In re McBride
{¶ 2} In the summer of 1996, appellant, Hamilton County Department of Human Services, now known as Hamilton County Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”), filed a complaint alleging that Selina McBride, who was born on February 8, 1990, and her brother were neglected, dependent, and abused. When the amended complaint was filed, Peggy Fugate, Selina’s natural mother, was incarcerated, and the children, then ages six and 12, were found living alone. The parties stipulated to the factual allegations of the complaint, and Selina was placed in the temporary custody of HCJFS. In April 1997, HCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of Selina. A hearing was held, and the juvenile court approved the magistrate’s award of permanent custody to HCJFS. Fugate did not file any objections to the magistrate’s decision. Adoption was the new case-plan goal for Selina. Yet despite many placement attempts, Selina was not adopted and has been in a variety of foster homes and institutions.
{¶ 3} On May 15, 2003, after learning that Selina had not been adopted, Fugate filed a petition as a nonparent for custody of Selina. HCJFS filed a motion to dismiss the petition arguing that Fugate lacked standing to assert a claim for custody, that her petition is barred by res judicata, and that she had filed a facially deficient petition. The magistrate issued a decision granting the motion to dismiss, and Fugate objected. The juvenile court set aside the magistrate’s decision, allowed Fugate to present her petition as a nonparent, and certified the matter to the First District Court of Appeals for a ruling on the interlocutory order.
{¶ 4} The First District affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court, concluding that there was no legal bar to Fugate’s pursuit of custody of Selina, because
{¶ 5} We accepted HCJFS’s discretionary appeal on its sole proposition of law, which states, “Pursuant to
Permanent Custody Statutes —
{¶ 6} HCJFS and the guardian ad litem argue that the First District was incorrect when it stated that there was no statute that addressed Fugate’s standing to file a petition for custody.
{¶ 7} In 1997 HCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody pursuant to
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} Fugate’s petition for custody was filed with the same case number used in the amended complaint of abuse, neglect, and dependency that resulted in Fugate’s parental rights being terminated. On its face,
{¶ 10} In addition to
{¶ 11} Although Fugate’s petition does not state specifically that she seeks to modify or terminate the August 1997 dispositional order terminating her parental rights, that, in essence, is what she requests. In her petition, Fugate alleges that Selina’s best interest would be served by awarding her custody because she is the natural mother and “the problems that required Selina to be placed in foster care, have been totally cleared up for over 5 consecutive years, and [Fugate has] been a model citizen during this time.” Fugate, however, does not fall within one of the four categories of persons or entities with standing to seek modification or termination of a dispositional order. Not only does
{¶ 12} The First Appellate District did not discuss either of the foregoing statutes, but determined that Fugate had standing to file a petition for custody because
{¶ 13} The authority to promulgate rules for the courts of Ohio stems from Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which provides: “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” In Krause v. State (1972),
{¶ 14} We find unpersuasive the arguments that Fugate should not be placed in a worse position than a legal stranger and that in denying her standing we create a separate class of those who cannot file for custody. Fugate is already in a limited class of two as one of Selina’s biological parents whose own actions caused her parental rights to be terminated. Nevertheless, she still may have an opportunity to obtain custody in the future, but only upon the initiative of Hamilton County Job and Family Services, which has authority under
Conclusion
{¶ 15} We hold that a parent who has lost permanent custody of a child does not have standing as a nonparent to file a petition for custody of that child. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. HCJFS raised
. This is a step beyond the issues of “legal custody” and “parental unsuitability” that we recently discussed in In re C.R.,
.