*640In this action for a state tax refund against the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (CDTFA), Plaintiff MCI Communications Services, Inc. (MCI) appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained CDTFA's demurrer to MCI's first amended complaint without leave to amend.
The California Sales and Use Tax Law ( Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6001 et seq. )
We hold that section 6016.5 excludes only fully installed and completed telephone and telegraph lines from sales and use taxation, not the pre-installation component parts of such lines. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
MCI is a provider of telecommunications services and products. Between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2011, MCI purchased telephone cables, conduit (a round sheath generally made of PVC plastic), and telephone poles from third party vendors and intercompany affiliates. The three categories of items at issue-telephone cables, conduit, and telephone poles-did not require further assembly or construction. Instead, each category of items was assembled and ready for installation at the time of purchase.
*641purchased these items, MCI and its subcontractors used MCI's purchased conduit and telephone poles to install the purchased *245telephone cables for use in MCI's telecommunications network.
MCI paid use tax on the telephone cables, conduit, and telephone poles that it purchased, and then filed a claim for refund under section 6934.
CDTFA demurred to MCI's first amended complaint and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. In relevant part, the trial court ruled that section 6016.5 did not apply to MCI's cables, conduit, and telephone poles because those items were "separate, component parts" of MCI's anticipated telephone line and section 6016.5 "does not apply to pre-installed component parts of a 'telephone line.' "
MCI appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer under a de novo standard of review. ( McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001)
II. Sales and Use Tax Principles
The SUTL "embodies a comprehensive tax system created to impose an excise tax, for the support of state and local government, on the sale, use, storage or consumption of tangible personal property within the state." ( Wallace Berrie & Co. v.State Bd. of Equalization (1985)
"The two taxes, sales and use, are mutually exclusive but complementary, and are designed to exact an equal tax based on a percentage of the purchase price of the property in question." ( Wallace , supra , 40 Cal.3d at p. 66,
Section 6016 defines tangible personal property-the storage, use, or consumption of which may give rise to use tax liability-as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or which is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." There are several exemptions from the tax, such as exemptions for most sales of foods for human consumption (§ 6359), sales of specified prescription medicines (§ 6369), and certain sales to the federal government (§ 6381). At issue here is section 6016.5, which excludes "telephone and telegraph lines, electrical transmission and distribution lines, and the poles, towers, or conduit by which they are supported or in which they are contained" from the definition of tangible personal property.
*643III. Statutory Interpretation Principles
"[W]e start with the language of the statute, 'giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute's purpose [citation].' " ( Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013)
"Nonetheless, 'the "plain meaning" rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]' ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988)
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law. ( Searles , supra , 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 520,
IV. Analysis
A. Statutory Text
Consistent with the rules of statutory construction, our analysis begins with an examination of the text of section 6016.5 and, more specifically, an inquiry into the meaning of the term "lines" in the statutory provision excluding "telephone and telegraph lines" from taxation. MCI contends that "lines" are *644synonymous with "cables" and, as a result, argues that a "line" (i.e., cable) exists regardless of whether that line has been installed into an integrated system. CDTFA, on the other hand, argues that a "line" denotes a complete telephone or telegraph system, such that section 6016.5 does not apply to the pre-installation component parts of any such system.
In determining whether either of these definitions is correct, we may look to dictionary definitions " 'to determine the usual and ordinary meaning of [the] words in [the] statute.' " ( Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife (2015)
A dictionary in publication at the time of section 6016.5's enactment
MCI proffers an alternative dictionary definition of "line," which states that a "line" is a "cable or wire for telegraph or telephone." (Oxford English Dict. (5th ed. 1964) p. 702, col. 2.) MCI's definition, however, is silent on the critical question in this appeal-whether uninstalled cable or wire constitutes a "line," or whether the cable or wire must be installed . MCI's proposed definition of "line" therefore is not helpful, and does not undercut our conclusion that a completed telephone or telegraph system must be installed for a "line" to exist within the meaning of the SUTL.
Our construction of "line" as constituting a completed, installed system is consistent with the court's ruling in Chula Vista Electric Company v. State Board of Equalization (1975)
The court's opinion in King v. State Board of Equalization (1972)
B. Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Familiar canons of statutory construction lend support to our textual analysis of section 6016.5. Most notably, the noscitur a sociis canon of construction ( People v. Prunty (2015)
As noted ante , section 6016.5 excludes "telephone and telegraph lines, electrical transmission and distribution lines, and the poles, towers, or conduit by which they are supported or in which they are contained" from taxation. Applying the noscitur a sociis canon of construction to this provision, we interpret section 6016.5's reference to "telephone and telegraph lines" in light of the clause that follows it-"the poles, towers, or conduit by which [the telephone and telegraph lines] are supported or in which they are contained."
As the trial court correctly recognized, the Legislature's use of present tense verbs in this clause ("are supported" and "are contained") confirms that a telephone or telegraph line must already be "supported" or "contained"-i.e., completed and installed-to fall within the scope of section 6016.5. (See Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Examiners (1998)
Had the Legislature intended section 6016.5 to apply to poles, towers, or conduit that would, in the future , support telephone or telegraph lines, it could have stated as much. But it did not. Our role in interpreting the statute is "not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 ; see Stirling v. Brown (2018)
We are further persuaded that section 6016.5 excludes only completed telephone and telegraph lines because section 6016.5 does not expressly exclude the "component" parts of such lines. That omission is *647noteworthy, given that the SUTL expressly exempts "component" parts of certain other categories of property from sales and use taxation. Section 6359, for instance, exempts "hot and cold food items or components " thereof from sales and use taxation. (§ 6359, subd. (e), italics added.) Section 6362.7 exempts "property which becomes an ingredient or component part of any newspaper or periodical" from taxation. (§ 6362.7, subd. (a), italics added.) And section 6366, subdivision (a)(3) exempts "a component part of any aircraft." (§ 6366, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Where, as here "different words or phrases are used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature intended a different meaning." ( Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999)
C. MCI's Arguments
MCI makes several interpretative arguments to support its reading of section 6016.5. We find none of MCI's arguments persuasive.
*250First, MCI argues that section 6016.5-although it uses present tense verbs ("are supported" and "are contained")-should be construed as though it employs the future tense, and therefore encompasses "telephone and telegraph lines ... and the poles, towers, or conduit by which they are [or will be ] supported or in which they are [or will be ] contained." (§ 6016.5.) In support of this argument, MCI relies on section 11, a default provision of the Revenue and Taxation Code stating that "[t]he present tense includes the past and future tenses; and the future, the present." Section 5, however, clarifies that the Revenue and Taxation Code's default provisions, including section 11, do not apply if "the context otherwise requires ...." (§ 5.) Here, the context of section 6016.5-most notably, the absence of any statutory exclusion for "component" parts prior to completion of the lines-evinces precisely the type of legislative intent sufficient to override the general provisions of section 11.
Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from State Board of Equalization v. Wirick (2001)
*648Wirick rejected that argument, applied section 11, and held that section 6829 imposes liability on any officer who "is [or was] charged with" corporate responsibilities, or who "is [or was] under a duty" to act for the corporation. ( Wirick , supra , 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 417,
Second, MCI contends we should reject CDTFA's interpretation of section 6016.5 because other provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code already ensure that the sale of fully installed telephone and telegraph lines are exempt from sales and use taxation. Namely, MCI contends that provisions relating to (1) occasional sales, and (2) real property improvements, would be rendered superfluous under CDTFA's proposed interpretation. ( People v. Salas (2017)
Pursuant to section 6367, "a sale of otherwise taxable property is not subject to sales [or use] tax if it constitutes an 'occasional sale.' " ( *251Touche Ross & Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1988)
Nor is it relevant, as MCI suggests, that MCI is in the business of selling telecommunications services and products, rather than telephone and telegraph lines. Indeed, "[i]t is not required that the principal business activity of the taxpayer shall involve making retail sales of tangible personal property, if, in fact, the retail sales of tangible personal property made by the taxpayer are sufficient in number, scope and character to make the taxpayer a retailer under the provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code." ( Hotel Del Coronado Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1971)
MCI also argues that CDTFA's reading of section 6016.5 would render that provision mere surplusage because telecommunications systems already fall within the definition of "real estate" or "real property"-i.e., they are not tangible personal property-under sections 104 and 105.
*252(§§ 104, 105, subd. (a).) However, sections 104 and 105 apply only to division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code (Property Taxation), not division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code (Other Taxes), in which the SUTL is situated. Section 101 limits the reach of sections 104 and 105, as follows: "Unless the context otherwise requires, the general provisions hereinafter set forth govern the construction of this division," i.e., division 1. (§ 101.) As a result, "there is no express direction by the Legislature compelling application of the definitions given in the General Provisions of division 1 to the Sales and Use *650Tax Law contained in division 2." ( Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1965)
Even if we were to agree with MCI that section 6016.5 would be rendered superfluous, it would not change the outcome of this appeal. Although "a construction that renders part of a statute to be surplusage should be avoided [citation], this rule is not absolute and 'the rule against surplusage will be applied only if it results in a reasonable reading of the legislation' [citation]." ( Park Medical Pharmacy v. San Diego Orthopedic Associates Medical Group, Inc . (2002)
Third, relying on 926 North Ardmore Avenue, LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2017)
Finally, MCI spends considerable effort attempting to distinguish this case from Chula Vista and arguing that the Chula Vista decision is erroneous. Specifically, MCI contends: (1) the present case is different because the facts are not yet developed; (2) Chula Vista only dealt with "electrical transmission cable" and an "electrical contractor," neither of which is at issue here; and (3) Chula Vista is distinguishable because it analyzed section 6016.5 in the context of lines connected to "movable property" and construction contracts, whereas MCI is not a construction contractor and its lines are "connected to permanent property." We are not persuaded by MCI's claims. As noted ante , a demurrer admits all material facts that are properly pleaded. The facts alleged in MCI's first amended complaint-describing how MCI purchases the materials at issue for later installation into its telecommunications network-sufficiently demonstrate that Chula Vista is controlling. The question before us is the same as the question before the Chula Vista court-i.e., whether the exclusion from the definition of tangible personal property under section 6016.5 includes component parts. In Chula Vista , that question was analyzed by reference to "electrical transmission and distribution lines." ( Chula Vista , supra , 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 451,
D. Legislative History
Because we resolve this appeal based on the plain text of section 6016.5, we need not engage in an extended analysis of that provision's legislative history. Nevertheless, MCI has not directed us to any legislative history supporting its interpretation of section 6016.5. The legislative record, scant though it is, supports our conclusion that the Legislature intended section 6016.5 to exclude only completed and installed telephone and telegraph lines from taxation.
When examining a statute's legislative history, it is appropriate for courts to consider the timing and historical context of the Legislature's actions. ( Briggs , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 1120,
CDTFA identifies a handful of statements in the legislative record that further support our interpretation of AB 1086: (1) a July 8, 1965 memorandum written by Hale Champion, the State's Director of Finance, to Governor Edmund G. Brown; (2) the Legislative Analyst's analysis of AB 1086; and (3) a May 24, 1965 Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation report. These materials demonstrate the Legislature was aware the Attorney General was interpreting former section 105's *255exclusion of telephone and telegraph lines from the definition of improvements to real property, and applying that interpretation in a manner that resulted in differential treatment of taxpayers. (See Director of Finance, Hale Champion, memorandum to Governor Edmund G. Brown, July 8, 1965 (Champion Memorandum) ["The Attorney General has ruled that this definition [in former section 105, subd. (a) ] also applies to the sales tax, and the ruling is broad enough to include transmission and distribution lines, poles, towers and conduit. This ruling has resulted in confusion and a different treatment between installations made for federal agencies and private utilities."]; accord, Legis. Analyst, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1086 (1965 Reg. Sess.).)
The legislative history further shows the Legislature was attempting to ensure uniform treatment of taxpayers-by declaring that "telephone and telegraph lines" and "electrical transmission and distribution lines" should be treated as improvements to real property for sales and use taxation purposes. (See Champion Memorandum [AB 1086 "declare[s] prospectively that telephone and telegraph lines, electric transmission and distribution lines, poles, towers, or conduit are not tangible personal property and hence are to be treated as improvements to real property"]; Legis. Analyst, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1086 (1965 Reg. Sess.) ["The effect [of section 6016.5 ] would be to eliminate confusion which now exists where contractors installing such facilities for a federal agency, such as the Central Valley Project, and those doing likewise for a private utility are accorded different treatment for sales tax purposes."]; Assem. Com. on Rev. and Tax. Analysis of Revenue Bills for Assem. Bill No. 1086 (Reg. Sess. 1965) May 24, 1965 [AB 1086 would "remove [sales and use] tax from sales of ... installed equipment to private utilities," a change expected to result in offsetting revenues because "when materials are purchased by the contractor the tax is imposed whether the construction is for a private utility or a federal agency."].)
