In re: Tasha Reed Outlaw, Trustee vs. MaryAnn Rellin - Order Denying Motion for Default Judgment
- Introduction..................................................................................................... - 3 -
- Jurisdiction and Venue................................................................................... - 4 -
- Facts ................................................................................................................ - 5 -
- Analysis of the Trustee’s Brief ....................................................................... - 8 -
- Brief’s Arguments: Section I(A) and I(B) statutory construction mandates that the Trustee, as disbursement agent, disburse the funds to Debtor and not Debtor’s attorneys. ................................................................................................. - 8 -
- Section 1326: The majority view applies because it is more specific than general Code provisions. ................................................................................ - 9 -
- Section 1326(a): Chapter 13 requires preconfirmation payments......... - 9 -
- Section 1326(a)(2): A Trustee’s roadmap for disbursement of funds when a Chapter 13 plan is not confirmed. ................................................................ - 10 -
- Section 503(b): Administrative compensation and reimbursement under § 330(a). ........................................................................................................ - 12 -
- Section 1326: The majority view applies because it is more specific than general Code provisions. ................................................................................ - 9 -
- Brief’s Arguments: Section I(A) and I(B) statutory construction mandates that the Trustee, as disbursement agent, disburse the funds to Debtor and not Debtor’s attorneys. ................................................................................................. - 8 -
Section 330(a)(4)(B): Compensation for attorney work, in Chapter 13 cases. .............................................................................................................. - 14 - - Section 330(a)(3): Compensation for relevant faсtors, including time, rate, and customary compensation. ...................................................................... - 14 -
- The Court found cause under § 349 to revest the property to Debtor’s attorneys. ....................................................................................................... - 16 -
- Brief’s Argument: Sweports is “binding case law” that requires the Court to return the funds to Debtor and not Debtor’s attorneys. . ................................... - 22 -
- Brief’s Argument: “Harm Created by a Contrary Ruling – Burden Shifting”…. ........................................................................................................... - 23 -
- Brief’s Argument: “Debtor’s Ability to Compromise/Contract with Trustee” . ……………………………………………………………………………………………..- 24 -
- Brief’s Shortcomings under Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. ............................................................... - 26 -
- Conclusion ..................................................................................................... - 35 -
I. Introduction
The Bankruptcy Code,1 requires a debtor to make plan payments to the Chapter 13 trustee before a bankruptcy court confirms a debtor’s plan.
Debtor’s attorneys, Geraci Law LLC, ask the Court to award the firm attorney fees from the funds the Chapter 13 Trustee currently holds. The Trustee argues: (I) the timing of Debtor’s Application for attorney fees prohibits the Court from
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
A. Jurisdiction Statutes and Local Rules
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Federal district courts have “original and exclusive jurisdiction” of all cases under Title 11 of the United States Code.
Bankruptcy courts are units of their district court.
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The Court also has “ancillary jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit described ancillary jurisdiction as “clean up” jurisdiction because bankruptcy courts use it to address any minor loose ends of a case. In re Sweports, Ltd., 777 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir. 2015). Bankruptcy courts may retain ancillary jurisdiction for fee appliсations post dismissal. Id. at 367-68; In re Garris, 496 B.R. 343, 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Merovich, 547 B.R. 643, 649 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2016); In re Elias, 188 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999).
C. Venue
The South Bend Division is the proper venue for Debtor’s case.
III. Facts
A. Debtor files her bankruptcy Petition and Plan but then moves to dismiss her case before confirmation.
On August 8, 2025, Geraci Law, on Debtor’s behalf, filed her Chapter 13 Petition [Doc 1] and Chapter 13 Plan. [Doc 6.] Once the attorneys filed the Petition, the automatic stay went into place.5 The Court set a plan confirmation hearing for November 6, 2025. [Doc 9.] At the hearing, one of Debtor’s attorneys orally moved to dismiss the case. [Docs 32, 33.] The Court granted the request but stated, “[a]ny entity wishing to file a request for payment of an administrative expense under
Debtor’s attorneys filed their Application for Compensation timely. [Doc 36.] In two and one-half pages, Debtor’s attorneys listed the time they spent on performing duties, including: interviewing Debtor, deciding whether to file a Chapter 7 or 13 petition, preparing for and attending the 341 meeting, communicating with Debtor and the Trustee, drafting the Plan, and reviewing documents. [Id. at pp. 3-5.] Further, Debtor’s attorneys listed their hourly rates and included the number of years each attorney has practiced law. [Id.] Senior attorneys worked for 13 years or more and billed at $425 or $450 per hour, while one attorney, who has only practicеd for two years, billed at $300 per hour. [Id.]
