In re N.P.
John S. Salem, Denman & Lerner Co., L.P.A., 8039 Broadmoor Road, Suite 22, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Appellant Veronica Pease).
Darya Jeffreys Klammer, The Klammer Law Office, Ltd., 7482 Center Street, Unit 6, Mentor, OH 44060 (Guardian ad litem).
OPINION
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
{¶1} On August 2, 2018, the Juvenile Division of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas denied a
{¶2} Appellant‘s parental rights regarding N.P. were terminated on April 17, 2015. The parental rights of N.P.‘s father were also terminated, and Lake County JFS was awarded permanent custody of N.P., who was eight years old at the time. N.P. was initially placed in a certified foster home. In July 2016, she was moved to a placement with her paternal grandmother and step-grandfather in the state of Georgia, with the intention of adoption. In July 2017, the placement with her paternal grandparents disrupted, and N.P. was returned to her former foster home in Ohio.
{¶3} Appellant became aware of the disruption in N.P.‘s placement, and on May 15, 2018, she filed a “motion to vacate” the judgment that granted permanent custody of N.P. to Lake County JFS, pursuant to
{¶4} On August 2, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Testimony was presented by appellant and a representative of Lake County JFS. N.P.‘s guardian ad litem presented her recommendation to the court. Also present were appellant‘s counsel and the assistant prosecutor. The trial court entered judgment that day, summarily denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment.
{¶5} Appellant noticed an appeal but has not provided this court with a transcript of the hearing. She presents one assignment of error for our review:
{¶6} “It was error for the Trial Court to deny Mother‘s Motion to Vacate Judgment.”
{¶7} To prevail on a
{¶8} “A motion for relief from judgment under
{¶9} Appellant sought relief under the grounds stated in
{¶10} Appellant asserts she is entitled to relief under (B)(4) because the permanent custody order was based, at least in part, on N.P.‘s placement with her grandparents with the intention of adoption soon thereafter. She contends that because the placement was disrupted, and adoption by the grandparents appears to no longer be an option, the purpose of the permanent custody order can no longer be effectuated; therefore, it is no longer equitable for the order to have prospective application. Under (B)(5), appellant asserts she is entitled to relief because she has successfully turned around her life, has custody of two of N.P.‘s younger siblings, and is now capable of raising N.P.
{¶12} We conclude the record before us does not demonstrate that appellant set forth sufficient operative facts demonstrating she has grounds for relief from the permanent custody order under either
{¶13} We find further support for our conclusion in an opinion from the Ninth Appellate District, which addressed similar arguments raised in a
Mother has not demonstrated that such extraordinary or unusual facts exist in this case. Although the circumstances of the parties have changed in a way that may not have been expected at the time of judgment, those changes have no bearing on the legal soundness of the trial court‘s original decision made under the facts at that time. Facts and circumstances of the children and the parents will often change in ways that are not specifically anticipated at the time of permanent custody decision. The purpose of
Civ.R. 60(B) is to limit the trial court‘s authority to vacate judgments, not to open all judgments to collateral attack based on changed circumstances of the parties.
In re J.W., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26874, 2013-Ohio-4368, ¶31.
{¶15} While the discussion is intellectually compelling, it is not legally persuasive. Ohio does not currently have a “reinstatement statute.” Under Ohio‘s statutory scheme, a parent who has lost permanent custody of a child “may have an opportunity to obtain custody in the future,” but not upon their own initiative. In re McBride, 110 Ohio St.3d 19, 2006-Ohio-3454, ¶14, citing former
{¶16} For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.