234 Conn. 194 | Conn. | 1995
The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the petitioner father’s petitions
The Appellate Court in its opinion narrated the following undisputed facts. “During the petitioner’s mar
“On May 14, 1991, the petitioner filed petitions in the Court of Probate for the district of Derby seeking to terminate his parental rights with respect to both children. Both petitions alleged the following reasons for seeking such termination of parental rights: ‘Since the date of dissolution, the children have been used as pawns. I have been denied visitation when requested. Allegations have been raised that I am not a fit father which led the Superior Court to enter supervised visitation. Since that order, additional problems with visitation have arisen which are now affecting the well-being of the children. In mid-winter 1990/1991, Respondent, mother of the minor [children], suggested that in the best interest of the children, that I consent to termination of my parental rights. After careful consideration and thought and after reviewing the inability of Respondent and me to discuss any difficulties that we have, including important matters in the [children’s lives], it is clear that I agree with her contention that my parental rights be terminated. The [children’s] well-being is affected adversely by the difficulties between Respondent and me which I do not believe can be cured through counseling. It is further clear that the ultimate
“On motion of the respondent, the petitions for termination of parental rights were ordered transferred from the Court of Probate to the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715 (g). On July 7,1992, the attorney for the children requested that the court issue an order to obtain updated evalu
The respondent mother, who contested the termination of the petitioner’s parental rights in the trial court, appealed. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that when the parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination, General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq. “requires that the trial court consider, as one of the elements necessary to make the determination of what is in the best interests of the children, the financial condition of the natural parents.” Id., 184-85. The Appellate Court stressed: “We do not hold, nor do we imply, that the financial conditions of the parents may alone determine the best interests of a child. We do hold that the trial court must be adequately apprised of such financial condition, must give it due consideration, and must accord it as much weight in its decision as the trial court in its discretion deems appropriate in light of all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed termination of parental rights.” Id., 185.
On appeal, the petitioner contends that § 45a-715 et seq. contain no mandate that the trial court consider the financial condition of the parents in determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings and, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly construed the statutory scheme to impose
Before turning to the petitioner’s claims, it is necessary to understand fully the significance of the issue before this court. “[T]he termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.” Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430, 362 A.2d 532, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 294, 46 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1975). A judgment terminating a parent’s rights not only severs the emotional and physical ties between parent and child, but also absolves that parent of all future support obligations. General Statutes § 45a-707 (g).
I
The petitioner first claims that the Appellate Court improperly required that the financial condition of the parents be considered by a trial court as one of the criteria for determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the procedure and criteria for the consensual termination of parental rights are
The termination of parental rights is governed strictly by statute.
In evaluating a petition, the court employs a standard that varies depending upon whether the parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination. To grant a consensual petition, the court must find “upon clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child and that, with respect to any consenting parent, such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of his parental rights with respect to such child . . . .” General Statutes § 45a-717 (f); see footnote 2. Thus, the consensual termination of parental rights under § 45a-717 (f) turns on two findings, both of which must be established on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. Initially, the trial court must find that the parent whose rights are being terminated has “voluntarily and knowingly” consented to the proceedings. See General Statutes § 45a-715 (d) (written consent form must
Nonconsensual termination proceedings, also governed by § 45a-717 (f); see footnote 2; involve a different two step process. First, the petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the specified statutory bases for termination, namely, that: (1) “[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent”; (2) “the child has been denied ... the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being”; or (3) “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.” General Statutes § 45a-717 (f) (1) through (3); footnote 2; see In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 517, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); see also In re Kelly S., 29 Conn. App. 600, 617-18, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992). Second, if one of the statutory bases is proven, then the court proceeds to the dispositional phase in which the petitioner must prove, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that the termination would be in the best interest of the child. In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994); In re Valerie D., supra, 511. “Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for [non-consensual] termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Valerie D., supra, 511. In the dispositional phase of a nonconsensual case, when the focus is on the best interest of the child, General Statutes § 45a-717 (h)
Unlike § 45a-717 (h) which enumerates certain factors that must be considered regarding the affected child’s best interest in granting a nonconsensual petition, no statute describes the factors that must be considered in the case of a consensual petition. In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 182-83. Identification of the relevant factors in this context is a question of legislative intent. We approach this question according to well established principles of statutory construction designed to further our fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). “ ‘In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
As discussed above, the trial court’s paramount objective, pursuant to § 45a-717 (f), is to determine what would be in the child’s best interest. This phrase is purposefully broad to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion based upon a host of considerations. What is clear, however, is that in deciding whether to grant a consensual petition to terminate parental rights, focus must be on how the child’s well-being would be affected by the loss of the consenting parent, not on the consenting parent’s desire to rid himself or herself of the unwanted obligation to support that child.
Although the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 45a-717 (f) are silent on the issue before the court, the legislature clearly expressed the policy that guides our determination in this case. General Statutes § 45a-706 expressly provides that § 45a-717 “shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition has been filed . . . .” See Guille v. Guille, 196 Conn. 260, 266, 492 A.2d 175 (1985) (broadly construing statutes regarding parental support of minor children); Faraday v. Dube, 175 Conn. 438, 443, 399 A.2d 1262 (1978) (same).
The petitioner argues that we must strictly construe all statutory provisions regarding the termination of parental rights, including the phrase “best interest of the child” as it is used in § 45a-717 (f). Although it is true that we have insisted upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria in the adjudicatory phase of non-
The present situation is different in that the petitioner has initiated this action in order to abandon his responsibility to support his children. Hence, the mandate of § 45a-706 compels the conclusion that the legislature intended that the best interest of the child be construed generously and broadly, rather than strictly and narrowly, in consensual termination proceedings. This construction is in accord with our decisions, albeit in other contexts, in which we have liberally interpreted the phrase “best interest of the child.” See, e.g., Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 230 Conn. 828, 848-49, 646 A.2d 822 (1994) (guardianship); In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 165, 554 A.2d 722 (1989) (custody); Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 414, 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (visitation); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 22, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993) (foster care).
“Statutes are to be construed consistently with other relevant statutes, because we presume that the legislature intended to create a coherent body of law. Baybank Connecticut, N.A. v. Thumlert, [222 Conn. 784, 790, 610 A.2d 658 (1992)].” In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. 533. Thus, we must assume that the subsections of § 45a-717 form a consistent body of law. “ ‘A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be con
Our analysis of what factors must be considered in evaluating the child’s best interest in a consensual termination petition is informed, therefore, by the other subsections of § 45a-717. Specifically, § 45a-717 (e) (1) requires that, in any contested case, the mandatory investigative report prepared by the department of children and families, or its designee, contain information relevant to the financial condition of the parents. The statute also provides that in a noncontested case the commissioner may request such information. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that information regarding the financial support of the minor child is considered as a factor, along with the child’s emotional, physical and educational well-being, in assessing the affected child’s best interest.
Because the present case is contested by the respondent mother, § 45a-717 (e) (1) requires the court to ensure that adequate information regarding the financial condition of the parents is before the court. It would be illogical to require a trial court to receive this material, but then not to require the trial court at least to consider the information therein contained. This requirement is particularly important in cases such as this one, where a father seeks to divest himself of responsibility for his children. Requiring that the parents’ financial condition be a consideration in determining the children’s best interest will deter the filing of a consensual petition that is no more than a ruse or a sham to avoid support obligations. Further, such information will enable the trial court to make a determination that is searching, penetrating and thorough.
Indeed, to interpret the current statutory scheme to permit a trial court to forgo consideration of the financial condition of the parents would ignore the clear federal and state policies that indisputably mandate that, in all but the most extreme cases, children should be maintained and supported by their parents. “[Bjoth state and national policy has been, and continues to be, to ensure that all parents support their children and that children who do not live with their parents benefit from adequate and enforceable orders of child support.
Connecticut child support enforcement legislation clearly evinces a strong state policy of ensuring that minor children receive the support to which they are entitled. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46b-37 (b) (“it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family”); General Statutes §§ 52-362b, 52-362c and 52-362Í (child support can be withheld from paychecks of parents or from unemployment compensation); General Statutes § 52-362e (unpaid support obligations can be deducted from federal and state income tax refunds); General Statutes § 52-362d (a) (lien may be placed on “any property, real or personal” of obligor who owes $500 or more of child support); General Statutes
In addition, we repeatedly have recognized that children must be supported adequately. See, e.g., Masters v. Masters, 201 Conn. 50, 67-68, 513 A.2d 104 (1986) (review of child support awards); Guille v. Guille, supra, 196 Conn. 266 (parent cannot, without court approval, contract away obligation of support for minor children); Burke v. Burke, 137 Conn. 74, 79, 75 A.2d 42 (1950) (common law prohibited parents from contractually restricting or defeating their children’s right to support); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 195 Conn. 344, 352, 488 A.2d 790 (1985) (recognizing that established public policy of state is to protect children and to make home safe for children); In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 190 Conn. 310, 318-19, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983) (recognizing state’s “continuing parens patriae interest .. . in the well being of children”); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 170-71, 425 A.2d 939 (1979)
Likewise, current federal child support enforcement legislation clearly demonstrates a federal policy of ensuring the financial support of children by their parents. See, e.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (child support can be withheld from paychecks of parents delinquent for one month); Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (federal law requires that states provide for imposition of liens against property of defaulting parent-obligor and reporting of delinquencies in excess of $1000 to credit companies); Title IV-D of Social Security Act (unpaid support obligations can be deducted from federal and state income tax refunds); 42 U.S.C. § 653 (deserting parents can be located through Parent Locator Service).
Similarly, the courts of our sister states universally have held that parents may not voluntarily terminate their parental rights simply to avoid their responsibility to support their children. See, e.g., Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614, 616-17 (Ala. 1987), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990) (termination of parental rights statutes not meant to be “means for a parent to avoid his obligation to support his child”); Husband (K) v. Wife (K), 343 A.2d 597, 599 (Del. Super. 1975) (father may not defeat court support order by willfully refusing to reach his reasonable earning capacity); In re K.L.S., 180 Ga. App. 688, 689, 350 S.E.2d 50 (1986) (“statutory authority of the juvenile court to entertain petitions to terminate parental
Legislative and judicial efforts to hold parents to their financial responsibility to support their children would be eviscerated if we were to allow an unfettered legal avenue through which a parent without regard to the best interest of the child could avoid all responsibility for future support. “We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63-64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). [Turner v. Turner, supra, 219 Conn. 713]. Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 453, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993); see also State v. Johnson, [227 Conn. 534, 542, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993)]; Fairfield Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. Kosa, 220 Conn. 643, 650-51, 600 A.2d 1 (1991).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concept Associates, Ltd. v. Board of Tax Review, 229 Conn. 618, 624, 642 A.2d 1186 (1994). Surely the legislature did not intend that § 45a-717 (f) be used as a means for a parent to avoid the obligation to support his or her children. To interpret the statutory scheme as such would alter radically the parental support obligation which our laws consistently have reinforced.
On the basis of the statutory scheme and the overwhelming public policy in support of requiring that par
II
The petitioner’s second claim is that requiring that the financial condition of the parents be considered in a consensual termination of parental rights proceeding would violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Connecticut and United States constitutions by creating an impermissible classification based on wealth.
For the above reasons, we conclude that, in a consensual termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court is required to consider the financial condition of the child’s parents in order to determine whether the termination of a parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The petitioner filed a petition to terminate his parental rights with respect to each of his minor children, Bruce R. and Jodi R.
General Statutes § 45a-717 (f) provides: “At the adjourned hearing or at the initial hearing where no investigation and report has been requested, the court may approve the petition terminating the parental rights and may appoint a guardian of the person of the child, or if the petitioner requests, the court may appoint a statutory parent, if it finds, upon clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child and that, with respect to any consenting parent, such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of his parental rights with respect to such child or that, with respect to any nonconsenting parent, over an extended period of time which, except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, shall not be less than one year: (1) The child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare
At oral argument before this court, the petitioner conceded that the trial court made no specific finding that it had considered the financial condition of the parents. Indeed, the only references in the record to the finances of the parents were: (1) the investigative report prepared by the Community Children and Family Services; (2) two brief colloquies during the hearing before the trial court that touched upon the respondent’s financial condition; and (3) the trial court’s pretrial denial of the respondent’s motion for the exchange of financial affidavits.
“General Statutes § 45a-715 (d) provides in pertinent part: ‘[E]ach consenting parent shall acknowledge such consent on a form promulgated by the office of the chief court administrator evidencing to the satisfaction of the court that the parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights. In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 179 n.1.
“The department of children and youth services has since been renamed the department of children and families. Public Acts 1993, No. 93-91, § 1.” In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 179 n.2.
General Statutes § 45a-707 (g) defines “[germination of parental rights” as “the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent or parents so that the child is free for adoption except it shall not affect the right of inheritance of the child or the religious affiliation of the child.”
General Statutes § 45a-717 (e) (1) provides: “The court may, and in any contested case shall, request the commissioner of children and families or any child-placing agency licensed by the commissioner to make an investigation and written report to it, within ninety days from the receipt of such request. The report shall indicate the physical, mental and emotional status of the child and shall contain such facts as may be relevant to determine whether the proposed termination of parental rights will be for the welfare of the child, including the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the natural parents, and any other factors which the commissioner or such agency finds relevant to determine whether the proposed termination will be for the welfare of the child.” (Emphasis added.)
Both the common law; 59 Am. Jur. 2d. § 51; and the statutory law; General Statutes § 46b-37; recognize that a parent has an obligation to support a minor child to the best of the parent’s ability. This obligation is deeply rooted in our law. For example, in the 1750s, Blackstone stated: “The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law .... By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life that they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have a perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents. . . . [A]nd the manner in which this obligation shall be performed, is thus pointed out. The father, and mother, grandfather, and grandmother of poor impotent persons shall maintain them at their own charges, if of sufficient ability . . . and if a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the churchwardens and overseers of the parish shall seize his rents, goods, and chattels, and dispose of them towards their relief.” (Emphasis in original.) 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) pp. 435-36.
General Statutes § 45a-715 (a) provides: “Any of the following persons may petition the court of probate to terminate parental rights of all persons who may have parental rights regarding any minor child or for the termination of parental rights of only one parent provided the application
A parent voluntarily may petition for the termination of his or her parental rights, even in the absence of a pending adoption or state custodial placement. General Statutes § 45a-715 (a); In re Theresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 30-31, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn. App. 180-81.
General Statutes § 45a-716 (b) provides: “The court shall cause notice of the hearing to be given to the following persons as applicable: (1) The parent or parents of the minor child, including any parent who has been removed as guardian on or after October 1, 1973, under section 45a-606; (2) the father of any minor child bom out of wedlock, provided at the time of the filing of the petition (A) he has been adjudicated the father of such child by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (B) he has acknowledged in writing to be the father of such child, or (C) he has contributed regularly to the support of such child, or (D) his name appears on the birth certificate, or (E) he has filed a claim for paternity as provided under section 46b-172a, or (F) he has been named in the petition as the father of the minor child by the mother; (3) the guardian or any other person whom the court shall deem appropriate; (4) the commissioner of children and families. If the recipient of the notice is a person described in subdivision (1) or (2) of
In the present case, it is uncontested that the petitioner voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights.
General Statutes § 45a-717 (h) provides: “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent,
For a comprehensive discussion of the issue of child support enforcement policy, see H. Krause, “Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest,” 24 Fam. L.Q., No. 1 (1990).
Indeed, during the hearing before it, the trial court heard an exchange between the respondent and her counsel that was illustrative of the potential for abuse of the consensual termination proceeding for personal convenience:
“[Respondent’s attorney]: Based on your own personal observation or your hearing statements made by your ex-husband, do you know, not what*214 someone else had said, except for him, do you know why he has filed this petition?
“[Respondent:] To get out of financially paying for the kids.
“Q. At the time that you went to court in March of 1991 before [the trial court] at which time a restraining order was entered, did [the petitioner] make any statements to you or before anyone else as to why he would file a termination petition?
“A. For not paying support or insurance.
“Q. Did you hear him say that?
“A. It’s a matter of public record.
“Q. What did you hear?
“A. He said I will not see, talk to, or bother with the children again. I will terminate my parental rights on the grounds that I do not pay insurance or support.”
The amicus curiae brief of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation goes one step further. The amicus suggests that the Appellate Court interpreted § 45a-717 (e) (1) as requiring that the financial condition of the parents be considered in determining the best interest of the child in all contested petitions, whether or not based on consent. As such, the amicus argues that such a requirement in the context of nonconsensual petitions could adversely impact minority groups, the poor and the uneducated and could produce racially disparate results. This concern was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-64, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
We decline to consider this argument. We granted permission for an amicus brief limited solely to the issues before us which were properly raised by the parties. See Practice Book § 4067; In re Saba P., 13 Conn. App. 605, 538 A.2d 711, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 811, 541 A.2d 1241 (1988). Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, we will not determine a constitutional question of first impression that was neither raised at trial nor relied upon by the parties on appeal. See Simons v. Canty, 195 Conn. 524, 529 n.8, 488 A.2d 1267 (1985).
We note, however, that our holding today is limited explicitly to consensual termination proceedings and, as such, does not relate to the concerns expressed by the amicus. As discussed above, this appeal concerns our interpretation of the best interest of the child standard as enunciated in § 45a-717 (f) in consensual petitions. We are persuaded that the combination of §§ 45a-717 (e) (1) and 45a-706, and the overwhelming public policy of this state and our nation mandate that the financial condition of the parents be considered in determining the best interest of the child when terminating, pursuant to a consensual petition initiated by the parent, parental