In re the Custody of: D.T.R. Michael L. Richards, Petitioner Below, vs. Derek Reiter, Respondent, Lynette A. Marthe, ...
David F. Herr, Haley N. Schaffer, Sarah B. Riskin, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
A biological mother has standing to appeal a district court‘s determination of paternity of her child as an aggrieved party on the grounds that the determination of paternity directly impacts the mother‘s responsibility for child support and her rights related to care, custody, and control of the child.
O P I N I O N
DIETZEN, Justice.
The petitioner below, Michael Richards, brought a petition seeking joint legal custody of and parenting time with D.T.R., and named the mother, appellant Lynette Marthe and her then-husband, respondent Derek Reiter, as parties to the proceeding. The district court adjudicated Reiter as the legal father of D.T.R. and dismissed Richards’ petition. Marthe appealed, but Richards did not. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that Marthe lacks standing to appeal. Because we conclude that Marthe is an aggrieved party and has standing to appeal a paternity determination, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings.
The minor child, D.T.R., was born in May 2004, during the marriage of Marthe and Reiter. At the time, both Marthe and Reiter believed that Reiter was D.T.R.‘s biological father. Reiter was listed as the father on D.T.R.‘s birth certificate, and has been the father to D.T.R. since his birth. In July of 2008, however, genetic testing established that Richards was D.T.R.‘s biological father.
In August 2008 Richards filed a petition for joint legal custody of D.T.R. pursuant to
Before trial, the parties stipulated that Richards was the biological father of D.T.R., but could not agree who should be adjudicated the legal father of D.T.R. pursuant to
The Parentage Act provides a statutory framework for determining parentage. Generally, the Parentage Act defines the parent-child relationship, describes certain presumptions of paternity, and sets forth the procedure for bringing an action in district court to determine the father-child relationship, as well as the mother-child relationship. See
The presumptions in the Parentage Act applicable to the facts of this case are that (1) a man who is married to a child‘s mother when the child is born, or who was married to a child‘s mother within 280 days before the child‘s birth, is presumed to be the child‘s biological father pursuant to section 257.55, subdivision 1(a); and (2) under section 257.62, subdivision 5(b), positive blood or genetic results create an “evidentiary presumption” of paternity that may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. When faced with competing presumptions, the court must evaluate the presumptions and “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”
In April 2010 the district court filed detailed and thorough findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order concluding that a parent-child relationship exists between Reiter and D.T.R., and adjudicated Reiter as D.T.R.‘s father. The court concluded that Reiter‘s presumption of paternity was “founded on the ‘weightier considerations of policy and logic’ ” under section 257.55, subdivision 2, and that Richards had not rebutted that presumption based on clear and convincing evidence. The court found that Reiter had been involved in D.T.R.‘s life since D.T.R. was born and D.T.R. knew Reiter as his father. The court‘s order did not address custody, parenting time, or financial issues.
Marthe appealed the district court‘s determination of paternity, but Richards did not. The court of appeals questioned Marthe‘s standing to appeal the dismissal of
I.
To answer the question presented, we first examine the doctrine of standing and then apply that doctrine to the facts of this case. Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine, and the lack of standing bars consideration of the claim by the court. See Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 2007) (citing Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. 1989)). Because standing is a jurisdictional issue, we evaluate decisions on standing de novo. See Swenson v. Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 2011) (reviewing jurisdiction de novo). The interpretation of a statute or case law is also reviewed de novo. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 2006) (citing Am. Nat‘l Gen. Ins. Co. v. Solum, 641 N.W.2d 891, 895 (Minn. 2002)).
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Id. at 560.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact“—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of . . . . Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Id. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted).
Minnesota case law also requires that a party have standing before a court can exercise jurisdiction. See Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 27. Generally, we examine standing at various stages of the litigation proceeding, including when a plaintiff brings a cause of action and when a party appeals a decision. Standing to bring an action can be conferred in two ways: “either the plaintiff has suffered some ‘injury-in-fact’ or the plaintiff is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing.” Enright, 735 N.W.2d at 329. To demonstrate an injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must show “a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
Standing to appeal may be conferred by a statute or by the appellant‘s status as an aggrieved party. City of St. Paul v. LaClair, 479 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. 1992). The appellant‘s status as an aggrieved party depends on whether “there is injury to a legally protected right.” Id. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (1951)).