*654Our own research disclosed an additional piece of the legislative record that supports CDTFA's position. In a June 10, 1965 letter to Governor Brown, Assemblyman Alfred E. Alquist, the sponsor of AB 1086, advised Governor Brown that his bill would "allow the state to tax the cost of materials used in constructing transmission lines," while "[a]t the same time it [would] relieve private and local government consumers of sales tax on the cost of fabricating these structures"-the same type of argument CDTFA asserts here. (Assemblyman Alquist, sponsor of Assem. Bill No. 1086 (1965 Reg. Sess.), letter to Governor, June 10, 1965.) While not controlling, the bill sponsor's statements further support our construction of section 6016.5. (See Larkin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015)
Collectively, this legislative history buttresses our conclusion that section 6016.5 applies only to completed telephone and telegraph lines, not the component parts thereof.
The judgment is affirmed. CDTFA is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P.J.
DATO, J.
All further statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code, unless otherwise noted.
MCI describes such purchased product as being "completed." For example, MCI states that it "purchased telephone poles used to support aerially-installed telephone cables above the ground," and further states that it "did not assemble the telephone poles but instead purchased only completed poles." MCI similarly states that it purchased "completed cable" and "completed conduit."
MCI initially named the California State Board of Equalization as defendant. However, CDTFA became the successor to the California State Board of Equalization, effective July 1, 2017. (Gov. Code, § 15570.22.) All further references to the California State Board of Equalization shall be to CDTFA.
The retailer, however, may collect use tax as an agent. (§ 6203; Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014)
The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1086 (AB 1086), which was codified as section 6016.5, in 1965. (Stats. 1965, ch. 1960, § 2, p. 4488.)
MCI sought judicial notice of the appellate briefing in Chula Vista . We will treat MCI's request to take judicial notice as a motion to augment the record on appeal and, as such, grant MCI's motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) ; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.122(a)(3).)
The SUTL defines "occasional sale" in pertinent part by reference to whether the seller is required to have a seller's permit. (See § 6006.5, subd. (a) [defining "occasional sale" to include "[a] sale of property not held or used by a seller in the course of activities for which he or she is required to hold a seller's permit or permits or would be required to hold a seller's permit or permits if the activities were conducted in this state, provided that the sale is not one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope, and character to constitute an activity for which he or she is required to hold a seller's permit or would be required to hold a seller's permit if the activity were conducted in this state."].) Sales and Use Tax regulation 1595 further provides: "Generally the minimum number of sales to require the holding of a seller's permit by a person not otherwise engaged in a selling activity is three within any 12 month period." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 1595, subd. (a)(4)(A).)
The complaint alleges that "[i]n years past, one or more of [MCI's] affiliates sold portions of a telecommunications network grid in California." This allegation is ambiguous at best, and undercuts MCI's occasional sales argument.
Previously, section 105 excluded "telephone and telegraph lines" from the definition of improvements to real property. (Former § 105, subd. (a).) The Legislature removed this exclusion in 1977. (Stats. 1977, ch. 539, § 1, p. 1741.)
MCI's effort to characterize its purchased materials as "complete"-one of the terms used in Chula Vista -does not alter our analysis. (Chula Vista , supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 453,
CDTFA's practices resulted in a spate of lawsuits in the early and mid-1960's challenging CDTFA's characterization of installation labor. (King , supra , 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1014-1015,
CDTFA requested judicial notice of the legislative records discussed herein. In opposition, MCI argued that these records are not indicative of legislative intent because they were obtained from the Governor's enrolled bill file. The Supreme Court, however, has "routinely found enrolled bill reports, prepared by a responsible agency contemporaneous with passage and before signing, instructive on matters of legislative intent." (Elsner v. Uveges (2004)
Because we decide this appeal based on the plain language of section 6016.5 in CDTFA's favor, it is unnecessary for us to determine the degree of deference that we may afford to CDTFA's interpretations of section 6016.5, including its interpretations set forth in annotation 190.1047 of the CDTFA's Business Taxes Law Guide, and a September 15, 1965 letter from CDTFA tax counsel E.H. Stetson discussing annotation 295.1400. We therefore deny CDTFA's request for judicial notice of those items.