Plaintiff, Adam Martinco, commenced this action against defendant,
After trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Hastings without awarding him damages on his counterclaim in the action brought by plaintiff and a verdict in favor of Gabrielson in the third-party action. Plaintiff thereupon moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial on the issue of damages only, or, in the alternative, for a new trial on all grounds. He appeals from the order denying that motion.
All vehicles involved in the collision were traveling north on U. S. Highway No. 61. The highway was dry and the day clear and sunny. The accident occurred in a 65-mile-per-hour zone, south of Pine City, Minnesota. Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of Pine County, was driving an unmarked red Chevrolet automobile equipped with a siren, two flashing lights in the windshield, and one in the rear window. Defendant Hastings was driving a 1959 Ford, and third-party defendant Eugene H. Gabrielson, a 1952 Mercury automobile. Philip L. Schulze and his wife, Yvonne A. Schulze, eyewitnesses of the collision, were also driving north in Mr. Schulze’s automobile. Plaintiff, observing a truck ahead of him crossing back and forth over the centerline of the highway, decided to investigate the apparent traffic violation and passed the Schulze auto without operating the flashing lights on his own vehicle, pulling in behind an old Chevrolet. He then flashed his lights, went around that vehicle, and pulled in directly behind the truck. He turned off his lights and followed the truck for a short distance. In the meantime, Eugene Gabrielson had passed defendant’s Ford. The Gabrielson vehicle came up behind the line of traffic, which included the truck,
After plaintiff came alongside the truck which he was attempting to stop, he slowed his car to between 40 and 50 miles per hour and continued slowing at a faster rate to about 20 miles per hour. Gabrielson was forced to apply his brakes hard. Hastings also had to apply his brakes, but in spite of his efforts he struck the Gabrielson car in the rear, pushing it into the rear of plaintiff’s Chevrolet.
Neither of the other drivers heard a siren from plaintiff’s automobile. Plaintiff testified that he “gave a spurt to the siren” while alongside the truck and waved the driver to move to the side of the road. He was beside the truck only for a short time and distance. He testified that he put on the flashing lights in his vehicle as he pulled into the passing lane, but admits he did not give any hand and arm or other directional signal. Defendant Hastings testified that he noticed the Gabrielson auto starting to slow down at about the time plaintiff’s car cut in front of it over into the passing lane. He testified that he saw smoke rise from the rear tires of the Gabrielson car, so he applied his brakes hard and angled off toward the shoulder. He came into contact with the Gabrielson car while it was still moving. Plaintiff’s Chevrolet came to rest 10 to 20 feet ahead of the Gabrielson vehicle, and the defendant’s car stopped 10 or 12 feet behind it.
Citing Markle v. Haase,
“Subd. 4. No person shall * * * turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after * * * giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.
“Subd. 5. A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
“Subd. 6. No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear unless there is a good and sufficient reason for not being able to do> so.”
The word “vehicle” is defined in § 169.01, subd. 2, as follows:
“ ‘Vehicle’ means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.”
Defendant insists that the Highway Traffic Regulation Act ought to
“* * * Exceptions expressed in a law shall be construed to exclude all others.”
Section 169.03, par. 1, reads as follows:
“The provisions of this chapter applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state, or any county, city, town, district, or any other political subdivision of the state, subject to such specific exemptions as are set forth in this chapter with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.”
It is our view that the word “shall” as used in § 169.03, par. 1, is mandatory unless another intention clearly appears. Under this construction the provisions of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act apply to the drivers of the vehicles described in § 169.03, par. 1, subject only to' the specific exemptions set forth in that act with reference to' authorized emergency vehicles.
We have said that when a statute speaks with clarity in limiting its application to specifically enumerated subjects, its application shall not be extended to other subjects by process of construction. Griswold v. County of Ramsey,
In Markle v. Haase,
supra,
relied on by plaintiff, we said that §§ 169.03, 169.17, and 169.20 do not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of others and permit him to disregard the speed and right-of-way requirements when responding to an emergency call only if he sounds an audible signal by siren and proceeds cautiously through a stop sign or intersection. We further held that § 169.03 does not impose on an emergency vehicle driver an absolute duty to slow down when approaching an intersection, but rather to slow down as the circumstances require and to proceed with caution, concluding that the extent to which the circum
As we pointed out in Hogle v. City of Minneapolis,
Plaintiff cites Edberg v. Johnson,
In Cavey v. Bethlehem,
The record indicates that plaintiff, after passing cars ahead of him,
Defendant Hastings also contends that while the general public can readily recognize a fire truck or a properly marked police vehicle, there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff’s vehicle was different from other vehicles operating on the highway. He therefore contends that plaintiff’s privately owned vehicle did not qualify as an emergency vehicle under § 169.01, subd. 5, and that he was, at the time immediately preceding the accident, using his car contrary to the provisions of § 169.98. We need not pass on those questions, however, since we have determined that plaintiff, whether or not the driver of an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency, was required to comply with § 169.19, subds. 4 to 6. We think it fair to say that the main fact issue involved here is whether plaintiff, under the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of due care and by so doing endangered life and property of others upon the highway.
Gabrielson, Philip Schulze, Yvonne Schulze, and Hastings testified that they did not hear a siren from plaintiff’s Chevrolet. Plaintiff’s testimony was that he touched the siren once — when his vehicle was beside the truck — and that it blared once. Defendant Hastings contends that had plaintiff sounded his siren prior to changing his course into the passing lane and while he was proceeding alongside the truck, and also while attempting to slow down and drop back behind the truck, it would have given Gabrielson and himself warning of plaintiff’s attempted maneuver.
Warning by a siren to other vehicles proceeding in the lane of passing traffic was necessary under the circumstances. Plaintiff could not safely rely upon a small red light in the rear window of his vehicle as a proper and adequate warning signal to several vehicles approaching from the rear, especially since he was driving a red, unmarked vehicle and the flashing red light might well blend with the color of his car or be ob
The charge of the trial court must be viewed in its entirety. If the instructions convey to the jury a clear and correct understanding of the law, that is all that is required. It is not necessary that every possible opportunity for misapprehension be guarded against. See, Lott v. Davidson,
In Lee v. Smith,
Reading of the provisions of § 169.19, subds. 4 to 6, was proper in order to present to the jury those fact issues involving the question whether the violation of those subdivisions, if found, constituted a proximate cause of the accident.
It has been suggested by plaintiff that the failure of the trial court to read § 169.03, par. 1, was prejudicial to him since it also makes reference to emergency vehicles. The record fails to disclose any request that this statute be given as part of the trial court’s instructions, and no such suggestion appears to have been made at the close of the court’s charge. Under the circumstances and viewing the charge in its entirety we fail to see where omitting the reading of that statute from the charge prejudiced any of the parties to the action.
In Kuether v. Locke,
“It is the duty of the driver of any motor vehicle to keep a lookout as to traffic conditions that affect him, whether to the front or the sides or the rear, * *
It was incumbent upon plaintiff here to make reasonable observation concerning traffic both to the front, sides, and rear of his vehicle before changing his course on the highway, whether to move into the passing
We have said that where reasonable men may differ as to what facts, essential to support negligence, have been established by the evidence the question then becomes one for the jury. Capriotti v. Beck,
There are no hard-and-fast rules as to just how close to a vehicle in the lead the operator of a following vehicle ought to drive in the exercise of ordinary care, nor as to what precautions he must take to avoid colliding with a leading vehicle which slows, stops, or swerves in front of him. Nor is there a general rule as to what signals the driver of a leading vehicle must give to warn those following him of his intentions to change his course, stop, or slow down. We have said that the driver of the leading vehicle must exercise ordinary care not to' stop, slow up, or swerve from his course without adequate warning to following vehicles; that the driver of the following vehicle must exercise ordinary care to avoid collision with vehicles, both in front and behind him. In each case, except when reasonable minds may not differ, the degree of care required, and whether it was exercised, are questions for the jury. Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
As was said in Teas v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
The trial court gave defendant Hastings the benefit of the emergency rule, and properly so, on the theory that the jury could find that he was confronted with an emergency situation when the Gabrielson vehicle came to a hard slowdown in front of him, following the maneuvers by plaintiff of his vehicle. It was for the jury to determine as fact issues whether plaintiff gave adequate warning or signals of his intentions in changing course or slowing down his vehicle suddenly.
Plaintiff contends that the defendant Hastings’ failure to see the flashing light on plaintiff’s automobile constituted an intervening cause and that plaintiff’s violation of the signal requirements of our highway statutes was not, therefore, a proximate cause of the collision. The mere fact that Hastings was in the passing lane, traveling behind the Gabrielson vehicle, would not constitute an intervening cause as a matter of law, especially in view of the fact that the jury could find from the evidence that plaintiff did not give adequate or timely signals of his change of course and intended maneuvers on the highway at the time in question. The accident that took place followed almost immediately after plaintiff had pulled out in front of the Gabrielson car. Therefore, any alleged act or omission of Hastings occurred so near in time to the accident that in the remaining time interval it could hardly have had the effect either of stopping or breaking the natural sequence and progression of the original negligence of plaintiff as a proximate cause. See, Benson v. Hoenig,
Plaintiff cites Barrett v. Nash Finch Co.
Plaintiff also relies on Ondrachek v. Kettner,
Conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We are required to review the evidence and the inferences to be reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties. It is only where different minds can reasonably arrive at but one result that fact issues become questions of law justifying a court in substituting its judgment for the jury’s. Therefore, where a verdict has the approval of the trial court and it is not manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole, it will not be disturbed. Lott v. Davidson,
It was plaintiff’s duty to comply with the requirements of § 169.19, subds. 4 to 6. The trial court’s instructions properly submitted the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant to the jury, were fair and reasonably complete, and properly stated the law applicable to this case.
Affirmed.
Notes
The provisions in the Highway Traffic Regulation Act, Minn. St. c. 169, dealing with emergency vehicles are as follows: § 169.01, subd. 5; § 169.03, pars. 1, 2, 3, and 4; § 169.17; § 169.20, subd. 5; § 169.59, subd. 4; § 169.64, subd. 3; and § 169.68, par. 2.
In Hogle v. City of Minneapolis,
“It would seem that the purpose and intent of all these statutory regulations contemplate that if a warning by siren, bell or whistle is given by an ambulance traveling in an emergency that the driver shall be entitled to certain exemptions from the operation of the provisions of the rules of the road, and that if he doesn’t give the warning that he then disregards the statute and subjects himself to the responsibility of drivers of other ordinary motor vehicles operating upon the highways.”
Minn. St. 169.68, par. 2, requires that emergency vehicles shall be equipped with a specified type of siren and that “such siren shall not be used except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, in which latter events the driver of such vehicle shall sound the siren when necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach thereof.”
It seems clear from the foregoing statutory provision, as well as §§ 169.17 and 169.20, subd. 5, that the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, even if granted certain specific exemptions from the traffic regulations of c. 169, cannot disregard the ordinary rules of the road and can lose these specific exemptions by failure to give proper warning by use of a siren .and thus become subject to the ordinary rules of the road. Hogle v. City of Minneapolis, supra; Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transp. Co.