IN RE NATALIE S.*
(SC 19707)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
June 6, 2017
Rоgers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued January 24
The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the “officially released” date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publiсations Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch,
Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Jоshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the appellee (respondent father).
Joseph A. Geremia, Jr., for the minor child.
Opinion
EVELEIGH, J. In this certified appeal, the respondent mother, Heather S., appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court adjudicating the minor child, Natalie S., neglected and granting temporary custody and guardianship to the respondent father, Matthew B.1 On appeal to this court, the respondent asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the Department of Children and Families (department) was not required to provide reunification efforts to her in the present case because the father was awarded temporary guardianship of Natalie. The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, asserts that the department was not required to continue providing reunification efforts to the respondent because the trial court granted custody and guardianship to the father. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.2
“[Thereafter, the father] appeared. He identified himself . . . was appointed counsel, advised, and a pro forma plea was entered. [On the basis of results from] paternity tests ordered by the court, [the father] was adjudicated [to be Natalie‘s biological father] on July 14, 2015, and a judgment of рaternity entered. On August 17, 2015, he moved the court to vacate [a previous order of temporary custody] and transfer guardianship and custody of Natalie to him. The motion was continued and consolidated with the neglect trial. . . .
“[At the neglect trial, the petitioner and the respondent presented witnesses and exhibits.] The father introduced one exhibit and testified.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Natalie S., 165 Conn. App. 604, 607–609, 139 A.3d 824 (2016). “[The trial court subsequently determined that the respondent had] failed to demonstrate that she is now or [could] in the reasonably foreseeable future be a consistent, stable, sober caregivеr to Natalie, able to meet her daily and emergency needs.
“The father was noncustodial at the time of Natalie‘s removal by [the department]. [The respondent] purposefully concealed and kept her and Natalie‘s whereabouts from being made known to him. At a meeting with [the department on] or about April 28, 2015, [the respondent] identified the father for the first time as the putative father of Natalie. After being noticed, the father appeared in [Connecticut] on or prior to May 27, 2015. Prior to May 2015, he had not seen Natalie since she was a few months old. His absence in her life is due solely to [thе respondent‘s] efforts to keep Natalie‘s whereabouts unknown to him. She knew he was Natalie‘s father. He was prevented from coming forward earlier and providing support for Natalie and presenting himself as a resource for her. He approached [the department] contending he was Natalie‘s biological father. He provided [the department] with a copy of the results of a paternity test done on July 1, 2013 in [North Carolina]. He has been fully cooperative with [the department] in every respect since then. No specific steps were issued for the father. [The departmеnt] did not recommend any services for him. [The department] could not identify any areas for services which he [needs]. He has been very responsive and fully cooperative with all requests made of him by [the department].
“The father recognizes the need and desires to keep [the respondent] involved in Natalie‘s life. He [is] willing to allow her to enjoy liberal and flexible visitation and other contact with Natalie. He has never been married and is not in a dating relationship. He continues to reside in [North Carolina] with his [parents]. [A social worker from the department, Rodney Moore] flew to [North Carolina] оn October 15, 2015, to interview [the father‘s] parents and inspect their home. His parents are his support system. They are
“The father served . . . as a parachute rigger in the 82nd Airborne Division [of the United States Army] and was honorably discharged. A background check by [the department] disclosed no criminal or domestic violence history for the father. Substance abuse test results for the father were all negative. [The respondent‘s] unsubstantiated allegation that he abused illegal and prescription drugs is given no weight by this court. He previously worked as a commercial scuba diver and with the Boy Scouts of America. He currently works with youth groups within his church. He is employed full-time as a horse farm manager. He earns about $20,000 a year. He has . . . health insurance. It is available for Natalie should shе be in his care. Since May 2015, he has travelled regularly on weekends from [North Carolina] to [Connecticut] to visit Natalie. He has driven to [Connecticut] at his expense. He has travelled to [Connecti-cut] two times by airplane. He [has] also visited with her each time he has had to appear in [Connecticut] for court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 613–15.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded as follows: “[The department] has established by a preponderance of the evidence adduced at trial that grounds for an adjudication of neglect . . . do exist in that Natalie . . . has been denied propеr care and attention and . . . has been permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being. The [father] was noncustodial at the time of the neglect. He was without knowledge or information as to the existence of the neglect and was [wilfully] prevented by [the respondent] from acquiring such knowledge. [The department] made reasonable efforts to reunite Natalie with both [the respondent and the father]. It is not in [Natalie‘s] best interest to be committed to the care and custody of [the department]. [A] [c]ause for [the] commitment of Natalie . . . to [the department] has not been proven to exist. The [father] is a worthy, suitable and appropriate person to be granted custody and guardianship of Natalie. . . . It is in [Natalie‘s] best interest for the [father] to be granted temporary custody and guardianship of her.” As a result, the trial court adjudicated Natalie neglected, vacated the order of temporary custody to the department, and granted “temporary/nonpermanent custody and guardianship” to the father.
Thereafter, the respondent appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. In that appeal, the respondent claimed that: (1) the department was required to continue efforts to reunify Natalie with her, and that the trial court incorrectly failed to order final specific steps or that the department make such additional reunification efforts; and (2) the trial court incorrectly failed to require the department to conduct further investigation into the father‘s fitness before granting custody and guardianship of Natalie to him and in permitting him to remove her to North Carolina. In re Natalie S., supra, 165 Conn. App. 604. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not incorrectly fail to order the department to make additional reunification efforts because “[t]he court‘s disposition in the present case awarding custody and guardianship to the father deprived it of continuing jurisdiction over the respondent‘s possible future reunification with Natalie and thus required the cessation of
Thereafter, the respondent filed a petition for certification to appeal, which this court granted, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that continuing reunification efforts for the respondent . . . were not required because temporary guardianship had been placed with the father?” In re Natalie S., 321 Conn. 928, 138 A.3d 287 (2016).
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court was required to order the department to continue reunification efforts despite awarding custody and guardianship to the father. Accordingly, resolution of this appeal requires us to construe
We begin by examining the statutory text. Section
The plain language of §
Furthermore, §
As this court has repeatedly recognized, “[a] neglect petition and concomitant request for an order of commitment are not a typical civil action. A neglect petition is sui generis and, unlike a complaint and answer in the usual civil case, does not lead to a judgment for or against the parties named. . . . In such proceedings, the petitioner acts not to vindicate her personal rights but, acting for the state as parens patriae, to ensure, first and foremost, the child‘s safety and, second, a permanent placement of the child as expeditiously as possible. . . . The petitioner does not seek the monetary or equitable relief of a typical civil action, but, rather, actions by the court that will further the dual goals of safety and permanency.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 158–59, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005).
This court has also explained that “[t]he adjudication and findings also have significance in that, if they result in an order of commitment, they also trigger a requirement that the court issue specific steps for reunification. . . . Although the specific steps provide a benchmark by which the court measures whether either reunification or termination of parental rights is appropriate, the court necessarily will consider the underlying adjudication and the attendant findings.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 160–61.
In furtherance of these dual goals of safety and permanency, however, our statutory scheme offers alternatives to commitment of the child to the care and custody of the department. Specifically, §
In the present case, it is undisputed that the court issued temporary specific steps tо the respondent pursuant to §
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly awarded legal guardianship of Natalie to the father and, despite being statutorily authorized to do so, did not order continuing supervision by the department. Although the trial court used the phrase “temporary/nonpermanent custody and guardianship,” we conclude that the trial court‘s decision not to order continuing supervision is controlling and demonstrates the trial court‘s recognition that the state‘s involvement in Natalie‘s life would cease. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner‘s involvement with Natalie has ceased, the case was closed, and the department was not required to continue providing reunification efforts to the respondent once guardianship was transferred to the father. See Fish v. Fish, 285 Conn. 24, 83, 939 A.2d 1040 (2008) (“[t]he periodic judicial review described in
The respondent asserts that because her parental rights have not been terminated, she retains her fundamental constitutional right to family integrity аnd that the department is required to make efforts to protect that right. This court has repeatedly recognized that “[c]oncomitant reunification efforts on the part of the parents and the department help to preserve the integrity of the family and are based on the well settled notion that [t]he right of a parent to raise his or her children [is] recognized as a basic constitutional right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 696, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). In the present case, the respondent asserts that family integrity would be preserved by continuing the department‘s involvement with the family by continuing reunification efforts for her. We disagreе.
It is axiomatic that, once a child has been adjudicated neglected, the dispositional decision must be based on the best interest of the child and that the interest of the child and the parent may diverge. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (“[a]fter the [s]tate has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge“). In the present case, the trial court determined that awarding guardianship to the father was in the best interest of the child. That finding is not a subject of this appeal.5
Indeed, this court previously has recоgnized that if a child is in the custody of the petitioner an out-of-state parent may be an appropriate placement. See In re Emoni W., 305 Conn. 723, 741, 48 A.3d 1 (2012).
Once both guardianship and custody were granted to the father in the present case, he and Natalie had a constitutional right to family integrity. As this court has recognized, “[t]his right to family integrity includes the most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy—the right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.” In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 284, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Accordingly, we cannot conclude
Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court thаt the trial court correctly determined that continuing reunification efforts for the respondent were not required because temporary custody and guardianship had been placed with the father.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of
Notes
“(b) The Commissioner of Children and Families or any other party may, at any time, file a motion with the court for a determination that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child are not required. The court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion not later than thirty days after the filing of the motion or may consolidate the hearing with a trial on a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112. The court may determine that such efforts are not required if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that: (1) The parent has subjected the child to the following aggravated circumstances: (A) The child has been abandoned, as defined in subsection (j) of section 17a-112; or (B) the parent has inflicted or knowingly permitted another person to inflict sexual molestation or exploitation or severe physical abuse on the child or engaged in a pattern of abuse of the child; (2) the parent has killed, through deliberate, nonaccidental act, another child of the parent or a sibling of the child, or has requested, commanded, importuned, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit or knowingly permitted another person to commit the killing of the child, another child of the parent or sibling of the child, or has committed or knowingly permittеd another person to commit an assault, through deliberate, nonaccidental act, that resulted in serious bodily injury of the child, another child of the parent or a sibling of the child; (3) the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated within three years of the filing of a petition pursuant to this section, provided the commissioner has made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child during a period of at least ninety days; (4) the parent was convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of sexual assault, except a conviction of a violation of section 53a-71 or 53a-73a resulting in the conception of the child; or (5) the child was placed in the care and control of the commissioner pursuant to the provisions of sections 17a-57 to 17a-60, inclusive, and section 17a-61.
“(c) If the court determines that such efforts are not required, the court shall, at such hearing or at a hearing held not later than thirty days after such determination, approve a permanency plan for such child. The plan may include (1) adoption and a requirement that the commissioner file a petition to terminate parental rights, (2) transfer of guardianship, or (3) for a child sixteen years of agе or older, such other planned permanent living arrangement as may be ordered by the court, provided the commissioner has documented a compelling reason why it would not be in the best interests of the child for the permanency plan to include one of the options set forth in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection. The child‘s health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan. If the permanency plan for a child sixteen years of age or older includes such other planned permanent living arrangement pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection, the provisions of subdivisions (3) to (5), inclusive, of subsection (k) of section 46b-129 shall be applicable.
“(d) If the court determines that reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child are not required, the Department of Children and Families shall use its best efforts to maintain the child in the initial out-of-home placement, provided the department determines that such placement is in the best interests of the child, until such time as a permanent home for the child is found or the child is placed for adoption. If the permanency plan calls for placing the child for adoption or in some other permanent home, good faith efforts shall be made to plаce the child for adoption or in some other permanent home.”