Lead Opinion
OPINION
This сase requires that we interpret provisions of Minn. Stat. chs. 211A and 211B (2010). Specifically, we must determine whether a school district is subject to the campaign-finance reporting requirements found in chapter 211A and whether the complaint in this matter stated a claim under section 211B.06, which prohibits the dissemination of false campaign material. We hold that a school district is a “corporation” under section 211A.01, subdivision 4, and therefore can qualify as a “committee” subject to chapter 211A’s campaign-finance reporting requirements if it acts “to promote or defeat a ballot question.” Because appellants’ complaint, filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), stated a prima facie claim that the school district here was a “committee” under section 211A.01, subdivision 4, that “promote[d] ... a ballot question,” the administrative law judge assigned to the matter erred in dismissing the complaint without an evidentiary hearing. We also hold that the complaint failed to state a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to two allegedly false statements. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the OAH for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On December 8, 2009, the St. Louis County School District (District) held a special election on a referendum that sought voter authorization for the school district to issue building bonds. At the time the school district passed the resolution to hold the special election, the district included seven schools and approximately 2,000 enrolled students. According to a resolution adopting a long-range facilities plan and approved at the June 8, 2009, school board meeting, enrollment in the school district had declined over the previous ten years by about 800 students and was expected to decline by another 100 students by 2013. The purpose of the long-range plan was to address the enrollment declines and the budget problems accompanying the declines. The District’s long-range plan called for the closure of two schools and the construction of two new, more centrally-located, schools. On September 14, 2009, the school board approved the placement of a referendum on the ballot at a special election to be held on December 8, 2009.
On November 4, 2010, respondents Steven Abrahamson and Tom Kotzian filed a complaint with the OAH against the District and seven school board members. See Minn.Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 1 (2010) (requiring a complaint alleging a violation of chapter 211A or 211B to filed with the OAH). The complaint alleged that the District violated the campaign-finance reporting requirements of Minn. Stat. ch. 211A by not reporting expenditures incurred in promoting passage of the De
An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed respondents’ complaint, without an evidentiary hearing, for failure to state a prima facie case. See Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a). The ALJ ruled that school districts are not subject to chapter 211A’s campaign-finance reporting requirements because they do not qualify as “committees” within the meaning of that term in chapter 211 A. Alternatively, the ALJ ruled that, even if school districts are “committees,” the specific expenses alleged in the complaint to have been unlawful fell within the exemption in the definition of “disbursement” under Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 6, for election-related expenditures.
By writ of certiorari, respondents Abra-hamson and Kotzian sought review in the court of aрpeals of the ALJ’s holdings that school districts are not subject to chapter 211A and that the complaint did not state a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to three of the four statements alleged in the complaint to have been false. The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Abrahamson v. St Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
We granted the District’s petition for further review. The questions in this case are: (1) whether the St. Louis County
Our review is governed by Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (2010). We may affirm the agency’s decision or remand for further proceedings. Id. Or, we may reverse or modify the decision “if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or (b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (c) made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) affected by other error of law; or (e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (f) arbitrary or capricious.” Id. The posture of this case is similar to a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 because the ALJ concluded that the complaint does not state prima facie violations of applicable provisions of chapters 211A and 211B. As a result, we “consider only the facts alleged in the complаint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of’ the complainant. See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc.,
I.
First, we consider whether the St. Louis County School District is a “committee” within the meaning of chapter 211A and is therefore subject to that chapter’s campaign-finance reporting requirements. Whether the District is a “committee” within the meaning of chapter 211A is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
As a preliminary matter, we .note that, although the complaint names the District and its individual school board members separately, we refer to the District and school board members collectively as the “District,” and do not consider separately whether the school board members themselves constitute a “committee” within the meaning of chapter 211 A. We do this because, as we read the complaint, the school board members were named in the complaint only in their official capacities; as such, they act only through the board and only on behalf of the District in that capacity. See Minn.Stat. §§ 123B.09, subd. 1 (placing “care, management, and control” of district in school board); 123B.85, subd. 4 (2010) (establishing a school board as the governing body of a school district). Thus, the court of appeals erred when it separately addressed whether individual board members, acting together in their official capacity, are a “committee” within the meaning of chapter 211A. See Abrahamson,
We begin with the plain language of the statute. Minnesota Statutes § 211A.02 imposes reporting requirements on “[a] committee or a candidate who receives contributions or makes disbursements of more than $750 in a calendar year.” A “committee,” in turn, is “a corpo
The District argues that the reference to “corporation” in Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4, should be read to exclude public corporations such as school districts. The District further argues that chapter 211A is limited to committees specifically formed to promote or defeat a ballot question, which is not the purpose of forming a school district. Finally, the District argues that characterizing it as a “corporation” within the meaning of chapter 211A is inconsistent with other legal authority that prohibits the expenditure of public funds to promote a favorable vote on a ballot question. We consider, and reject, each of these arguments in light of the plain language of the statute and statutory interpretation principles.