Prior to 1963,
Currently,
Whether a party is aggrieved depends on whether that party‘s “personal right [was] injuriously affected by the adjudication.” Singer v. Allied Factors, Inc., 216 Minn. 443, 446, 13 N.W.2d 378, 380 (1944). A party with “no interest in the subject of the litigation cannot be aggrieved by the adjudication and consequently has no right to appeal.” Id. at 446, 13 N.W.2d at 380 (citing Kellogg v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 126 Minn. 31, 32-33, 147 N.W. 667, 667-68 (1914)). The injury to the right impacted by the adjudication must be immediate, and not a “possible, remote consequence, or mere possibility arising from some unknown or future contingency.” In re Trust in Estate of Everett, 263 Minn. 398, 401, 116 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1962) (citation omitted). Thus, a party is “aggrieved” when that person had a direct interest in the litigation and that person‘s rights were injuriously affected by the adjudication.
Marthe argues that she has standing to appeal as an aggrieved party pursuant to applicable case law and the Minnesota Parentage Act,
We first examine Marthe‘s standing as an aggrieved party under our existing case law. We have addressed a mother‘s standing to appeal from an adjudication of paternity in at least two cases. State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680 (1950); State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn. 299, 75 N.W.2d 195 (1956). In Sax, the biological mother commenced a paternity action against a putative father, Sax. 231 Minn. at 3, 42 N.W.2d at 682. The jury found Sax guilty of paternity, and Sax then petitioned the district court to approve a lump sum settlement award for child support. Id. at 3-4, 42 N.W.2d at 682. The district court entered an order approving the lump sum award, and the mother appealed. Id. at 4, 42 N.W.2d at 682. On appeal, a dispute arose regarding the mother‘s standing to appeal.1 Id. at 4, 42 N.W.2d at 682. The court held that the mother was an aggrieved party and therefore was entitled to appeal under
Subsequently, in E.A.H. we considered whether the complainant mother had standing to appeal a determination that the putative father was not guilty of paternity. 246 Minn. at 304-05, 75 N.W.2d at 199-200. In that case, the State brought a paternity action against the putative father, E.A.H., on the complaint of the biological mother. Id. at 300, 75 N.W.2d at 197. The district court found in favor of E.A.H. and denied the State‘s motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 303, 75 N.W.2d at 198. Judgment was entered in favor of E.A.H., and the mother appealed. Id. at 303, 75 N.W.2d at 198-99. On appeal, E.A.H. argued that the mother did not have standing to appeal paternity as an aggrieved party. Id. at 303, 75 N.W.2d at 198-99. E.A.H. asserted that the mother had a personal financial interest in child support, but not in paternity. Id. at 304, 75 N.W.2d at 199. E.A.H. argued that Sax was factually distinguishable on the ground that the guilt of the putative father had been established and the only issue was the amount of the child support award. Id. at 304, 75 N.W.2d at 199.
We concluded, among other things, that the biological mother had standing to appeal and denied E.A.H.‘s motion to dismiss the mother‘s appeal. Id. at 305, 75 N.W.2d at 200. Our determination rested on the conclusion that a biological mother‘s “secondary responsibility for support of the child gives her a direct interest in the amount of the award,” and that responsibility also “gives her a direct interest in determining the primary question as to who is father of the child. The determination of [paternity] is a prerequisite to the order for support.” Id. at 304-05, 75 N.W.2d at 199.
Applying the reasoning in E.A.H., we conclude that Marthe has a direct financial interest in the determination of paternity. The child support obligations of both parents depend on a comparison of their respective individual incomes. Pursuant to
Moreover, both parents have a right to make decisions related to care, custody, and control of their child. See SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 2007) (“A parent‘s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her children is a protected fundamental right.” (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000))). The determination of the identity of the father directly impacts the mother‘s responsibility for care, custody, and control of the child.3 Consequently, a mother‘s rights related to care, custody, and control of her child also give her a direct interest in the determination of the paternity of her child.4
In summary, we conclude that Marthe has standing to appeal as an aggrieved party the district court‘s determination of the paternity of D.T.R. on the grounds that the determination of paternity directly impacts her responsibility for child support and her
Reversed and remanded.