993 N.W.2d 295

Minn. Ct. App.

2023

In re the Matter of Joseph Rued, Appellant, vs. the Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.

A22-1420

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

Filed June 26, 2023

Johnson, Judge

Vacated; motion denied
Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-22-7318

William J. Mauzy, William R. Dooling, Mauzy Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

SYLLABUS

A person commencing a proceeding pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7 (2022), must serve the notice of appeal on the commissioner of human services and “any adverse party of record.” If the person commencing the proceeding does not serve the notice of appeal on each adverse party of record, the district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

Joseph Rued is the father of a young child. Rued seeks a hearing before a human-services judge to challenge Scott County‘s determination that the child has not been sexually abused. Rued commenced this proceeding in the district court pursuant to a statute authorizing judicial review of a decision of the commissioner of human services. The district court ruled that Rued is not entitled to a hearing before a human-services judge. We do not reach the merits of the district court‘s decision. Rather, we conclude that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding because Rued did not serve his initial pleading on Scott County, as required by the statute authorizing the proceeding. Therefore, we vacate the district court‘s decision.

FACTS

Sometime before January 18, 2022, Rued made a report to Scott County that his child may have been sexually abused. The Scott County Health and Human Services Division conducted an investigation to determine whether maltreatment has occurred and whether child-protective services are necessary. The county interviewed family members and other persons and reviewed documents relating to prior child-protection cases and related court cases.

The county informed Rued by letter that it determined that maltreatment has not occurred and that child-protective services are not necessary. The letter states that the county previously had received 11 reports of alleged maltreatment and had conducted four prior investigations, all of which had resulted in the conclusion that no maltreatment has occurred. The letter also states that, in 2019, the county determined that the child had suffered from “the detrimental psychological effects [of] being subjected to repeated questioning and investigation.” The county‘s letter concludes by stating, “If you do not agree with the county‘s determination regarding maltreatment, you may ask the county to reconsider its determination.”

Rued requested reconsideration of the county‘s determination of no maltreatment. Two weeks later, the county informed Rued by letter that the county had conducted “[a]n independent review of the record” and had determined that its “determination of no maltreatment was appropriate.” The county‘s letter concludes by stating, “You have the right to appeal the maltreatment determination by requesting a fair hearing under Minnesota Statutes, section 256.045” with a written request to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS).

In March 2022, Rued submitted a request to DHS for a fair hearing pursuant to section 256.045. The request was assigned to a human-services judge (HSJ), who held a pre-hearing conference in April 2022. Rued was present at the pre-hearing conference and was represented by two attorneys. Two Scott County employees were present, as was an Assistant Scott County Attorney. The county argued that Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing on a determination that maltreatment has not occurred (as opposed to a determination that maltreatment has occurred). The HSJ requested that Rued and the county submit briefs on that issue, and they did so.

In May 2022, the HSJ issued a six-page decision recommending that the commissioner of human services dismiss Rued‘s request for a fair hearing on the ground that Rued is not entitled to such a hearing with respect to a no-maltreatment determination. A representative of the commissioner adopted the HSJ‘s decision as the final decision of DHS.

Rued then commenced this action to challenge the commissioner‘s decision. He filed a document captioned “notice of appeal” with the Scott County District Court. He served his initial pleading on the commissioner of human services. He did not serve it on Scott County.¹

The district court conducted a hearing in early August 2022. Rued was present at the hearing and was represented by an attorney. An Assistant Scott County Attorney also appeared. After the hearing, Rued submitted a letter brief in which he summarized the reasons why he is entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ. Rued also argued, apparently in response to an argument made by the county at the hearing, that he was not required to serve his initial pleading on the county. The county submitted a responsive letter brief in which it argued, among other things, that the district court did not have jurisdiction because Rued did not serve his initial pleading on the county. The county argued in the alternative that the HSJ correctly decided that Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing.

One week after the hearing, the district court filed a two-page order denying Rued‘s appeal. The district court resolved the jurisdictional issue by reasoning that Rued was required to serve his initial pleading on the county but the county waived the jurisdictional defect—which the district court deemed a matter of personal jurisdiction—by appearing at the hearing. The district court resolved the merits of Rued‘s appeal by reasoning that he is not permitted to challenge a determination of no maltreatment.

Rued appeals. He argues that the district court erred by denying his appeal. He contends that a statute gives him a right to a fair hearing before the HSJ.² In response, the county makes two arguments. The county first argues that Rued was required to serve his

initial pleading on both the commissioner and the county, that his failure to serve the county deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and that the district court should have dismissed Rued‘s appeal for that reason. The county argues in the alternative that Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ. Because we have an obligation to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction exists before we review the merits of the district court‘s decision, see, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 812-13 (Minn. 2012), we begin by considering the county‘s jurisdictional argument. Because the county‘s jurisdictional argument is dispositive, we do not reach the parties’ arguments concerning whether Rued has a right to a fair hearing before the HSJ.

ISSUE

Did the district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over Rued‘s action in light of the fact that Rued did not serve his initial pleading on Scott County?

ANALYSIS

A.

To provide context for our analysis of the county‘s jurisdictional argument, we begin by reciting the law that applies to Rued‘s action.

This case arises from chapter 260E of the Minnesota Statutes, which is captioned “reporting of maltreatment of minors.” Under the act, “Any person may voluntarily report to the local welfare agency, agency responsible for assessing or investigating the report, police department, county sheriff, tribal social services agency, or tribal police department if the person knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being or has been maltreated.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 2 (2022). Local welfare agencies are responsible

for investigating allegations of sexual abuse of a child by family members, relatives, and other persons with a significant relationship to the child. Minn. Stat. § 260E.14, subd. 2(a) (2022). The local welfare agency must conclude its investigation within 45 days and must determine “whether maltreatment occurred” and “whether child protective services are needed.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.24, subds. 1, 3(a) (2022). Within ten business days of the conclusion of an investigation, the local welfare agency must communicate its determination, with “a summary of the specific reasons for the determination,” to the parents or guardians of a child who is the subject of a report and to “the person determined to be maltreating the child.” Id., subd. 5(a).

A request for reconsideration may be submitted by either a person who was determined to have maltreated a child or “an interested person acting on behalf of the child, regardless of the determination, who contests the investigating agency‘s final determination regarding maltreatment.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.33, subd. 2(a) (2022). If the local welfare agency denies a request for reconsideration, a “person . . . entitled to a fair hearing under section 256.045” may submit a written request for such a hearing to the commissioner of human services. Id., subd. 3(a). A person is “entitled to a fair hearing under section 256.045” if the person satisfies any one of 14 criteria in that statute. Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(a)(1)-(14). The sixth criterion confers a right to a fair hearing on “any person to whom a right of appeal according to this section is given by other provision of law.” Id., subd. 3(a)(6). In Fosselman v. Commissioner of Human Services, 612 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. App. 2000), this court reasoned that the sixth criterion confers a right to a fair hearing on any person who has a constitutional right to a hearing. Id. at 459-60.

60. We concluded that ”Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(a)(6), affords a statutory right to a hearing where due process rights would otherwise be violated.” Id. at 465.

The commissioner of human services may accept or refuse to accept the recommendation of an HSJ. Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 5. “A party aggrieved by an order of the commissioner may appeal under subdivision 7.” Id. Subdivision 7 provides, in relevant part:

[A]ny party who is aggrieved by an order of the commissioner of human services, . . . may appeal the order to the district court of . . . , in appeals under subdivision 3b, the county where the maltreatment occurred, by serving a written copy of a notice of appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days after the date the commissioner issued the order, the amended order, or order affirming the original order, and by filing the original notice and proof of service with the court administrator of the district court. . . . The commissioner may elect to become a party to the proceedings in the district court.

Id., subd. 7; see also Chorolec v. Commissioner of Dep‘t of Human Servs., 990 N.W.2d 474, 476-78 (Minn. App. 2023) (concluding that plaintiff properly commenced action by serving initial pleading on commissioner within 30 days despite filing it with district court after more than 30 days).

On appeal, Rued relies on the sixth criterion in section 256.045, subdivision 3(a), and Fosselman in arguing that he is entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ to challenge Scott County‘s no-maltreatment determination because he has a constitutional right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause.

B.

We next consider Scott County‘s argument that Rued was required to serve his initial pleading on the county.

It is undisputed that section 256.045, subdivision 7, expressly required Rued to serve his initial pleading on the commissioner and that he did so. The county argues that Rued also was required to serve his initial pleading on the county. The county focuses on the statutory language requiring service on “the commissioner and any adverse party of record.” See Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7 (emphasis added). In an appeal arising from a different statute with similar language, the supreme court defined the term “adverse party” to mean a “party whose interest in relation to the subject of the appeal is in direct conflict with a reversal or modification of the order or judgment appealed from” or a party who “will be prejudiced or adversely affected by reversal or modification of judgment appealed from.” In re Estate of Meyer, 186 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn. 1971) (quotations omitted) (applying Minn. Stat. § 525.712).

In this case, the county previously appeared at the pre-hearing conference conducted by the HSJ through two employees and an assistant county attorney. If the HSJ were to conduct a fair hearing, he would determine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the county‘s determination that Rued‘s child was not maltreated. Accordingly, the county has an interest in the matter that would be considered by the HSJ and, thus, an interest in the commissioner‘s decision. If the HSJ were to determine that the evidence does not support the county‘s determination, the HSJ presumably would recommend that the commissioner require the county to take appropriate action on Rued‘s report. In that

event, the county‘s interest would be “in direct conflict with a reversal or modification of the order or judgment appealed from,” and the county would be “prejudiced or adversely affected by reversal or modification of judgment appealed from.” See id. Consequently, the county was an “adverse party of record” in the proceedings that led to the commissioner‘s decision, which is the decision under review. See Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7.

Thus, Rued was required to serve his initial pleading on the county.

C.

We now consider Scott County‘s argument that Rued‘s failure to serve his initial pleading on the county deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction “refers to a court‘s authority ‘to hear and determine a particular class of actions and the particular questions’ presented to the court for its decision.” Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Robinette v. Price, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1943)). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction “generally depends on the scope of the constitutional and statutory grant of authority to the court.” McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016). A party may raise a question of subject-matter jurisdiction “at any time.” Dead Lake Ass‘n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County, 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005). Furthermore, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited by a party. Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010).

Not every use of the word “jurisdiction” implicates the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “Jurisdiction . . . is a word

of many, too many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (quotation omitted). For example, a time limitation that might be described as “mandatory and jurisdictional” is, nonetheless, “not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.‘” Id. (quotations omitted). Such time limitations generally “do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction” but, rather, “are claim-processing rules that do not delineate what cases . . . courts are competent to adjudicate.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453-54 (2004) (quotation omitted). Similarly, statutes that define the elements of a cause of action generally do not affect a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510-16. A statute or rule is deemed jurisdictional “only if Congress clearly states that it is.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2023) (quotations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that its own caselaw concerning jurisdiction also has been “at best . . . confusing.” Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Minn. 2006). But the supreme court has held that a district court does not lose subject-matter jurisdiction by not complying with a statutory requirement to conduct a hearing on a civil-commitment petition within 90 days. In re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 426-30 (Minn. 2007) (citing Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 1 (2006)). Similarly, the supreme court has held that a district court does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction if a party seeking judicial review of a city‘s special assessment failed to object within the time period required by statute. McCullough, 883 N.W.2d at 587-90 (citing Minn. Stat. § 429.061, subd. 2 (2014)). The supreme court has used the term “claim-processing rules” to describe such statutory requirements. Id. at 588.

In addition, the supreme court stated in McCullough that statutory or rules-based requirements concerning service of process generally do not affect subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 590. This is so because “service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. at 590 (emphasis added). As an example, the McCullough court cited In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 2013). Id. In Skyline, the district court dismissed an action under Minnesota Statutes section 394.27, subdivision 9, for judicial review of a county board of adjustment‘s zoning-variance decision because the plaintiffs, who owned property adjacent to the variance applicant‘s property, did not serve the county in the manner required by rule 4.03 of the rules of civil procedure. 835 N.W.2d at 473-78. The supreme court concluded in Skyline that “the district court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at 477. The supreme court later clarified that the jurisdictional defect in Skyline was a matter of “personal jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction.” McCullough, 883 N.W.2d at 590 n.3. A defect in personal jurisdiction (unlike a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction) can be waived or forfeited by a party. Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 381-82 (Minn. 2008); Patterson v. Wu Fam. Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 866-67 (Minn. 2000).

The supreme court applied Skyline in Schulz v. Town of Duluth, 936 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 2019), which concerned an action under Minnesota Statutes section 462.361, subdivision 1, for judicial review of a township board‘s zoning-variance decision. Id. at 336-38. The plaintiffs in Schulz served process on the township but did not serve process on the variance applicants, who were interested parties. Id. at 337-38. The supreme court noted that both the statute authorizing the action and the applicable township ordinance

were silent as to who must be served. Id. at 338-39. The supreme court noted that the township had made the decision that was under review and that the statute expressly allowed the township to assert an affirmative defense, which indicated that the township was a party in any action under the statute. Id. at 339. For those reasons, the supreme court held that “a district court retains jurisdiction when the municipality is served, regardless of whether a necessary party is also served” and that the plaintiffs’ “failure to serve [the variance applicants] and make them parties to the action does not mean that the district court loses jurisdiction over the entire action.” Id. at 340.

The Schulz case is similar to the present case, but another supreme court opinion is more closely on point. In Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2007), two property owners appealed condemnation awards to the district court. Id. at 359. The statute authorizing the appeals specified that a party to a condemnation proceeding “may appeal to the district court from any award of damages” by doing two things:

(1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal, and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the petitioner‘s affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of the commissioners.