First, althоugh a school district is a public corporation under Minnesota law, see Minn.Stat. § 123A.55 (2010), the District argues that the reference to “corporation” in Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4, should not be read to refer to all corporations and, in fact, should be read to specifically exclude school districts. In support of its argument, the District points to several statutes that refer separately to “corporation” and “school district” in the same definition. See Minn.Stat. §§ 181.940, subd. 3 (2010) (including both “corporation” and “school district” in the definition of “employer”); 181.945, subd. 1(c) (2010) (including both “corporation” and “school district” in the definition of “employer”). The District also points to the definition of “school district” in another provision of election law, Minn.Stat. § 200.02, subd. 19 (2010) (defining “school district” to mean “an independent, special, or county school district”).
Given that the Legislature has specifically designated school districts as public corporations, see Minn.Stat. § 123A.55 (2010), excluding school districts from the definition of “corporation” under Minn. Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4, simply because other statutes refer separately to “corporations” and “school districts” ignores the plain meaning of section 211A.01, subdivision 4. The plain meaning of “corporation” is broad and includes public corporations. See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 410 (5th ed.2011) (defining “corporation” as “[a]n entity such as a business, municipality, or organization, that involves more than one person but that has met the legal requirements to operate as a single person, so that it may enter into contracts and engage in transactions under its own identity”); see also Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12,
Alternatively, the school district argues it is not a committee because a school district is not “formed to promоte or defeat a ballot question.” Subdivision 4 of section 211A.01 defines a committee, among other things, as a corporation that “promote[s] or defeatfs] a ballot question.” Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4. But, the statute refers to the activities conducted by the committee, not the reason for the committee’s existence. Again, had the Legislature intended to limit the scope of “committees” subject to the reporting requirements of chapter 211A to those “formed” for the purpose of promoting or defeating a ballot question, it could easily have done so. But the word “formed” is not explicitly or by reasonable implication a part of section 211A.01, subdivision 4, and we will not read that word into the statute. See Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC,
Finally, the District argues that because public funds cаnnot be used to advocate one side of a voter issue, it could not have expended funds to promote or defeat a ballot issue and therefore cannot be a “committee” within the meaning of chapter 211A. In making the argument, the District relies on cases decided by courts in other jurisdictions and on an opinion of the Minnesota Attorney General. See Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp.,
Next, we consider whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a prima facie claim that the District promoted the ballot question. Although we conclude that a “committee” need not have been formed “to promote or defeat a ballot question,” the committee must nevertheless “act[ ] ... to promote or defeat a ballot question” in order to be subject to the reporting requirements of section
Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that the District promoted the ballot question depends on the meaning of the term “promote.” This is also a question of first impression for our court. We construe words “according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08. “Promote” means to “urge the adoption of’ or “advocate.” American Heritage Dictionary 1410 (5th ed.2011).
Here, the materials published by the District in the weeks leading up to the special election included statements that if the referendum was defeated, taxes would “most likely still increase,” that defeat of the referendum would lead to district dissolution “as an inevitable consequence,” and that defeat of the referendum would “put[ ] every school in the district at the risk of closure.” The materials also discussed the numеrous ways in which the additional funding would benefit the educational opportunities available to the District’s students. These statements, by them very nature, “urge[d]” the passage of the ballot question. Viewing the reasonable inferences to be drawn from these facts in the light most favorable to the complainants, as we must, see Bodah,
Because a school district is a “corporation” within the meaning of chapter 211A and because the complaint sufficiently alleges that the District made statements that promoted passage of the ballot question, we affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of the ALJ’s dismissal of the complaint’s chapter 211A claim.
Next, we consider whether the ALJ erred when it dismissed the complaint’s claims alleging a violation of MinmStat. § 211B.06.
A person is guilty of a gross misdemean- or who intentionally participates in the prepai’ation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid pоlitical advertising or campaign material with respect to the ... effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to ... promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.
MinmStat. § 211B.06, subd. 1.
The language of section 211B.06 closely tracks the standard for actual malice. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
The complaint alleges that four statements made by the District were false; however, only two statements remain at issue here:
• Statement 1:5 [I]f residents vote no, them taxes will most likely still increase — in some cases, by a large amount. Thats because if the plan is not approved, the school district wouldenter into “statutory operating debt” by June 2011, which means the State of Minnesota recognizes that the school district can no longer balance its expenditures and revenues, and would need to dissolve. Children in this school district would then go to neighboring school districts.
• Statement 8: Projected annual deficit in 2011-12: $4.1 million.
The ALJ dismissed the claims with respect to both of these statements for failure to state a prima facie violation; the court of appeals reversed. Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
1. Statement One
We begin with the question of whether the complaint established a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to statement one. The District argues that the complaint was untimely with respect to statement one and that the statement, even if false, does not violate section 211B.06. We agree .with the District that the complaint was untimely with respect to statement one.
Under Minn.Stat. § 21 IB.32, subd. 2, and with exceptions not applicable here, a complaint alleging violations of chapter 211B “must be filed ... within one year after the occurrence of the act or failure to act that is the subject of the complaint.” The allegedly false statement appeai'ed on a flyer dated September/October 2009, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to respondents’ complaint. The complaint was filed on November 4, 2010.
The court of appeals did not rule on the school district’s argument regarding timeliness, noting “the ALJ did not address whether a claim concerning statement number one was time barred.” Abrahamson,
Minnesota Statutes § 211B.36, subd. 5 (2010), provides: “A party aggrieved by a final decision on a complaint filed under [Minn.Stаt. § 211B.32] is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in [Minn.Stat. §§ 14.63-.69 (2010)].” In determining whether we can reach the District’s arguments concerning the timeliness of the complaint, we therefore turn to sections 14.63 to 14.69. Minnesota Statutes § 14.69 provides:
In a judicial review under sections 14.63 to 14.68, the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.
Because Minn.Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 2, requires the complaint to have been filed within оne year of the publication of statement one, the ALJ lacked statutory authority to consider it. See MinmStat.
2. Statement Three
Finally, we turn to the question of whether respondents established a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to statement three: “Projected annual defiсit in 2011-12: $4.1 million.” The complaint alleges that statement three was based on “worst case” assumptions. The complaint further alleges that the “budget projection was never a realistic budget projection” and, at the time statement three was made, the District “knew that [the budget projections] no longer reflected their actual financial situation.” According to the complaint, statement three suggests the District’s deficit was increasing, but at the time the statement was made the District’s deficit was actually decreasing.
Exhibit H to the complaint includes the following statement: “This 2008-2009 adopted budget shortfall is projected to be $1.5 million. Without adoption of the proposed plan, the projected shortfall would be near $4.1 million for budget year 2011-2012, which would place the district into stаtutory operating debt.”
Although the complaint questions the District’s motives in doing so, the complaint acknowledges that the District projected a deficit of $4.1 million for the 2011-12 budget year. Even “a ‘highly slanted perspective’ ... is not enough by itself to establish actual malice.” Chafoulias,
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Notes
. A school district may, on its own motion, call a special election "to vote on any matter requiring approval of the voters of a district.” Minn.Stat. § 205A.05, subd. 1 (2010). Generally, authorization for a school district to issue building bonds requires voter approval. See Minn.Stat. § 475.58, subd. 1 (2010).
. Financial reporting requirements under section 211A.02 apply to committees that "make[ ] disbursements of more than $750 in a calendar year.” Minn.Stat. § 211A.02, subd. 1(a). But, " '[disbursement’ does not include payment by a county, municipality, school district, or other political subdivision for election-related expenditures required or authorized by law.” Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 6.
. The ALJ resolved this claim on the alternate ground that even if school districts are subject to chapter 211A’s reporting requirements, "[t]he Complainants have failed to point to any authority to support their argument that these election-related expenditures were unlawful or that the School District was prohibited from using any public funds to promote passage of the ballot question.” As a result, the ALJ concluded that the "specific expenses at issue” were not "disbursements” under chapter 211A. See Minn.Stat. §211A.01,
We note, however, that other states have addressed whether ballot question expenditures were required or authorized, see, e.g., Vargas v. City of Salinas,
. Abrahamson did not seek court of appeals review of the ALJ’s dismissal of the allegations of the complaint that rested on statement two, so the ALJ's holding with respect to statement two is not before us. Abrahamson argues in his brief to our court that the court of appeals erred in affirming dismissal of the false statement claim with respect to statement four, but because he did not request cross-review of that issue, it is waived. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 117, subd. 4 (permitting party opposing supreme court review to file response to petition for review and to “conditionally seek review of additional designated issues not raised by the petition”); see also Peterson v. Wilson Twp.,
. Our numbering scheme is consistent with the numbering of the statements in the complaint.
. The District argues that the claim with respect to statement three fails because the exact phrase "Projected annual deficit in 2011-12: $4.1 million" does not appear in any of the publications referenced in the complaint. Because we ultimately resolve this issue on the merits in the District’s favor, and because we "construe all reasonable inferences in favor of" the complainant, Bodah,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the court, but I write separately to express my
In Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed election expenditures by a school district that had proposed a referendum to issue school building bonds.
Writing for the New Jersey court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. — who 3 years later would become an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court — began by noting that New Jersey school districts had a statutory duty to provide adequate facilities for all schoolchildren. Id. at 676. Justice Brennan said:
Every school district is obligated to provide suitable school facilities and accommodations for all children who reside in the district and desire to attend the public schools therein.... The elected board ... in a township school district ... with the previous authority of a vote of the legal voters of the district may erect[,] enlarge, [and] improve school buildings and borrow money therefor. ...
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal ellipses omitted). Justice Brennan explained that this statutory obligation implicitly conferred authority to school districts to spend public funds educating voters on the consequences of bond rеferenda. See id. (“The power ... is to be found by necessary or fair implication in the powers expressly conferred .... ”). Specifically, Justice Brennan concluded that school districts had a right to make
reasonable expenditures for the purpose of giving voters relevant facts to aid them in reaching an informed judgment when voting upon the proposal. In these days of high costs, projects of this type invariably run into very substantial outlays. This has tended to sharpen the interest of every taxpayer and [voter] in such projects.
Id.
As it was in New Jersey in 1953, so it is in Minnesota in 2012. Our statutes require school districts to “furnish school facilities to every child of school age residing in any part of the district.” Minn.Stat. § 123B.02, subd. 2 (2010). As Justice Brennan said, “The importance of the proper discharge of this responsibility cannot be overemphasized.” Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds,
Therefore, when viewed as a whole, our statutes implicitly authorize school districts to make reasonable expenditures to educate voters about district-proposed ballot questions. See Smith v. Dorsey,
Read together, Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4, and Minn. Stat. § 211A.02, subd. 1, require a school district “acting ... to promote or defeat a ballot question” to report “contributions” or “disbursements of more than $750.” In other words, these statutes neither authorize a school district to, nor prohibit a school district from, acting to promote or defeat a ballot question. Rather, these statutes simply provide that if a school district acts to promote or defeat a ballot question, the district may be subjeсt to reporting requirements.
Here, respondents’ complaint identified several statements published by the St. Louis County School District (District) that arguably promoted passage of the District’s proposed $78,800,000 school-building bond referendum. In particular, the complaint identified District publicity materials that included the following statements:
• Statement 1: “[I]f residents vote no, their taxes will most likely still increase — in some cases, by a large amount. That’s because if the plan is not approved, the school district would enter into ‘statutory operating debt’ ... and would need to dissolve.”
• Statement 2: “[I]f a ‘no’ vote passes, you’ll likely be paying taxes of the district ... that’s closest to your home.”
• Statement 3: “Projected annual deficit in 2011-12: $4.1 million.”
I conclude that respondents’ complaint, when all of its allegаtions are accepted as true and those allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to the respondents, satisfies the threshold imposed by Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a) (2010). See Hoffman v. N. States Power Co.,
I note, however, that at this stage of the litigation, it is premature to conclude that the District promoted passage of the ballot question. Thus, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the District’s statеments “by their very nature ‘urge[d]’ the
Therefore, I agree with the court that this matter should be remanded so that the ALJ may hold an evidentiary heаring to consider all of the facts and circumstances relevant to answering that question, as well as any defenses that the District may have. One of those relevant circumstances is the District’s right — indeed duty — to educate voters on the purposes and effects of the proposed ballot question, and whether it was that duty that the District fulfilled here.
. The court notes that several other courts have adopted a general rule that school districts and other public bodies may not spend public funds to promote ballot questions. See, e.g.. Smith,
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I join Part I of the court’s opinion. I also agree that respondents’ claim that thе St. Louis County School District (District) violated Minn.Stat. § 211B.06 (2010) with respect to statement one is time-barred. See Minn.Stat. § 21 IB .32, subd. 2 (2010) (requiring violations of chapter 211B to be filed within one year after the “occurrence” underlying the complaint). I respectfully dissent, however, from the court’s conclusion that respondents failed to allege a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to statement three: “[p]rojected annual deficit in 2011-12: $4.1 million.”
The court concludes that statement three may have been “slanted,” but that it did not rise to the level of a demonstrably false statement sufficient to satisfy the actual malice requirement in section 211B.06. As the court acknowledges, however, we must assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferencеs in favor of the complainant in reviewing a dismissal on the pleadings. See Zutz v. Nelson,
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice STRAS.