Isаac A. POTTER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant.
No. 12-567C
United States Court of Federal Claims.
Filed January 22, 2013
108 Fed. Cl. 544
EDWARD J. DAMICH, Judge.
Whatever may be the merits of petitioners’ argument that the latent nature of autism renders unconstitutional a statute of limitations that runs from the date of the first manifestation of symptoms, the court need not reach that question. Petitioners’ concern is that a child‘s parents or guardian could not know that the child had suffered an injury as a result of vaccines until the child has received a diagnosis, see id. a concern echoed by the dissenting opinion in Cloer, see 654 F.3d at 1352-53 (Dyk, J., dissenting). As discussed above, however, petitioners did not file suit until more than thirty-six months had passed after Andrew‘s autism diagnosis. Even under petitioners’ constitutional theory, then, they have nоt suffered a taking without due process.4
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the decision of the special master is sustained and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for respondent in accordance with the decision of the special master.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
No costs on review.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
EDWARD J. DAMICH, Judge.
On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a Complaint and Petition for Injunction.1 The Government has moved for dismissal on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s claims or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff has failеd to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has filed a document entitled “Petition for Declaratory Judgment (
All told, Potter expressly asserts the following causes of action: breach of contract; fraud or misprision; аnd breach of fiduciary duty. These causes of action are all directed against the Apartment, members of the Florida judiciary, or individuals associated with one of those two entities. As noted above, Plaintiff‘s filings can also be construed as requesting that this Court review the decisions of the Florida state court. Based on the asserted causes of action, it appears that Plaintiff has filed—either as part of his Complaint, his amended complaint, or his briefing on the Govеrnment‘s pending motion—the following, among others: a “Petition for Injunction“; a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment“; a “Motion for Default Judgment“; and a “Writ of Prohibition.” Naturally, the Court‘s power to hear and consider all of these issues is dependent uрon the Court‘s findings as to its jurisdiction over the various causes of action asserted.
I. Standard of Review
Parties acting pro se are generally held to “less stringent standards” than professional lawyers. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers“); Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard than those drafted by professional lawyers....“).
However, “[w]hile a court should be receptive to pro se plaintiffs and assist them, justice is ill-served when a jurist crosses the line from finder of fact to advocate.” Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 369 (2002). Moreover, “the leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.” Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007) (citing Kelley v. Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
II. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff‘s Complaint
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a threshold matter in every case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standаrd, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, “a court may not similarly take a liberal view of jurisdictional requirement[s] and set a different rule for pro se litigants only.” Kelley, 812 F.2d at 1380 (emphasis added).
The
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is governed by Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC“). In deciding whether to dismiss a matter pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), the Court is “obligated to assume all factual allegations to be true and to draw all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiff‘s favor.” Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Even accepting as true all of Plaintiff‘s factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court is still compelled to find that Plaintiff has failed to рresent a claim within the Court‘s jurisdiction. The Court has considered all of Plaintiff‘s filings and finds that, when read in the context of his three asserted causes of action, there are two general bases upon which Plaintiff may be asserting jurisdiction: (1) an allеged relationship between the Government and the Apartment, which appears to be related to Plaintiff‘s breach of contract cause; and (2) an alleged violation of Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights, which appears to be rеlated to his fraud and fiduciary duty causes of action.
As to the first, Plaintiff claims that the Government and the Apartment engaged in a “joint enterprise” or undertook a “symbiotic relationship.” The only justification that could explain this assertion is thаt the Government allegedly subsidized Plaintiff‘s lease through federal housing funds or via the federal Housing Tax Credit Program, both of which are referred to in provisions of the lease agreement. It seems that Plaintiff is attempting to state a cause оf action against the Government, through its relationship with the Apartment, for actions taken by the Apartment.
The Government correctly argues that the alleged “symbiotic relationship” is insufficient to satisfy this Court‘s jurisdictional requirements. “To have standing to sue the sovereign on a contract claim, a plaintiff must be in privity of contract with the United States.” Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Erickson Air Crane Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract....“)). The lease expressly states that it is an agreemеnt between the Apartment and Plaintiff. See A53-54, A58-59. Plaintiff‘s allegations of a “symbiotic relationship” do not overcome the fact that he is not in privity of contract with the Government, such that this Court does not have jurisdiction over a claim arising under this theory.
As to the second jurisdictional base, the Court reads Plaintiff‘s briefs and Complaint as claiming a violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, evidently because he was denied due process or equal protection when his state case was dismissed without allowing him sufficient opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss.3 Relatedly, it appears that Plaintiff maintains that the state court proceedings give rise to fraud or breach of fiduciary duty claims. Although the Court is uncertain, it seems that Plaintiff‘s fraud and fiduciary duty causes of action, his constitutional arguments, and his request for judicial review are all related to alleged deficiencies with the
In addition, the Government argues that LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1995), is applicable. There, the Federal Circuit held that this Court lacks jurisdiction over “violаtions under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ... because they do not mandate payment of money by the government.” Reply at 3 (citing LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1029). The Court agrees that LeBlanc applies here, such that it also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s tenuous constitutionаl claims on this basis.
III. Transfer to a Federal District Court is Inappropriate
Although Plaintiff has not specifically requested a transfer of this case to a district court, the Court considers the possibility because Plaintiff is acting pro se. When a given federal court lacks jurisdiction over the subject mаtter of a given Complaint,
This Court concludes that transfer would not be in the interests of justice. To this Court‘s reading, if Plaintiff has any viable claims, they arise under state law and are restricted to citizens of Florida only. As pled, such claims do not give rise to federal jurisdiction. It appears that a Florida state court would be the most appropriate venue, if any, for Plaintiff to pursue this action, and his most recent filings indicate that he is again attempting to pursue his claims there. See Docket No. 10 at A 11-12 (default and motion for default, signed by Plaintiff and dated December 8, 2012). Given the apparent futility of transfer to another federal court, the Court declines to transfer this action.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is accordingly directed to dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint without prejudice.
EDWARD J. DAMICH
Judge