ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM W. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
A156489
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 12/17/19
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. JD 029265-01, JD 029266-01)
We are tasked with determining whether a juvenile court is mandated or permitted to order a county child welfare agency to provide discovery to the parents of dependent minors at no cost in dependency proceedings. Both William W. (father) and Kathryn M. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court‘s refusal to order the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) to deliver requested discovery electronically and at no cost in advance of a contested review hearing involving their two young sons, William M.W. (born in 2014) and William Z.W. (born in 2017). We conclude that no court rule, statute, or constitutional principle requires the discovery order sought by parents in this case. However, should a circumstance arise where an indigent parent‘s meaningful access to the judicial process is impaired by discovery requirements, the juvenile court has the authority to fix the time, place, and manner of discovery upon such terms and conditions as will serve the ends of justice and the purposes of the juvenile court law. Because the juvenile court below incorrectly determined it had no such authority, we remand the matter so that the court may exercise its discretion in the first
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2018, the Agency filed a petition alleging that William M.W. and William Z.W. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300 of the
In September 2018, parents were notified that the Judicial Council—who selects and pays for attorneys to represent parents in juvenile dependency cases (see
In advance of the December 2018 six-month review hearing, the Agency filed a status review report recommending that reunification services continue for both parents. However, in a January 2019 report, the Agency reconsidered, and recommended termination of reunification and referral for selection of a permanent plan. The matter was set for a contested hearing in February 2019.
In advance of the contested hearing, EBFD filed a joint motion to compel discovery, seeking a juvenile court order that copies of relevant discovery be provided by
The Agency argued that the motion lacked merit because it had fulfilled its discovery obligations by making discovery available to parents for inspection in accordance with its usual protocol. Specifically, attorneys for both parents had been notified that the redacted discovery materials would be ready for their review on February 1, 2019. Once counsel reviewed the discovery and identified the documents they would like duplicated, the Agency was willing to provide copies at a rate of $.10 per page. Parents’ counsel was also allowed to take pictures of desired documents or to otherwise copy them using their own supplies without charge by the Agency. The Agency argued that any order by the juvenile court requiring it to expend funds to provide the discovery free of charge to parents was impermissible because no statute authorizes such an order and it would violate separation of powers principles and constitute a gift of public funds.
At the hearing on the parents’ discovery matter, parents’ counsel asserted that free discovery was required in this case under constitutional principles of due process and equal protection. The Agency maintained that its obligation to disclose did not extend to copying and production of discoverable materials. After argument, the juvenile court denied the discovery motion. It stated that it was denying parents’ request because it believed it would otherwise “be acting in excess of its authority given the current state of the statutory law.” The court further noted that the Agency had already made the discovery available, but parents’ counsel had declined to go to the Agency‘s office and inspect it. In the court‘s view, the Agency‘s obligation under the law was “to make those records available, period, and then counsel can decide on their own if they want to copy the whole file or just one page.” Parents’ counsel “should get an opportunity to review the discovery and then make whatever copies they need because they know their clients’ cases best.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Requirements of California Rule of Court 5.546
“Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings with their own set of rules, governed, in general, by the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200.) Prehearing discovery is primarily regulated in the juvenile court by
To ensure compliance with its discovery mandates,
Appellants broadly assert that the Agency‘s “open file” discovery procedure is burdensome and unreasonable and therefore at odds with its affirmative duty to disclose discovery under
The Judicial Council adopted
We independently review interpretations of California Rules of Court, applying the usual rules of statutory construction. (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 81; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 695, 703.) These tenets are well established. ” ’ “When construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the enacting legislative body.” [Citation.] ” ‘We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.’ [Citation.] If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute‘s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” ’ ” (Catlin v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 304; see MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 635, 643 [” ’ ” ’ [i]f there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs’ ” ’ “]; ibid. [in determining plain meaning, the words of a statute ” ’ “must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible” ’ “].) In contrast, ” ‘if the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, ” ’ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the
Turning to our interpretation of
Citing Duhaime‘s Law Dictionary, CJCA argues that “disclosure” has a specific legal meaning—“the identification and surrendering to the other side of photocopies’ of documents” (http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/D/Disclosure.aspx, as of Dec. 17, 2019)—that should trump the ordinary, lay meaning of the term. (See Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 19 [while “courts ordinarily give the words of a statute the usual, everyday meaning they have in lay speech[,] . . . when a word used in a statute has a well-established legal meaning, it will be given that meaning in construing the statute“].)
Moreover, the full text of
We have no reason to doubt CJCA‘s assertion that numerous California counties provide discovery to the parents of dependent minors pursuant to
B. Due Process Challenge
Having concluded that the disclosure obligations set forth in
It is beyond debate that the parental rights implicated in dependency proceedings are significant. “[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753.) In an action initiated by the state to terminate parental rights, the private interest at stake is a parent‘s “fundamental” and “commanding” liberty interest in maintaining a parent-child relationship with the child. (Id. at pp. 758-759.) Indeed, it is
“In addition to these statutory rights, an indigent parent may in some cases have a due process right to counsel where the termination of parental rights may result.” (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1659 (Kristin H.)) “This is because the parent‘s interest at the termination of parental rights stage is extremely important; the state shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision; and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent‘s rights is insupportably high.” (In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1407.) Moreover, a parent who has established a due process right to appointed counsel in dependency proceedings is also “entitled to effective assistance of counsel; otherwise ’it will be a hollow right.’ ” (Kristin H., at p. 1659.) We will assume, without deciding, that a parent has a due process right to effective counsel at a hearing that may result in the setting of a hearing to terminate parental rights, such as the hearing that was pending when appellants made the discovery requests at issue in the instant case.
In the criminal context, our high court has opined: “It cannot be doubted that the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services.” (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319, fns. omitted.) For an indigent defendant, “[n]ecessary expenses for a criminal defense can include discovery costs, investigative costs, transcript costs, expert fees, etc.” (Schaffer, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245; see
Preliminarily, we note that parents in dependency proceedings are not generally entitled to the same due process protections as criminal defendants. (See In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 982 [“An indigent parent adversely affected by a state-obtained decision on child custody or parental status is simply not a criminal defendant.“].) Dependency proceedings are civil in nature and nonpunitive. (Ibid.) In the civil context, ” ’ “[d]ue process requires only that the procedure adopted comport with fundamental principles of fairness and decency.” ’ ” (People v. Nelson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 698, 712; see People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 154 [due process in civil proceedings “is not measured by the rights accorded a defendant in criminal proceedings“].) Thus, ” ’ “[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of procedure.” ’ ” (Nelson, at p. 712, italics added.) Rather, in testing the fundamental fairness of government decisionmaking, courts balance four relevant factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them
Here, appellants have the services of appointed counsel, compensated under contract by the Judicial Council, who are charged with their client‘s effective representation and who have access to all mandated discovery. Although appellants contend that, as indigent parents, they should not be required to bear the cost of obtaining documents necessary to mount a defense in dependency proceedings, they do not, in fact, claim that they have had to bear these discovery expenses themselves. And the record does not disclose what, if any, discovery expenses were incurred. Rather, appellants’ due process claim is premised on the notion that the Agency has a constitutional duty to implement more efficient and cost-effective policies. While having to drive to an Agency office to review documents and earmark those for photocopying may be time consuming and indeed “archaic” in this modern age, we fail to see how the possible inconveniencing of parents’ counsel implicates fundamental precepts of fairness and decency or deprives appellants of a substantial right.
Even if the specific due process rights afforded to criminal defendants were available to parents in dependency proceedings, due process would not require the electronic transmission of discoverable materials to indigent parents free of charge. As stated above, the appellate court in Schaffer, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, rejected a similar argument, opining that the People can comply with
Although the attorney in Schaffer was retained rather than appointed, our analysis does not hinge on this distinction. Several courts have concluded that making discovery available is enough, even when the defendant involved was represented by appointed counsel. In People v. Garner (1961) 57 Cal.2d 135, 142, for example, the Supreme Court remarked that the defendant‘s court-appointed trial counsel “was entitled to inspect, view, hear, or copy any and all statements of defendant” and that “it was the duty of defendant‘s trial counsel to go to the office of the district attorney and inspect the statements available to him there.” Similarly, in Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 799, 803, our high court upheld the right of a juvenile ward represented by the public defender to “inspect and copy” his pretrial statements. Finally, the opinion of the Attorney General cited extensively in Schaffer found no authority supporting an indigent‘s right to copies—in addition to inspection—of discoverable materials in the possession of the prosecution. (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 123, 127, fn. 7 (2002).) We thus conclude that the open file procedure adopted by the Agency comports with due process as a general matter.
C. Equal Protection Claim
We are similarly unpersuaded by CJCA‘s argument that the Agency‘s process for disclosing discovery materials under
Griffin and M.L.B. are readily distinguishable from the situation under review because, in those cases, the litigant was denied all access to an established court process based on lack of financial resources. Here, in contrast, appellants have been given access to review the mandated discovery in preparation for their defense, just not in their preferred manner. CJCA appears to argue, however, that once the Agency set up a discovery process that provides copies of discoverable materials contingent upon payment of a fee, it subjected indigent litigants to disparate treatment, blocking them from the full and meaningful access to discovery available to those parents with sufficient funds to obtain copies. We reject this argument, primarily because the constitutional right of indigent parents in dependency proceedings to equal access to the courts has been
We find instructive the precedent discussing the constitutional right of indigent prisoners to meaningful access to courts as civil defendants. “An indigent prisoner who is a defendant in a bona fide civil action threatening his or her personal or property interests has a federal and state constitutional right, as a matter of due process and equal protection, of meaningful access to the courts in order to present a defense.” (Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 792, citing Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197, 203-207 & Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 913-919, 924.) Meaningful access to the courts, however, ” ‘does not necessarily mandate a particular remedy’ to secure access.” (Wantuch, at p. 792; see Payne, at p. 923.) Rather, “[t]he trial court determines the appropriate remedy to secure access in the exercise of its sound discretion.” (Wantuch, at p. 794; see Yarbrough, at pp. 200, 207; Payne, at p. 927.) Case law suggests a laundry list of remedies to provide access in this context, including “appointment of counsel for the prisoner.” (Wantuch, at p. 792; see Yarbrough, at pp. 200-201.) Indeed, appointment of counsel is viewed as the remedy to be considered when other lesser remedies prove inadequate. (Yarbrough, at pp. 200-201 [“In an appropriate case, and as a last alternative, appointment of counsel may be the only way to provide an incarcerated, indigent civil defendant with access to the courts for the protection of threatened personal and property rights.“].)
Here, appellants may rely on the services of their court appointed EBFD counsel to manage the preparations for their upcoming review hearing. We have no doubt that—even if counsel did not prefer the Agency‘s discovery procedure—they would do whatever was necessary to obtain the information needed to zealously advocate for their clients. For this reason, we reject the suggestion that only retained counsel would have the time and incentive to inspect and copy discovery at the Agency‘s office. In our experience, court-appointed counsel in dependency actions take their duty to effectively represent their clients very seriously. Indeed, in the proceedings below, once the juvenile court denied their motion to compel, parents’ counsel immediately requested a
Could the Agency have managed to create a more seamless discovery process in service to their young and vulnerable clients and the underlying purposes of the juvenile court law? Almost certainly, as many other counties have done. In finding no equal protection violation on this record, we are not opining on the wisdom of the Agency‘s chosen procedure. Absent legislative change or an agreement among the stakeholders to adopt a different approach, we hold only that, where counsel is appointed to represent an indigent litigant, the Agency‘s current discovery policy does not run afoul of state or federal equal protection guarantees. (Compare People v. Washington (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 311, 318-321 [finding no equal protection issue with respect to charging discovery costs to an indigent defendant where a third party, who retained counsel for him under a written agreement, agreed to pay such costs].)
D. The Court Had Authority to Manage Discovery
Discovery in juvenile matters rests within the control of the juvenile court, and the exercise of its discretion in this context will be reversed on appeal only on a showing of a clear abuse. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166.) Had the juvenile court concluded that appellants’ requested discovery order was not legally compelled or warranted, we would normally find its denial of appellants’ motion well within the bounds of its broad discretion in such matters. However, a court‘s failure to exercise discretion may itself constitute an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847-848; Doan v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1099.) Here, the juvenile court expressly stated that it did not have the authority to make the requested discovery order. We must therefore determine whether the juvenile court was correct in its belief that it had no discretion to enter an order requiring the Agency to provide discovery to parents at no cost. We conclude the juvenile court misapprehended the scope of its powers.
“The California Constitution divides power equally among three branches of state government: the Legislature (
“A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties.” (Perez, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.) “The juvenile court is a special department of the superior court whose powers are limited to those granted by the Juvenile Court Law [citation] plus those incidental thereto.” (In re Ashley M. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 (Ashley M.).) “The county‘s social services agency plays a ‘hybrid’ role in dependency proceedings, exercising both executive and judicial functions.” (Id. at p. 7.) At times, the social services agency acts as an arm of the court, providing it with essential information. (Ibid.) At other times, “[i]n providing child welfare services, the county‘s social services agency acts as an administrative agency of the executive branch, subject to supervision by the State Department of Social Services.” (Id. at p. 8.) Moreover, “[t]he internal management of the social services agency is given by statute to the county‘s director of social services, who acts on behalf of the county‘s board of supervisors.” (Id. at p. 9.) Based on these respective judicial and executive functions, our First District in Ashley M. concluded that “[t]he determination of how best to assign duties to employees and otherwise allocate the agency‘s resources is not a judicial function and must be left to the agency‘s own discretion.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the decision to
Relying on Ashley M., the Agency argues that its decision to partially recoup the cost of copying discovery is an internal policy decision regarding how best to allocate its resources that cannot be disturbed by the juvenile court. We disagree. The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine ” ‘is to prevent one branch of government from exercising the complete power constitutionally vested in another [citation]; it is not intended to prohibit one branch from taking action properly within its sphere that has the incidental effect of duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another branch.’ ” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 298; see In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 807-815 [no separation of powers violation when juvenile court ordered child welfare agency to file dependency petition].) In contrast to the Agency‘s internal personnel determinations (Ashley M., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 9) or its adjudication of a former dependent‘s eligibility for AFDC FC payments (In re A.F. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 51, 59-60), the juvenile court is vested with the authority to manage discovery in juvenile dependency actions and to adjudicate disputes between parties. The juvenile court discovery rule was adopted pursuant to a constitutional grant of authority and has the force of statute. (See
Many of the orders routinely and properly made by juvenile courts have incidental financial impacts on child welfare agencies. For example, a juvenile court might require that weekend visitation be provided under the facts of a specific case, even if such an approach imposes greater expense on a child welfare agency. Or the court might order preparation of a supplemental report on a specific issue, thereby requiring a social worker to expend additional time and resources. Similarly, in the discovery context, we conclude
We will not here attempt to delineate the scope of the juvenile court‘s power in this regard. As one example, however, it seems likely that a juvenile court could properly order a child welfare agency to immediately provide copies of relevant discovery at no cost if the agency‘s implementation of its discovery policy significantly burdened or completely blocked a parent‘s right to timely discovery under
Finally, since we have concluded that, under appropriate circumstances, the juvenile court may make a discovery order that results in incidental additional costs to the Agency, it necessarily follows that such an order would not constitute an improper gift of public funds. “Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provides that the Legislature has no power ‘to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation . . . .’ The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450.) “The primary question is whether the money is to be used for a public or a
We have concluded that a discovery order made in an appropriate case which mandates disclosure in a manner requiring an additional Agency expenditure is specifically authorized by
In sum, the juvenile court has the discretion to issue an order which sets the time, place, and manner of discovery without violating separation of powers principles or improperly gifting public funds. Having failed to exercise its discretion in the first instance, we are obligated to remand this matter to allow the juvenile court the opportunity to do so. We are well aware that dependency proceedings with respect to these young minors have continued in the juvenile court during the time this appeal has been pending, and it may be that current circumstances make any further consideration of this discovery matter unnecessary. Nevertheless, we leave it to the trial court to determine whether any further action must be taken.
The matter is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Sanchez, J.
WE CONCUR:
Humes, P. J.
Margulies, J.
A156489 Alameda County Social Services Agency v. William W.
Trial Judge: Hon. Charles Smiley
Counsel:
Valerie N. Lankford, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendants and Appellants.
Boies Schiller Flexner, Maxwell V. Pritt, for California Juvenile Court Advocates as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Donna R. Ziegler, County Counsel, Samantha N. Stonework, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A156489 Alameda County Social Services Agency v. William W.