John A. WOODHALL, Jr., et al., petitioners, Appellants, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, and State of Minnesota, by its Commissioner of Transportation, petitioner, Respondent, v. Grove City Grain and Feed Company, Respondent Below, and Timothy R. Pieh, et al., Appellants.
Nos. A05-2424, A05-2525
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Sept. 13, 2007
738 N.W.2d 357
For these additional reasons, I respectfully dissent.
OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
Appellants Woodhall and Pieh (collectively appellants) appealed to the district court from separate condemnation awards. Respondent State of Minnesota filed motions to dismiss the appeals, and the district court granted both motions, holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appeals because appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under
In October 2002, the state filed a petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain.1 With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 34, the petition listed appellants John A. Woodhall, Jr., Donna I. Woodhall, John A. Woodhall III, Diane M. Woodhall, Douglas Woodhall, and Carmen Woodhall as having an interest as either a fee holder or spouse of a fee holder. The petition also listed Kandiyohi County as having a tax interest in Parcel 34. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition.
In December 2002, the state filed a separate petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain. With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 64, this petition stated that appellants Timothy R. Pieh and Mary B. Pieh had an interest as contract for deed vendees, Burton Van Ort had a fee interest, Ella Van Ort had an interest as spouse of the fee holder, Wells Fargo Bank had a mortgage interest, and Kandiyohi County had a tax interest. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition.
The district court granted both petitions and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained by each condemnee pursuant to
The Woodhalls, believing the commissioners’ award to be inadequate, filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and, at that time, served notice of appeal only on the Office of the Attorney General.2 Similarly, the Piehs filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and served notice only on the Office of the Attorney General.
The state moved to dismiss both appeals on the grounds that appellants failed to serve timely notices of their appeals on all
The district court granted the state‘s motion to dismiss both appeals for the reason that
Appellants appealed separately, and the appeals were consolidated. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. Woodhall v. State, Nos. A05-2424 & A05-2525, 2006 WL 2053415 (Minn.App. July 25, 2006). The court of appeals held that
On appeal to this court, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that
I.
The right to appeal from a commissioners’ award in a condemnation case is governed by
At any time within 40 days from the date that the [commissioners‘] report has been filed, any party to the proceedings may appeal to the district court from any award of damages embraced in the report, or from any omission to award damages, by: (1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal, and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the petitioner‘s affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of the commissioners.
(Emphasis added.)
Within ten days after the date of the filing of the report of commissioners, the
- each respondent listed in the petition as having an interest in any parcel described in the report;
- each other party to the proceeding whose appearance has been noted by the court in its order approving the petition under section 117.075; and
- each respondent‘s attorney.
Such notification shall be addressed to the last known post office address of each person notified. Notice of the filing of the report need not be given to parties initially served by publication under section 117.055. The petitioner shall file with the court administrator an affidavit of mailing of the notice, setting forth the names and addresses of all the persons so notified.
Appellants argue that
The state argues that
Our rules of statutory construction lead us to conclude that the state correctly describes the meaning of the statute. When the meaning of statutory language is clear, that meaning governs application of that statute.
Appellants suggest that a consequence of requiring service on all respondents, even if they have no ongoing interest in the parcel, is that a condemning authority could name any number of unrelated parties as respondents merely to make taking an appeal logistically burdensome. But neither our ruling nor the facts of this case suggest that the service requirement sweeps so broadly. It is unquestionable that each of the unserved respondents on which the ruling in this case was based had an interest in the affected parcel at the beginning of the condemnation proceeding. But requiring service of notice of appeal only on parties with an ongoing interest in the parcel subject to appeal would have the undesirable result of permitting the appealing party to unilaterally decide who does or does not have an interest in the property. While procedures exist to join additional parties at the appeal stage, there would be no clear mechanism for adjudicating which parties retain an ongoing interest. And if there is no penalty for failure to serve all parties entitled to service, there would be little incentive for appealing parties to accurately determine which parties retain ongoing interests in the parcel involved in the appeal. This would potentially result in confusion, inefficiencies, and inconsistent judgments. In contrast, requiring an appealing party to serve all respondents and other parties to whom notice is required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, results in neither confusion nor inefficiencies and promotes the goal of ensuring that all parties with a potential stake in the outcome of the proceedings are involved at all stages of the proceedings.
Regardless of the practical difficulties that would arise if we adopt appellant‘s interpretation of the statute, we conclude that the words of the statute unambiguously require service on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings who are required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, to have been mailed notice of the commissioners’ report.
II.
The next question is whether the appeal may go forward without the notice of appeal having been served on all parties required by the statute. Appellants urge this court to hold that service of the notice of appeal is only necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction over respondents, and failure to serve any one respondent does not require dismissal of the appeal but rather means only that unserved parties are not bound by the outcome of the appeal. The state argues that the statute requires strict compliance with service of a notice of appeal and failure to serve all necessary parties deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
We have repeatedly held that failure to comply with the statute governing appeals from eminent domain proceedings is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., State v. Radosevich, 249 Minn. 268, 271, 82 N.W.2d 70, 72 (1957) (“[U]nless the conditions prescribed by [the condemnation appeal] statute are observed, the court acquires no jurisdiction.“). Appellants, citing as authority the special concurrence in Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Adelmann, 590 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially), urge the court to abandon this long-held position. They argue that a dis-
“The doctrine of stare decisis directs that we adhere to former decisions in order that there might be stability in the law.” Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn.2000). Because there is sound basis for the current rule and because appellants have not supplied an adequate reason to abandon it, we decline to do so. Appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under
III.
Appellants argue that the right to just compensation for a government taking is a fundamental right, and they claim that “if
The constitutionality of a statute is a question this court reviews de novo. State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Minn.2006). Appellants will not be denied just compensation even if their appeals are dismissed because they will still receive just compensation as determined by neutral commissioners. Moreover, appellants cite no authority for the proposition that the right to just compensation is not sufficiently protected by the award determination of the commissioners alone; i.e., that any mechanism for appeal of the commissioners’ award is required or is a fundamental right. Accordingly, appellants’ first constitutional claim is without merit.
A statute does not comport with due process when it is arbitrary or unreasonable. See Int‘l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 547 (1956). Procedural due process does protect certain property interests, see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972), but appellants make no argument that the right to appeal a condemnation award is a property interest. Furthermore, the service requirements of
Affirmed.
Dissenting, ANDERSON, PAUL H. and PAGE, JJ.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Adelmann, 590 N.W.2d 327 (Minn.1999) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially), I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the district court has lost subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, I would reverse and let this case proceed.
We need to be very cautious about how we treat the rights of persons when we apply the Takings Clauses which are more accurately described as the Eminent Domain Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. In State v. Jude, we stated:
The decisions in this state have never unduly restricted the owner‘s constitutional right to just compensation where there has been a taking of private property for public use under the powers of eminent domain. *** Attempts on the part of a condemnor by technical means to defeat the landowner‘s right to his day in court have never been viewed with favor.
258 Minn. 43, 44, 102 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1960) (quoting State v. Rust, 256 Minn. 246, 253, 98 N.W.2d 271, 276 (1959)). In my view, the Takings Clauses do not expressly grant eminent domain powers to the government; eminent domain powers are rightly regarded as inherent powers of government. Rather, the Takings Clauses impose limitations on the exercise of this power, one limitation being the requirement that “just compensation be paid to the owner.”2 I regret that our jurisprudence has evolved to the point where we confuse the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction such that a failure to give notice to someone who does not have an interest in the condemned property can potentially thwart an owner‘s ability to receive “just compensation.”
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson.