for the next year and a half.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 19.) Pursuant to the DVCPO, appellant shall not enter any school, daycare center, or childcare provider of the protected persons under the order; he shall not be present within 500 feet of those persons; and he shall not initiate or have any contact with those persons. He argues that these restrictions preventing him from having any interaction with his children are “far too long for such young children to maintain a meaningful relationship with their father.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 20.)
{¶ 27} Under
{¶ 28} In the absence of such a modification or termination, the DVCPO at issue will remain in effect and precludes appellant‘s contact with his children (and Q.W.) until December 31, 2026. Appellant suggests that the duration of the DVCPO is unreasonable, and that it is detrimental to his children, protected persons under the order, not to have
{¶ 29} Therefore, we overrule appellant‘s third assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 30} Having overruled all three of appellant‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS, P.J., and EDELSTEIN, J., concur.