Id. at 360 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006)). The property owners in Woodhall served their respective notices of appeal on the attorney general but not on other persons who had been identified in the state‘s condemnation petitions as having interests in the described parcels. Id. at 359. The state moved to dismiss the appeals on the ground that the property owners did not serve their notices of appeal on all parties

entitled to service. Id. at 359-60. The district court granted the motion, and this court affirmed. Id. at 360. The supreme court agreed with the lower courts that the property owners failed to serve all parties entitled to service. Id. at 360-62. The supreme court then considered “whether the appeal may go forward without the notice of appeal having been served on all parties required by the statute.” Id. at 362. The supreme court concluded that, as a consequence of the failure of service, “the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over appellants’ condemnation appeals.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added).

In this case, Rued seeks review of the commissioner‘s decision pursuant to a statute that is very similar to the statute in Woodhall. Section 256.045, subdivision 7, expressly requires an appealing party to do two things: first, “serv[e] a written copy of a notice of appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record,” and, second, “fil[e] the original notice and proof of service with the court administrator of the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7. The Woodhall court concluded that, because the plaintiffs failed to serve their notice of appeal on all persons entitled to service, the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. 738 N.W.2d at 363. In light of Woodhall, if a plaintiff fails to serve all persons entitled to service under section 256.045, subdivision 7—the commissioner of human services and any adverse party of record—a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Schulz opinion does not apply here because the statute in that case is meaningfully different from the statute in this case. The statute in Schulz did not specify any governmental entity or person that was required to be served. See Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (2022). In that situation, the supreme court reasoned that service on the

township was “enough to perfect an appeal under section 462.361 and confer jurisdiction on the district court.” Schulz, 936 N.W.2d at 339. In this case, however, the statute expressly requires a plaintiff to serve the initial pleading on both the commissioner and “any adverse party of record,” Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, thus indicating that service on all adverse parties is necessary to “perfect an appeal.” See Schulz, 936 N.W.2d at 339. In addition, the statute in this case provides that the commissioner “may elect to become a party to the proceedings in the district court,” Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, thus indicating that the commissioner is not automatically a party to an action commenced under the statute, which makes the presence of an adverse party all the more necessary. See Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 298-99 (Minn. 2012) (stating that justiciable controversy requires, among other things, “genuine conflict . . . between parties with adverse interests“).

Rued served his initial pleading on the commissioner of human services, who made the decision that is under review. But Rued did not serve his initial pleading on the county, which is an adverse party because it made the determination about which Rued seeks a hearing before the HSJ. Rued‘s failure to serve his initial pleading on the county deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. See Woodhall, 738 N.W.2d at 363.

In light of that conclusion, we do not reach Rued‘s argument that he is entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ.

DECISION

The district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Rued‘s action for judicial review of the commissioner‘s decision because Rued did not serve his initial pleading on Scott County, an adverse party of record. Therefore, we vacate the district court‘s decision. See Howard v. Svoboda, 890 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn. 2017); Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 296 (Minn. 2015); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Minn. App. 2003); Neitzel v. County of Redwood, 521 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).

Vacated; motion denied.

Notes

Throughout this opinion, we refer to the district-court proceeding as an “action” rather than an “appeal” because the supreme court did so in , because doing so tends to avoid confusion with an appeal to an appellate court, and because the term “action” is used in the rules of civil procedure, which apply to a proceeding authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 1, 2, 81, app. A; . We refer to the document that commences the district-court proceeding as the “initial pleading” rather than a “notice of appeal” for similar reasons.

After briefing but before oral argument, Rued moved to strike certain portions of the county‘s brief that refer to prior opinions of this court in related cases. See ; , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2022). In general, the record on appeal consists of “documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. “We generally will not consider matters outside the record on appeal or evidence not produced and received in the district court.” . But we generally may consider public records, even if they are not part of the district court record. See, e.g., . It is not uncommon for appellate courts to cite prior appellate opinions in related cases. See, e.g., (relying on prior opinion in related case when reciting relevant facts). Rued has not cited any authority for the proposition that it is improper for an appellate court to do so. It is notable that, in his own brief, Rued cited our opinion in , in the course of explaining that he seeks a fair hearing because the custody proceeding in that case “did not allow him to properly develop a record regarding [the child]‘s maltreatment.” Having cited that prior opinion in his own brief, he cannot complain about the county‘s use of prior opinions in a similar manner. In any event, we have resolved this appeal based solely on the facts contained in the district court record in this case. See (denying motion to strike because court did not rely on facts stated in objected-to portions of brief). Thus, we deny Rued‘s motion to strike.