The Application says nothing about settlement or an agreement between parties, nor did it ask the Court to return the funds to Geraci Law through Debtor. The Attorneys’ Application simply requested, “that the balance of Attorney fees in the amount of $1,785 be ordered in the instant case and to grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.” [Id. at p. 1.]
Geraci Law’s proposed order [Doc 36-2.] did not match the firm’s Application. The proposed order stated, “Trustee shall disburse any funds on hand at dismissal to the Debtor – Care of Geraci Law LLC.” [Id.] The form of order did not state that
Geraci Law informed Debtor, сreditors, and the Trustee that if they objected to the law firm’s Application, they must file their objection on or before December 11, 2025. [Doc 37.] If they did not file their objection by that time, the Court may grant the attorneys’ request without having a hearing. [Id.] On the other hand, if they did object, the Court would set a hearing. [Id.]
C. The Trustee objects to the Application.
The Trustee, the only party opposing the Application, timely filed her Objection. [Doc 38.] At the hearing, the Trustee was not prepared to argue the Objection and asked for additional time to file a supporting brief. [Docket Entry 01/22/2026.] The Court granted the request, and 34 days later, the Trustee filed her Brief.7 [Doc 41.] The Brief’s outline is as follows:
- Timing of any post-dismissal administrative claim would be inappropriate for Trustee to disburse.
- Duties and Authority of the Chapter 13 Trustee as Disbursement Agent set by statute
- Statutory Construction
- Binding Casеlaw Supports Return of All Funds at Denial of Confirmation
- Harm Created by a Contrary Ruling – Burden Shifting
Debtor’s Ability to Compromise/Contract with Trustee
The Court includes additional facts pertaining to the Trustee’s individual arguments in the relevant sections below.
IV. Analysis of the Trustee’s Brief
A. Brief’s Arguments: Section I(A) and I(B) statutory construction mandates that the Trustee, as disbursement agent, disburse the funds to Debtor and not Debtor’s attorneys.
For Parts I(A) and I(B) of the Brief, it appears the Trustee’s argument highlights a split that the Seventh Circuit has yet to resolve – whether
Under the minority view,
The Trustee’s Brief is unclear, at times, about which Code provision it is citing. It uses words from both statutes but often omits the Code citations. In short, the Court rejects the Brief’s arguments under I(A) and I(B) and finds:
§ 1326(a)(2) applies because it is the more specific Code provision that controls Chapter 13 cases, whereas§ 349(b)(3) has general applicability across all chapters;§ 349(b)(3) does not apply, but even if it did, the Court’s “finding cause” and “ordering otherwise” requires the Trustee to disburse the funds to Debtor’s attorneys; and- Contrary to the Brief’s assertions, under the facts here,
§ 1326(a)(2) , not§ 349(b)(3) , returns the parties closest to their prepetition status.
1. Sectiоn 1326: The majority view applies because it is more specific than general Code provisions.
As explained in more detail in sections (a)-(e) below,
a) Section 1326(a): Chapter 13 requires preconfirmation payments.
b) Section 1326(a)(2): A Trustee’s roadmap for disbursement of funds when a Chapter 13 plan is not confirmed.
A payment made under paragraph (1)(A) shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or denial of confirmation. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance with the plan as soon as is practicable. If a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return any such payments not previously paid and not yet due and owing to creditors pursuant to paragraph (3) to the debtor, after deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b)
(emphasis added).
Thus, here,
- Under the first sentence in
§ 1326(a)(2) , Debtor made pre-confirmation plan payments.
The Chapter 13 Trustee held those payments until the Plan was confirmed or denied. - Under the third sentence in
§ 1326(a)(2) , the Plan was not confirmed. Accordingly, the Trustee must first deduct unpaid§ 503(b) claims, which, as the next section of this Decision explains, can be Debtor’s attorney fees, and then return the funds to Debtor (or appropriate creditors under some circumstances, none of which apply here).
The third sentence in
The general Code provision, the pаrt of the Bankruptcy Code the minority view approach uses, is
This Court agrees with the majority of courts that have concluded that when a Chapter 13 case is dismissed pre-confirmation,
Therefore, the Trustee must disburse, as directed by
c) Section 503(b): Administrative compensation and reimbursement under § 330(a)
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses … including—
(1)
(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate …9
(2) compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a) of this title;
(emphasis added). The Brief makes a critical error. It reliеs on the underlined text – the text in
In a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section
(emphasis added); In re Steen, 631 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2021) (“Section 330(a)(4)(B) essentially creates an exception to the general rule that fees are compensable from the estate only if the services benefit the estate”); In re Williams, 378 B.R. 811, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007) (Section 330(a)(4)(B) (same)); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P 330.03[1][b][v] (16th 2026) (same).
Therefore, whether the services rendered benefited the estate is not the proper question to ask here. Congress intended for debtors’ attorneys in Chapter 13 cases to be compensated from the estate, even when the estate received no direct benefit from the attorneys’ services. In re Walsh, 538 B.R. 466, 475 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (citations omitted).
e) Section 330(a)(3): Compensation for relevant factors, including time, rate, and customary compensation
In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee under Chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including—
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title
(emphasis added). When a Chapter 13 debtor’s plan is not confirmed, and the debtor’s attorneys seek administrative expenses, the attorneys must show they “provided substantial, valuable professional services including investigation, evaluation, and counseling that was intended and designed to achieve an objective appropriate for Chapter 13 cases.” Garris, 496 B.R. at 350.
Here, Geraci Law acted reasonably because they provided substantial, valuable, and professional services that were consistent with the complexity of the problems. The more experienced attorneys billed at either $425 or $450 per hour. The
The automatic stay gave Debtor “a breathing spell” from her creditors. Swindle, 584 B.R. at 263 (quotation omitted). The attorneys also interviewed Debtor. They evaluated whether a Chapter 7 petition was better than a Chapter 13 petition. Even though the Court did not confirm Debtor’s Plan, the attorneys’ counseling intended and was designed to achieve an objective appropriate for Chapter 13 cases. Thus, the Court holds, after careful review, that Geraci Law’s Application for Compensation, Doc 36, shows a clear benefit to Debtor and is reasonable. Geraci Law’s Application for Compensation is allowed under
2. The Court found cause under § 349 to revest the property to Debtor’s attorneys.
Again, the Court finds the majority’s approach to the
The Trustee argues policy considerations should be the reason the Court uses
First, to address the timing argument, this Court, like many other courts, concludes, the Trustee’s argument is mistaken. Accepting the Trustee’s argument would encourage, “earlier and more frequent fee applications.” Garris, 496 B.R. at 350. Additionally, the Trustee’s argument “would ‘add complexity to the Chapter 13 process and compel the expenditure of an inordinate amount of attorney and judicial resources on the fee allowance process.’” Id. (quotation omitted). Courts may order Chapter 13 trustees to disburse funds in unconfirmed cases on “unpaid claim[s] that might be allowed under
Second, the Trustee’s 349(b) argument is wrong for another reason. The Trustee cites In re Hamilton, 493 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2013), but that case does not apply. In Hamilton, Chief Judge Lundin confirmed debtor’s plan. Id. at 32, 33 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court never confirmed Debtor’s Plan.
Third, even if Hamilton did apply, the holding hurts the Trustee’s argument. There, the Hamilton court stated, at least four times, under
Figures 1 and 2 below summarize the major provisions from
Figure 1: Attorney Compensation in Ch. 13 (Majority)
Figure 2: § 349(b)(3) Dismissal of a Case (Minority)
(Minority)
- Applies to all bankruptcy chapters
- When a case is dismissed, returns property to pre-petition status - unless the court orders otherwise
The Trustee’s Brief is wrong for three reasons. First, Sweports does not apply. In re Sweports Ltd., 777 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2015). In Sweports, the Seventh Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court when the bankruptcy court erroneously concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Chapter 11 creditors’ attorney was entitled tо attorney fees, after the bankruptcy court dismissed the case. Id. at 365, 368. Sweports does not apply because:
- Sweports was a Chapter 11 case, and this case is a Chapter 13 case. As discussed above,
§ 330(a)(4)(B) , allows Chapter 13 attorneys to be compensated when their work benefits the debtor. - The issue in Sweports was whether the bankruptcy court had the jurisdiction to order payment of fees (as opposed to “determining an entitlement to fees”) on the attorney’s second request for work. Id. at 365. Previously, the attorney made an interim request for fees, and the Court granted the request. Id. at 365, 366.
- The attorney in Sweports requested an award for attorney fees as creditor’s counsel. Id. at 365-366. Here, Geraci Law firm represents Debtor, not creditors.
