IN RE NANETTE MARIE SISK, Debtor, NANETTE MARIE SISK, Appellant. IN RE MARK IRVIN CANDALLA, Debtor, MARK IRVIN CANDALLA, Appellant. IN RE JERI LYLE SALDUA MERCADO, Debtor, JERI LYLE SALDUA MERCADO, Appellant. IN RE DENNIS MICHAEL ESCARCEGA, Debtor, DENNIS MICHAEL ESCARCEGA, Appellant.
Nos. 18-17445, 18-17446, 18-17447, 18-17448
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed June 22, 2020
D.C. Nos. 5:16-bk-50548, 5:16-bk-50659, 5:16-bk-50651, 5:16-bk-50368. Appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit. M. Elaine Hammond and Stephen L. Johnson, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding. Argued and Submitted March 6, 2020, San Francisco, California.
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Milan D. Smith, Jr. and Patrick J.
Opinion by Judge Bumatay
SUMMARY*
Bankruptcy
The panel affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel‘s decision refusing to allow confirmation of four Chapter 13 debtors’ plans with an estimated duration, and the bankruptcy court‘s subsequent confirmation of plans with a fixed duration.
Neither the bankruptcy trustee nor any unsecured creditor objected to debtors’ plans. The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court‘s rejection of the initial plans as in violation of the Bankruptcy Code and not proposed in good faith. On remand, the bankruptcy court confirmed plans with a fixed duration. This court then granted debtors’ certifications for direct appeal.
The panel held that even though only the debtors challenged the bankruptcy court‘s ruling, the panel had jurisdiction to consider their appeal because they suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer standing. The panel held that, as the only parties, the debtors need not establish prudential standing. Further, the lack of an appellee did not deprive the panel of jurisdiction, and the lack of an objection by creditors did not insulate the bankruptcy court from appellate review or abrogate debtors’ rights to challenge plan provisions that could detrimentally affect their interests.
Reversing, the panel held that when there is no objection, a bankruptcy plan need not include a fixed duration because no express provision of Chapter 13, even when viewed in the context of its broader structure, prohibits plans with estimated lengths. The panel concluded that neither
The panel vacated the BAP‘s ruling that the debtors’ proposed their initial plans in bad faith.
Affirming in part as to the BAP‘s holding regarding the bankruptcy court‘s confirmation procedures, the panel held that the bankruptcy court did not fail to hold a confirmation hearing within the timeframe prescribed by the Code and properly exercised its discretion by deferring consideration of debtors’ estimated-duration provisions until it could adequately address them.
The panel affirmed in part, reversed and vacated the BAP‘s decision in part, and remanded for further consideration.
COUNSEL
Norma L. Hammes (argued), James J. Gold, and Lucinda L.H. Gold, Gold and Hammes, San Jose, California, for for Debtor-Appellants Nanette Marie Sisk, Mark Irvin Candalla, and Dennis Michael Escarcega.
James S.K. Shulman (argued), Shulman Law Offices, San Jose, California, for Debtor-Appellant Jeri Lyle Saldua Mercado.
Jane Z. Bohrer (argued), Los Gatos, California, for Amicus Curiae Devin Derham-Burk.
OPINION
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:
Absent an objection, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes no minimum duration for a bankruptcy plan. Debtors are thus free to propose a bankruptcy plan lasting any amount of time up to the statutory maximum period of three or five years. See
BACKGROUND
To file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor must propose a plan to use future income to repay a portion of debts within the Code‘s maximum duration. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1690 (2015). If the plan is confirmed and the debtor succeeds in carrying it out, the debtor is entitled to a discharge of the debts according to the plan. Id.
Between February and March of 2016, Dennis Michael Escarcega, Nanette Marie Sisk, and Mark Irvin Candalla (“Debtors“) filed petitions for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.2
Before 2016, the San Jose Division of the Northern District of California Bankruptcy Court used a preprinted model Chapter 13 plan that expressly permitted a debtor to propose a plan with an estimated term of months. In February of 2016, bankruptcy judges of the San Jose Division began requiring debtors to use the Northern District of California‘s new Model Chapter 13 Plan (“Model Plan“). Unlike the previous plan, the new Model Plan
Under § 1.01 of the Model Plan, a debtor commits to make set payments to the trustee for a certain number of months, as shown below:
Candalla Plan 1, § 1.01(a) and (c).
Under § 2.12 of the Model Plan, a debtor must specify the amount he will pay unsecured creditors on a pro-rata basis after satisfying all other claims, as shown below:
Candalla Plan 4, § 2.12.
The Model Plan expressly authorizes a debtor to propose additional provisions that modify the preprinted text so long as those provisions are consistent with the Code.
Debtors’ bankruptcy plans largely conformed to the Model Plan, but deviated from it in two significant ways. First, Debtors added provisions replacing § 1.01‘s fixed durational language with estimated time periods. In their amendments, Debtors changed this provision with the following language:
Candalla Plan 6, § 5.02.
Second, Debtors sought to amend § 2.12‘s default dividend provision. Instead of choosing between the options presented in the Model Plan, Debtors added an alternative provision:
Candalla Plan 6, § 5.03.
Neither the trustee nor any unsecured creditor objected to Debtors’ plans. The bankruptcy court then held an initial confirmation hearing for each of the Debtors within 45 days of their meetings of creditors. See
Debtors then filed motions requesting confirmation of their plans and set hearings on the bankruptcy court‘s contested confirmation calendar. The court scheduled several additional hearings to determine the confirmability of Debtors’ plans. First, the court held individual hearings with each of the Debtors on May 19, 2016. At these hearings, the court discussed Debtors’ amendments. Next, the court scheduled additional evidentiary hearings on confirmation for late July 2016, citing the “complexity of the issues, the absence of a Trustee objection, and the need for certain factual findings.”
Before the bankruptcy court, several of the Debtors raised procedural objections to the length of the court‘s confirmation process. They protested that the additional hearings fell outside the 45-day window for confirmation hearings. See
In a consolidated joint memorandum decision, two judges of the bankruptcy court for the Northern District refused to confirm Debtors’ plans because of the additional provisions. First, the court rejected Debtors’ procedural objections. The court ruled that moving cases to the Trustee‘s Pending List did not violate federal law, and enabled the court to carry out its duty to review plans submitted under the Code. In re Escarcega, 557 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2016). The court also ruled that
The bankruptcy court also rejected the amendments to Debtors’ plans, despite recognizing that they were consistent with the way “certain plans in the San Jose Division have been administered in the recent past.” Id. at 764. The court ruled that Debtors’ amendments calling for estimated plan durations violated the Code, which “read fairly, provides that a debtor will specify a length for their plan and will carry that plan out.” Id. at 775. The bankruptcy court reasoned that plans with no specific duration were impermissibly “self-modifying,” in violation of §§ 1328(a) and 1329(b), because such provisions “construct a plan that authorizes modifications without notice to parties in interest eliminates creditor‘s rights to object to the modification.” Id. at 771.
Finally, the bankruptcy court held that Debtors’ proposed plans made “the careful structure and protections of the Bankruptcy Code ephemeral” and rendered creditors’ modification rights under
On appeal, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court, ruling that Debtors’ plans
Debtors filed certifications to appeal directly to this court, which we denied as interlocutory. Now back in the bankruptcy court, Debtors removed the offending estimated duration provisions, re-filed their plans, and had them confirmed with a fixed duration.
Debtors elected to appeal the confirmations of their bankruptcy plans in the district court rather than the BAP, and simultaneously filed certifications for direct appeal in this court. See
DISCUSSION
I.
We review the denial of Debtors’ original plans here. To obtain final, appealable orders, Debtors filed new plans with the unwanted fixed duration and appealed from the confirmation of the amended plans. See Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692-93. But we may review the bankruptcy court‘s rejection of their initial plans and the BAP‘s affirmance of the amended plan as part of this appeal. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Watt, 867 F.3d 1155, 1159-60.
We review the legal conclusions of the BAP de novo. In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the BAP‘s decision is based on the bankruptcy court‘s order, we review the bankruptcy court‘s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings—including those related to good faith—for clear error. Id. The bankruptcy court‘s evidentiary rulings, including its decision of whether to hold evidentiary hearings, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Int‘l Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2007).
II.
This case presents the somewhat unusual circumstance in which only one side, composed of the Debtors, appears before us to challenge the bankruptcy court‘s ruling. Given this unique posture, we must first assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to consider their appeal. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
A.
The Constitution restricts our jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.”
To demonstrate “injury in fact,” the pleaded injury must be both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. A “concrete” injury must actually exist; it must be “real” and not “abstract,” “remote,” or “speculative.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016); Clapper v. Amnesty Int‘l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). It need not,
The key question here is whether Debtors have shown an “injury in fact“: the “[f]irst and foremost” of standing‘s three elements. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). We are convinced that Debtors’ current and ongoing injuries meet this test.
Debtors identify three rights allegedly abridged by the bankruptcy court‘s denial of their original plans: (1) the right to file their own initial plans under
In practical terms, Debtors assert that the bankruptcy court‘s rejection of their proposed bankruptcy plans will cause them economic harm. Under their original plans, Debtors specified a fixed dividend to unsecured creditors of zero dollars ($0) and an estimated plan duration. Debtors argue that they could have exited bankruptcy easily with these plans, requesting discharge “as soon as” their priority and secured creditors’ debts were paid off. See
As a result, Debtors maintain that they will be stuck in bankruptcy for the length of the fixed period, even if they pay off all listed priority and secured debts before that period elapses. With the fixed duration, Debtors can be forced to make additional payments beyond what they would have under their original plans. During the additional time that their plans remain in effect, Debtors contend, they will be vulnerable to “hostile” plan modifications by creditors or the trustee that could increase the amounts they owe, currently set at $0, to unsecured creditors. See Escarcega, 573 B.R. at 239. In addition, this extended time may lead to greater fees being paid to the trustee. See
While Debtors concede that the exact effect of the bankruptcy court‘s order is unknown at this time, they face a “risk of real harm” and increased economic burdens due to the bankruptcy court‘s order. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Debtors have alleged that the bankruptcy court‘s order, beyond affecting their procedural rights under the Code, impaired their ability to immediately exit their bankruptcies, exposed them to greater costs and payments, and increased their burdens.
This harm is illustrated by the results in the (now moot) case of Mr. Mercado, who would have been eligible for a discharge as soon as he completed all outstanding payments under his original plan. Under his amended plan, Mr. Mercado was required to pay nearly $1,000 to unsecured creditors during the remaining term of his bankruptcy. See Chapter 13 Standing Trustee‘s Final Report and Account (Mercado), ECF No. 81 Case No. 5:16-BK-50651. The injuries stemming from the bankruptcy court‘s
The injuries are also “particularized” since each Debtor suffered an impairment to their own ongoing bankruptcy case. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. Accordingly, we conclude that Debtors suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer standing.4
B.
In the bankruptcy context, Article III is not the end of the standing inquiry. Since bankruptcy proceedings affect the “rights of many,” implicating the interests of persons not formally parties to the litigation, our court has adopted an additional prudential test to determine an appellant‘s standing to appeal a bankruptcy order. See In re P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999). This limitation stems from an interest to promote “efficient judicial administration.” Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).
Under this test, the appellant must be a “person aggrieved” by the bankruptcy order to pursue an appeal. P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 F.3d at 777. The appellant is “aggrieved” if the bankruptcy court order “diminish[es] the [appellant‘s] property, increase[s] his burdens, or detrimentally affect[s] his rights.” Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 442. Nevertheless, “[w]e generally do not invoke [this test] in instances in which the appellant was the party that brought the motion at issue on appeal.” In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, 654 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2011) (simplified). We adopted this exception because the purpose of the doctrine—limiting the appeals of remote non-parties—is not implicated when the appellant is the party below and remains integrally connected to the issues on appeal. See In re Sherman, 491 F.3d 948, 957 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007).
No reason warrants applying the “persons aggrieved” test to Debtors. In contrast to non-parties with only a remote connection to the bankruptcy proceedings, Debtors are the only parties below and remain the only parties in this appeal. Debtors also brought the filings—their own Chapter 13 plans—at issue in this appeal. We, therefore, hold that Debtors need not establish prudential standing here.5
C.
Nor does the lack of an appellee here deprive us of jurisdiction.6 The
Thus, in the bankruptcy context, courts have retained jurisdiction from unopposed proceedings challenging a decision of the bankruptcy court. In Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 159-160 (1991), the Court considered the appeal of a debtor whose bankruptcy petition was sua sponte dismissed by the bankruptcy court. Because the trustee in that case was no longer part of the bankruptcy proceedings, no opposing party appeared in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. Id. at 160 n.4. The Court found no jurisdictional issue with the lack of an adversary, but appointed an amicus to support the bankruptcy court‘s position. Id.
Our court has regularly considered bankruptcy appeals with only one party appearing. See, e.g., In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592, 596 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (no appellee briefs filed); In re Nakhuda, 797 F. App‘x 328 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (no respondent); In re Inglewood Woman‘s Club, Inc., 708 F. App‘x 392, 393 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (no appellee briefs filed). Other circuit courts have done the same. See, e.g., Matter of Kindhart, 160 F.3d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1998) (no appellee to support lower court order); In re Ramirez, 204 F.3d 595, 595 (5th Cir. 2000) (no opposing brief filed).
We see no reason why the lack of an objection by the creditors here insulates the bankruptcy court from appellate review or abrogates Debtors’ rights to challenge plan provisions which may detrimentally affect their interests. If deprived of
For the foregoing reasons, we have jurisdiction over Debtors’ appeal and we now turn to the merits of this case.
III.
We have never had occasion to decide whether a bankruptcy plan must include a fixed—rather than estimated—duration when no party objects to the plan‘s confirmation. Since no express provision of Chapter 13, even when viewed in the context of its broader structure, prohibits plans with estimated lengths, we reverse.
A.
“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Engine Mfrs. Ass‘n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). “We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). We read legislative texts “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
The Bankruptcy Code is no different. We are not at liberty to “alter the balance struck by the statute” when interpreting the Code. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017) (quoting Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 427 (2014)). “[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.” Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). Thus, we apply the traditional tools of statutory interpretation in construing the Code.
The Code expressly allows debtors to “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with [Chapter 13]” in their plans,
Only two provisions of Chapter 13 expressly discuss the duration of a bankruptcy plan. First,
Second,
“applicable commitment period.” Id.; see In re Flores, 735 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that a Chapter 13 plan under
Neither
Read together, the Code provides for a maximum duration for all plans and a minimum duration for objected-to plans. The clear implication of this framework is that, for plans with no objection, the Code provides no minimum or fixed durations. Coupled with the additional grant allowing debtors to “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with [Chapter 13]” in their plans,
The Code‘s structure also supports a debtor‘s ability to include estimated terms. Section 1328 mandates that “as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan, . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan.”
And estimated plan lengths would not interfere with fundamental aspects of the
Instead of construing the Code‘s silence on estimated terms as a permissive grant to debtors, the BAP read a prohibition where none exists. The BAP‘s decision relies principally on its interpretation of
The BAP concluded that it would not make sense to allow a debtor to have unfettered discretion to complete payments “early” and shorten the time for payments without complying with
We disagree. First,
Second, estimated term provisions do not allow debtors to unilaterally reduce the “time” for plan payments.
Third, the modification rights of creditors and trustees are not nullified by allowing a plan to be confirmed with an estimated term. After plan confirmation, both still retain the right to modify the amount, timing, and distribution of payments of a debtor‘s plan before completion of the plan.
Moreover, if creditors are concerned about a plan containing an estimated duration, they can object prior to confirmation or seek conversion to a fixed duration under
In fact,
Because the text and structure of the Code do not mandate a fixed term requirement for all Chapter 13 plans, we should not add one without clear direction from the statute. Accordingly, we hold that the Code does not prevent Debtors from proposing and confirming plans with an estimated duration.
B.
The BAP relied on several distinguishable cases to support its ruling that Chapter 13 plans confirmed without objection must have a fixed term. In Fridley, the debtors expressly committed to make plan payments for a specific period of 36 months. Fridley, 380 B.R. at 544. The BAP explained that “since they committed themselves to thirty-six months, their prepayment does not ‘complete’ their plan for purposes of
The BAP‘s interpretation of Flores, our en banc case, suffers from a similar flaw. In Flores, 735 F.3d at 862, we held that a bankruptcy court may confirm a plan under
Nevertheless, Flores is squarely an interpretation of
Finally, we disagree with the BAP‘s reading of In re Anderson, 21 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994). There, the trustee sought a plan provision to require the debtors to pay their “actual” rather than “projected” disposable income and to allow him to automatically adjust their periodic plan payments without a court order. Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358. Nevertheless,
The BAP construed Anderson to prohibit a plan provision that amounts to a plan modification without notice to the trustee or creditors or complying with
To be sure, we were also concerned that the contested plan provision in Anderson would extinguish debtors’
C.
The BAP also rested its imposition of fixed terms on policy grounds. The BAP concluded that mandating a specified plan duration in all Chapter 13 bankruptcies is consistent with Congress‘s intent in enacting the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA“)—“to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” Escarcega, 573 B.R. at 241 (citing Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 64 (2011) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005)).
We do not believe that this purpose, extrapolated from a single sentence in the congressional record, justifies judicial reconstruction of the Code. Even if Congress intended a “pro-unsecured creditor” policy in crafting the BAPCPA, we cannot upset the balance it struck in enacting the Code.10
Indeed, nothing in this decision contravenes a creditor‘s right to object to an estimated term plan prior to confirmation or to seek modification of the plan before the debtor completes payments. Even if creditors might be better served by requiring fixed minimum terms, this does not give courts license to judicially amend Chapter 13‘s requirements. “Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm‘t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989).
Moreover, there is no reason to read this particular requirement derived from Congressional purpose into the statute. Courts have identified several congressional purposes underlying Chapter 13, including “enabl[ing] the debtor to make a fresh start,” In re Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982); “affording relief only to an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor,‘” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2018); “permit[ting] eligible debtors . . . [to] pay a greater amount on debts than they would have . . . under a Chapter 7 liquidation,” In re Blendheim, 803 F.3d 477, 496 (9th Cir. 2015); and “secur[ing] a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7[.]” Pennsylvania Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990). Given the wide array of divergent “purposes” embodied in the Code, we hew to the statute‘s language and structure, neither of which prohibits estimated term provisions.
* * *
Because Congress did not prohibit Debtors from proposing an estimated duration in their Chapter 13 plans, we reverse.11
IV.
We now address the BAP‘s ruling that the Debtors proposed their initial plans in bad faith. The Code compels a bankruptcy court to confirm a debtor‘s plan if it “has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law[.]”
The good faith inquiry is not a vehicle to promulgate bankruptcy requirements not already in the Code. Courts “cannot add to what Congress has enacted under the guise of interpreting good faith.” In re Welsh, 711 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) (simplified). We decline to create additional mandatory provisions under the good faith inquiry because “Congress could enact, ‘if it chooses, further conditions for the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans.‘” Id. (quoting Goeb, 675 F.2d at 1389). It should also go without saying that “[d]ebtors are not [acting] in bad faith merely for doing what the Code permits them to do.” Id. at 1132. Instead, the good faith analysis should be a fact-intensive examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” Welsh, 711 F.3d at 1129. Where courts fail to factually support their good faith determinations, this Court has remanded for further findings. In re Tucker, 989 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1993).
Here, the courts below relied on their erroneous interpretation of the Code to determine that the Debtors lacked good faith. The bankruptcy court‘s good faith analysis was sparse: “the court finds the additional provisions to the plans are not proposed in good faith, as required by
None of these reasons justify the lack of good faith finding. Prior to 2016, Debtors’ estimated duration provision would have mirrored the provisions in the San Jose Division‘s model Chapter 13 plan. We find it hard to believe that debtors who dutifully followed the Division‘s previous model plan were—despite all appearances—“unfairly manipulat[ing]” the Code all along. Id. at 225. Furthermore, as we
We vacate this finding. See Tucker, 989 F.2d at 330.
V.
Debtors finally argue that the bankruptcy court failed to hold a confirmation hearing within the timeframe prescribed by the Code and imposed an unwritten “de facto local rule” which burdened their procedural rights. We disagree.
First, the Code states that “the court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the plan” “not earlier than 20 days and not later than 45 days after the date of the meeting of creditors.”
In contrast, under Chapter 12‘s confirmation provision, courts must “conclude[]” the confirmation process “not later than 45 days after” the plan is filed.
Moreover, even when no party objects, courts have an independent duty to determine whether a debtor‘s plan complies with the Code. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 277 (2010). The Code “makes plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority—indeed, the obligation—to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the requirements [of Chapter 13].” Id. In fulfilling this duty, the bankruptcy court has discretion to manage its docket and to call for additional hearings to aid its inquiry. See
Accordingly, we affirm the BAP‘s holding regarding the bankruptcy court‘s confirmation procedures.12
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate the BAP‘s decision except as to part V.B, and remand for further consideration in light of this opinion.
REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED.