In re A.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. A.F., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. A137913
First Dist., Div. Five
Aug. 27, 2013
51
Donna Ziegler, County Counsel, and Tamara Wiggins Steele, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
NEEDHAM, J.-Former juvenile court dependents who were placed in nonrelative guardianships may be eligible to receive public assistance until the age of 21 if they meet certain educational or vocational requirements and continue under the care of their guardian. Here, we address the options available to the court when the guardian dies and an otherwise eligible adult youth seeks to maintain those public assistance payments. We conclude the statutory scheme authorizes the appointment of a successor guardian.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.F. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court shortly after her birth in December 1993 and was removed from her parents’ custody. (
A.F. turned 18 in December 2011. On her birthday, A.F., her Agency social worker and her guardian executed a mutual agreement for extended foster care, which included a transitional independent living plan and agreement requiring A.F. to work toward three goals-finishing high school, enrolling in college and preparing to get a job. A.F.‘s guardian continued to receive AFDC-FC benefits under
These extended AFDC-FC payments continued until A.F.‘s guardian died in a fire in May 2012. Agency terminated the benefits, taking the position that no further payments could be made on A.F.‘s behalf because the guardian was the only authorized payee under the statute. A.F. remained in the guardian‘s family home along with the guardian‘s adult biological daughters (whom A.F.
In July 2012, A.F. filed a request to return to juvenile court jurisdiction and foster care (Judicial Council form JV-466) in an effort to secure extended AFDC-FC benefits for herself. In letter briefing filed in support of the petition, A.F.‘s counsel argued
The trial court concluded A.F. remained eligible for AFDC-FC benefits as a nonminor dependent or nonminor former dependent. (See
DISCUSSION
Agency‘s appeal raises purely legal issues based on undisputed facts, making our standard of review de novo. (In re Darlene T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 929, 937 (Darlene T.); see In re R.C. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 741, 748 (R.C.).) Though the facts on which the arguments are based are relatively straightforward, the underlying statutory scheme is not.
By way of background, the federal government offers financial support to foster care providers by making block grants to the states through the AFDC-FC program. (
The federal and state AFDC-FC statutes and the benefits they provide are complementary but not coextensive. For example, children placed under a guardianship rather than in foster care are not eligible for federal funds (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 274-275), but under California law, a minor who is placed in the home of a nonrelated legal guardian is eligible for state AFDC-FC. (
There are two categories of nonminors who may be eligible for extended AFDC-FC payments under state law: “nonminor dependents” and “nonminor former dependents.” A nonminor dependent is defined as “a foster child . . . who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court . . . who satisfies all of the following criteria: [[] (1) He or she has attained 18 years of age while under an order of foster care placement by the juvenile court, and is not more than 19 years of age on or after January 1, 2012. . . . [[] (2) He or she is in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department . . . [[] (3) He or she is participating in a transitional independent living case plan . . . as described in Section 11403.” (
A.F. turned 18 in December 2011 and had previously been a dependent child before her guardianship was established and her dependency was terminated in 1996. This renders her a nonminor former dependent under
The problem in this case arises because A.F.‘s guardian died in May 2012. Agency took the position that AFDC-FC payments for a minor or nonminor former dependent under a legal guardianship could only be made to the guardian, and with no guardian to receive the assistance payments, no further payments could be made. In the papers filed in support of the request for reentry form (form JV-466), A.F.‘s counsel agreed that
Notwithstanding the dismissal of A.F.‘s dependency in 1996, the court retained jurisdiction over the guardianship for the limited purpose suggested by A.F.‘s counsel.
Agency submits
Agency argues the court had no power to appoint a successor guardian because the guardianship itself ended when A.F. turned 18. It cites
Agency argues a modification of the original guardianship order was precluded by
Having concluded the juvenile court had the authority to modify the order of guardianship and appoint a successor guardian for the purpose of facilitating AFDC-FC payments under
The problem with the court‘s order is twofold. First, to the extent it contemplates a foster care placement rather than a continuation of the guardianship, it runs afoul of
The second defect in the court‘s order is that it purports to adjudicate A.F.‘s eligibility for AFDC-FC payments, a function that rests with Agency as part of the executive branch of government. (Darlene T., supra, 163
Though the order as written cannot stand, we remand the case to the juvenile court so it can, upon a request and sufficient showing by A.F., modify the prior order of guardianship to appoint a successor guardian. Such an order, which is not a determination of eligibility for benefits per se, would not implicate the administrative process and would not be precluded by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Upon the court appointment of a successor guardian, if any, A.F. may seek extended AFDC-FC payments through the available administrative process, and may petition to become her own payee to the extent authorized by the Eligibility Manual.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court‘s order of January 28, 2013 (as modified Mar. 22, 2013), is reversed. The case is remanded so the court can consider the appointment of a successor guardian, consistent with the views in this opinion. Our writ of supersedeas shall be dissolved upon issuance of the remittitur.
Jones, P. J., and Simons, J, concurred.
Appellant‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 20, 2013, S213821.