Geraci Law is not yet a creditor (but would be, if the Court adopted the Trustee’s approach). Geraci Law represents Debtor;
The Brief also cites Marshall v. Johnson, another case from the Seventh Circuit. Marshall v. Johnson, 100 F.4th 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2024). It is unclear whether the Brief considers Marshall binding case law because it only discusses it in the section labeled “Statutory Construction.” Still, the Court finds Marshall inapplicable. The issue in Marshall was whether Chapter 13 trustees could deduct their own fees before disbursing the remaining funds back to debtors. Id. at 916. The case was not about distribution of all fees as the Trustee’s Brief indicates. The Seventh Circuit explained that neither exception under
Thus, different from what the Brief says, neither Sweports nor Marshall apply, and there is no other “binding” case law that mandates the Court order the Trustee to disburse the funds to Debtor and not Debtor’s attorneys.
C. Brief’s Argument: “Harm Created by a Contrary Ruling – Burden Shifting”
Section (I)(D) of the Brief states, “Harm Created by a Contrary Ruling – Burden Shifting,” and the first sentence in this section reads, “Trustee fees are not compensation to the Trustee, but instead are reimbursement to the Trust for costs .…” [Doc 41 at p. 9.] The Brief also says, “shifting costs for disbursements that are
The Court does not understand how the Trustee distributing the funds to Debtor instead of Debtor’s attorneys shifts a burden or harms other debtors. Further, the Trustee did not support the argument with statutes, rules, case law, or data. The arguments pertained tо whether the Trustee could be compensated for the Trustee’s expenses in unconfirmed Chapter 13 cases. They make no sense here, and the Court disregards them.
D. Brief’s Argument: “Debtor’s Ability to Compromise/Contract with Trustee”
The Trustee states that Debtor, Debtor’s attorneys, and the Trustee reached a settlement agreement where the Trustee would pay Debtor, and then Debtor would pay Geraci Law. [Doc 41 at pp. 1, 10.]
The Trustee never filed a motion to settle or compromise, nоr did the Trustee give notice to creditors. And even if the Trustee did both things, parties may not enter into an agreement to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code. Rogers, 519 B.R. at 271 (explaining, “the Code is not preempted or supplanted by the supposed attorney’s lien or [debtor’s attorney] contract with the debtor.”); see generally In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 596 B.R. 631, 659 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2019) (citation omitted) (explaining that a party’s right to contract around an essential provision of the Bankruptcy Code is pre-empted). Allowing parties to contract around the Code would render the Code useless. In re Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 B.R. 258, 263 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (quoting In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 246 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)).
Further, no party would be able to enforce the parties’ separate agreement. Garris, 496 B.R. at 354 (citations omitted) (explaining “[a] fee that is not enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code is not transformed by virtue of a private agreement, into an enforceable one after a case is dismissed, even if such an agreement would be otherwise enforceable under state law.”) Geraci Law would be unable to collect fees without the Court’s approval. Rogers, 519 B.R. at 271 (citing Garris, 496 B.R. at 353-54).
Additionally, the settlement would leave Debtor worse than she was before filing her bankruptcy petition. As the Brief says, if the Court dismissed the case and the Trustee gave the funds directly to Debtor, Debtor would now have “obligations to counsel.” [Doc 41 at p. 11.] So, if the Court were to accept the Trustee’s approach after the Court dismissed the case, Debtor would not be in the same position she was in before she filed her Petition. She would be in a less desirable position because she would have a new creditor – Geraci Law. If she did not pay Geraci Law and sought to file another bankruptcy petition, Geraci Law would be unable to represent her. In Debtor’s hypothetical new petition, Debtor would list Geraci Law as a creditor and the attorneys would be in a position where they would be seeking to discharge the
Here, the Court declines to accept an unapproved, unenforceable settlement agreement. The Trustee must distribute payments as laid out in
V. Brief’s Shortcomings under Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
The Seventh Circuit said, “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). The Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ind. R. Prof. Cond.”)10 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Fed. R. Bank. P.”)11 codify this sentiment. Under the Ind. R.
Under
…
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions arе warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or to establish new law; [and]
(3) the allegations and factual contentions have evidentiary support—or if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
The Court was prepared to hear arguments on the Trustee’s Objection. But the Trustee was not prepared and asked for additional time to file a supporting Brief. The Court granted the Trustee’s request and gave her 34 days to file the Brief. Still, the Court had to hunt for the arguments buried in the Trustee’s Brief. Some errors could be seen as a reasonable misconstruction оf case law. Other arguments, some discussed above, and others included below, misstated case law, did not indicate that
Figure 3 below cites the 13 deficient arguments previously mentioned above; captures additional questionable arguments, misleading quotes, a non-existent Bankruptcy Rule; internally inconsistent and contradictory arguments; and describes other problems with the Trustee’s Brief. The Court would not have a problem if the issues below were isolated, or if only a few of them appeared. But collectively, they may suggest that the Trustee has violated one or more оf the Ind. R. Prof. Cond or
| Issue | The Trustee’s Brief Says | Why the Brief is Wrong |
|---|---|---|
| 1) | “Trustee contends that she has established cause for denial of Debtor’s Application for Compensation as originally submitted only to the extent the Court intends to order such payment to be made to counsel directly from Trustee as conduit, contrary to Marshall v. Johnson, 100 F.4th 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2024)…” [p. 1.] | The Brief takes Marshall out of context. Marshall concluded that the Chapter 13 trustee must return her fee. Marshall, 100 F.4th at 916. Marshall did not state that the trustee must return the fees to the debtor and not debtor’s counsel. Marshall never mentions |
| 2) | “[C]ontrary to the agreement that the parties negotiated (consisting of an offer, acceptance, consideration and a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties) and submitted by Debtor in her proposed order.” [p. 1.] | No Agreement was filed with the Court. |
| 3) | “[D]espite the noted agreement between the parties and the negotiated proposed order…” [p. 2.] | No Agreement was filed with the Court. |
| 4) | “In particular, | The Brief implies there was no “notice and hearing.” “Notice and hearing” has a specific meaning in bankruptcy. Under |
| 5) | “And Section 503(b) provides that a claim is allowed only after notice and hearing.” [p. 6.] | As stated above, the Brief implies there was no “notice and hearing,” but that assertion is not true. |
| 6) | “Indeed, as the Supreme Court reminds us, if an interpretation of one provision ‘would render another provision superfluous, courts presume that interpretation is incorrect.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010).” [p. 6] (emphasis added). | The bolded part of the quotation does not appear in Bilski. |
| 7) | “The Trustee must convey the estate back immediately, without providing for attorney fees, especially where such fees were not allowed prior to dismissal.” In re Ward, 523 B.R. 142, 147-148 (E.D. Wis. 2014). [p. 7.] | This citation misstates Ward’s holding. After the bankruptcy case was appealed to the district court, the district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s reasoning but affirmed the bankruptcy court because the judge did not abuse his discretion. Ward, 523 B.R. at 148, 151. What the Trustee cited is a portion of the opinion, where the district court discussed the different approaches to |
| 8) | “Any administrative claim paid by the estate must be for the purpose of ‘preserving the estate.’” [p. 7.] | This statement is not true in Chapter 13 cases. As previously discussed, The Brief never mentions |
| 9) | “F.R.B.P. Rule 1019(6) unequivocally provides that a request for administrative expense incurred before conversion is ‘timely’ under §503(a) of the Code if it is filed before conversion or a time fixed by the court.” [p. 8.] | |
| 10) | “Therefore, if there has been no notice or hearing, and thus no administrative claim allowed prior to “Trustee does not contest counsel’s entitlement to some amount of fees amounting to a debt owing by the Debtor despite the lack of hearing to meet their burden of proof.” [p. 9.] | The Brief says there was no “notice and hearing.” That statement is incorrect. There was a hearing on the Trustee’s objection. [Doc entry 01/22/2026.] There was not a hearing on the reasonableness of fees because the Trustee did not object to reasonableness or entitlement of fees. In fact, the Trustee explicitly says she is not contesting entitlement to fees. “Notice and hearing” has a specific meaning in bankruptcy. Under |
| 11) | “Trustee fees are not compensation to the Trustee, but instead are reimbursement to the Trust for costs, and based upon the budget of the Trust the percentage fee of such costs for each compliant debtor in an active chapter 13 case is set to cover all costs, with the Trust remaining non-profit. In other words, shifting costs for disbursements that are not required to be made by the Trust to the Trust by ordering such disbursements shifts those costs to all other debtors.” [p. 9.] | As stated above, this statement has nothing to do with this case and appears to have been cut and pasted from the Trustee’s briefs in other cases. |
| 12) | “[C]ontrary to the agreement that the parties negotiated (consisting of an offer, acceptance, consideration and a meeting of the minds of the | No Agreement was filed with the Court. |
| 13) | In re Hamilton, 493 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2013) supports the Trustee’s position. [Doc 41 at p. 11.] | The Brief does not mention that Hamilton involved a confirmed plan or that Hamilton is consistent with the Court’s order. |
The Court rejects the Trustee’s arguments. First, the majority approach to the
The Trustee’s third argument, the harm created by a contrary ruling, does not apply to these facts, and it appears to be cut and pasted from previous briefs. The fourth argument, Debtor’s ability to compromise, lacks support from the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and case law.
The Court will enter two separate orders. The first will award Geraci Law its request for compensation as an allowed administrative expense under
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 10, 2026
PAUL E. SINGLETON
United States Bankruptcy Judge