In the Matter of the Expulsion of A.D. from United South Central Public Schools No. 2134.
No. A14-1587.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 3, 2016.
883 N.W.2d 251
Affirmed as modified.
HUDSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CHUTICH, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
for a fact-finder, and thus O‘Neill‘s argument is without merit.
Trevor S. Helmers, Elizabeth J. Vieira, Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant Independent School District No. 2134, United South Central.
Andrea J. Jepsen, Amy J. Goetz, School Law Center, LLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Nicole M. Moen, Timothy W. Billion, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent A.D.
Neal T. Buethe, Claire V.J. Joseph, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of School Administrators.
Roger J. Aronson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Secondary School Principals.
Michelle D. Kenney, Knutson, Flynn & Deans, P.A., Mendota Heights, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota School Boards Association.
Selene Almazan, Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Towson, Maryland; and Christopher E. Crutchfield, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amici curiae Children‘s Defense Fund, Children‘s Law Center of Minnesota, Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Council on Crime and Justice, ISAIAH, Legal Rights Center, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, Professor Jason P. Nance, Saint Paul Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services.
OPINION
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The questions presented in this case involve the interpretation of the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act,
This case arises from a random search for controlled substances at United South Central High School on Tuesday, April 15, 2014. During the search, the building was put on “lockdown” and the students were required to remain in their classrooms. Officials used a drug-sniffing police dog to conduct the search and the dog alerted on A.D.‘s locker. When the school liaison officer searched A.D.‘s unlocked locker, he found no controlled substances. He did, however, observe a 3-inch folding pocketknife in the side-pocket of a purse that was hanging in A.D.‘s locker. The officer secured the pocketknife and informed the principal.
Approximately 2 hours after the search, the officer and the school principal called A.D. into the principal‘s office. When asked if she knew why she was called to the principal‘s office, A.D. admitted that she had brought a pocketknife to school. A.D. explained that she used the pocketknife to cut twine on hay bales at her boyfriend‘s family farm. She had visited the farm during the previous weekend, and while she typically removes the pocketknife from her purse and places it on a table before leaving her home, on that occasion she had forgotten to do so. A.D. told the principal that she “totally forgot” the pocketknife was in her purse until the school announced the lockdown that morning.2
The District‘s weapons policy provides that “[n]o student or nonstudent, including adults and visitors, shall possess, use or distribute a weapon when in a school location.” A “weapon” is defined to include all knives and blades. This policy was listed in the school-issued “Agenda Book” and the student handbook, and was discussed during the beginning-of-the-year assembly. Although the record does not reflect how A.D. knew of the weapons policy, A.D. told the principal that she knew it was against school policy to have a pocketknife at school. A.D. did not alert anyone of her possession of the pocketknife until questioned by the principal. The principal told A.D. that, even though she believed A.D. was fully cooperating with the administration and had “told [the] truth” about forgetting the knife‘s presence in her purse, the District‘s weapons policy required the principal to suspend A.D. for at least 3 days. The school issued A.D. a “Notice of Suspension,” citing “[w]illful conduct that endangers the student, others, or property of the school,“—namely, “[p]ossession of a knife on school property.”3 Consistent with the District‘s weapons policy, the principal recommended to the Superintendent that A.D. be expelled for the remainder of the school year.
On April 21, 2014, A.D. and her parents received a “Notice of Proposed Expulsion”
A.D. appealed the Board‘s decision to the Commissioner of Education. See
A.D. then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of appeals. See
On appeal, the District first contends that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the Act‘s “willful violation” provision,
I.
We first address the “willful violation” provision. This provision grants school districts the authority to suspend or expel a student upon finding a “willful violation of any reasonable school board regulation.”
The District asks us to reverse the court of appeals, arguing that the phrase “willful violation,” at least in the student discipline context, includes not only intentional, deliberate violations, but also actions taken in “careless disregard” of a school policy. The District also argues that an “actual knowledge” requirement, whereby a student must be aware of the relevant policy in order to be charged with its willful violation, is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Based on its proffered interpretation of this provision, the District argues there is substantial evidence in the record to support A.D.‘s dismissal.
A.D., on the other hand, argues that the plain language of the Act allows for dismissal only when a student makes a deliberate, conscious, and intentional choice to violate a reasonable school policy, and that there is insufficient evidence in the record that A.D. intentionally and deliberately violated the District‘s weapons policy. We agree with A.D.
A.
The parties’ arguments about the meaning of the “willful violation” provision present a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cty. Sch. Dist., 819 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn.2012). The goal of all statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.2012); see
We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Weiler v. Ritchie, 788 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn.2010). The Act provides that a student may be dismissed for a “willful violation of any reasonable school board regulation.”
The District does not disagree that a deliberate and intentional violation subjects a student to expulsion. But, the District argues, the phrase “willful violation” also includes actions taken in “careless” or “reckless” disregard of school policy. The District also argues that A.D. did not have to know that she was in violation of the policy for the District to have grounds to dismiss her. Neither of these arguments is consistent with the plain meaning of “willful violation.”6
In support of its argument that “willful violation” includes careless or reckless violations, the District cites a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision and a number of Supreme Court cases in which the Court defined “willful violation” to include reckless behavior under several federal statutes. In re Lawful Gambling License of Henry Youth Hockey Ass‘n, 511 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Minn.App.) (recognizing a “pattern of willful violations” of Gambling Board rules based on the party‘s “careless disregard of legal requirements“), modified in part on other grounds mem., 559 N.W.2d 410 (Minn.1994); see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007) (“[W]here willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well....“); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-33, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (defining “willful” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act to include claims of “reckless” violation); United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43, 58 S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773 (1938) (defining “willfully,” as used in a civil penalty provision, to include “conduct marked by careless disregard“). Neither Henry Youth Hockey nor the federal cases
Henry Youth Hockey is not binding on our court; in addition, the Henry Youth Hockey court relied on federal cases, some also cited by the District, which address the definition of “willful” under several federal statutes that contain materially different language than the statutory provision at issue here. See 511 N.W.2d at 456. These cases therefore do not provide a basis for us to depart from the plain meaning of “willful violation.”
Separate from its argument that the Act includes careless or reckless violations, the District also argues that the plain language of the Act does not require that the student have knowledge of the District policy. There is no dispute in this case that A.D. knew of the District‘s weapons policy. Nevertheless, the District argues that a student does not need to be aware of a school policy in order to be expelled for willfully violating the policy. We disagree.
The statute does not specifically address whether a student must know of a school‘s policy in order for it to be the basis for dismissal. See
In sum, the plain language of
B.
With this definition of “willful violation” in mind, we turn next to the question of whether substantial evidence supports the Board‘s decision to expel A.D. for a willful violation of the District‘s weapons policy. A school board decision “will be reversed when it is fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, not within its jurisdiction, or based on an error of law.” Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, Anoka-Hennepin, 459 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.1990). If the agency‘s findings are insufficient, “the case can be either remanded for additional findings or reversed for lacking substantial evidence supporting the decision.” Id.; see also
We have said that a substantial basis in the record to support an agency‘s determination exists where, considering the evidence in its entirety, there is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the substantial-evidence standard requires more than “a scintilla of evidence” and more than “some” or “any” evidence. Cable Commc‘ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc‘ns P‘ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn.1984) (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn.1977)). The substantial-evidence standard addresses “the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715, 83 S.Ct. 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d 652 (1963). We must defer to an agency‘s decision so long as it is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Cable Commc‘ns Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 668-69.
In support of its determination that A.D. willfully violated the District‘s weapons policy, the Board found:
The Student admitted that the knife was hers, and that she brought it to school with her when she brought her purse to school. The Student knew, or should have known, that she could be expelled for bringing a knife to school. While she “stated that she” simply forgot that the knife was in her bag, she admitted that she immediately remembered that the knife was in her bag when the notice was made about the locker searches, but she did not immediately report it to her teachers or the Principal.
In finding that the student “forgot that the knife was in her bag,” the Board proceeded from the premise that accidentally bringing a pocketknife to school was a “willful violation” of the District‘s weapons policy. The Commissioner reached the same conclusion. As we explained above, however, this behavior does not constitute a willful violation. Both the Board and the Commissioner, therefore, misapplied the “willful violation” provision in the Act. Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 675 (noting that an administrative decision will be set aside when misapplication of the law infects the decision).
In the alternative, the District argues that, even if we hold, as we do above, that “willful violation” requires actual knowledge and an intentional choice to violate the policy, the evidence is still sufficient to sustain the dismissal. The record does not leave room for such a conclusion. The Board‘s findings of fact demonstrate that A.D. willfully placed the pocketknife in her purse over the weekend and willfully brought that purse to school the next week. But the provision at issue in the Act does not allow for the punishment of a student who engages in willful acts without intending to violate the policy. In other words, willful conduct is not the same thing as a willful violation. The Act makes this clear by listing the “willful violation” ground for dismissal and the willful conduct grounds in separate provisions. Compare
In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion and uphold the expulsion, the District contends that A.D. deliberately and intentionally violated the District‘s weapons policy by remaining silent about the pocketknife once she remembered it was in her purse. In other words, the District argues that because A.D. continued to keep the knife a secret after she remembered that she had accidentally brought it to school, she willfully violated the District‘s weapons policy. The Board, however, did not explicitly conclude that A.D.‘s failure to report the existence of the knife constituted a willful violation of the District‘s weapons policy. See In re Minn. Power, 838 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Minn.2013) (explaining that a reviewing court will uphold an agency decision only where “the agency has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion,” and where “that conclusion is reasonable on the basis of the record” (quoting Minn. Power & Light Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm‘n, 342 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn.1983))); see also Cable Commc‘ns Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 669 (recognizing that judicial intervention is proper “where there is a ‘combination of danger signals which suggest the agency has not taken a “hard look” at the salient problems’ and the decision lacks ‘articulated standards and reflective findings‘” (quoting Reserve Mining Co., 256 N.W.2d at 825)). Instead, the Board found only that “when the lockdown was announced,” A.D. remembered that the pocketknife was in her purse, but “did not report” it to the school.8
To the extent that the District relies on this finding to support its expulsion decision, the District suggests only that A.D. failed to take advantage of the District‘s safe harbor provision to avoid punishment. But the District concedes that the failure to comply with the safe harbor provision of the weapons policy, which allows a student to avoid punishment for the accidental possession of a weapon if the student immediately informs a teacher or administrator of the possession, is not a separate violation of the weapons policy. Based on this concession, the only evidence in the record is A.D.‘s inadvertent possession of the knife, which we have concluded is not substantial evidence that A.D. intentionally violated the District‘s weapons policy.
