In re Navaeh W.
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Renee Bevacqua Bollier, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
SHELDON, J. In this appeal from the judgments of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the respondent mother1 as to her two minor daughters, Nevaeh W., age six, and Janiyah A., age four, the respondent raises three claims of error. With respect to the adjudicatory phase of the termination proceeding, the respondent claims that the trial court erred in finding: (1) that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children; and (2) that she had failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of her daughters, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. With respect to the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding, the respondent claims deficiencies in the process by which the trial court determined that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of her two children. Specifically, she asserts that the trial court based its best interests determination solely upon its findings as to the children’s positive relationship with and likely future adoption by their preadoptive foster parents, without considering or making written findings as to the children’s relationship with her, as expressly required by
The respondent gave birth to her daughter, Nevaeh, in July, 2008. Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 2008, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, invoked an administrative ninety-six hour hold as to Navaeh due to the respondent’s alleged ‘‘substance abuse, unaddressed mental health issues and unstable housing.’’ An order of temporary custody subsequently was issued on September 8, 2008, and sustained on October 23, 2008. The respondent later engaged in substance abuse treatment at Coventry House, an inpatient facility, where Nevaeh was returned to her care and custody under an order of protective supervision on January 8, 2009. On April 3, 2009, the petitioner invoked a second ninety-six hour hold as to Navaeh after the respondent was discharged from Coventry House for noncompliance with program rules.
In March, 2010, after Nevaeh’s recommitment to the petitioner, the respondent gave birth to Janiyah. Several months after Janiyah’s birth, in January, 2011, Nevaeh’s commitment was revoked and she was reunited with the respondent under an order of protective supervision. On July 2, 2012, the respondent was arrested,2 whereupon an order of temporary custody was granted
On February 22, 2013, the petitioner filed termination petitions with respect to the two children, alleging that the respondent’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds that she had failed to rehabilitate, and that she had abandoned the children. A joint trial on the two petitions took place over two days, commencing on October 15, 2013, and ending on November 20, 2013. The respondent was represented at the trial by counsel, as were the children.3 The petitioner called four witnesses to testify in support of the petitions for termination, and the respondent called two witnesses to testify on her behalf. Thereafter, on January 27, 2014, the trial court, Cronan, J., rendered its decision. In a seven page memorandum of decision, the court granted both petitions on the grounds that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of her daughters, she could assume a responsible position in their lives, and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her children. Thereafter, the respondent filed the present appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to review the respondent’s claims.
I
The respondent claims initially that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings in the adjudicatory phase of the termination proceeding. Specifically, she claims that the court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children; and (2) that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation to satisfy the requirements of
‘‘Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The determinations reached by the trial court that the evidence is clear and convincing will be disturbed only if [any challenged] finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aziza S.-B., 138 Conn. App. 639, 657, 53 A.3d 1001 (2012). ‘‘[G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 488, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). ‘‘We do not examine the record to determine whether
‘‘The legal framework for deciding termination petitions is well established. [A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
A
Reunification Efforts
The respondent first claims that the court erred in finding that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children, as required by
As a preliminary matter,
In making its determination that reasonable efforts had been made in this case, the court found the following. ‘‘[The department] has provided numerous opportunities to [the respondent] for treatment of her substances and mental health problems that would
The respondent argues that, contrary to the court’s conclusions, the evidence shows that the department had ‘‘written her off’’ based upon her prior unsuccessful attempts to complete treatment, as a result of which it had allegedly chosen not to provide her with additional services. In addition, she claims that the evidence shows that she had made a ‘‘substantial step’’ prior to the termination proceedings, in that she had voluntarily sought treatment for her alcohol abuse and achieved sobriety. Accordingly, she argues, the department had an obligation to reengage with her and provide her additional services aimed at reunification as well as to afford her additional opportunities for visitation with her children.
In support of her argument, the respondent directs our attention to In re Vincent B., 73 Conn. App. 637, 645, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 814 A.2d 136 (2003), in which this court reversed an order terminating a father’s parental rights because the department had made ‘‘no efforts at reunification at all.’’ In In re Vincent B., the respondent father had a lengthy history with the department as a result of previous termination petitions that had been filed with respect to his other children. Id., 642. Based upon the father’s previous failure to avail himself of services, the department concluded that he would be similarly unwilling or unable to benefit from efforts at reunification with his child, Vincent. Id. Accordingly, the department did not contact the father or offer him any services prior to seeking termination of his parental rights. Id., 643. In reversing the termination order, this court held that the department’s decision to make ‘‘no efforts’’ to reunify the father with his son was not reasonable. Id., 645. This court also noted that there was evidence in the record that the father had undergone substance abuse treatment and was sober and, thus, it was likely that he would benefit from reunification services. Id., 646.
There are important differences between In re Vincent B. and the present case. First and foremost, in this case there is no evidence that the department ever denied the respondent services; in fact, there is evidence that the department made repeated efforts to provide the respondent with inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling. The respondent concedes that referrals for such services were indeed made, but claims that these services were inadequate to assist her because they were not tailored to meet her individual needs. She argues, inter alia, that
The record indicates that the department began offering the respondent services shortly after Nevaeh’s birth in 2008. These services were designed to help the respondent address the problems that interfered with her ability to parent Navaeh, particularly her alcohol abuse and mental health issues. In addition, the respondent was provided with supportive housing. The record shows that on two occasions when the respondent successfully completed programs in 2009 and 2011, she was reunified with Nevaeh. The department made similar efforts to provide appropriate services to the respondent after the children came into the custody of the petitioner in July, 2012. Joel Pullen, a department social worker, testified as to the department’s efforts at reunification prior to trial, which included a referral to the Fresh Start program in Hartford. The respondent did not complete the Fresh Start program, and the department subsequently made a referral to the APT Foundation. In sum, the record reflects that this is not a case where the department made no efforts at reunification at all. See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn. App. 645.
Another important distinction between the present case and In re Vincent B. is that here there is evidence that the respondent herself undermined the department’s efforts to facilitate reunification with her children. Pullen testified that in November, 2012, he informed the respondent that the department intended to place the children with the foster family that had previously served as a placement for Nevaeh in 2009 and 2010. The respondent, who reportedly had a difficult relationship with the foster family, was not in agreement with that plan. According to Pullen’s testimony, ‘‘[she] made it very clear to me, to my supervisor, to my program manager that she was very disgusted with the plan for her child to be placed in the foster home and she [did not] want anything to do with the [department’s case], the involvement of her daughters or any further visits.’’ The respondent subsequently withdrew from her inpatient substance abuse treatment program without providing a forwarding address to the department. The respondent did not resurface until February, 2013.
As previously noted, in assessing the department’s reunification efforts, ‘‘[t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tabitha T., supra, 51 Conn. App. 600. It is well established that ‘‘[t]he department is not required to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts.
The trial court’s determination of this issue will not be overturned on appeal unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it is clearly erroneous. In re Destiny R., 134 Conn. App. 628, 628–29. In light of the evidence that was presented at trial, the court reasonably concluded that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with her children.
B
Rehabilitation
The respondent next claims that the court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had failed to rehabilitate to the degree required by
Failure to rehabilitate is one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under
In assessing whether a parent can achieve personal rehabilitation within a reasonable time frame, the trial court is accorded substantial deference. ‘‘We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [O]n review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jordan T., supra, 119 Conn. App. 755.
In this case, the court heard testimony, reviewed the psychological evaluation and the social study, and found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate to the degree required by
Ines Schroeder, a court-appointed psychologist who evaluated the respondent’s case in October, 2012, and August, 2013, testified to her observations and conclusions at trial. In Schroeder’s initial assessment, dated October 15, 2012, she was unable to provide a recommendation as to whether reunification was advisable. Instead, she directed the court’s attention to several factors both in favor of reunification and against it. Later, however, in her updated evaluation, dated August 12, 2013, Schroeder advised against further efforts at reunification. Schroeder concluded, upon further evaluation after interviewing the respondent a second time, that the respondent would need ‘‘at least a year to show stability in her sobriety and mental health treatment as well as to show consistency in her employment and living arrangements.’’
Schroeder thus opined that, although the respondent was making progress with her problems with alcohol and in securing employment, she would need additional time to address her mental health problems, so as to reduce the likelihood of future relapses. Schroeder further testified that she had gathered additional information regarding the circumstances of the children, and
Testimony by the respondent’s witnesses also suggested she would benefit from continued treatment. Nora Cleary, the respondent’s case manager at the Elm City Women and Children Center in New Haven, testified that the respondent had been receiving inpatient treatment under her supervision at the center for approximately three months prior to trial, and that she appeared to be doing well. Cleary testified, however, that although the respondent had been following the center’s rules and had not relapsed, she continued to suffer from depression. Cleary attributed the respondent’s depression, in part, to the turmoil associated with the loss of her children. Cleary testified that the respondent would benefit from additional time at the center to continue working through her issues. She based this conclusion on her individual assessment of the respondent, as well as on her general understanding that the ‘‘more sober time that people have under their belt the better.’’
On appeal, the respondent directs our attention to the testimony of Schroeder and Cleary, arguing that such evidence indicated that, by the time of trial, she had sought treatment to control her alcohol abuse and had made significant progress toward rehabilitation. In addition, she argues that the court failed to make specific findings as to her past participation in various programs or as to what she claims to have been her valid reasons for failing to complete those programs. In essence, the respondent argues that the court disregarded or undervalued evidence she deems significant, while relying on other evidence to reach its conclusion.
‘‘Our function as an appellate court is to review and not retry the proceeding . . . . The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 262, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). There was evidence presented to the court that suggested that the respondent has made unsuccessful attempts to control her alcohol abuse and that problems stemming from alcohol abuse had thwarted her efforts to reunite with her children and live a productive life. Although there was evidence that the respondent had made progress at the time of trial, there was also evidence that she would need additional time to attain stability in her sobriety and her mental health treatment. In light of such evidence, the court found that the respondent’s problems were ‘‘ongoing’’ and that she was unable to provide necessary care for her children.
The respondent argues that rehabilitation does not require a parent to assume full responsibility for a child, without the aid of available support systems. See In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn. App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert.
The respondent also argues that alcohol abuse, ‘‘standing alone,’’ does not support termination of parental rights on lack of rehabilitation grounds. Even assuming that that is true, the evidence before the court suggested that the respondent had been struggling with several issues—her mental health, abuse of alcohol, and lack of proper housing. The court found that the respondent had been inconsistent in addressing ‘‘her ongoing needs.’’ Thus, the respondent’s argument, that alcohol abuse was the sole basis for the court’s finding of failure to rehabilitate, is unfounded.
We conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the court’s finding that despite the respondent’s ongoing participation in several treatment programs, she had failed to achieve the degree of stability necessary to assume parental responsibility for her children.
II
The respondent next claims error in the dispositional phase of the challenged proceeding on the basis of alleged deficiencies in the court’s determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her two children. The court’s determination, she asserts, was based solely upon its finding under
We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard
In seeking termination of parental rights, the petitioner has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, both that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 675–76, 420 A.2d 875 (1979); In re Sheena I., 63 Conn. App. 713, 725, 778 A.2d 997 (2001); see also
Although neither the statute nor the case law interpreting it expressly requires the trial court to rely upon its mandatory findings as to any particular factor or factors as the explicit basis for its ultimate decision whether to terminate parental rights; In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 687–95; both the statute and controlling case law make it clear that the trial court has a mandatory obligation to consider and make written findings as to all such factors in the course of making that ultimate decision.10
Relevant to the respondent’s claim in this case is
Here, before reaching its ultimate conclusion as to the children’s best interests, the court correctly listed the seven statutory factors set forth in
We are mindful, of course, that the court’s memorandum of decision must be read and considered in its entirety. See In re Halle T., 96 Conn. App. 815, 839–42, 902 A.2d 670 (court considered respondent’s care for child and efforts at rehabilitation and found termination was in child’s best interests), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006); In re Aziza S.-B., supra, 138 Conn. App. 655–59 (court did not fail to consider parent-child relationship). Here, however, the court’s abbreviated decision contains no reference at all, either express or implied, to the children’s feelings or emotional ties with respect to the respondent.11 The petitioner argues that such consideration is evidenced by the court’s reference in its decision to Nevaeh’s commitments in 2008, 2009, and 2012.12 The court’s adjudicatory finding with respect to Nevaeh’s previous removals from the respondent, however, is utterly silent as to Nevaeh’s feelings or emotional ties with respect to the respondent. Furthermore, of course, the court’s fleeting reference to Nevaeh’s commitments sheds absolutely no light on the feelings and emotional ties of Janiyah with respect to the respondent.13
The trial court’s decision, read in its totality, simply contains no finding at all concerning the feelings and emotional ties of either child with respect to the respondent, and thus gives no evidence that the court considered that critical issue, as the law required it to, in making the delicate, life-altering determination that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. In the absence of such consideration and related findings, the court was not empowered to reach, much less to decide, whether it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. See
The judgments are reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings before a different judicial authority on the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding. The judgments are affirmed in all
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
SHELDON, J.
JUDGE