Moreover, the evidence is conflicting as to when A.D. remembered the knife was in her purse. The District focuses on A.D.‘s admission to the principal that she remembered the knife was in her purse when she learned of the lockdown. But at the evidentiary hearing, A.D. testified, “I guess I should have reported it, but it was—you know, I forgot it was in there. I didn‘t even know it was in there at that time.” The Board did not explicitly weigh the testimony, explain how it resolved this discrepancy in A.D.‘s statements, or even specifically address A.D.‘s credibility in its findings of fact. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (“The substantiali-
In sum, the Board did not explain in its findings how A.D.‘s secrecy of the knife after she apparently remembered that she had accidentally brought it to school constitutes a willful violation of the District‘s weapons policy. And the Board‘s decision does not reflect how the Board resolved A.D.‘s conflicting statements about when she realized that she had a pocketknife in her purse. Based on these deficiencies, we cannot conclude on this record that substantial evidence supports the Board‘s determination that A.D. willfully violated the District‘s weapons policy.
II.
We next consider the endangerment ground for A.D.‘s dismissal. See
Under the endangerment provision, a student may be dismissed from school for “willful conduct that endangers the pupil or other pupils, or surrounding persons, including school district employees, or property of the school.”
The interpretation of the endangerment provision is a question of law subject to de novo review. Abrahamson, 819 N.W.2d at 133. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain language of the statute controls.
The term “endangers” is not defined in the statute, and so we again look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. Larson, 855 N.W.2d at 301. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines “endanger” as “[t]o expose to harm or danger; imperil.” 607 (3d ed.1996). Other dictionaries include similar definitions. See The New Oxford American Dictionary 561 (2001) (defining “endanger” as to “put (someone or something) at risk or in danger“); Black‘s Law Dictionary 568 (8th ed.2004) (defining “endanger” as “exposure to peril or harm“).
The dictionary definition upon which the court of appeals relied, however, defines “endanger” as “to bring into danger or peril of probable harm or loss.” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (3d ed.1961) (emphasis added), quoted in In re Expulsion of A.D., 2015 WL 4393395, at *6. By referring to probability, this definition arguably indicates that endangerment can involve an assessment of potentiality. See United States v. Jarvis, 258 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir.2001) (stating that the term “endangerment” “necessarily refers to potentiality“).11
It is not necessary for us to fully define the parameters of the endangerment provision in the Act, because even if we were to interpret the provision to cover willful conduct that exposes others to probable harm, as the court of appeals held, the record does not contain substantial evidence that A.D. exposed anyone to actual or even probable harm. In its order following the expulsion hearing, the Board concluded that A.D. engaged in “willful conduct that endangered the Student, other pupils, and surrounding persons,”12 stating that she “created a material and substantial risk of harm to other students and staff by possessing a knife on school property.” The Board did not, however, make any findings of fact as to the danger posed by the presence of a pocketknife in a purse in a locker on school grounds.
The District nevertheless maintains that the mere presence of a weapon on school grounds, despite the fact that no one knew of its presence and no one could have accessed the pocketknife without going
Based on the record, which does not reflect that any student or staff member was even aware of the presence of the pocketknife or that any student or staff member had reason to access A.D.‘s locker and discover the knife‘s presence, the risk and possibility of harm is too tenuous to constitute substantial evidence of endangerment. The record is simply devoid of evidence that suggests endangerment results from the mere presence of a forgotten 3-inch pocketknife.14
Lastly, the District argues that courts should defer to a school board‘s determination of what conduct endangers students. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968) (“Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system ... raises problems requiring care and restraint.“). We do not intend to suggest that there is never any danger from the mere presence of a pocketknife at a school, whether or not others are aware of its presence or can access it. Our conclusion here is simply that the record in this case does not contain substantial evidence of endangerment. We defer to a school board‘s policy deter-
Affirmed.
LILLEHAUG, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CHUTICH, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.